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Abstract	
In	 319	 B.C,	 the	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 and	 guardian	 of	 the	 kings,	 Antipater,	 died.	Prior	 to	 his	 death,	 the	 experienced	 politician	 and	 general	 appointed	 one	Polyperchon,	the	son	of	Simmias	as	his	successor,	with	his	own	son	Cassander	as	Polyperchon’s	 subordinate.	 	 Cassander	did	not	 accept	his	 father’s	 decision	 and	the	ensuing	conflict	between	him	and	Polyperchon	would	rage	across	Greece	and	the	Macedonian	homeland	 for	over	a	decade	resulting	 in	 the	destruction	of	 the	royal	 Argead	 family	 as	 well	 as	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 the	 installation	 of	 the	Antipatrid	 Dynasty.	 While	 previous	 investigations	 have	 been	 devoted	 to	 the	conflict,	primarily	focussing	on	Cassander	(Fortina,	1965;	Adams,	1975;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003),	or	to	a	lesser	extent	Polyperchon	(Carney,	2014),	there	has	not	previously	been	a	substantial	study	devoted	to	the	warring	pair	in	apposition	to	each	other.	Because	of	the	disproportionate	amount	of	academic	study	based	on	Cassander,	a	distorted	view	of	both	Polyperchon	and	Cassander	has	emerged	in	perception	 of	 both	 men.	 In	 response	 to	 this,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 a	 re-evaluation	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 career	 and	 standing	 within	 the	 fragmenting	Macedonian	 Empire.	 	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 greater	 understanding	 of	 events,	 this	study	investigates	the	way	in	which	each	man	approached	the	conflict	in	Greece	and	Macedon,	how	they	engaged	with	both	the	royal	family	and	the	Greek	cities	and	 how	 the	 conflict	 between	 them	 impacted	 on	 the	 political	 and	 military	turmoil	present	in	the	fragmenting	Macedonian	Empire	during	the	emergence	of	the	Early	Hellenistic	World.	
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Formal	Aspects	on	the	Presentation	of	this	Thesis	
Editions	of	ancient	material	used	
All	 references	 to	 primary	 sources	 are,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 taken	 from	 the	 Loeb	Classical	Library	with	further	reference	to	the	Teubner	and	Oxford	Classical	texts	for	textual	matters.	Where	a	different	translation	or	interpretation	of	a	particular	reading	has	been	deemed	appropriate,	it	has	been	discussed.	If	an	alternate	text	or	manuscript	divergence	has	been	used,	it	has	been	noted	in	the	corresponding	citation.	
A	note	of	orthography	and	nomenclature	
Research	based	on	both	Greek	and	Latin	sources	can	lead	to	problems	regarding	the	 orthography.	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 commonly	 used	 English	 spelling	 of	names	has	been	used,	being	based	on	the	Latinised	form	of	the	name.	However,	due	 to	 the	 existence	 of	multiple	men	with	 the	 same	 name,	who	 are	 operating	within	 the	 same	 geographical	 area,	 the	 names	 are	 delineated	 into	 both	 the	Latinised	form	as	well	as	the	Greek	transliteration,	with	each	being	assigned	to	separate	individuals	version	for	purpose	of	clarity.	
The	role	of	the	appendix	
The	 appendix	 of	 this	 thesis	 contained	 and	 reproduction	 and	 accompanying	translation	to	Antigonus’	Letter	to	Scepsis,	written	after	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	in	311/310	and	first	published	by	Munro	in	the	 late	nineteenth	century.1	Other	reproductions	of	 this	 text,	 accompanied	by	 translations,	have	become	available	following	 Munro’s	 initial	 discovery.2	The	 appendix	 presents	 my	 own	 choice	among	 these	 possible	 readings.	 As	 these	 differences	 are	 significant	 to	 my	argument,	it	is	necessary	to	present	my	version	of	the	text	in	this	thesis.	
1	Munro,	JRS.	19.	(1899).	pp.	330–340.	2	See	Appendix	1.	pp.	297-300.	
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Abbreviations	
Journal	 titles	 are	 abbreviated	 as	 in	 L’Année	 philologique	 and	 references	 to	ancient	source	evidence	follow	standard	academic	conventions	as	set	out	by	LSJ	and	the	OLD.	
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Chapter	1:		Introduction.	
In	 the	 late	 summer	 or	 early	 autumn	 of	 3193	and	 after	 a	 period	 of	 illness,	 the	regent	 of	 Macedon	 and	 guardian	 of	 the	 kings,	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	Alexander	 IV,	 Antipater,	 the	 son	 of	 Iolaus,	 died.	 Before	 he	 died,	 Antipater	appointed	one	Polyperchon,	the	son	of	Simmias,	as	the	successor	to	the	regency,	along	with	his	own	son	Cassander,	as	Polyperchon’s	second	in	command.	While	there	 was	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 time	 where	 the	 transition	 appeared	 peaceful,	hostilities	broke	out	between	the	regent	and	his	second	in	command	that	would	rage	across	Macedon	and	Greece	for	over	a	decade,	eventuating	in	the	death	of	the	majority	of	the	royal	Argead	family,	and	paving	the	way	for	the	installation	of	the	Antipatrid	Dynasty	in	the	European	Sphere	of	the	fragmenting	Macedonian	Empire.	
In	 recent	 decades,	 the	 emerging	 Hellenistic	 World,	 and	 the	 multiple	 power	factions	that	resulted	in	the	creation	of	the	Hellenistic	Kingdoms,	have	received	an	increased	amount	of	academic	attention.	This	was	a	period	of	great	political	and	 military	 upheaval	 as	 powerful	 members	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	 court	jostled	for	position	and	influence	in	the	fragmenting	Macedonian	Empire.		One	of	the	 points	 of	 contention	 during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 post-323	Macedonian	 Empire	was	the	position	of	regent,4	which	was	hotly	contested	among	the	Successors,	or	Diadochoi,	of	Alexander	the	Great.	Not	only	did	the	position	mean	control	over	the	traditional	boundaries	of	the	Empire,	but	it	also	allowed	close	access	to,	and	control	 over,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Argead	 House.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 bitterly	contested	and	 longest	 running	 struggles	 for	 the	Regency	 took	place	 in	 the	 last	
3	All	 dates	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 “B.C”	 unless	 otherwise	 stated.	 For	 the	complete	chronology	used	by	this	study,	see:	Ch.	2.2.	pp.	38-46.	4	For	 the	purposes	of	 this	 investigation,	 the	 term	“regent”	usually	 refers	 to	 the	position	 of	 strategos.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 amorphous	 nature	 of	 Macedonian	official	 appointments	 as	 well	 as	 the	 pragmatic	 and	 autocratic	 nature	 of	 the	Macedonian	political	 structure,	 the	use	of	 the	 term	regent	or	 regency	 can	also	refer	 to	 different	 aspects	 of	 control	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Homeland	 over	 the	course	 of	 the	 investigation.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 practicality,	 the	 term	 regent	should	be	understood	as	referring	to	the	man	who	was	either	supported	by	the	royal	household,	or	who	had	direct	practical	control	of	Macedon	itself.	
2	
decades	of	the	fourth	century	B.C.	between	Cassander,	the	son	of	Antipater	and	Polyperchon,	the	son	of	Simmias.	
The	 death	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 in	 June	 323,5	seemingly	 at	 the	 height	 of	 his	power	 and	 in	 his	 relative	 youth,6	at	 Babylon,	 left	 a	 massive	 power	 vacuum	within	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 With	 the	 absence	 of	 either	 an	 obvious	 or	completely	 satisfactory	 heir	 from	 the	 royal	 Argead	 House,	 the	 running	 of	 the	Empire	was	 left	 to	 the	 generals	 of	Alexander’s	 armies	 and	other	 eminent	men	acting	on	behalf	of	the	royal	Argead	family	of	Macedon.7		
Since	the	outset	of	Alexander’s	great	expansion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire	into	the	 east	 in	 334,	 the	 monarch	 had	 left	 his	 trusted	 and	 long	 time	 supporter	Antipater,	the	son	of	Iolaus,	as	the	governor	of	Macedon.8		Antipater	was	charged	with	managing	the	Macedonian	homeland	on	the	king’s	behalf,	supplying	 fresh	military	resources	and	levies	for	the	king’s	army	as	the	campaign	continued,	as	well	 as	maintaining	 the	uneasy	peace	among	 the	 recently	 subdued	Greek	 city-states.	 Despite	 tensions	 rising	 between	 the	 king	 and	 his	 regent	 during	 the	campaign,	 Antipater	 remained	 in	 his	 office	 as	 the	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 until	Alexander’s	 death,	 and	 would	 continue	 his	 tenure	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 king’s	death,	when	he	was	appointed	regent	in	conjunction	with	his	partner	Craterus,	until	 the	 Macedonian	 Assembly	 at	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Triparadisus	 officially	elected	him	the	regent	of	Macedon	in	321	at	the	conclusion	of	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi.9	Antipater’s	reign	as	regent	however	was	to	be	short	lived.	After	a	period	of	ill	health,	Antipater	died	in	the	late	summer	or	early	autumn	of	319.10	Shortly	before	his	death,	Antipater	left	one	of	Alexander’s	generals,	Polyperchon	“as	 guardian	 of	 the	 kings	 and	 supreme	 commander.”11	Along	with	 Polyperchon,	
5	Arr.	 7.26.3;	 Curt.	 10.5.6;	 Just.	 13.1.1;	Heidl.	 Epit.	FGrH.	 155.	 F.	 1.1;	 Plut.	Alex.	76.4;	Plut.	Eum.	3.1.	6	Just.	13.1.1.	7	Diod.	18.1.2;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	174;	Billows,	1990.	p.	52;	cf.	Ch.	3.	p.	58.	8	Arr.	1.11.3.	9	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.3;	Diod.	18.39.3;	Just.	13.4.5.		10	Diod.	18.48.4.	11	Diod.	18.48.4.	“ἐπιμελητὴν	τῶν	βασιλέων...καὶ	στρατηγὸν	αὐτοκράτορα”	trans,	Geer,	1947.	
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Antipater	appointed	his	own	son,	Cassander,	as	the	regent’s	second	in	command	as	chiliarch.12	
	This	decision	by	Antipater	was	not	without	 controversy.	During	his	 time	of	 ill	health,	Antipater	left	the	affairs	of	his	office	for	Cassander	to	oversee.13	Despite	this	apparent	evidence	of	confidence	in	Cassander’s	abilities,	 instead	of	 leaving	his	office	to	his	son,	Antipater	made	a	conscious	decision	to	bypass	him,	and	to	appoint	Polyperchon,	one	of	oldest	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	as	his	successor.	Like	 Cassander,	 Polyperchon	 also	 had	 experience	 of	 managing	 Macedon	 on	behalf	of	Antipater.	This	had	taken	place	during	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi	in	321,	when	Antipater,	and	his	co-regent	Craterus,	had	led	their	combined	forces	against	 the	Perdiccan	 factions	 in	Asia	Minor.14	Because	of	Antipater’s	decision,	conflict	 and	 rivalry	was	 ignited	 between	 Cassander	 and	 the	 recently	 inducted	Polyperchon.	This	struggle	 led	to	a	civil	war	that	 lasted	for	over	a	decade,	 that	raged	over	the	European	sections	of	the	Macedonian	Empire	and	even	extended	into	Asia	Minor.			It	is	the	purpose	of	this	study	to	examine	and	understand	the	war	which	resulted	from	 Antipater’s	 decision	 in	 319	 and	 Polypechon’s	 appointment	 as	 the	succeeding	regent	of	Macedon.	The	rivalry	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	raged	 across	 the	European	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 for	 a	 decade,	 beginning	soon	 after	 Antipater’s	 demise	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 319	 until	 the	 death	 of	Herakles,	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	 illegitimate	 son	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 Polyperchon	during	his	ill-fated	effort	to	remove	Cassander	from	the	Macedonian	Homeland	in	309/8.	While	the	conflict	itself	was,	for	the	most	part,	geographically	confined	to	 the	 vicinity	 of	 Greece	 and	 Macedon,	 its	 influence	 and	 effects	 permeated	throughout	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 and	directly	 engaged	with	 the	majority	 of	Alexander’s	Diadochoi.		
																																																								12	Diod.	 18.48.4;	 For	 more	 discussion	 on	 the	 office	 of	 chiliarch,	 see:	 Collins,	
Phoenix.	55.	(2001).	pp.	259-283,	especially	pp.	274-279.	13	Diod.	18.49.1;	Errington,	2008.	p.	22;	See	also:	Ch.	5.1.		14	Just.	13.6.9.	
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There	 were	 also	 a	 number	 of	 other	 groups	 that	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	conflict,	 including	 the	 Greek	 cities,	 whose	 favour	 both	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 vied	 for	 throughout	 the	 conflict.	 	 Additionally,	 external	 political	groups	outside	of	direct	Macedonian	control,	such	as	royal	Epirote	 family	 ,	 too	would	 play	 important	 political	 and	 military	 roles	 during	 the	 early	 stages	 of	Polyperchon’s	effort	against	the	son	of	Antipater.		While	the	members	of	 the	Diadochoi	and	the	Greek	cities	had	profound	effects	on	both	Cassander	and	Polyperchon’s	war,	 the	 role	of	 the	 royal	Argead	house,	and	the	way	that	both	Cassander	and	Polyperchoned	engaged	with	them	as	time	progressed,	was	 a	 hallmark	 to	 their	 conflict.	 Polyperchon	would	 actively	 seek	and	 employ	 Argead	 support	 to	 legitimise	 his	 position	 as	 regent	 and	 his	 cause	throughout	 the	war	against	Cassander.	His	opponent	however,	would	not	 take	such	a	unilateral	approach	to	the	royal	family.	Cassander’s	interactions	with	the	Argeads	 vacillated	 wildly	 throughout	 the	 conflict,	 from	 complete	 aversion,	 to	explicit	integration	as	the	conflict	progressed.		This	 study	 examines	 and	 evaluates	 each	 of	 these	 issues	 in	 regards	 to	 their	impact	on	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	in	their	struggle	for	control	 of	 Macedon.	 At	 the	 centre	 of	 this	 study	 is	 the	 conflict	 itself	 and	 both	Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 in	 combination	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	approached	the	war	rather	than	as	explicitly	separate	individuals.		Little	 is	 known	 about	 Cassander’s	 early	 life	 prior	 to	 his	 journey	 to	Babylon	 in	324	on	behalf	of	his	 father.15	With	no	extant	biography	devoted	 to	him	among	the	ancient	sources,	it	must	be	left	to	modern	scholars	to	draw	upon	the	various	literary	sources	and	to	speculate	on	the	many	unknowns	surrounding	him	so	as	to	construct	an	understanding	of	his	early	years	and	upbringing.	The	exact	year	in	 which	 Cassander	 was	 born	 is	 not	 known;	 this	 has	 led	 to	 speculation	 and	debate	among	modern	scholars.16	While	it	 is	 impossible	to	know	his	exact	year																																																									15	Plut.	Alex.	74.2.	16	Heckel	(2006.	p.	79)	asserts	that	his	birth	should	be	placed	no	later	than	354.	Adams	(1975.	p.	42)	suggests	that,	while	it	is	impossible	to	be	certain	of	an	exact	
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of	 birth,	 it	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 believe	 that	 he	was	born	no	 later	 than	354.	 If	Cassander	were	 born	 roughly	 around	 this	 time,	 it	would	make	 him	 about	 the	same	 age	 as	 Alexander	 the	 Great.17	Because	 of	 Antipater’s	 position	within	 the	Macedonian	Royal	Court,	it	is	likely	that	Cassander	would	have	had	at	least	some	interaction	with	the	young	Macedonian	prince	during	their	youth	and	that	they	would	have	known	each	other.18	
	Cassander’s	 early	 military	 experience	 presents	 another	 difficult	 challenge	 for	modern	scholars.	The	only	mention	of	a	Cassander	conducting	a	military	action	is	 found	 in	Diodorus,	who	 speaks	 of,	 “...nine-hundred	Thracian	Paeonian	scouts	
with	Cassander	in	command…”19	However,	Heckel	has	argued	that	this	account	of	Diodorus	 is	 corrupt	 and	 should	 not	 read	 “Cassander”	 but,	 in	 fact,	 should	 read	“Asander.”20	While	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 argue	 with	 any	 certainty	 due	 to	 lack	 of	evidence,	it	is	likely	that	Cassander	did	not	have	a	strong	or	illustrious	military	career	 prior	 to	 319.	 Given	 the	 centrality	 of	 military	 experience	 to	 claims	 of	leadership	 among	 the	 diadochoi,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 there	would	 have	 been	 some	evidence	of	this	in	the	ancient	sources.																																																																																																																																																																date,	 Berve’s	 (Vol.	 II.	 1926.	 p.	 202)	 proposal	 that	 Cassander’s	 birth	 should	 be	placed	just	prior	to	355	is	best.	The	basis	for	the	estimation	of	Cassander’s	birth	to	the	mid-350s,	presumably,	is	based	upon	his	later	interactions	with	Alexander	the	Great,	which	suggest	the	two	were	roughly	the	same	age.	For	the	purposes	of	this	 thesis,	 and	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 clarity,	 Heckel’s	 proposed	 terminus	 ante	
quem	for	Cassander’s	date	of	birth	is	used.	17	Who	was	born	in	356	(Heckel,	2006.	p.	10).	18	Adams	suggests	that,	because	of	Antipater’s	strong	position,	Cassander	would	have	 served	 as	 one	 of	 the	 royal	 pages	 (the	 basilikoi	 paides)	 during	 his	 youth	(Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 43.)	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 tradition	 for	 Macedonian	 Elite	Families	 to	 cement	 their	 bond	 with	 the	 monarchy	 in	 this	 way	 (Berve,	 Vol.	 I.	1926.	 pp.	 37–39;	 Carney,	 in	 Howe	 &	 Reames,	 2008.	 pp.	 147-148.).	While	 this	does	 seem	 a	 very	 real	 possibility,	 it	 is	 unfortunately	 impossible	 to	 state	unequivocally	 that	 Cassander	 was	 indeed	 part	 of	 this	 group.	 For	 recent	discussion	on	the	royal	pages,	and	their	role	within	the	Macedonian	Court,	see:	Carney,	in	Howe	&	Reames,	2008.	pp.	145-164.	19	Diod.	 17.17.4.	 “…Θρᾷκες	 δὲ	 πρόδρομοι	 καὶ	 Παίονες	 ἐννακόσιοι,	 Κάσανδρον	
ἔχοντες.”	(trans.	Geer,	1947.).	20	Heckel,	2006.	p.	79:	Where	Heckel	suggests	that	the	Asander	in	question	might	refer	 to	either	Asander,	son	of	Philotas,	or	Asander	of	Agathon.	For	arguments	supporting	 the	 reading	 of	 Cassander,	 see:	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 44;	 Adams,	 Anc.	
World.	2.	(1979).	pp.	111-115.	
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It	seems	clear	however	that	there	was	a	tense	relationship	between	Cassander	and	Alexander	the	Great,	with	mutual	dislike	and	suspicion.21	This	is	typified	by	Plutarch’s	account	of	the	hostile	encounter	that	occurred	between	the	pair	after	Cassander	 was	 said	 to	 have	 mocked	 the	 practice	 of	 proskynesis	 after	 its	introduction	into	the	royal	court	by	Alexander.22	This	animosity	was	so	extreme	that,	 as	 Plutarch	 states,	 Cassander	was	 subject	 to	 fits	 of	 trembling	 and	 illness	whenever	he	saw	an	image	of	Alexander.23	While	this	account	seems	unlikely,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	Plutarch	was	operating	on	some	basis	of	historical	events	and	understanding	 to	emphasise	 the	antipathy	between	 the	 two	men.24	Adams	 suggests	 that	 this	 disdain	may	 have	 originated	 from	 an	 event	 in	 their	youth	that	persisted	into	their	adulthood.25	This	tension	between	the	two	would	greatly	 affect	 Cassander’s	 future	 strategy	 as	 he	 set	 about	 building	 his	 support	base	 after	 Antipater’s	 death.	 Consequently,	 Cassander	 would	 avoid	 linking	himself	 to	Alexander	 the	Great	 and	make	pains	 to	bypass	him	 in	 favour	of	his	father,	Philip	II.	
	Just	 as	 with	 Cassander,	 there	 is	 no	 extant	 biographical	 work	 devoted	 to	Polyperchon,	either	from	ancient	scholarship,	or	from	modern	academia.	He	was	one	of	the	oldest	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	being	born	sometime	between	390	and	380.26		As	 is	often	the	case	when	studying	 figures	during	the	period	of	 the	Diadochoi,	next	to	nothing	is	known	about	Polyperchon	for	at	least	the	first	forty	years	of	his	life.	What	can	be	deduced	though	is	that	he	must	have	accompanied																																																									21	Plut.	Alex.	74.1–4;	Plut.	Mor.	180f.	This	 is	 to	be	 contrasted	and	not	 confused	with	 the	deterioration	of	 the	 familial	 relationship	between	the	Antipatrids	and	the	Argeads.	This	is	dealt	with	in	more	depth	in	Chapter	2.		22	Plut.	Alex.	74.2–3;	Heckel,	AJPh.	99.	(1978).	p.	459;	For	other	recording	of	the	mockery	of	the	practice,	see:	Arr.	4.12.2;	Curt.	8.5.22.	For	more	discussion	of	the	infamous	 proskynesis	 affair	 and	 how	 it	 pertains	 to	 both	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon,	see:	Ch.	4.	pp.	91-97.	23	Plut.	Alex.	74.6.	24	Though,	 as	 Pelling	 highlights,	 Plutarch	 was	 more	 than	 willing	 to	 alter	 his	adapted	source	material	where	and	when	it	was	fitting	to	do	so	(Pelling.	2002.	pp.	91-96.	For	more	discussion	on	Plutarch’s	methodology,	see:	Ch.	2.1.6	pp.	29-31.	25	Adams,	1975.	p.	55.	26	Heckel,	1992.	p.	189.	This	would	make	him	at	 least	 sixty-one	by	 the	 time	of	Antipater’s	death	in	319.	
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Alexander	on	his	campaign	into	the	East	in	334.27	It	was	while	on	campaign	that	Polyperchon	 entered	 into	 the	 upper	 levels	 of	 the	Macedonian	military,28	when	Alexander	 gave	 him	 command	 (taxiarchy)	 over	 a	 battalion	 whose	 leader,	Ptolemaeus,	the	son	of	Seleucus,	had	recently	been	killed	in	battle,	presumably	during	 the	 fighting	 at	 Issus.29	Polyperchon	 would	 continue	 in	 this	 capacity	through	the	battle	of	Gaugamela30	and	Alexander’s	campaigns	into	India.31	
	Polyperchon	was	a	trusted	companion	to	Alexander,	as	is	clearly	demonstrated	by	 the	 commands	 that	 the	 king	 allotted	 to	 him	 during	 his	 expansion	 of	 the	Macedonian	 Empire.32	Most	 telling	 of	 the	 faith	which	 Alexander	 had	 placed	 in	Polyperchon	 is	 the	 potentially	 vital	 position	 that	 he	 was	 given,	 namely,	 his	placement	as	second	 in	command	of	 the	returning	veterans	 to	Macedon	under	Craterus	 in	 324. 33 	Polyperchon’s	 placement	 under	 Craterus	 clearly	demonstrates	his	capability	in	the	eyes	of	Alexander.	A	key	purpose	in	sending	Craterus	and	the	thousands34	of	seasoned	veterans	he	led	back	to	Macedon	was	to	replace	Antipater	as	the	regent	of	Macedon.35	Arrian	states	that	Craterus	was																																																									27	Heckel,	1992.	p.	189;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	4.	28	Which	implies	that	he	may	have	served	among	the	military	officer	class	during	the	reign	of	Philip	II.	cf.	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	4.	29	Arr.	2.12.2.	For	the	battle	at	Issus,	see	Arr.	2.11.7–10;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	p.	4.	30	Arr.	3.11.9;	Diod.	17.57.2;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	4.	31	Arr.	4.16.1,	4.23.5,	4.24.6-7,	4.25.6,	4.26.1-27.4,	5.11.3,	6.5.5;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	226-227;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	4.	32	Arr.	2.12.2;	Arr.	7.12.4;	Diod.	17.57.2.	33	Arr.	7.12.4;	 Just.	12.12.9;	Contained	within	 Justin’s	Epitome,	 there	 is	another	account	that	places	Polyperchon	in	command	of	the	Macedonian	Army	for	their	return	 to	 Babylonia	 in	 324	 (Just.	 12.10.1.).	 Justin	 states	 that	 Alexander	 was	unable	to	personally	lead	the	army	due	to	a	leg	injury	he	sustained	which	forced	him	to	make	the	return	 journey	by	boat.	However,	as	Yardley	and	Heckel	have	identified,	 Justin	 has	 mistaken	 Polyperchon’s	 name	 for	 Craterus	 (Yardley	 &	Heckel,	1997.	p.	260.).	This	case	of	mistaken	identity	seems	not	to	have	been	an	isolated	 incident	made	by	 Justin	who	confuses	 them	on	a	number	of	occasions	(Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	276.),	see	Just.	13.8.5-7;	15.1.1.		34	There	exists	a	disparity	in	the	number	of	veterans	who	were	sent	home	at	this	time.	 Arrian	 (Arr.	 7.21.1.)	 and	Diodorus	 (Diod.	 17.109.1;	 18.4.1;	 18.12.1)	 both	suggest	 that	 ten	 thousand	 were	 at	 Craterus’	 command,	 while	 Justin	 (Just.	12.12.7.)	states	it	was	eleven	thousand.	For	a	discussion	of	numbers	within	the	ancient	sources,	see	Rubincam,	CQ.	53.	(2003).	pp.	448–463.	35	Just.	12.12.8–9.	
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an	invalid	and	suffering	ill	health.36	Alexander	could	not	therefore	be	confident	of	Craterus	surviving	the	return	journey	to	Macedon.37	Because	of	this,	the	man	who	 was	 his	 second	 in	 command	 needed	 to	 be	 both	 trusted	 and	 capable	 of	assuming	 Craterus’	 responsibilities,	 such	 as	 leading	 the	 troops	 home	 and	replacing	Antipater	as	commander	 in	Europe.	The	man	Alexander	put	his	trust	in	was	Polyperchon.	The	rule	of	Macedon	could	only	have	been	left	to	someone	in	 whom	 Alexander	 had	 complete	 faith.	 If	 Craterus	 was	 to	 die	 on	 the	 long	journey,	Alexander	had	to,	and	seemingly	did,	trust	the	capability	and	leadership	of	Polyperchon.		Following	 the	death	of	Alexander	 the	Great,	 the	Diadochoi	would	soon	use	 the	remaining	members	of	the	Argead	house	as	political	pawns.	This	is	exemplified	by	 the	case	of	Cassander	and	Polyperchon.	Polyperchon	had	 long-standing	ties	with	the	Royal	house.	His	rise	to	prominence	within	the	Macedonian	Empire	was	through	 appointments	 made	 by	 Alexander.	 He	 was	 Alexander’s	 man	 and	 his	actions	after	Alexander’s	death	are	readily	explicable	in	terms	of	cultivating	and	captialising	 upon	 loyalty	 to	 the	 royal	 family.	 Thus	 Polyperchon	went	 to	 great	efforts	to	win,	maintain	and	employ	their	support	to	further	his	own	cause,	with	members	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 forming	 the	 core	 of	 his	 support	 base	 during	 the	conflict	 against	 Cassander.	 This	 in	 turn	would	 allow	 Polyperchon	 to	 build	 his	standing	 and	 position	 as	 regent,	 while	 simultaneously	 undermining	 the	legitimacy	 of	 Cassander’s	 claim	 and	 support	 for	 his	 position.	 Conversely,	Cassander	and	his	father	had	been	involved	in	an	increasingly	tense	relationship	with	the	Argeads.	Therefore,	during	the	opening	years	of	the	conflict,	Cassander	chose	 not	 to	 centre	 his	 powerbase	 on	 royally	 backed	 legitimisation,	 instead	electing	to	employ	the	political	and	military	connections	his	father	had	forged	in	Greece	as	well	 as	 creating	alliances	with	various	members	of	 the	Diadochoi	 to	form	the	core	of	his	support	base.	These	initial	support	structures	employed	by	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	were	by	no	means	fixed,	and	would	adapt	and	shift	over	 time,	with	examples	of	Cassander	actively	engaging	with	 the	 royal	 family																																																									36	Arr.	7.12.4.	37	For	more	discussion	of	Polyperchon’s	role	under	Craterus,	and	how	this	may	have	 impacted	 on	 Antipater’s	 decision	 to	 appoint	 him	 as	 the	 next	 regent	 of	Macedon,	see:	Ch.	5.2.	pp.	126-128.	
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following	his	return	to	Macedon	in	316,	and	Polyperchon	giving	tacit	support	for	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus	and	Eurydice	in	317.	The	vastly	different	ways	in	 which	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 chose	 to	 approach	 working	 with	 the	Argeads	 in	 their	 rivalry	 brought	 the	 royals,	 willingly	 or	 unwillingly,	 into	 the	forefront	 of	 the	 conflict.	 This	 led,	 almost	 inevitably,	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	royal	family	itself	by	the	time	the	war	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	was	brought	to	an	end	in	308,	with	the	death	of	Herakles,	the	final	Argead	with	any	claim	to	the	throne	of	Macedon.		Cassander	and	Polyperchon	both	played	a	substantial	role	in	the	downfall	of	the	Argeads	and	their	destruction.	Despite	this,	relatively	little	modern	scholarship	has	 been	 devoted	 to	 either	 man.	 While	 there	 is	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 modern	scholarship	surrounding	the	Diadochoi,	including	numerous	journal	articles	and	books,	many	that	deal	with	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	treat	them	as	side-notes	and	largely	disregard	the	role	they	played	in	their	relationships	with	the	Royals	post-323.	This	lack	of	scholarship	is	understandable,	given	the	lack	of	attention	given	to	the	conflict	by	the	ancient	sources,	with	the	account	of	Diodorus	Siculus	often	 serving	 as	 the	 sole	 surviving	 authority	 for	 events	 in	 Europe	 during	 the	closing	 years	 of	 the	 Fourth	 century	 as	 well	 as	 the	 short-lived	 nature	 of	 the	Antipatrid	Dynasty.	One	exception,	with	respect	to	Cassander,	is	the	work	done	by	 Italian	 scholar,	 Franca	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 whose	 publication	 “L’arte	 del	
potere:	Vita	e	opera	di	Cassandro	di	Macedonia,”38	is	possibly	the	most	important	work	 on	 Cassander	 to	 date.	 Another	 scholar,	 whose	 output	 has	 become	invaluable	 to	 modern	 scholarship	 concerning	 Cassander,	 is	 Lindsey	Winthrop	Adams,	 whose	 doctoral	 thesis	 and	 numerous	 journal	 articles	 have	 made	substantial	additions	to	the	field.		In	comparison	to	Cassander,	 there	has	been	 far	 less	scholarly	work	devoted	to	Polyperchon.	There	 is	 a	 ready	answer	available	 for	 this	discrepancy	 in	output,	that	being	the	dearth	of	extant	 information	regarding	Polyperchon	and	his	 life.		In	addition	to	this	difference	in	readily	available	material,	the	general	perception	held	by	many	scholars	who	describe	him	as	an	incompetent	military	leader	and																																																									38	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	
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poor	politician,	who	would	inevitably	fade	into	obscurity,39	a	perception	that	is	not	 without	 ancient	 precedent.	 The	 ancient	 sources	 took	 pains	 to	 emphasise	Polyperchon’s	 shortcomings40	and	 defeats	 throughout	 his	 life	 and	 during	 his	conflict	 with	 Cassander.41	One	 reason	 for	 this	 may	 be	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	ultimately	 unsuccessful	 against	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater,	 in	 a	 civil	 war	 on	 the	peripheries	 of	 an	 increasingly	 fragmented	 empire,	 at	 a	 time	when	 substantial	events	were	occurring	 in	other	regions	of	 the	Empire.	This	situation	can	easily	result	 in	a	gross	simplification	of	events	and	characteristics	within	 the	ancient	sources.	 The	 age	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 is	 one	 where	 a	 plurality	 of	 intertwining	narratives	exist,	each	centring	around	an	eminent	Macedonian,	and	because	of	the	discrepancy	in	the	amount	of	academic	 literature	in	favour	of	Cassander,	 it	has	 led	 to	 an	 unfortunate	 distortion	 in	 the	 career	 of	 Polyperchon	 which	 has	emerged.	 The	 reception	 of	 Polyperchon	 too	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 unnecessary	dismissal	 of	 his	 influence	 on	 the	 political	 environment	 during	 the	 conflict,	especially	during	 the	 final	 stages	of	 the	war	 against	Cassander	 and	during	 the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts.42		Despite	his	defeat,	Polyperchon	was	able	to	maintain	a	strong	opposition	to	Cassander	throughout	the	entirety	of	the	conflict,	a	conflict	that	was	not	ended	on	the	battlefield,	but	via	diplomatic	compromise.	However,	it	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 investigation	 does	 not	 attempt	 to	 defend,	 nor	rehabilitate	Polyperchon	in	the	late	fourth	century.	Instead,	the	complexity	and	ever-evolving	nature	of	 the	war	between	Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 is	 at	 the	heart	 of	 examination.	 This	 thesis	 rejects	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 conflict	 between																																																									39	Heckel,	2006.	p.	229;	Heckel	1992.	p.	197,	p.	204;	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	244;	Pownall,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	50;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25	(2014).	40	Aelian,	VH.	12.43.	 (cf.	 Curt.	 4.13.8-9;	Heckel,	Mnemosyne.	60.	 (2007).	 p.	 125,	who	offers	a	possible	explanation	for	the	hostility	towards	Polyperchon	within	Curtius’	 account	 which	 comes	 via	 his	 source,	 the	 history	 left	 by	 Cleitarchus.);		Athen.	 4.155c;	 Pownall,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 50;	 it	 must	 be	noted	however,	that	Atheneaus,	via	his	authority	Duris	of	Samos	(cf.	FGrH.	76.	F.	12),	does	highlight	Polyperchon’s	military	acumen	in	spite	of	his	liking	for	dance	and	 drink.	 This	 sentiment	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 Pyrrhus	 of	Epirus,	as	recorded	by	Plutarch.	Here,	the	biographer	relays	the	esteem	in	which	the	great	Carthaginian	leader	Hannibal	held	the	Epirote	king’s	military	acumen.	Here,	 Plutarch	 records	 a	 conversation	 during	 a	 dinner	 party	 where	 Pyrrhus	praises	Polyperchon’s	military	ability	(Plut.	Pyrr.	8.3.).	41	Diod.	18.69.3,	18.70.4,	19.36.6.	42	See	Ch.	8.2.	
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Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 was	 a	 one-sided	 affair	 leading	 to	 Cassander’s	unavoidable	 victory.	 By	 engaging	 directly	with	 the	 conflict	 as	 it	 progressed,	 a	deeper	 understanding	 of	 events	 in	 Europe	 during	 the	 closing	 decades	 of	 the	fourth	century	is	available.	
	It	must	be	highlighted,	as	this	examination	does,	that,	despite	Cassander’s	ability	to	subdue	the	threat	of	Polyperchon	that	ultimately	saw	his	rival	submit	to	his	authority,	 this	 does	 not	 equate	 to	 an	 overwhelming	 and	 easy	 Cassandrean	victory.	Despite	 the	hostile	 reception	 from	both	ancient	and	modern	writers,43	the	depiction	of	Polyperchon	as	an	incompetent	leader	appears	overly	harsh	and	simplistic.44	Not	only	was	Polyperchon’s	acumen	trusted	by	Antipater,	who	 left	him	in	charge	of	Macedon	not	once,	but	twice,45	but	also	by	Alexander	the	Great	himself,	 who	 gave	 Polyperchon	 several	 positions	 as	 commander	 of	 military	forces,	 as	 well	 as	 his	 role	 alongside	 the	 returning	 Craterus	 in	 324. 46 	As	previously	stated,	these	appointments	demonstrate	that	he	was	at	least	an	able	military	 leader	 and	 also	 one	 trusted	 with	 political	 positions	 by	 his	contemporaries.	The	distortion	too	undermines	our	understanding	of	Cassander	and	his	own	rise	to	power,	and	overshadows	some	of	the	astute	manoeuvring	he	achieved	in	bringing	the	Macedonian	Homeland	under	his	authority.		This	thesis	tackles	 the	 examination	 of	 this	 period	 using	 a	 chronological	method,	which	 is	done	by	allotting	a	set	period	of	time	to	each	of	the	six	chapters	it	contains.	
	
																																																								43	cf.	Heckel,	AJPh.	99.	(1978).	p.	461;	Particularly	of	note,	Heckel’s	assessment	of	Polyperchon	as	a	man	out	of	his	depth,		“A	Jackel	among	Lions”	(Heckel,	1992.	p.	188),	 Hornblower	 as	 one	 of	 Alexander’s	 “second	 class	 generals,”	 (Hornblower,	1981.	p.	224),	Wheatley’s	description	of	Polyperchon	as	“indecisive,	unlucky,	and	
more	 than	 a	 little	 incompetent,”	 (Wheatley,	 Antichthon.	32.	 (1998).	 p.	 12)	 and	Carney’s	 recent	 and	 welcome	 contribution,	 who,	 while	 recognizing	Polyperchon’s	durability,	describes	him	as	one	who	“lacked	focus	when	political	
situations	 got	 more	 complex	 and,	 as	 with	 military	 matters,	 he	 never	 seemed	 to	
expect	his	opponents’	counter	moves.”	(Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	18.).		44	Indeed,	this	is	a	point	that	Heckel,	via	personal	correspondence	with	Wheatley	directly	warns	against	(Wheatley,	Antichthon	38	(2004).	p.	3.	n.	1).	45	As	 he	 had	 done	 initially	 in	 321,	 with	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 First	 War	 of	 the	Diadochoi,	see	Ch.	5.2.	p.	126.	46	Arr.	2.12.2;	7.12.4;	Just.	12.12.8.		
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The	next	chapter	in	this	study	is	devoted	to	the	methodology	within	which	this	thesis	operates.	Contained	within	this	chapter	is	a	brief	evaluation	of	a	number	of	the	main	ancient	sources	devoted	to	this	period.	While	there	has	already	been	much	 discussion	 and	 scholarship	 concerning	 the	 ancient	 sources, 47 	it	 is	necessary	to	include	a	brief	overview	of	the	sources	used	in	this	study.	The	next	issue	 that	 the	methodological	 chapter	 concerns	 itself	with	 is	 the	matter	of	 the	chronology	followed	by	the	study.	Chronologies	for	the	period	of	the	Diadochoi	are	a	notoriously	divisive	issue	which	scholars	face	when	studying	this	period.48	There	is	still	much	discussion	today	concerning	the	issue.	Three	main	schools	of	thought	 have	 emerged,	 these	 being	 the	 High, 49 	Low 50 	and	 the	 Mixed,	 or	Eclectic,51	chronological	methods.		While	the	chronologies	of	the	Diadochoi	are	a	critical	 issue,	 it	 is	 not	 one	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 this	 investigation	 to	 offer	 any	substantial	 contribution	 on	 the	 matter.	 My	 focus,	 rather,	 is	 on	 the	 rivalry	 of	Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 and	 chronology	 is	 discussed	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 is	relevant	to	this	discussion.		This	 thesis	 subscribes	 predominantly	 to	 High	 chronology	 as	 suggested	 by	Bosworth	and	Wheatley.52	There	is	however,	one	insertion	into	this	method,	that	being	 the	 movements	 of	 Polyperchon	 between	 318–317	 as	 suggested	 by	Paschidis.53	While	Paschidis	 is	a	proponent	of	a	mixed	chronological	method,54	he	does	assert	that	the	High	Chronology	is	the	most	likely	reconstruction	of	the	years	 of	 319–317. 55 	Therefore,	 Paschidis’	 proposal	 can	 be	 inserted	 into	Bosworth’s	chronology	without	complication.	Further	discussion	and	evaluation	of	 the	 respective	 chronological	 schools	 takes	 place	 within	 the	methodological	chapter	of	this	study.	
																																																								47	Hornblower,	 1981;	 Kebric,	 1977;	 Wheatley,	 in	 Heckel,	 Tritle	 &	 Wheatley,	2007.	pp.	179	–	192.	48	Wheatley,	Phoenix	52.	1998.	p.	257.	49	As	 suggested	 by	 Bosworth	 (Chiron.	 22.	 1992)	 and	 Wheatley	 (Phoenix.	 52.	1998).	50	As	suggested	by	Errington	(Hermes.	105.	1977)	and	Hauben	(AJPh.	93.	1973).	51	As	suggested	by	Boiy	(Boiy,	2007).	52	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	1992;	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	1998.		53	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	2008.	54	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	2008.	p.	235.	55	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	2008.	p.	235.	
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As	 previously	 noted,	 there	 exist	 sections	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 both	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 where	 little	 to	 no	 evidence	 is	 available	 upon	 which	 modern	scholars	can	draw.	However,	leaving	these	sections	of	silence	without	comment	is	not	 satisfactory	 and	 they	must	be	 assessed	within	 their	 respective	 contexts.	The	 final	 section	of	 the	methodological	 chapter	outlines	 the	way	 in	which	 this	investigation	 tackles	 the	problematic	historical	 issue	of	 silence	 throughout	 the	scope	of	its	examination.		The	 third	 chapter	 is	 focussed	 on	 the	 events	 prior	 to	 the	 death	 of	 Antipater	 in	319,56	being	devoted	to	the	career	of	Antipater	during	the	reign	of	Philip	II	and	Alexander	 III.	 	 During	 Alexander’s	 life,	 Antipater	 had	 acted	 as	 a	 stalwart	supporter	of	the	king	and	had	held	a	number	of	vital	offices,	the	most	notable	of	which	 was	 Antipater’s	 appointment	 to	 the	 regency	 of	 Macedon	 during	Alexander’s	 embarkation	 east	 during	 the	 great	 expansion	 of	 the	 Macedonian	Empire	 in	 334.	 Of	 central	 concern	 to	 this	 study	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	Alexander	 and	 Antipater	 during	 the	 king’s	 reign.	 As	 Alexander’s	 campaign	continued,	 strains	 emerged	 between	 the	 two	 men,	 which	 ultimately	 saw	Antipater	 replaced	 as	 regent	 by	 another	 of	 Alexander’s	 trusted	 generals,	Craterus	 in	324.	The	 significance	of	 this	portion	of	 investigation	 is	 to	 evaluate	whether	 the	 tensions	 between	 Alexander	 and	 his	 regent	were	 responsible	 for	Cassander’s	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	 securing	Argead	 support	 following	 the	death	 of	his	father	in	319.		Chapter	Four	is	devoted	to	Cassander’s	 journey	to	the	new	Macedonian	capital	of	Babylon	 in	324	 in	place	of	 the	 recently	 replaced	Antipater	 in	order	 to	meet	with	Alexander	III	following	the	conclusion	of	Macedonian	expansionism	in	the	same	 year.	 In	 addition	 to	 discussing	 Antipater’s	 reasoning	 for	 remaining	 in	Macedon	 in	 defiance	 of	 Alexander’s	 orders,	 this	 chapter	 covers	 Cassander’s	relationship	 with	 the	 monarch,	 as	 well	 as	 his	 involvement	 in	 the	 infamous	
proskynesis	affair.	To	conclude	the	fourth	chapter	of	this	investigation,	the	death	of	Alexander	III	in	323,	and	the	confusion	surrounding	the	cause	of	his	death	is	evaluated,	especially	the	supposed	Antipatrid	conspiracy	to	murder	the	king	as																																																									56	Diod.	18.48.4.	
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well	 as	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 news	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 spread	 throughout	 the	Macedonian	Empire.	 Additional	 focus	 too	 is	 given	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	Antipater	and	his	replacement,	Craterus,	the	way	in	which	the	two	would	forge	a	strong	alliance	with	each	other	 in	 the	wake	of	Alexander’s	death,	 the	unrest	 in	Greece	 that	 resulted	 from	Alexander’s	death	and	 their	 actions	during	 the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi	in	321,	as	tensions	erupted	among	the	Successors.	
	Chapter	 Five	 moves	 from	 understanding	 the	 context	 of	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon,	 shifting	 into	 how	 each	 man’s	 career,	 following	 the	 year	 of	 324,	affected	the	dying	regent’s	thought	process.	To	do	so,	this	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections,	with	a	section	each	on	the	movements	of	first	Cassander	and	then	Polyperchon	in	the	intervening	period	between	324	and	Antipater’s	death,	and	the	 final	 section	 devoted	 specifically	 to	 Antipater	 and	 how	 his	 choice	 of	successor	would	impact	on	the	greater	Macedonian	Empire.	
	Chapter	Six	is	devoted	to	the	events	immediately	following	Antipater’s	death	in	319,	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 embarked	 upon	 the	construction	 of	 their	 respective	 bodies	 of	 support.	 Soon	 after	 his	 father	 died,	Cassander	 retired	 from	 the	 court	 at	 Pella,	 ostensibly	 for	 leisure,	 but	 used	 his	departure	to	flee	Macedon	for	Asia	Minor	and	the	court	of	Antigonus.	In	addition	to	 Antigonus,	 Cassander	 would	 develop	 alliances	 with	 other	 members	 of	 the	Diadochoi,	 his	 brothers	 in	 law,	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy.	 To	 complement	 his	bonds	 with	 members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 Cassander	 also	 took	 advantage	 of	Antipater’s	long-standing	connections	to	the	oligarchies	in	southern	Greece	that	he	had	 installed	during	his	 tenure	as	regent	of	Macedon	during	Alexander	 III’s	expansion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.	By	doing	so,	Cassander	was	able	to	build	a	foothold	 in	 southern	Greece	 that	 could	 facilitate	his	 return	 to	 the	 continent	 in	318.	However,	one	group	conspicuously	absent	 from	Cassander’s	 repertoire	of	supporters	was	the	royal	Argead	family.		This	 aversion	 to	 the	 royal	 family	was	 not	 present	 for	 Polyperchon,	Macedon’s	new	 regent.	 In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 his	 new	 rival,	 Polyperchon	 sought	 extensive	support	 from	 both	 the	 royals	 at	 Pella,	 and	 those	 external	 to	 the	 Macedonian	
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Homeland,	 most	 notably	 Olympias,	 the	 grandmother	 of	 Alexander	 IV.	 The	regent’s	concerted	efforts	to	build	on	the	aura	of	the	royal	family	also	extended	to	those	members	of	the	Diadochoi	who	continued	in	their	support	for	the	royal	family,	namely	Eumenes	of	Cardia,	who	maintained	his	strong	ties	to	Olympias	following	the	death	of	Alexander	III	and	was	currently	in	conflict	with	Antigonus	in	Anatolia.		Just	like	Cassander,	Polyperchon	actively	engaged	with	the	Greek	cities,	first	via	political	means,	and	subsequently	via	more	military	means.	From	these	efforts,	Polyperchon	 was	 able	 to	 develop	 a	 base	 of	 support,	 primarily	 in	 the	Peloponnese,	 that	 would	 continue	 to	 serve	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 his	 war	 against	Cassander.	While	the	most	notable	event	during	Polyperchon’s	establishment	of	support	 in	the	south	was	the	failed	siege	of	Megalopolis	 in	the	summer	of	318,	the	action	should	not	be	taken	as	representative	of	the	regent’s	efforts	to	impart	his	 influence	 in	Greece.	Chapter	Five	concludes	with	 the	series	of	naval	battles	that	took	place	near	Byzantium	between	the	fleet	commanded	by	Polyperchon’s	general	Cleitus,	and	the	combined	forces	of	Cassander,	Lysimachus,	Ptolemy	and	Antigonus,	 also	 dated	 to	 the	 summer	 of	 318.	 While	 initially	 successful,	Polyperchon’s	forces	would	be	defeated,	marking	an	early	shift	in	the	balance	of	power	in	Europe	away	from	the	regent	to	Cassander.		The	 seventh	 chapter	 of	 this	 investigation	 covers	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Cassander’s	victory	 over	 Polyperchon’s	 navy	 off	 Byzantium	 until	 solidification	 of	 his	authority	in	the	Macedonian	homeland,	following	the	successful	conquest	of	the	region	in	the	winter	of	317/16.	This	period	of	time	would	see	a	major	shift	in	the	ways	both	Polyperchon	and	Cassander	would	approach	the	conflict	 for	control	of	Europe,	as	 it	 saw	the	deaths	of	 the	most	prominent	members	of	 the	Argead	house	as	well	as	an	upending	 in	 the	alliances	 formed	by	 the	warring	pair	with	external	 forces,	 namely	 the	 decision	 by	 Antigonus	 to	 forsake	 his	 alliance	 to	Cassander,	 instead	opting	 to	 throw	his	support	behind	Polyperchon’s	 forces	 in	southern	Greece.		
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Chapter	 Eight	 engages	 with	 events	 in	 Europe	 following	 the	 creation	 of	 the	Antigonid-Polyperchon	alliance	in	315	until	the	cessation	of	hostilities	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	in	309	with	the	death	of	Alexander	III’s	illegitimate	son,	Herakles.	A	central	focus	of	this	chapter	is	the	evaluation	of	Polyperchon’s	strength	 in	 his	 position	 in	 southern	 Greece	 as	 well	 as	 his	 impact	 on	 greater	Hellenistic	 politics	 after	 his	 expulsion	 from	 the	Macedonian	 homeland	 in	 316.	While	 the	 prevailing	 interpretation	 of	 the	 war	 between	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 following	Polyperchon’s	 flight	 from	Macedon	places	Cassander	as	the	 dominant	 master	 of	 Macedon,	 with	 Polyperchon	 relegated	 to	 a	 minor	toehold	 in	 southern	 Greece,	 a	 re-evaluation	 of	 key	 neglected	 sources	 disrupts	this	 view	 and	 demonstrates	 that	 not	 only	 was	 Cassander	 in	 a	 less	 well	entrenched	 position,	 but	 that	 Polyperchon	was	 still	 a	 powerful	 and	 influential	figure	within	Hellenistic	politics	until	the	end	of	the	war	against	his	adversary.		In	 the	 final	 chapter	 I	 briefly	 revisit	 the	 key	 points	 of	 previous	 chapters.	 	 By	examining	 the	entirety	of	 the	 rivalry	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	and	their	relationships	with	the	Argead	family,	this	study	hopes	to	demonstrate	the	role	they	played	in	the	ultimate	destruction	of	the	royal	family.	Before	assessing	the	events	after	the	death	of	Antipater	in	319,	it	is	necessary	to	engage	with	his	career	and	interaction	with	the	Argeads.	By	doing	this,	the	groundwork	will	be	laid	 in	 order	 to	 more	 fully	 understand	 the	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon,	conflict	which	ultimately	led	to	the	end	of	the	Argead	House.	
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Chapter	2:	Methodology.	
	This	chapter	is	devoted	to	the	methodology	used	in	this	study.	It	is	divided	into	three	sections,	each	tackling	different,	but	no	less	significant,	issues.	The	first	is	a	brief	outline,	evaluation	and	discussion	of	a	number	of	the	major	ancient	sources	that	form	the	basis	of	the	study.	The	second	portion	of	the	chapter	is	devoted	to	the	problematic	issue	of	chronologies	for	the	period	of	the	Diadochoi,	as	well	as	the	chronology	that	this	study	follows.	The	third	and	final	section	of	this	chapter	provides	an	overview	to	the	approach	this	thesis	takes	to	the	gaps	in	surviving	ancient	 literary	 corpus,	 the	 problematic	 issue	 of	 gaining	 understanding	 of	 the	past	and	the	undesirable	necessity	of	arguments	built	upon	silence.		This	 first	section	presents	a	brief	description	of	 the	ancient	sources	concerned	with	this	period.	As	well	as	a	brief	discussion	and	outline	of	each	of	the	sources	and	their	respective	authors,	the	various	problems	inherent	in	each	of	them	are	also	presented.	This	cross-examination	of	the	ancient	sources	 is	vital.	They	are	not	 always	 historically	 reliable	 in	 a	 modern	 context	 and	 must	 therefore	 be	subject	 to	scrutiny.	Because	of	 this,	each	ancient	source	must	be	placed	within	its	historical	and	literary	context	so	they	may	contribute	to	this	analysis	within	an	 appropriate	 understanding.	 There	 has	 already	 been	 considerable	 modern	academic	 scholarship	 devoted	 to	 these	 sources,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 the	 intent	 of	 the	overview	 to	 contribute	 new	 elements	 of	 understanding.	 It	 is	 however,	 still	 a	prudent	 venture	 for	 this	 study	 to	undertake	 an	overview	of	 the	major	 ancient	sources	that	form	the	basis	of	the	argument	presented.	
	The	 second	 portion	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 problematic	 issue	 of	chronologies	for	the	period	of	the	Diadochoi.	One	of	the	most	challenging	issues	facing	modern	scholars	who	study	this	period	is	that	of	establishing	a	consistent,	reliable	 chronology.	 This	 endeavour	 is	 made	 no	 easier	 by	 the	 difficulties	surrounding	the	available	ancient	sources,	which	are	notorious	for	the	periodic	compression,	 simplification	 and	 even	 omission	 of	 events,	 particularly	 those	events	 in	 Europe,	 within	 their	 narratives.	 Over	 a	 period	 of	 many	 decades	modern	 scholars	 have	 constructed	 various	 theories	 and	 timelines.	 These	
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theories	 have	 resulted	 in	 three	 major	 schools	 of	 thought,	 the	 High,	 Low	 and	Mixed	 Chronological	 methods.	 Because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 agreement	 on	 the	 most	suitable	 approach,	 chronologies	 of	 the	Diadochi	 have	become	a	 focal	 point	 for	modern	scholarship	on	this	period.		Contained	within	this	section	is	a	brief	overview	of	the	academic	debate	as	well	as	an	evaluation	of	the	various	chronologies.	From	this,	the	chronology	that	this	study	follows	which	is	based	primarily	on	the	High	Chronology,	as	espoused	by	Bosworth	 and	 Wheatley,	 is	 outlined.	 There	 is	 one	 modification	 to	 the	 High	Chronology	that	is	accepted,	that	being	the	addition	proposed	by	Paschidis57	in	2008	regarding	the	movements	of	Polyperchon	and	Cassander	in	318/317.		The	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 engages	 with	 the	 problematic	 issue	 of	 gaps	within	 the	 ancient	 evidence	 from	 the	 surviving	 sources	 regarding	 the	 conflict	between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon.	 These	 gaps	 prove	 a	 particular	 issue	 for	understanding	events	in	Europe	during	the	late	fourth	century	as	the	majority	of	our	 first	 hand	 accounts,	 and	 inherently	 their	 respective	 foci	 are	 primarily	concerned	with	events	 in	Asia	Minor	and	the	east.58	Because	of	 this,	significant	absences	 confront	 attempts	 to	 gain	 insight	 into	 events	 for	 the	period	 that	 this	study	 evaluates.	 This	 final	 section	 details	 the	 way	 in	 which	 these	 gaps	 in	knowledge	are	tackled	by	this	study.	
	
2.1:	Source	Critique.	
	
2.1.1:	Hieronymus	of	Cardia.	
	Possibly	the	most	important	source	for	any	study	of	the	Diadochi	is	that	written	by	Hieronymus	of	Cardia.	Hieronymus	was	born	at	 some	 time	during	 the	mid-350s,59	in	the	Greek	city	of	Cardia	and	died	in	approximately	260.60		As	a	result																																																									57	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	pp.	233-250.	58	See	below.	59	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	6.	For	a	more	 in-depth	studies	of	Hieronymus’	 life	and	work,	 see:	 Brown,	AHR.	 52.	 (1947).	 pp.	 684-696;	Hornblower,	 1981;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	XIII-XVI;	Roisman,	in	Carney	&	Ogden,	2010.	pp.	135-150.	
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he	was	well	 positioned	 to	 record	 the	 events	within	 the	 post-323	Macedonian	Empire.	 Although	 his	 work	 is	 highly	 regarded	 by	 modern	 scholars, 61	Hieronymus’	history	has	been	completely	lost,	save	for	some	nineteen	fragments	compiled	by	Jacoby.62		Adding	 further	 weight	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 Hieronymus’	 work	 is	 that	 the	historian	was	an	active	participant	in	Macedonian	politics,	likely	knowing	many	of	 the	 major	 belligerents	 who	 rose	 to	 prominence	 after	 Alexander’s	 death	 in	323.63	From	 the	 outset	 of	 his	 entrance	 into	 the	 political	 sphere,	 Hieronymus	worked	 closely	 with	 Eumenes,64	whom	 Hornblower	 suggests	 was	 his	 uncle.65	Later,	after	the	execution	of	Eumenes	during	the	winter	of	317/16	at	the	hands	of	 Antigonus,66	Hieronymus	 entered	 into	 the	 service	 of	 the	Antigonid	House.67	From	 this	 point,	 the	 historian	would	 serve	 the	 house	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 his	life.68	These	close,	direct	 relationships	with	members	of	 the	Diadochoi	allowed	Hieronymus	to	use	first	hand	accounts	when	constructing	his	works.	As	a	result	Hieronymus’	 history	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 later	 ancient	 historical	 texts,	 which	relied	 heavily	 on	 his	 accounts. 69 	From	 what	 can	 be	 ascertained	 about	Hieronymus’	 historiographical	 style,	 the	 historian	 appears	 to	 have	 allowed,	 as	Brown	 highlights,	 “the	 “facts”	 [their	 emphasis]	 to	 speak	 for	 themselves,” 70																																																																																																																																																															60	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	5.	61	Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	p.	684;	Bosworth,	in	Stadter,	1992.	p.	57;	Roisman,	in	Carney	&	Ogden,	2010.	p.	135.	62	FGrH.	154;	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	1;	Roisman,	in	Carney	&	Ogden,	2010.	p.	135	63	Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	p.	688;	Roisman,	in	Carney	&	Ogden,	2010.	p.	138.	64	Whose	 employment	 under	 both	 Philip	 II	 and	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 as	 their	scribe	 must	 have	 provided	 invaluable	 insight	 for	 the	 composition	 of	Hieronymus’	magnum	opus.	(Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	p.	684.)	65	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	9.	66	Diod.	19.44.2;	Plut.	Eum.	19.1;	Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	p.	686.	67 	Diod.	 19.44.3;	 Jacoby,	 RE.	 8.	 1540;	 Brown,	 AHR.	 52.	 (1947).	 p.	 684;	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	11;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	XIII.	68	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	15.	69	Jacoby,	RE.	8.	 1540;	 Brown,	AHR.	 52.	 (1947).	 p.	 685,	 687,	 692;	Hornblower,	1981.	p.	17;	Whealtey,	in	Heckel	&	Tritle,	2009.	pp.	129-131;	Roisman,	in	Carney	&	Ogden,	2010.	p.	135,	138;	Wheatley,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	25,	also	29.	n.	25;	Hieronymus’	influence	is	also	felt	in	works	not	typically	associated	with	the	Diadochoi,	including	those	of	Strabo.	For	more	discussion,	see:	Engels,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	pp.	9-12.	70	Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	p.	684.	
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providing	an	accessible	and	likely	reliable	account	of	the	Macedonian	Empire	of	the	late	4th	century.71	Brown’s	assessment	however	should	not	be	mistaken	for	lack	 of	 bias	 within	 the	 Hieronymus’	 narrative.	 As	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Antigonid	court	 during	 the	 composition	 of	 his	 history,	 it	 is	 not	 unreasonble	 to	 suspect	some	measure	of	pro-Antigonid	bias	at	one	or	more	points	in	his	history.72	This	aspect	 is	 vital	 to	 understand	when	 engaging	with	 the	war	 between	Cassander	and	 Polyperchon,	 as	 Hieronymus’	 position	 of	 support	 for	 Antigonus	Monophthalmus,	a	man	who	was	in	conflict	with	both	men	at	some	point	during	the	conflict,	results	in	a	pejorative	representation	filtering	down	to	our	surviving	later	sources.73	
	
2.1.2:	Duris	of	Samos.	
	Another	historian	who	was	living	during	the	years	of	the	Diadochoi	was	Duris	of	Samos.74 	Like	 Hieronymus,	 Duris	 had	 first-hand	 experience	 of	 Macedonian	domination	during	his	time	as	tyrant	on	the	 island	of	his	birth.	Little	 is	known	about	the	facts	and	events	of	Duris’	life.	Though	it	is	clear	that	he	lived	in	the	late	fourth	and	early	third	centuries	BC,	the	exact	dates	of	birth,	death	and	the	years	within	which	he	composed	his	works	remain	a	mystery.75	What	is	known	is	that	Duris	 ruled	 as	 tyrant	 over	 Samos	 for	 a	 period	 of	 his	 life,76	as	well	 as	 possibly	studying	under	the	philosopher	Theophrastus.77	While	the	exact	years	in	which																																																									71	Baynham,	1998.	p.	100.	72	Brown,	AHR.	52.	(1947).	pp.	694-695.	73	Hughes,	2008.	p.	224;	Walsh	highlights	the	effects	of	 the	anti-Antipatrid	bias	within	Hieronymus’	account	(Walsh,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	pp.	154-159).	An	example	of	 this	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	account	of	Diodorus	 (Diod.	18.54.3-4;	 cf.	Ch.	6.1.	p.	153)	during	the	initial	alliance	between	Cassander	and	Antigonus	in	318	as	the	son	of	Antipater	arrived	in	Asia	Minor.	Here,	Antigonus’	alliance	to	Cassander	is	represented	as	disingenuous	and	based	not	of	personal	affection	for	Cassander,	but	 more	 on	 the	 practical	 necessity	 of	 maintaining	 Polyperchon’s	 location	 in	Macedon.		74	For	 a	 thorough	 investigation	 of	Duris	 of	 Samos,	 see	Kebric,	 1977,	 and	more	recently,	Pownall,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	43-56.	75	Kebric,	1977.	p.	2;	Barin,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	61	76	Athen.	337d	=	FGrH.	76.	T.	2;	Barron,	CR.	12.	(1962).	p.	191;	Kebric,	CPh.	69.	(1974).	p.	286;	Kebric,	1977.	p.	1,	8.	77	Athen.	4.128a;	Kebric,	CPh.	69.	 (1974).	p.	286;	Doubt	however	has	been	cast	over	 this	 possibility	 at	 the	 accuracy	 of	 Athenaeus’	 account.	 cf.	 Dalby	 (CQ.	 41.	
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this	 took	 place	 are	 unknown,	 Kebric	 suggests	 that	 his	 rule	 over	 Samos	 ended	prior	to	the	death	of	Lysimachus	in	281.78	
	The	 most	 important	 work	 for	 this	 analysis	 that	 is	 attributed	 to	 Duris	 is	 his	
Macedonian	 History,	 which	 would	 serve	 as	 a	 central	 authority	 to	 many	 later	ancient	 writers.79	Even	 though	 the	 history	 is	 almost	 entirely	 lost,	 there	 are	fragmentary	remains,	some	thirty-five	in	total80	and	quotations,	which	are	found	in	later	sources.81	Despite	being	criticised	for	his	lack	of	reliability	in	these	later	sources,82	Duris	was	a	major	influence	on	subsequent	ancient	writers,	who	used	his	history	as	 the	basis	 for	 their	own	works.83	As	with	Hieronymus’	bias,	Duris	too	may	have	held	close	 ties	with	the	Antigonid	 factions	during	the	 late	 fourth	century.84	What	 can	 be	 deduced	with	more	 certainty,	 as	 Pownall	 has	 recently	and	 convincing	 argued,	 is	 that	 while	 Duris	 may	 have	 held	 links	 to	 the	Macedonians,	he	was	generally	hostile	towards	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi	as	a	whole.85	Of	particular	note	for	this	study	is	the	excerpt	of	Athenaeus’	narrative,	for	 which	 Duris	 was	 the	 authority,	 that	 refers	 to	 Polyperchon. 86 	While	disparaging,	as	Duris	was	of	all	 the	Diadochoi,	he	does	highlight	Polyperchon’s	military	 prowess,	 offering	 a	 brief	 glimpse	 into	 Polyperchon’s	 acumen	 on	 the	battlefield.			
	
																																																																																																																																																															(1991).	pp.	539-540.)	who	warns	against	the	over	utilisation	of	the	excerpt	for	understanding	biographical	aspects	of	Duris’	life.	78	Kebric,	1977.	p.	10.	79	Kebric,	 1977.	 p.	 9;	 Pownall,	 in	 Brill’s	 New	 Jacoby,	 2009.	 76;	 Baynham,	 in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 113;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 in	Naas	&	Simon,	2015.	p.	37;	Baron,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	62.	80	FGrH.	76;	Pownall,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	44.	81	Kebric,	 1977.	 p.	 10;	 Engels,	 in	 Hauben	 &	 Meeus,	 2014.	 p.	 10;	 Baron,	 in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	62.	82	Kebric,	1977.	p.	10;	Dalby,	CQ.	41.	(1991).	p.	539;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	XX-XXI.	83	Kebric,	1977.	p.	10;	Baron,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	pp.	61-62.	84	Kebric,	 CPh.	69.	 (1974).	 p.	 686;	 in	 opposition	 to	 this	 position,	 see:	 Billows,	1990.	pp.	335-356.	85	passim.	Pownall,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	especially	pp.	50-52.		86	Athen.	4.155c	=	FGrH	F.	12;	Pownall,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	50.	
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2.1.3:	Cleitarchus	of	Alexandria.	
	“There	is	an	unwritten	law	that	the	volume	of	scholarship	on	a	subject	is	in	inverse	
proportion	 to	 the	 evidence	 available.	 That	 is	 particularly	 true	 of	 the	 early	
Hellenistic	historian,	Cleitarchus,	son	of	Deinon.”87	This	assessment	by	Bosworth	offers	 a	 fitting	 introduction	 to	 any	 discussion	 of	 Cleitarchus,	 especially	 on	 the	severe	lack	of	surviving	fragments	attributed	to	him.		Like	Hieronymus	and	Duris,	Cleitarchus	was	a	contemporary,	albeit	a	later	one,	of	 the	 Diadochi.88	Little	 to	 nothing	 can	 be	 confidently	 stated	 about	 the	 exact	dates	 of	 Cleitarchus’	 life,	 nor	 for	 the	 composition	 of	 his	 history.	 This	 lack	 of	reliable	 material	 is	 problematic	 for	 modern	 scholars	 in	 general	 and	 for	 this	study	in	particular	because	of	the	later	impact	and	influence	Cleitarchus	had	on	historians,	 most	 notably	 (but	 not	 limited	 to)	 the	 vulgate	 writers,	 Diodorus,	Curtius	and	Justin.89	
	For	over	half	a	century,	various	dates	have	been	suggested	for	Cleitarchus’	years	of	 work	 as	 a	 historian.	While	 not	 the	 first,	 the	 date	 espoused	 by	 Tarn90	for	 a	composition	date	of	no	earlier	 than	280,	has	become	a	 focal	point	of	 scholarly	discussion	since	 the	1950s.	Hamilton	called	 into	question	both	 the	outcome	of	Tarn’s	study	and	the	methodology	used	to	establish	his	post-280	date.91	Though	not	 suggesting	 an	 exact	 timeframe	 within	 which	 Cleitarchus	 wrote,	 Hamilton	argues	 that	 it	most	 likely	occurred	during	 the	 late	Fourth	Century.92	In	 a	 clear	demonstration	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 hard	 evidence	 to	 allow	 secure	 dating	 for																																																									87	Bosworth,	Histos.	1.	(1997).	p.	211.	88	Recent	papyri	evidence	(P.	Oxy.	4808)	however	might	push	Cleitarchus’	dates	further	back	to	around	260.	See:	Baynham,	in	Romm	&	Statler,	2010.	p.	330.	n.	A.15b	for	more	analysis.	89	Tarn,	JHS.	43.	(1923).	p.	95;	Hammond,	CQ.	41.	(1991).	p.	504;	McKechnie,	CQ.	45.	 (1995).	 pp.	 423-424,	 431;	 Bosworth,	 Histos.	 1.	 (1997).	 p.	 211;	 Heckel,	
Mnemosyne,	60.	(2007).	p.	124.	n.	6;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	9;	Walsh,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	155;	Howe,	in	Heckel,	Müller	&	Wrightson,	2015.	pp.	169-171.	90	Tarn,	 Vol	 II.	 1950.	 p.	 19;	 for	 a	 counter	 argument	 to	 Tarn’s	 position,	 see:	Hamilton,	Historia.	10.	(1961).	pp.	448-458.	91	Hamilton.	Historia.	10.	(1961).	p.	449–451.	92	Hamilton.	Historia.	10.	(1961).	p.	453.	
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Cleitarchus,	 Brown	 states	 that	 the	 composition	 of	 his	 history	may	 have	 taken	place	any	time	between	312–260.93	If	it	is	safe	to	say	that	Cleitarchus	dates	from	any	 time	within	 the	 timeframe	 suggested	 by	 Brown,	 then	 the	 historian	 offers	another	vital	primary	historical	account	of	events	in	post-323	Macedon.	This	is	an	 account	 which	 later	 historians,	 central	 to	 this	 study,	 drew	 upon	 while	composing	their	own	works	on	the	period.	
	Save	 for	 the	 thirty-six	 fragments	 complied	 by	 Jacoby,94	Cleitarchus’	 history	 is	lost.	 From	 what	 survives	 of	 the	 narrative,	 some	 broad	 understadings	 can	 be	reached	 regarding	 his	 literary	 style	 and	 composition	 of	what	 appears	 to	 have	been	 his	 sole	 literary	 work. 95 	Given	 the	 dearth	 of	 surviving	 material,	 the	fragmentary	 nature	 of	 Cletiarchus	 results	 in	 a	 severe	 limitation	 on	 the	 extend	that	historical	understanding	can	be	deduced,96	and	attention	must	be	given	to	the	later	sources	that	made	use	of	his	history	for	their	own	work	in	order	to	gain	a	 better	 understanding	 of	 his	 methods.	 An	 understanding	 of	 Cleitarchus	 is	important	 for	 this	study	because,	owing	to	his	popularity	among	 later	sources,	his	style	and	themes	may	have	impacted	on	the	presentation	of	events	that	have	been	used	by	later	extant	sources.		
	From	what	material	 is	available	to	modern	scholars,	Cleitarchus	aimed	to	both	entertain	 and	 inform	 and	 his	 literary	 style	 is	 one	 appropriate	 to	 this	 dual	purpose.97The	 entertainment	 factor	 of	 his	 work	 could	 easily	 explain	 his	 later	popularity	 amongst	 Roman	 readers. 98 	However,	 caution	 is	 required	 when	engaging	with	his	influence,	as	this	apparent	desire	to	entertain	may	also	detract	from	the	historical	accuracy	of	Cleitarchus	as	a	source.	Making	entertainment	a	pivotal	 aspect	 of	 his	 work	 may	 have	 negatively	 affected	 the	 accuracy	 of	 his	
																																																								93	Brown.	AJPh.	71.	(1950).	p.	142;	cf.	Baynham,	in	Romm	&	Statler,	2010.	p.	330.	94	FGrH.	137.	95	Tarn,	Vol.	II.	1950.	p.	43;	Brown,	AJPh.	71.	(1950).	p.	137;	Bosworth.	Histos.	1.	(1997).	p.	211.		96	Brown.	AJPh.	71.	(1950).	p.	141.	97	Brown,	AJPh.	71.	(1950).	p.	151;	Hamilton,	1969.	p.	208;	Bosworth,	ClAnt.	22.	(2003).	p.	176.	98	Bosworth,	FAA,	1988.	p.	7.	
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historical	narrative.99	This	problem	would	be	further	compounded	when	events	were	transmitted	via	the	later	sources,	such	as	Curtius,	Diodorus	and	Justin,	all	of	 whom	may	 have	 altered,	 added	 to	 or	 deviated	 away	 from	 the	 Cleitarchian	text.100 	The	 issue	 is	 central	 to	 the	 present	 study	 as	 historical	 events	 and	characters	 may	 become	 distorted	 within	 the	 extant	 ancient	 sources,	 further	complicating	study	of	 the	period.	Despite	the	many	problems	with	Cleitarchus’	History,	 it	 is	of	great	significance	for	this	study	in	that	it	was	a	major	influence	for	the	later	surviving	ancient	sources	that	form	the	basis	for	this	work.		
	The	opening	section	of	this	source	critique	has	engaged	with	the	few	sources	of	those	 writers	 who	 had	 direct	 contact	 with	 the	 world	 of	 the	 Diadochoi.	 All	following	sources	were	written	after	the	end	of	Macedonian	supremacy,	utilising	the	above	sources	as	the	basis	for	their	respective	works.			
	
2.1.4:	Diodorus	Siculus.	
	The	 historian	 Diodorus	 Siculus	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 next	 major	 source	 of	information	regarding	 the	Diadochoi.	Born	on	Sicily,	Diodorus	 lived	during	 the	twilight	 of	 the	 Roman	 Republic,	 in	 the	 First	 century	 BC.101	His	 history,	 the	
Bibliotheke,	 reflects	 the	 geographical	 and	 temporal	 shift	 that	 had	 taken	 place	since	Hieronymus,	Duris	and	Cleitarchus.	His	account	covers	the	vast	expanse	of	time	 from	 the	Trojan	War	up	until	 the	year	60BC.102	The	expansive	 timeframe	for	The	Bibliotheke	is	divided	into	forty	books.	Of	these	books,	only	Books	1	-	5	and	11	to	20	survive.	Books	18	-	20	of	the	Bibliotheke	are	the	central	focus	of	this	study,	as	the	historian	predominantly	devotes	these	to	Macedonian	affairs	after	the	death	of	Alexander	the	Great	and	are	therefore	critical	for	gaining	a	further	
																																																								99	Hammond,	 AJPh.	110.	 (1989).	 p.	 159;	 Also	 note	Walsh	 (AHB.	26.	 (2012).	 p.	155),	 who	 highlights	 the	 hostility	 Cleitarchus	 may	 have	 held,	 much	 as	Hieronymus	did,	toward	the	Antipatrids	within	his	historical	work.	100	Bosworth,	FAA,	1988.	p.	11-12.	101	Sacks,	1990.	p.	1.	102	Diod.	1.4.6-7;	Sacks,	1990.	p.	1.	
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understanding	 of	 the	 period.	 These	 books	 offer	 modern	 scholars	 detailed	accounts	of	and	insight	into	Macedonian	affairs.	
	Diodorus	explicitly	states	in	the	opening	book	of	his	history	that,	in	writing	the	
Bibliotheke,	he	is	attempting	to	construct	an	overarching	history.	This	moves	on	from	previous	historians	whom	he	accuses	of	 focussing	on	a	 single	 subject	 for	their	 works.103	His	 rationale	 for	 this	 is	 clear.	 Diodorus	 argues	 that	 writing	 an	overarching	 history	 is	 more	 beneficial	 to	 his	 readers	 due	 to	 the	many	 varied	accounts	and	lessons	contained	within	the	Bibliotheke.104	
	In	 order	 to	 write	 his	 history,	 Diodorus	 drew	 on	 many	 previous	 literary	sources,105	with	Hieronymus	 serving	 as	 his	 chief	 authority	 for	 Books	 18-20.106	Most	important	for	this	study	are	the	three	main	sources	Diodorus	relied	on	for	his	 accounts	of	Macedonian	affairs,	Hieronymus	of	Cardia,	Duris	of	 Samos	and	Cleitarchus.107	By	using	sources	contemporary	to	the	events	he	was	recounting,	Diodorus	added	historical	credibility	to	his	work.	Credibility	and	reliability	are	explicitly	described	as	 fundamental	 tenants	by	Diodorus	 throughout	Book	1	of	the	Bibliotheke.108	His	goal	was	to	write	a	sound,	reliable	history.109	In	addition	to	 his	 attempt	 at	 historical	 soundness,	 Diodorus	 constructed	 a	 chronology	 of	events	into	his	narrative.110	His	chronology	for	Macedonian	affairs	was	based	on	that	 constructed	 by	 Hieronymus	 and	 incorporated	 into	 his	 own	 greater	chronological	 scheme. 111 	However,	 Diodorus	 had	 difficulty	 merging	 the																																																									103	Diod.	1.3.	104	Diod.	1.3.2;	cf.	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	85-87.	105	Drews.	AJPh.	83.	(1962).	p.	384.		106	Brown,	 AHR.	 52.	 (1947).	 p.	 685;	 Errington,	 Hermes.	 105.	 (1977).	 p.	 480;	Whealtey,	 in	Heckel	&	Tritle,	2009.	pp.	129;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	XIII-XIV.	107	Tarn,	 JHS.	 43.	 (1923).	 p.	 93,	 95-96;	 Drew,	AJPh.	83.	 (1962).	 p.	 384;	 	 Sacks,	1990.	 p.	 35;	 p.	 94;	 Errington,	Hermes.	105.	 (1977).	 p.	 480;	McKechnie,	CQ.	45.	(1995).	p.	431;	Walsh,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	155.	108	Diod.	1.	109	Drews.	AJPh.	83.	(1962).	p.	383.	110	Errington,	Hermes.	105.	 (1977).	p.	479;	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	 (1992).	p.	56;	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	p.	257;	Anson,	Phoenix.	60.	(2006).	p.	228;	Meeus,	
Phoenix.	66.	(2012).	p.	76;	Wheatley,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	247.	111	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	p.	261.	
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complexities	of	the	chronologies	and	therefore	his	chronology	for	this	period	has	become	 compressed,	 distorted	 and	 somewhat	 haphazard.112	This	 means	 that	Diodorus’	chronology	cannot	be	fully	trusted	by	modern	scholars.113	
	As	a	result	Diodorus	has	attracted	criticism	from	modern	scholars.114	Despite	his	desire	 for	 a	 consistent	 and	 reliable	 recount	 of	 events,	 Diodorus	 often	encountered	 difficulty	 when	 compiling	 and	 incorporating	 his	 various	 sources	into	a	single	cohesive	narrative.115	It	is	important	to	take	into	consideration	the	confusion	 Diodorus	 encountered	 and,	 while	 there	 is	 great	 worth	 in	 engaging	with	 the	 Bibliotheke,	 modern	 scholars	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 Diodorus	 is	 not	infallible.	 Diodorus’	 chronological	 problems	 have	 created	 intense	 academic	discussion	 among	 modern	 scholars	 and	 this	 is	 discussed	 in	 more	 depth	 in	Section	2	of	this	chapter.		Despite	 the	 various	 reliability	 issues	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 Diodorus’	historical	and	chronological	method,	 the	Bibliotheke	offers	modern	scholarship	an	invaluable	account	of	Macedonian	history	and	this	work	forms	a	central	pillar	of	 any	 study	 of	 the	 Diadochoi.	 In	 particular	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 war	between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 often	 becomes	 the	monograph	 through	 which	 to	 engage	 with	 events	 in	 Europe	 following	Antipater’s	 death	 in	 319.	 While	 not	 a	 simple	 task,	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	Diodorus’	 method,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 possible	 bias	 that	 exists	 within	 his	 source	material,	the	account	can	be	used	throughout	the	entirety	of	this	examination.	
	
2.1.5:	Quintus	Curtius	Rufus.	
	The	next	major	source	for	the	Diadochi,	at	least	until	the	conclusion	of	the	First	Diadoch	War	 in	 319,	 is	 that	 written	 by	 the	 Roman	 Historian	 Quintus	 Curtius																																																									112	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	p.	261.	113	Errington,	Hermes.	105.	(1977).	p.	481.	114	see	 for	example:	Errington,	Hermes.	105.	 (1977).	p.	479;	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	 (1998).	 p.	 257;	 Meeus,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 87;	 cf.	McKechnie,	Historia.	43.	(1994).	p.	304.	115	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	p.	261.	
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Rufus.116	Curtius’	 only	 known	 work	 is	 the	 Historiae	 Alexandri	 Magni.117	The	
Historiae	 follows	 the	 life	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great,	 with	 a	 continuing	 narrative	until	the	period	of	time	after	the	meeting	at	Triaparadeisus	in	320.	Curtius’	work	was	in	part	a	result	of	Roman	fascination	with	Macedon,	more	specifically	with	the	person	of	Alexander	the	Great,118	providing	vital	insight	into	the	early	stage	of	this	investigation,	prior	to	the	rise	of	the	Diadochoi.	
	The	 exact	 dates	 of	 Curtius’	 composition	 of	 his	 history	 is	 the	 subject	 of	notoriously	 contentious,	 exhaustive	 and	 long	 running	 debates	 among	modern	scholars	with	discussion	and	argument	continuing	for	over	a	century.	While	it	is	generally	accepted	that	Curtius	wrote	in	the	early	1st	century	AD,	the	exact	dates	remain	 a	 mystery	 to	 modern	 scholarship.119	Other	 than	 the	 authorship	 of	 the	
Historiae,	nothing	is	known	about	any	part	of	Curtius’	life.120	
	The	Historiae	 was	 divided	 into	 ten	 separate	 books.	Whle	 the	 first	 and	 second	books	have	been	completely	 lost,	 the	 remaining	eight	are	mostly	 intact.121	It	 is	likely	 that	 the	 missing	 two	 books	 are	 responsible	 for	 much	 of	 the	 academic	debate	surrounding	Curtius.	This	is	because	it	is	likely	that	the	opening	of	Book	One	would	have	 contained	 a	 prologue	 from	 the	 author,	 outlining	who	he	was,	and	the	methodology	with	which	he	was	writing.	Out	of	the	ten	books,	the	most	valuable	to	this	study	is	the	final	book,	Book	Ten.	This	section	of	Curtius’	history	focuses	 on	 the	 final	 years	 of	 Alexander	 the	Great’s	 life	 and	 subsequent	 events	until	 after	 the	 events	 at	 Triparadisus	 in	 320.	 This	 final	 book	 of	 the	Historiae	offers	 an	 invaluable	 account	 of	 the	 intervening	 period	 between	 the	 death	 of	Alexander	the	Great	and	the	rise	of	Cassander	and	Polyperchon.	
																																																									116	For	an	in-depth	evaluation	of	Curtius,	see:	Baynham,	1998.	117	Steele,	AJPh.	36.	(1915).	p.	402;	Hamilton,	Historia	37.	(1988).	p.	445.	118	Adams,	2004.	p.	40.	119	Baynham,	 1998.	 p.	 7;	 cf.	 Pomeroy,	 in	 Wheatley	 &	 Baynham,	 2015.	 p.	 317;	though	 wider	 suggestions	 to	 Curtius’	 dates	 have	 been	 postulated	 prior	 to	Baynham,	 see	 for	 example:	Milns,	 Latmus.	 25.	 (1966).	 p.	 490;	 cf.	 Rufus	 Fears,	
CPh.	71.	(1976).	p.	214.	120	Steele,	AJPh.	36.	(1915).	402;	Bosworth,	CPh	78.	(1983).	p.	150.	121	Baynham,	1998.	p.	1.	
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When	 compiling	 his	 history,	 Curtius	 drew	 on	many	 and	 varied	 sources.	 From	these,	he	wove	the	accounts	together	in	order	to	construct	his	own	narrative.122	Curtius	offers	little	insight	into	the	sources	he	used,	only	rarely	making	a	direct	reference	to	the	authorities	for	events	he	is	recounting.123	Arguably,	Curtius	had	access	 to,	Pompeius	Trogas’	Historiae	Philippicae,	which	was	 composed	during	the	Augustan	Era	and	survived	into	the	fourth	century	AD	as	an	epitome,	and	it	seems	plausible	that	he	used	it.124	Contained	within	the	Historiae	are	accounts	of	the	 details	 of	 Alexander’s	 life	 that	 are	 found	 nowhere	 else	 in	 extant	 ancient	scholarship.	As	Baynham	argues,	this	would	suggest	that	Curtius	also	had	access	to	other	ancient	sources	that	alluded	to	other	contemporary	scholars	who	were	writing	 on	 the	 period.125	There	 has	 been	much	 comparison	 of	 events	 found	 in	both	 Diodorus	 and	 Curtius’	 respective	 histories.126 	It	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	original	source	on	which	both	these	sources	relied	was	that	of	Cleitarchus.127	
	One	of	the	fundamental	features	of	the	Historiae	Alexandri	Magni	is	the	concept	and	role	of	fortuna.128	The	various	figures	contained	within	Curtius’	history	were	governed	by	 fortuna’s	 influence,	which	would	ultimately	be	responsible	 for	his	
																																																								122	Baynham,	1998.	p.	89;	Heckel,	Mnemosyne.	60.	(2007).	p.	124.	n.	6,	125;	One	of	 the	 few	 references	 Curtius	 makes	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Curt.	 9.	 5.	 21,	 when	 he	makes	references	to	Cleitarchus	and	Timagenes,	both	of	whom	he	is	critical.	123	Baynham,	1998.	p.	57.	124	Baynham,	 1998.	 pp.	 30	 -31.	 For	 more	 on	 Pompeius	 Trogas	 and	 Justin’s	epitome	of	Trogus’	history,	see:	Ch.	2.1.8.	pp.	33-35.	125	Baynham,	1998.	p.	57.	126	Atkinson,	in	Bosworth	&	Baynham,	2000.	p.	320.	127	Tarn,	JHS.	43.	(1913).	p.	95;	Brown,	AJPh.	71.	(1950).	p.	146;	Rufus	Fears,	CPh.	71.	 (1976).	 p.	 219;	 Bosworth,	Histos	 1,	 1997.	 p.	 211;	 McKechnie,	Historia.	48.	(1998).	 p.	 45;	 Bosworth,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 81;	 Howe,	 in	Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 69.	 n.	 16;	 Müller,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	Anson,	2013.	p.	207;	Howe,	 in	Heckel,	Müller	&	Wrightson,	2015.	p.	169;	Lane	Fox,	 in	Wheatley	 &	 Baynham,	 2015.	 p.	 166;	 Heckel,	 in	Wheatley	 &	 Baynham,	2015.	 p.	 29;	 though	 Cleitarchus	 is	 by	 no	means	 Curtius’	 sole	 authority,	 as	 he	appears	 to	 have	 also	 made	 extensive	 use	 of	 Hieronymus’	 history	 during	 the	composition	 of	 the	 Historiae	 (Errington,	 JHS.	 90.	 (1970).	 p.	 75;	 McKechnie,	
Historia.	48.	(1999).	p.	47;	cf.	Wheatley,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	29.	n.	25.	128	Baynham,	1988.	p.	103.	For	more	on	the	tradition	of	 fortuna	within	Curtius,	see:	Baynham,	1988.	pp.	101	–	131;	cf.	Tarn,	Vol.	II.	1948.	pp.	91-116.	
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subjects’	 actions.129	By	using	 fortuna,	 Curtius	 taps	 into	 a	 long-standing	 literary	tradition	 within	 Greek	 and	 Roman	 sources,130	and	 this	 would	 have	 made	 his	account	readily	received	by	his	readership.131	
	The	 historical	 reliability	 of	 Curtius,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 this	 among	modern	scholars,	has	changed	a	great	deal	 since	Tarn’s	evaluation	of	him	as	having	an	“…entire	lack	of	historical	principle…”132	Tarn’s	expectation	that	Curtius	should	provide	 a	 cohesive,	 historical	 narrative	 comparable	 to	 modern	 academic	scholarship	 is	 unfortunate	 and	 misguided.	 As	 Baynham	 convincingly	 affirms,	
“…Roman	historians	were	not	interested	in	their	traditions	to	the	same	extent	as	a	
modern	scholar;	while	they	were	aware	of	issues	like	historical	veracity,	they	were	
far	 more	 concerned	 with	 moral	 didacticism	 and	 its	 presentation.” 133 	If	 the	
Historiae	 Alexandri	 Magni	 is	 approached	 with	 this	 understanding,	 Curtius’	account	and	its	completeness	provide	a	valuable	source	for	modern	scholarship.	
	
2.1.6:	Plutarch.	
	The	 next	 major	 sources	 for	 study	 on	 the	 Early	 Hellenistic	 World	 come	 from	select	 biographies	 from	 the	 Greek	 biographer	 Plutarch’s	 series,	 The	 Parallel	
Lives.134	In	this	series	Plutarch	compared	the	lives	of	eminent	Greeks	with	their	Roman	counterparts.135	The	composition	of	his	biographies	most	likely	occurred	after	 96	 AD,	 after	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Roman	 Emperor	 Domitian,	 and	 continued	until	 Plutarch’s	 own	 death	 in	 120	 AD.136	Of	 The	 Parallel	 Lives,	 four	 are	 of	particular	 importance	 and	 relevance	 to	 this	 study;	 these	 are	 The	 Life	 of	
Alexander,	 The	 Life	 of	 Demetrius,	 The	 Life	 of	 Eumenes	 and	 the	 Life	 of	 Phocion.																																																									129	Baynham,	1998.	p.	113.	130	Baynham,	1998.	p.	104.	131	McKechnie,	Historia.	48.	(1999).	pp.	52-53;	Adams,	2007.	p.	43;	cf.	Tarn.	Vol.	II.	1948.	p.	92.	132	Tarn,	Vol.	II.	1948.	p.	93.	133	Baynham,	1998.	p.	59.	134	For	in	depth	engagement	with	Plutarch’s	works,	see:	Pelling,	2002;	Duff,	CQ.	30.	(2011).	pp.	213-278.	135	Duff,	CQ.	30.	(2011).	p.	213.	136	Duff,	1999.	p.	2;	Buszard	suggests	composition	of	the	Lives	may	have	taken	a	period	of	some	twenty	years	(Buszard,	TAPA.	138.	(2008).	p.	186).	
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Plutarch’s	 biographical	 style	 differs	 greatly	 from	 the	 sources	 previously	 dealt	with	in	this	section,	which	were	written	by	historians.	Plutarch’s	aim	was	not	to	record	 historical	 truths.	 Rather	 he	 aimed	 to	 provide	 moral	 lessons	 to	 his	readership	 via	 the	 subjects	 of	 his	works.137	With	 this	 in	mind,	 Plutarch’s	Lives	offer	 another	 valuable	 account	 of	 the	 Early	 Hellenistic	 World	 for	 this	 study,	albeit	from	a	different	perspective	than	that	of	an	historian.	
	Before	dealing	directly	with	Plutarch’s	biographies,	it	is	necessary	to	distinguish	the	object	of	biography	from	those	of	history.	While	superficially	biography	may	be	seen	as	a	synonym	for	history,	in	an	ancient	context	they	are	vastly	different	literary	 styles	 with	 differing	 methodologies	 and	 goals.	 Understanding	 this	difference	 between	biography	 and	history	 is	 vital	 for	 any	historical	 study	 that	draws	upon	Plutarch’s	Lives.	
	It	 is	 best	 to	 begin	 with	 Plutarch’s	 own	 words	 on	 the	 difference	 between	biography	 and	history.	While	 there	 is	 no	 overall	 prologue	 for	 his	Lives,	where	one	might	 expect	 him	 to	 discuss	 his	 style	 and	methodology,138	the	 biographer	makes	clear	statements	on	what	he	is,	and	is	not,	concerned	with	in	his	works:	
“οὔτε	 γὰρ	 ίστορίας	 γράφομεν,	 ἀλλὰ	 βίους	 ...	 ὥσπερ	 οὖν	 οἱ	 ξωγράφοι	 τὰς	
ὁμοιότητας	ἀπὸ	τοῦ	προσώπου	καὶ	τῶν	περὶ	τὴν	ὄψιν	εἰδῶν,	οἷς	ἐμφαίωεται	τὸ	
ἦθος,	 ἀναλαμβάνουσιν,	 ἐλάχιστα	 τῶν	 λοιπῶν	 μερῶν	 φροντίζοντες,	 οὕτως	 ἡμῖν	
δοτέον	εἰς	τὰ	τῆς	ψυχῆς	σημεῖα	μᾶλλον	ἐνδύεσθαι	καὶ	διὰ	τούτων	εἰδοποιεῖν	τὸν	
ἑκάστου	βίον,	ἐάσαντας	ἑτέροις	τὰ	μεγέθη	καὶ	τοὺς	ἀγῶνας.”139		Unlike	 historians,	 who	 place	 great	 importance	 on	 historical	 accuracy	 and	overarching	 themes,	 Plutarch	 is	more	 focussed	 upon	 the	 individual	 subject	 to	which	each	of	his	biographies	 is	devoted.	Within	this	he	conducts	a	moralising	investigation	 of	 their	 lives	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 the	 moral	 personae	 of	 his	
																																																								137	Duff,	 1999.	 p.	 13,	 50;	Marincola,	 in	 Priestley	&	 Zali,	 2016.	 p.	 102;	 see	 also:	Hägg,	2012.	pp.	268-281.	138	Duff,	1999.	p.	14.	139	Plut.	Alex.	1.1-3.	
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subjects.140	It	is	vtial	to	remember	Plutarch’s	purpose	when	biographical	works	are	 subjected	 to	 historical	 scrutiny.	 This	 is	 because	 historical,	 chronological,	sequential	 narrative	 does	 not	 always	 play	 a	 central	 role	 within	 biography.141	Therefore	 Plutarch	 is	 able	 to	 distort	 events	 and	 chronologies	 to	 suit	 his	purpose,142	or	 even	 to	 create	 events	 within	 his	 accounts.143	This	 difference	 in	focus	 and	 element	 of	 creativity	 results	 in	 his	 sequence	 being	 more	 focussed	upon	characters	rather	than	on	historical	accuracy.144		An	 additional	 distortion	 in	 Plutarch’s	 account	 can	 occur	 in	 the	 biographer’s	notion	 of	 “parallel	 lives”	 -	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 eminent	 Greeks	 and	 Romans	 he	compares	were	living	the	same	lives.145	This	notion	of	two	men	living	the	same	life,	 albeit	 in	 different	 geographic	 and	 temporal	 spaces,	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 and	improbable.	 In	order	 to	make	 the	 lives	he	 is	comparing	 fit	with	 this	belief	 in	a	same	life	scenario,	Plutarch	may	downplay	or	omit	certain	events,	or	conversely,	emphasise	 or	 introduce	 events	 into	 his	 biographies	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	plausibility	 of	 his	 biographical	method.146	Additionally,	 Plutarch	 at	 times	 does	allow	providence	to	exert	itself	upon	the	narrative	of	his	biographies,	however,	as	 Swain	 has	 duly	 identified,	 for	 the	 Life	 of	 Alexander	 and	 the	 successive	biographies	of	the	Diadochoi,	τύχη	is	not	an	influential	factor	on	the	works.147																																																									140	Swain,	Phoenix.	43.	 (1989).	pp.	62-64;	Pelling,	2002.	p.	237;	Buszard,	TAPA.	138.	 (2008).	 p.	 187;	 Duff,	 JHS.	128.	 (2008).	 pp.	 19-26;	 cf.	 Beck,	Hermes.	 130.	(2002).	pp.	467-469;	Marincola,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	102)	141	cf.	Duff,	CQ.	30.	 (2011).	p.	265;	Though	 it	 is	vital	 to	note	 is	keenly	aware	of	history	as	a	genre	and	engaged	deeply	with	his	authorities	(Baron,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	62;	Marincola,	in	Priestley	&	Zali,	2016.	p.	101).	142	Pelling,	2002.	p.	92.	143	Pelling,	2002.	p.	95.	144	Bosworth,	in	Stadter,	1992.	pp.	67;	79.	145	Recent	scholarly	thought	has	argued	convincingly	that	the	Lives	should	not	be	read	as	separate	Greek	and	Roman	biography	to	be	later	read	in	comparison,	but	instead	as	a	single	 literary	work	(Buszard,	TAPA.	138.	 (2008).	p.	185;	Duff,	CQ.	30.	(2011).	pp.	215-216.)	146	Pelling,	1980.	pp.	127-140;	Bosworth,	in	Stadter,	1992.	p.	70;	though	it	is,	of	course,	overly	simplistic	and	unfair	to	state	that	Plutarch	strictly	adheres	to	this	method,	 as	 his	 work	 does	 include	 inconsistencies	 within	 comparative	biographies	 (see:	 Buszard,	 TAPA.	 138.	 (2008).	 pp.	 187-188).	 cf.	 Eskine,	 in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	pp.	591-596;	See	also:	Swain,	AJPh.	110.	(1989).	pp.	276-279.	147	Swain,	AJPh.	110.	(1989).	p.	282.	
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	Awareness	of	 issues	of	biographical	manipulation	and	Plutarch’s	willingness	to	distort	 his	 historical	 narrative	 in	 order	 to	 fit	 his	 style	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	
Parallel	Lives	 are	 not	 a	 useful	 source	 for	 this	 study.	General	 consensus	 among	modern	scholarship	is	that	Plutarch	was	widely	read	in	the	source	material	used	for	 the	 composition	 of	 his	 biographies.148	It	 can	 therefore	 be	 argued	 that	 the	strong	foundation	that	he	had	with	previous	scholarly	sources	lends	legitimacy	to	certain	accounts	contained	within	his	biographies.149	
	Despite	the	difference	of	genre,	and	the	problems	that	arise	from	this,	Plutarch’s	
Parallel	Lives	offers	a	series	of	vital	literary	sources	for	any	study	of	the	Diadochi	and	the	Early	Hellenistic	World.	
	
2.1.7:	Arrian.	
	The	next	major	source	for	study	of	Macedonian	Affairs	is	found	in	accounts	from	the	 Greek	 writer	 Lucius	 Flavius	 Arrianus	 of	 Nikomedia.150	Arrian’s	 historical	works	form	a	central	resource	for	any	study	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.151	Thus	it	is	vital	for	this	study	to	gain	an	understanding	of	his	accounts.	While	a	prolific	writer,	crossing	many	genres,152	the	works	of	most	value	to	this	study	are	two	of	his	historical	works,	the	Anabasis	of	Alexander,	and	the	Successors	of	Alexander.	
																																																								148	Müller,	1973.	pp.	55-57;	Wardman,	1974.	p.	153;	Bosworth,	in	Stadter,	1992.	pp.	 56	 –	 57;	 Baynham,	 1998.	 p.	 72;	 Pelling,	 2002.	 p.	 1;	 Paschidis,	 in	 Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	126;	Wheatley,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	24;	Engels,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	10;	Mileta,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	427,	434;	Roisman,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	472;	O’Sullivan,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	pp.	44-45;	As	can	be	seen	with	Plutarch’s	use	of	Duris	as	an	authority	(compare	Athen.	4.155c	=	FGrH.	76.	F.	12	and	Plut.	Pyrr.	8.3;	cf.	Anson,	in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 103;	 Pownall,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	Anson,	2013.	p.	44,	55.	n.	7.).	149	Tritle,	1998.	p.	22	150	For	more	extensive	evaluations	of	Arrian’s	life	and	works,	see:	Bosworth,	Vol.	I	1980;	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988;	Bosworth,	Vol.	II.	1995.	151	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	p.	16.	152	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	p.	25.	
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Arrian’s	date	of	birth	cannot	be	stated	with	confidence,	but	 it	 is	most	 likely	 to	have	 occurred	 between	 AD	 85–90.153	Likewise	 many	 details	 of	 Arrian’s	 life	remain	a	mystery,	including	the	date	of	his	death.	However,	it	is	clear	that	Arrian	held	 a	 prestigious	 position	 within	 the	 Roman	 political	 sphere,	 receiving	 a	Consulship	in	either	129	or	130	AD.154		
	Providing	a	historically	accurate	literary	work	was	a	central	concern	for	Arrian	during	his	composition.	Within	the	preface	of	the	Anabasis,	Arrian	explains	the	way	in	which	he	approaches	his	source	material,155	evaluating	each	of	them	for	their	trustworthiness	and	historical	merit.156	Arrian’s	ability	as	an	historian	was	such	that,	as	Bosworth	writes,	amongst	later	ancient	scholarship,	“….he	[Arrian]	
became	a	model	of	historiography”,157	as	well	as	being	considered	one	of	the	best	sources	for	Alexander	the	Great	by	modern	scholars.158		Possibly	 the	 most	 well	 known	 of	 Arrian’s	 literary	 works	 is	 his	 Anabasis	 of	
Alexander.159	The	historian	devotes	the	work	to	the	reign	of	Alexander	the	Great,	commencing	 shortly	 after	 the	 death	 of	 his	 father,	 Philip	 II,	 in	 336	 with	 his	coronation	 as	 King	 of	 Macedon,160	and	 concluding	 with	 the	 events	 directly	following	Alexander’s	 own	death	 at	Babylon	 in	323.161	As	with	 the	majority	 of																																																									153	Bosworth,	Vol.	I.	1980.	p.	1.	154	Bosworth,	HSPh.	81.	(1977).	p.	217;	Bosworth,	Vol.	I.	1980.	p.	23;	Syme,	HSPh.	86.	(1982).	p.	188;	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	p.	16.	155	Arrian	 drew	 upon	 a	 diverse	 group	 of	 sources	 to	 construct	 his	 histories,	particularly	the	work	of	Aristobulus	and	the	lost	history	of	Ptolemy	I	Soter.	See	for	 identification	 of	 Arrian’s	 authorities:	 Meyer,	 Hermes.	 33.	 (1898).	 p.	 651;	Steele,	 CPh.	14.	 (1919).	 p.	 147,	 148,	 152-153;	 Steele,	 CPh.	 15.	 (1920).	 p.	 282;	Bosworth,	HSPh.	81.	 (1977).	 p.	 248;	 Baynham,	 in	 Romm	&	 Strassler,	 2010.	 p.	329-331;	Engels,	 in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	23.	n.	45;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	40;	Kennedy,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	280.	156	Arr.	 i.1-3;	 Steele,	CPh.	14.	 (1919).	 p.	 147;	 cf.	Bosworth,	HSPh.	81.	 (1977).	 p.	248;	 Syme,	HSPh.	86.	 (1982).	p.	206;	 see	also:	Baynham,	 in	Romm	&	Strassler,	2010.	pp.	325-332.	157	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	pp.	38-60.	158	Meyer,	Hermes.	33.	(1898).	p.	651;	Bosworth,	HSPh.	81.	(1977).	p.	217;	Milns,	
Historia.	 27.	 (1978).	 p.	 374;	 Baynham,	 1998.	 p.	 13;	 Baynham,	 in	 Romm	 &	Strassler,	2010.	p.	325.	159	cf.	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	p.	27.	160	Arr.	1.1.1.	161	Arr.	7.28.1.	
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Alexander’s	 reign,	 much	 of	 the	 Anabasis	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 campaigning	 and	expansion	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 The	 Anabasis	 contains	 an	 almost	completely	 intact	 account	 of	 the	 entirety	 of	 Alexander’s	 rule.162	However,	 in	relation	 to	 this	 study,	 the	 work	 provides	 a	 detailed	 context	 for	 the	 current	analysis,	 employing	 precise	 terminology163	that	 lays	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	events	 after	 Antipater’s	 death	 in	 319,	 including	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	Argeads	 and	 Antipatrids	 and	 especially,	 the	 hostility	 between	 Olympias	 and	Antipater.	
	Contained	 within	 the	 Anabasis	 are	 accounts	 and	 details	 not	 present	 in	 other	ancient	 literary	sources.	Given	Arrian’s	determined	commitment	 to	provide	an	accurate	historical	account,	the	Anabasis	offers	a	detailed	insight	 into	events	of	Alexander’s	 reign	 as	 monarch.	 Arrian’s	 other	 work	 that	 is	 of	 concern	 to	 this	study	 is	 his	 history,	 the	 Successors	 of	 Alexander.	 This	 work	 continued	 the	narrative	 of	 the	 Anabasis.	 It	 spanned	 ten	 books	 and	 covered	 events	 after	 the	death	of	 the	monarch,	until	 the	partition	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	during	the	meeting	of	 the	Macedonian	Generals	 at	Triparadeisus	 in	319.164	Unfortunately,	Arrian’s	 Successors,	 in	 its	 original	 form,	 has	 been	 lost. 165 	However,	 some	fragments	of	 the	work	have	survived	as	well	as	a	 summary	of	 the	history	as	a	whole,	written	by	the	Byzantine	scholar,	Photius,	in	the	mid	ninth	century	AD.166	Photius’	 summary	 offers	 a	 highly	 condensed	 version	 of	 Arrian’s	 original	work	that,	while	brief	and	hence	prone	to	omissions	 from	the	original	work,167	gives	an	insight	into	the	material	that	was	covered	in	the	Successors.168	
	It	 is	 likely	 that	 Arrian	 would	 have	 continued	 with	 his	 ambition	 to	 provide	 a	cogent	historical	narrative	for	his	audience	from	the	Anabasis	to	the	Successors																																																									162	Bosworth,	FAA.	1988.	p.	13.	163	Milns,	Historia.	27.	(1978).	p.	374.	164	Bosworth,	FAA.	 1988.	 p.	 29;	Bosworth,	 Vol.	 II.	 1995.	 p.	 2;	Meeus,	 in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	85;	Wheatley,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	22.	165	Meyer,	Hermes.	 33.	 (1898).	 p.	 649;	 Bosworth,	 FAA.	1988.	 p.	 28;	 Dreyer,	 in	Heckel,	Tritle,	Wheatley,	2007.	p.	245.	166	Treadgold,	1980.	p.	34.	167 	cf.	 Roisman,	 in	 Hauben	 &	 Meeus,	 2014.	 p.	 471;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	30.	168	Dreyer,	in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	p.	246.	
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and	had	the	scholarly	ability	to	do	so.	If	this	hypothesis	is	correct	it	means	that	Photius’	 summary	 could	 have	 been	 based	 upon	 a	 previous	 work	 of	 historical	merit.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Photius’	summary	should	be	considered	by	modern	scholarship	as	being	of	the	same	importance	as	an	original	work	of	Arrian.	His	epitome	must	be	treated	with	caution	when	scrutinised	for	its	historical	merit	as	a	source	of	study	of	post-323	Macedon.	Owing	to	the	highly	condensed	nature	of	the	 epitome	 itself,	 combined	 with	 the	 vast	 temporal	 gap	 between	 Arrian’s	original	 composition	 and	 Photius’	 epitome,	 this	 work	 is	 of	 limited	 use	 to	historiography	and	should	not	be	treated	as	an	original	Arrianic	source.		
	While	Arrian’s	 output	 are	 pivotal	 for	 all	 studies	 of	 ancient	Macedonia	 and	 the	initial	 phases	 of	 the	 early	 Hellenistic	 World,	 his	 accounts	 are	 limited	 for	 the	scope	of	this	study.	Arrian’s	accounts	offer	insight	into	events	occurring	towards	the	 end	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	 Life	 in	 the	 Anabasis,	 and	 early	 319	 for	 the	
Successors.	 Despite	 not	 dealing	 directly	 with	 Cassander,	 Polyperchon	 and	 the	fate	of	the	Argead	House,	Arrian	briefly	refers	to	both	men	and	his	accounts	offer	invaluable	insight	into	pivotal	events	that	would	go	on	to	influence	the	rivalry	of	Cassander,	Polyperchon	and	the	end	of	the	Argeads.			
2.1.8:	Justin.	
	The	 final	 source	 under	 evaluation	 for	 this	 study	 is	 the	 epitome	 of	 Pompeius	Trogus’	 Philippic	 History,	 but	 the	 Latin	 historian	 Marcus	 Junianus	 Justinus.169	Justin’s	 account	 is	 infamous	 for	 its	problematic	nature.	 	Modern	 scholars	have	treated	his	work	with	criticism,	170	and	even	dismissal;171	however	perception	of	the	epitome	has	undergone	a	drastic	change	and	has	recently,	despite	its	flaws,																																																									169	For	in	depth	investigations	of	Justin,	see:	Alonso-Núñez,	G&R.	34.	(1987).	pp.	56-72;	Syme,	Historia.	37.	(1988).	pp.	358-371;	Yardley	&	Develin,	1994;	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	170	Steele,	AJPh.	38.	(1917).	pp.	28-35;	Meiggs,	1972.	p.	475.	Hammond,	1983,	p.	86;	 Bosworth,	 FAA,	1988.	 p.	 12;	 Syme,	Historia.	37.	 (1988).	 p.	 358;	 Yardley	 &	Heckel,	 1997.	 p.	 36;	 Bellesteros	 Pastor,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	&	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	186;	Howe,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	65-66;	Hauben,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	236;	cf.	Wheatley,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	pp.	501-502.	171	Tarn,	Vol.	II.	1948.	p.	122.	
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become	 more	 appreciated	 for	 its	 content	 by	 modern	 scholars. 172 	When	approached	with	due	caution,	Justin’s	Epitome	offers	important	insight	into	the	Post-323	Macedonian	Empire	and	the	Early	Hellenistic	World.		Little	is	known	of	Justin	or	his	dates,173	including	the	date	of	composition	for	his	epitome.174	The	 epitome	of	Trogus	 is	 all	 the	writer	 leaves	 from	which	modern	scholars	 can	 draw	 upon	 to	 understand	 his	 life.175 	Because	 of	 this	 lack	 of	information	 regarding	 the	 author,	 his	 dates	 have	 become	 a	 contentious	 focal	point	of	academic	debate.	This	study,	however,	accepts	the	proposal	put	forward	by	Develin	of	a	composition	date	some	time	in	the	late	second-century	AD.176	Justin’s	 Epitome	 is	 a	 condensed	 account	 of	 the	work	written	 by	 the	 Augustan	historian	Pompeius	Trogus,	 the	Philippic	History.177	Trogus’	history	however,	 is	entirely	lost	and	its	only	preservation	is	found	in	the	forty-four	books	of	Justin’s	Epitome.178		Within	 the	 praefatio	 of	 the	 epitome,	 Justin	 states	 his	 admiration	 for	 Trogus’	history,	 and	 follows	 the	 basic	 framework	 of	 the	 Augustan	 Historian.179	Like	Trogus,	the	epitome	records	a	continuous	narrative	of	events	from	Assyria,	up	to	events	within	the	final	years	of	the	Roman	Republic.180	Of	particular	value	to	this	study	 are	 Books	 13–17.	 These	 books	 are	 devoted	 specifically	 to	 Alexander’s	successors	and	 therefore	must	be	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 Justin’s	Epitome	 is	significant	 because	 it	 offers	 modern	 scholars	 the	 only	 surviving	 continuous	narrative	 of	 events	 in	 the	 Hellenistic	 World,181	as	 well	 as,	 at	 times,	 the	 most																																																									172	Yardley	&	Develin,	1994.	pp.	1-2.	173	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	1.	174	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	8.	175	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	8.	176	Yardley	&	Develin,	1994.		p.	4.	177	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	pp.	1-8;	see	also:	Steele,	AJPh.	38.	(1917).	pp.	19-41;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	pp.	1-22.	178	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	2.	179	Just.	1.4;	For	more	on	Trogus’s	dates,	see:	Urban,	Historia.	31.	(1982).	pp.	82-96;	 Alonso-Núñez,	 G&R.	34.	 (1987).	 pp.	 56-72;	 Hammond,	 CQ.	41.	 (1991).	 pp.	506-507;	Yardley,	CQ.	50.	(2000).	pp.	632-633;	Rubicam,	Historia.	54.	(2005).	pp.	266-26.	180	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	22	181	Yardley	&	Develin,	1994.	p.	1.	
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extensive	surviving	account	of	events	during	the	zenith	of	Macedonian	power.182	However,	Justin	and	his	Epitome	are	notoriously	problematic.	Even	though	it	is	expected	 that	 an	 epitome	of	 a	more	 extensive	work	will	 abbreviate	 or	neglect	certain	 events	 that	 the	 epitomiser	 does	 not	 feel	 important	 to	 his	 narrative,183	Justin	 goes	 beyond	 a	 simple	 compression	 of	 Trogus’	 History.	 In	 the	 praefatio,	Justin	 signals	 that	 he	 has	 deliberately	 omitted	 material	 that	 he	 believes	 his	audience	may	not	find	enjoyable.184		This	is	important	to	take	into	consideration	because	 the	 sequences	 within	 the	 work	 are	 called	 into	 question	 by	 the	epitomiser’s	stated	aim,	that	being	to	entertain	his	readers.		Justin’s	epitome	also	contains	many	exaggerated185	and	fabricated	events;	this	is	exemplified	by	his	account	of	Alexander’s	single-handed	assault	on	a	city	held	by	the	Mandri	and	Sudrace	while	campaigning	in	India.186	While	it	could	be	argued	that	 the	 account	 of	 this	 event	 was	 designed	 more	 for	 entertainment	 and	glorification	of	the	King	than	for	historical	accuracy,	its	inclusion	detracts	from	the	 historical	 validity	 of	 the	 work.	 	 Another	 issue	 with	 the	 Epitome	 is	 the	author’s	 regular	 confusion	 of	 names	 within	 the	 text.	 This	 is	 typified	 by	 an	example	 that	 has	 a	 direct	 relation	 to	 this	 study;	 Justin	 regularly	 confuses	 the	names	 of	 Craterus	 and	 Polyperchon.187	These	 confusions	 can	 be	 refuted	 by	other,	 more	 reliable,	 ancient	 scholarship,188	and	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	when	reading	Justin.		Despite	the	criticisms	levelled	against	Justin	and	both	his	methodology	and	the	obvious	mistakes	within	his	narrative,	this	does	not	detract	from	the	significance	of	 the	 epitome	 to	 this	 study.	 By	 drawing	 on	 the	 extensive	 academic																																																									182	See:	Wheatley,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	pp.	512-514;	Howe,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	pp.	134-135.	183	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	1.	184	Just.	1.4.	185	cf.	Baynham,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	114.	186	Just.	12.9.5–13.	187	Just.	 12.10.1.	 (see:	 Yardley	&	Heckel,	 1997.	 p.	 260.);	 13.8.5,7.	 (see:	 Yardley,	Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 158.);	 15.1.1.	 (see:	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	2011.	p.	218.);	Though,	as	Lane	Fox	notes,	Justin	routinely	omits	or	alters	names	within	his	work	(Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	pp.	168-170).	188	For	example	Just.	12.10.1.	cf.	Arr.	6.15.5.	
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commentaries	 and	 critiques	 of	 Justin	 by	 Yardley,	 Develin,	 Heckel	 and	Wheatley,189	it	 is	possible	 to	engage	with	 the	epitome	of	Trogus	 in	an	effective	manner.	With	an	understanding	of	the	problematic	nature	of	Justin’s	source,	this	study	 closely	 adheres	 to	 the	 output	 of	 Yardley,	 Develin	 and	Wheatley,	 and	 by	doing	 so,	 Justin	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 valuable	 historical	 source	 for	 the	 Early	Hellenistic	World.	
	
2.2:	Chronology.	
	This	section	of	the	methodology	chapter	is	devoted	to	the	chronology	to	which	this	study	adheres.	There	are	few	areas	of	Early	Hellenistic	scholarship	that	are	as	divisive	in	modern	academia	as	the	subject	of	chronologies	between	323–301	B.C.	 resulting	 from	 the	 compressed	 and	 distorted	 narratives	 contained	within	the	accounts	of	 the	ancient	 sources.	Because	of	 this,	discussion	of	 the	 timeline	used	by	this	study	is	required.	It	must	be	stated	however,	that	the	area	of	focus	of	this	study	is	not	upon	the	chronologies	of	the	Diadochoi,	nor	does	it	attempt	to	add	to	the	debate	in	this	area.	Of	greater	significance	for	this	study	than	the	assessment	and	comparison	of	the	respective	schools	of	chronological	thought	is	a	 coherent	 narrative	 and	 sequence	 of	 events	 between	 the	 years	 of	 319–301	during	 the	 rivalry	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon.	 At	 this	 time,	 it	 is	 not	possible	to	present	a	timeline	that	is	universally	acceptable	and	agreed	upon	by	all	 of	 modern	 scholarship,	 but	 as	 no	 crucial	 evidence	 from	 the	 overall	conclusions	 of	 this	 study	 rest	 unquiely	 upon	 chronological	 uncertainty,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 adopt	 a	 previously	 proposed	 chronological	 methodology.	 Of	 more	importance	to	this	study	is	a	coherent	sequence	of	events	within	the	European	sphere	of	the	post-323	Macedonian	Empire.		Over	 the	past	ninety	years,	various	chronological	 theories	have	been	proposed	and	built	upon	by	modern	scholars.190	From	these	various	theories,	 three	main																																																									189	Yardley	 &	 Develin,	 1994;	 Yardley	 &	 Heckel,	 1997;	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	Heckel,	2011.	190	The	sequence	of	chronological	schools	of	 thought	amongst	modern	scholars	is	an	extensive	and	much	discussed	topic.	While	currently	there	exist	three	main	bodies	of	thought,	that	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	only	three	options	for	scholars	
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schools	of	thought	have	emerged	regarding	chronologies	for	the	period	after	the	death	of	Alexander	III	and	the	year	of	301,	those	being:	the	High,	Low	and	Mixed	chronological	 methods.	 While	 each	 of	 these	 schools	 has	 their	 own	 respective	merits	 and	 strengths,	 this	 study	 follows	 the	 High	 chronology	 as	 argued	 by	Bosworth	and	Wheatley,191	for	the	entirety	of	the	period	covered	by	it.		The	only	variation	 to	 the	High	 chronology	 used	 is	 an	 addition	 to	 the	 years	 of	 318–317.	This	 addition,	 originally	 proposed	 by	 Paschidis, 192 	is	 concerned	 with	 the	movements	of	Polyperchon	and	a	military	expedition	into	Asia	Minor	during	the	campaigning	seasons	of	the	years	stated	above.	The	following	is	divided	into	two	sub-sections,	these	being	first	a	brief	justification	of	the	chronology	used	by	this	study	and	then	a	table	of	the	chronology	itself.		
																																																																																																																																																														to	 choose	 from	 or	 accept.	 Many	 scholarly	 works	 (including	 this	 one)	 base	themselves	upon	one	of	the	schools	with	variations	from	the	set	timeline.	What	follows	 is	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 chronologies	 for	 the	 Early	Hellenistic	 World	 that	 has	 occurred	 over	 the	 last	 century.	 It	 would	 be	impractical	 to	 list	 every	 work	 completed	 by	 every	 scholar	 on	 this	 topic.	 The	proceeding	hopes	to	demonstrate	the	general	sequence	of	thought	and	the	ebb	and	flow	of	scholarly	thought	upon	this	topic.	The	original	High	Chronology	was	established	 by	 Beloch	 (Beloch,	 Vol.	 III2	 1904.	 pp.	 187–201	 and	 IV2	 1927.	 pp.	235–249).	 Beloch’s	 chronology	 was	 later	 counter-proposed	 by	 Manni,	 whom	presented	his	own	Low	Chronology	(Manni,	RAL.	4.	(1949).	pp.	53–83.).	Manni’s	chronology	became	the	generally	accepted	sequence	among	modern	scholars	for	the	next	 four	decades	(See	 for	example:	Hauben,	AJP.	94.	 (1973).	pp.	256–267;	Hauben,	AncSoc.	8.	(1977).	pp.	85–120;	Errington,	Hermes.	105.	(1977).	pp.	478–504;	Williams,	Hermes.	112.	(1984).	pp.	300	–	305;	Anson,	Phoenix.	60.	(2006).	pp.	 226–235;	 Anson,	 in	 Heckel,	 Tritle,	 Wheatley,	 2007.	 The	 1990s	 saw	 a	 re-emergence	of	the	High	Chronology,	headed	by	Bosworth	(Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	 pp.	 55	 –	 81;	 Bosworth,	 2002.)	 and	 Wheatley	 (Wheatley,	 Phoenix.	 52.	(1998),	 pp.	 257–281);	 Wheatley	 (ZPE.	 166.	 (2003),	 pp.	 268–276.)	 who	convincingly	argued	the	value	of	the	High	Chronology.	In	recent	years,	the	Mixed	Chronology	 been	 put	 forward,	 spearheaded	 by	 possible	 the	 most	 substantial	work	 on	 the	 chronologies	 of	 the	 Early	 Hellenistic	 World,	 composed	 by	 Boiy	(Boiy,	2007).	For	an	 introduction	to	the	problems	surrounding	chronologies	of	this	period,	see:	Wheatley,	in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	pp.	179–192.	For	an	in-depth	evaluation	of	each	of	the	chronological	schools,	see:	Boiy,	2007.	191	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992);	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	A	combinations	of	these	timelines	can	be	found	in	Bosworth,	2003.	pp.	246	–	284.	192	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	pp.	233	–	250.	
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While	 the	 justification	 for	 the	 High	 chronology	 and	 its	 integrity	 have	 already	been	 convincingly	 argued	 elsewhere,193	the	 insertion	 proposed	 by	 Paschidis	deserves	more	attention.	Contained	within	a	Nesian	decree	that	honours	one	of	its	prominent	citizens,	Thersippos,194	is	a	passage	relating	to	an	expedition	made	by	 Polyperchon	 into	 Asia	 Minor.195	Precise	 details	 of	 this	 expedition	 are	 not	recorded	in	any	of	the	ancient	literary	sources.196	Unfortunately,	the	passage	in	question	 is	 fragmented	 and	 required	 reconstruction.197	Paschidis	 convincingly	argues	for	an	alternative	reconstruction	to	the	one	offered	within	the	corpus:	
καὶ	Πολπέρχοντος	εἰς	τὰν	Ἀσί[αν]	[διάβα(?)]ντος	διώικησε	φίλον	αὖτον	τᾶι	πό-	[λι	ὑπά]ρχην.	“…and	 when	 Polyperchon	crossed(?)	 to	 Asia,	 he	 [scil.	 Thersippos]	arranged	for	him	to	become	a	friend	of	the	city.”198	 	If	this	construction	is	correct,	it	would	suggest	that	the	nature	of	Polyperchon’s	expedition	 into	 Asia	 Minor	 was	 a	 military	 intervention,	 possibly	 to	 aid	 his	strongest	 ally	 in	 the	 region,	 Eumenes,	 designed	 to	 threaten	 their	 joint-enemy,	Antigonus	 and	 hi	 base	 of	 operations	 in	 Anatolia.	 However,	 to	 view	 the	manoeuvre	 as	 solely	 designed	 to	 harm	 Antigonusis	 over	 simplistic.	Polyperchon’s	 venture	 into	 Asia	 Minor	 was	 much	 more	 complex	 and	multifaceted.	Had	it	secured	the	removal	of	Antigonus	as	an	influential	member	of	the	Diadochoi	it	would	also	have	dealt	a	significant	blow	to	Cassander’s	efforts	in	Europe.	In	addition,	it	would	have	help	the	regent	to	secure	the	services	of	the																																																									193	Bosworth,	 Chiron	 22.	 (1992);	 Wheatley,	 Phoenix.	 52.	 (1998);	 Wheatley’s	output	 concerning	 the	dating	 for	 Polyperchon’s	 final	 invasion	of	Macedon	 and	the	 death	 of	 Herakles	 (Antichthon.	 32.	 (1998)),	 is	 used.	 Though,	 as	 Wheatley	identifies,	 supplying	 precise	 dating	 for	 these	 events	 is	 difficult	 to	 assert	(Antichthon.	32.	(1998).	p.	12.).	194	IG.	XII	2,	645.	195	IG.	XII	2,	645.	23–25.	196	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	234.	197	For	discussion	surrounding	 the	 reconstruction	of	 IG.	XII.	2,	645.	23–25,	See	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	pp.	233–234.	198	Paschidis,	Tekermia.	9.	(2008).	p.	234.	cf.	IG.	XII	2,	645.	23-25.	
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mother	 of	 Alexander	 III,	 Olympias,	whose	 close	 ties	 to	 Eumenes	 of	 Cardia	 are	well	attested.199		
	Paschidis’	 support	of	 the	Mixed	chronology	does	not	 interfere	with	 the	overall	chronology	 of	 this	 study.	 The	 discrepancies	 between	 the	High	 chronology	 and	that	followed	by	Paschidis	do	not	present	a	problem	for	the	proposed	insertion	used	 by	 this	 study.	 As	 there	 is	 not	 satisfactory	 alternative	 chronological	sequence	 apart	 from	 the	 High	 chronology	 for	 events	 within	 Europe	 after	 the	death	of	Antipater	in	319	and	the	death	of	Philip	III	in	317,	the	insertion	can	be	made	without	issue.200		Though	 no	 date	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 text,	 a	 clue	 as	 to	 when	 Polyperchon	conducted	 the	 expedition	 does	 exist.	 	 A	 reference	 is	made	 to	 the	 kings,	 in	 the	plural.201	This	 suggests	 that	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 expedition,	 both	 the	kings	were	still	living	and	that	Polyperchon’s	venture	into	Asia	Minor	took	place	prior	to	his	embassy	to	Epirus	in	the	autumn	of	317.202		Since	both	kings	are	being	referred	to	within	the	text,	a	terminus	ante	quem	exists	for	Polyperchon’s	return	from	the	expedition	 as	 taking	 place	 no	 later	 than	 the	 autumn	 of	 317.	 It	 is,	 of	 course,	impossible	for	Polyperchon	to	have	occupied	both	positions	simultaneously	and	this	would	therefore,	suggest	that	the	most	plausible	period	of	time	in	which	the	invasion	of	Asia	Minor	must	be	situated	was	prior	to	the	closing	stages	of	317.	
	It	is	unlikely	in	the	extreme	that	the	expedition	into	Asia	Minor	occurred	during	the	 year	 of	 318.	 The	 reasoning	 behind	 this	 claim	 is	 that	 Polyperchon	 had	sustained	sizable	military	defeats,	both	at	Megalopolis,203	as	well	as	during	 the	series	of	engagements	off	Byzantium.204	These	defeats	would	have	necessitated	time	 for	 Polyperchon	 to	 regroup	 and	 replenish	 his	 military	 strength	 before	embarking	 for	 Asia	 Minor.	 Following	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 siege	 action	 at																																																									199	For	more	discussion,	see	Ch.	6.2.	p.	168.	200	Paschidis,	2008.	p.	235.	201	IG.	XII	2,	645.	27.	202	Diod.	19.11.2.	203	Diod.	18.70-72.	204	Diod.	18.72.3.	cf.	Ch.	6.3.	
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Megalopolis,	 there	 is	 reference	 to	Polyperchon	 turning	his	 attentions	 to	 other,	more	pressing	business,	which	Paschidis	suggests	concerned	preparations	of	the	embarkation	of	Polyperchon’s	troops	across	the	Aegean.205		The	implications	of	Polyperchon’s	military	expedition	into	Asia	Minor	in	318/7	are	 of	 great	 significance	 to	 this	 study.	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 expedition	 place	Polyperchon	 outside	 of	 Europe	 during	 a	 volatile	 time	 in	 his	 conflict	 with	Cassander,	but	it	also	suggests	that	he	would	have	taken	with	him	a	substantial	segment	 of	 his	 military	 resources	 on	 the	 mission,	 thereby	 weakening	 his	position	 within	 Macedon	 and	 the	 Greek	 Peninsula. 206 		 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	Polyperchon	 left	Cassander	 in	peace	during	his	absence.	 It	 is	also	unlikely	 that	he	would	 have	 lacked	 the	military	 strength	 needed	 to	 hold	 his	 own	positions.	However	 Polyperchon’s	 absence	 from	 Europe	 during	 this	 time	 would	 have	weakened	 his	 position	 in	 that	 it	 allowed	 Cassander	 time	 to	 organise	 his	 next	manoeuvres	in	gaining	power	and	influence	within	the	Greek	Peninsula	as	well	as	opening	an	opportunity	for	Cassander’s	first	venture	into	Macedon	during	the	summer	of	317.		Presented	in	the	table	below	are	key	events	on	the	Greek	Peninsula	during	the	timeframe	of	 this	paper.	However,	events	occurring	outside	of	Europe	are	also	taken	 into	account	during	 this	study,	as	 they	play	key	roles	 in	 the	evolution	of	events	during	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon.																																																																		205	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	240;	cf.	Diod.	18.72.1.	206	This	area	is	discussed	in	further	detail	in	Ch.	7.1.	
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Date:	 Cassander:	 Polyperchon:	 Other	Events:	
Late	
Summer/Autumn	
319.	
Appointed	
chiliarch	under	Polyperchon	
Appointed	
strategos	of	Macedon	
Death	of	Antipater	
Autumn	319.	 Leaves	Macedon	for	Antigonus’	Court.	
Philip	III	issues	decree	to	the	Greeks		
Nicanor	arrives	in	Athens.	
Spring	318.	 Arrives	in	the	Peiraeus.	 Alexander	invades	Attica.		
Death	of	Phocion	(May).	
Summer	318.	 	 Campaigns	in	the	Peloponnese.	 Siege	of	Megalopolis.	Naval	battles	off	Byzantium.	Polyperchon’s	fleet	destroyed.	
Winter	318/7.	 Capitulation	of	Athens.	Demetrius	of	Phalerum	installed	as	Govenor.		
	 	
Spring	317.	 	 Campaigns	in	Asia	Minor.			
Nicanor	executed.	
Summer	317.	 First	venture	into	Macedon.	 Returns	to	Macedon	to	check	Cassandrean	advances	north.	
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Autumn	317.	 	 Journeys	to	Epirus	to	escort	Olympias	back	to	Macedon.	
Eurydice	declares	Cassander	regent	of	Macedon.		Olympias	returns	to	Macedon.		Philip	III	and	Adea-Eurydice	executed.		
Spring	316.	 Takes	control	of	Macedon.	 Flees	to	southern	Greece	and	the	Peloponnese.	
Capitulation	of	Olympias	to	Cassander.		Execution	of	Olympias.	
Summer	316.	
	
	
	
	
Marriage	to	Thessaloniki			Burial	of	Philip	III	and	Adea-Eurydice	at	Vergina				?Embarkation	of	building	programme.	
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Spring/Summer	
315.	
Campaigns	in	the	Peloponnese.	 Forges	alliance	with	Antigonus	 Aristodemus	arrives	in	the	Peloponnese	
Summer	314.	 Campaigns	in	Acarnania,	the	Adriatic	Coast	and	Illyria.	
Alexander	defects	to	Cassander’s	–	Killed	shortly	afterwards.		
Asander	visits	Athens.	
Winter	314.	 Sends	expeditionary	force	to	Caria.	
	 	
Summer	313.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Summer	313.	
Intervenes	in	Epirus.		Besieges	Oreüs.		Campaigns	in	Euboea	and	Boeotia.				Returns	to	Macedon	before	winter	to	forestall	threat	from	Antigonus.	
	 Antigonus	moves	against	Lysimachus	and	Cassander.		Polemaeus	arrives	in	Greece.	
Autumn/Winter	
312.	
	 	 Polemaeus	campaigns	in	Euboea,	Attica,	Boeotia,	Phocis	and	Locris.	
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Summer	312.	 Sends	expeditionary	force	to	Epirus.		
	 Polemaeus	checks	Telesphorus’	dissention.		
Autumn	312.	 Unsuccessful	siege	of	Apollonia.		Returns	to	Macedon	for	the	Winter.	
	 Battle	of	Gaza.	
Autumn	311.	 	 	 ?Peace	talks	begin	among	Cassander,	Lysimachus,	Ptolemy	and	Antigonus.		
Winter	311/310.	 	 	 Peace	of	the	Dynasts	enacted.		Death	of	Alexander	IV	and	Rhoxane.		
310.	 	 	 ?Arrival	of	Herakles	into	southern	Greece.					
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309/8.	 	 ?Appointed	commander	of	the	Peloponnese	under	Cassander.		
?Death	 of	Herakles.	
	
	
2.3	Gaps	in	Knowledge	and	its	Treatment	
	All	 areas	 of	 historical	 investigation	 must	 contend	 with	 problematic,	 often	frustrating,	 gaps	 in	 the	 surviving	 evidence	 from	 the	 source	 material	 and	 the	early	 Hellenistic	 World	 of	 the	 late	 fourth	 century	 is	 a	 notorious	 example.207	Evidence	for	this	period	is	often	fragmentary	at	best,	and	completely	absent	at	worst,	 with	 only	 the	 works	 of	 Diodorus	 and	 Justin	 surviving	 in	 any	 complete	state	with	which	to	inform	our	understanding	of	the	Diadochoi.208	Because	of	the	nature	 of	 the	 surviving	 textual,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 for	 this	 study	archaeological,	evidence,	there	are	ultimately	events	that	are	impossible	to	state	with	complete	certainty	simply	because	of	the	lack	of	surviving	information.	
		Vast	 gaps	 are	 endemic	 within	 our	 surviving	 source	 tradition,	 especially	 for	events	 in	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	 as	 many	 of	 the	contemporary	 historical	 works	 of	 the	 era	 are	 lost	 or	 transmitted	 via	intermediaries.	This	therefore	results	in	a	limitation	on	our	understanding	of	the	events	 that	 took	 place	 during	 the	 closing	 years	 of	 fourth	 century.	 This	means	that	 there	are	will	always	be	gaps	 in	certain	knowledge	of	 the	period	 that	will	remain	so	until	the	possible,	although	unlikely,	discovery	of	more	evidence.	This	does	 not	mean	 that	 no	 comment	 can	 be	made	 about	 the	 spaces	within	which	certain	understanding	 is	 limited.	 It	 is,	however,	both	prudent	and	necessary	to	outline	the	ways	in	which	analysis	and	discussion	of	events	is	approached.																																																									207	See	for	discussion	of	prosopographical	issues	specifically	focused	on	the	topic	of	the	Diadochoi:	Wheatley,	Liminia	3.	(1997).	pp.	61-70;	Wheatley,	in	Heckel	&	Tritle,	2009.	pp.	127-161,	especially	129-131;	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	84-98.	208	See	above	Ch.	2.1.4;	Ch.	2.1.8	for	discussion	of	there	two	accounts.	
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Both	 Wheatley	 and	 Meeus	 have	 quite	 correctly	 urged	 the	 implementation	 of	strict	 methodological	 adherence	 to	 what	 our	 source	material	 can,	 and	 cannot	reveal.	209		They	warn	against	the	employment	of	arguments	on	these	gaps	and	silence	 primarily	 based	 upon	 supposition	 at	 any	 level	 and	 argue	 that	hypothetical	 reconstruction	 does	 little	 to	 advance	 overall	 comprehension	 and	academic	 thought,	 especially	when	one	hypothetical	 construction	 is	made,	 and	then	 built	 upon	 by	 other,	 inherently	 less-stable,	 hypotheticals.	 In	 particular,	Meeus	has	noted	 that	without	explicit	 references	 to	events	 taking	place	within	the	ancient	sources,	our	ability	to	establish	historical	truth	is	removed.210		Within	this	study,	there	are	several	points	in	which	there	are	significant	gaps	in	our	 understanding	 of	 the	motivations,	 locations	 and	 events	within	 the	 lives	 of	Cassander,	Polyperchon	and	with	those	with	whom	they	interact,	which	require	some	 comment.	 However,	 these	 gaps	 in	 the	 source	 account	 should	 not	 be	mistaken	for	a	gap	in	events	taking	place	in	Europe.	During	the	conflict	between	Cassander	 Polyperchon,	 there	 are	 period	 where	 no	 explicit	 information	 is	available.	These	breaks	in	our	source	material	do	not	equate	to	a	stoppage	in	the	conflict	and	pivotal	events	must	have	occurred	during	these	breaks	in	available	information.	These	gaps	emerge	when	there	is	an	existence	between	two	nodal	historical	 points	 of	 certainty	 where	 the	 situation	 has	 altered	 for	 a	 myriad	 of	reasons.	While	it	would	be	desirable	to	have	all	the	known	ancient	sources	that	have	been	lost	available,	reality	dictates	that,	in	order	to	engage	with	these	men	and	 the	world	 they	 inhabited,	 they	must	be	viewed	with	only	 a	portion	of	 the	known	ancient	literature	at	hand.	It	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	study	to	determine	what	may,	or	may	not	have	existed	within	the	lost	literary	accounts,	nor	is	a	goal	to	insert	informed	assumptions	as	concrete	evidence	or	facts.		In	 these	 instances	 where	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 comment	 upon	 these	 gaps	 in	 the	surviving	historiographical	material,	this	study	clearly	highlights	these	areas	in																																																									209	Wheatley,	Liminia	3.	(1997).	p.	61,	67;	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	84,	94-95.	Also	see	McNeal,	Historia	19.	(1970).	p.	306.	For	a	select	overview	of	the	employment	of	arguments	from	silence	for	the	period	of	the	Diadochoi,	see:	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	84-98.	210	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	88-89.	
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order	 to	avoid	confusion	between	events	 that	can	be	understood	with	support	from	 ancient	 evidence	 and	 those	 that	 can	 only	 be	 tentatively	 assumed.	 These	assumptions	 are	 primarily	 focussed	 upon	 identifying	 possibilities	 in	circumstance	 and	 conveying	 the	 options	 that	may	 have	 existed	 for	 the	 people	they	effect.	 In	addition	to	these	 identifications,	 these	assumptions	are	not	built	upon	 to	 inform	 later	 events.	 As	 Meeus	 highlights,	 each	 instance	 must	 be	evaluated	 on	 its	 own	 merits	 before	 proceeding,211	and	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 make	some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 occurrence	 of	 historical	 events	 that	may,	 despite	the	impossibility	of	knowing	for	certain,	be	in	fact	true.212	The	mistake	however,	is	not	to	confuse	factual	certainty	with	assumption	and	informed	guesswork.		Ultimately,	 as	 Meeus	 highlights,	 a	 general	 employment	 of	 silence	 is	 not	 a	desirable,	nor	a	valid	approach	to	understanding	antiquity.213	However,	as	long	as	 there	exist	historical	nodal	points,	 interspersed	with	 these	gaps	 in	 the	 lives	and	 endeavours	 of	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 it	 is	 possible,	 with	 great	caution	 and	 conservative	 reconstructions,	 to	 suggest	 possible	 placements	 and	actions	of	 the	pair	during	 this	 time,	 as	 long	 as	 these	points	 are	understood	as	suggestions	and	not	mistaken	for	concrete	historical	certainty	and	built	upon	as	such	for	later	purposes.	It	is	this	approach	taken	by	the	current	study	and	every	attempt	has	been	made	to	ensure	clear	distinction	between	factual	account	and	tentative	hypotheses.		An	example	of	the	way	in	which	this	investigation	engages	with	silence	and	the	problematic	issues	that	result	from	it	can	be	found	with	the	interaction	between	Antipater	 and	 Alexander	 following	 Antiapter’s	 replacement	 with	 as	 regent	 of	Macedon	by	Craterus	in	324.214	
	
	
																																																								211	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	84.	212	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	pp.	94-95.		213	Meeus,	in	Alonso	Troncoso,	2013.	p.	94.	214	See	Ch.	5.2.	But	also	Pitt	&	Richardson,	CQ.	67	(forthcoming	2017)	for	an	employment	of	the	same	approach.	
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Chapter	3:	The	Relationship	between	Antipater	and	Alexander.	
	Before	 engaging	 directly	 with	 the	 war	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	following	Antipater’s	 death	 in	319,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 understand	 the	 career	 of	Antipater.	Therefore	this	chapter	explores	the	career	of	Antipater,	from	his	role	in	 the	 expansion	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 into	Greece	by	Philip	 II	 until	 324,	and	Alexander’s	 replacement	 of	 Antipater	 as	 regent	 of	Macedon,	with	 another	eminent	officer	from	the	army,	Craterus.	By	doing	so,	this	chapter	provides	the	groundwork	and	context	for	the	way	in	which	Cassander	experienced	the	royal	family	 prior	 to	 his	 rise	 to	 prominence	 in	 324,	 and	 his	mission	 to	 Babylon.	 Of	central	 concern	 is	 the	 dynamic	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Antipater	 and	Alexander	III	over	the	course	of	Alexander’s	life.	The	evolving	dynamic	between	the	two	is	significant	to	the	greater	scope	of	this	inquiry	because	of	the	ways	in	which	this	would	affect	Cassander’s	attitude	towards,	and	engagement	with,	the	Argeads	following	319	and	the	war	with	Polyperchon.	It	is	also	relevant	to	what	is	known	about	Polyperchon’s	career	due	to	his	connections	with	Craterus.		During	 Philip	 II’s	 expansion	 of	 Macedonian	 power	 into	 Greece,	 Antipater	 had	played	 a	 central	 role	 as	 both	 a	 military	 leader	 and	 a	 political	 negotiator	 for	Philip’s	cause	 in	order	 to	secure	greater	 influence	over	 the	Greek	Cities.	These	activities	provided	Antipater	with	invaluable	practical	experience	of	engaging	in	the	 Greek	 political	 sphere.	 It	 also	 demonstrated	 that	 Philip	 II,	 and	 later	Alexander	III,	believed	that	Antipater	had	the	skills	and	knowledge	needed	to	act	on	their	behalf	during	the	periods	of	time	when	they	were	away	from	court.	This	is	 also	 evident	much	 later	when	Antipater	would	 act	 as	 regent	 in	 Alexander’s	absence	during	his	 expansion	 into	 the	East	 in	334.	However,	 despite	 the	 trust	evidently	placed	in	Antipater,	tensions	did	arise	between	the	regent	and	king.	As	Alexander	 ventured	 further	 east	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 pair	 became	increasingly	strained	for	a	number	of	reasons,	including	the	extension	of	supply	lines	between	Macedon	and	Alexander’s	ever-advancing	army	and	the	depletion	
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of	 manpower	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland	 as	 well	 as	 unrest	 within	Macedonian	controlled	Greece.215		Little	is	known	of	Antipater’s	early	years,	and	this	gap	may	account	for	the	lack	of	 modern	 scholarship	 dedicated	 to	 his	 life.216		 	 His	 date	 of	 birth	 has	 been	suggested	to	be	around	399/8,217	making	him	one	of	the	oldest	members	of	the	Diadochoi	when	Alexander	 died	 in	 323.	Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 extant	 accounts	 of	Antipater’s	 early	 life,	 the	 few	 references	 that	 exist	 within	 the	 ancient	 literary	corpus	 do	 permit	 some	 reasonable	 inference	 about	 his	 rise	 within	 the	Macedonian	 Court.218	The	 consensus	 among	modern	 scholars	 draws	 upon	 the	accounts	 contained	 within	 the	 Suda,	 most	 notably	 that	 Antipater	 wrote	 a	historical	 work	 on	 Perdiccas	 III’s	 Illyrian	 campaigns,	 “τὰς	 Περδίκκου	 πράξεις	
Ἰλλυρικάς.”219 	The	 ability	 to	 write	 this	 history	 would	 at	 least	 suggest	 that	Antipater	held	an	influential	position	under	Philip	II’s	predecessors,	Perdiccas	III	and	Amyntas	IV.220	If	so,	such	a	position	would	have	provided	him	with	political	and	military	experience	prior	to	Philip’s	succession.		
	Antipater’s	emergence	into	the	ancient	sources	takes	place	during	the	expansion	of	Macedonian	influence	under	Philip	II	and	the	Third	Sacred	War	between	356	-	346.221		 It	 is	 evident	 that	 by	 this	 time	 Antipater	 was	 a	 trusted	 leader	 and	 an	integral	 part	 of	 Philip’s	 plans	 and	 that	 a	 very	 strong	 relationship	 existed	between	the	two.	Antipater	played	a	leading	role	in	the	peace	negotiations	with	Athens	in	346	on	behalf	of	the	king	during	Philip’s	expansion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.222	These	 negotiations	 and	 the	 subsequent	 peace	 treaty	 brought	 the																																																									215	Heckel,	1992.	p.	40.	216	Kanatsulis,	 Hellenika.	 16.	 (1958/59).	 pp.	 14–64;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 38,	 who	does	highlight	 that	despite	 the	dearth	of	 information	 regarding	 the	 families	 of	the	 Diadochoi,	 the	 Antipatrids	 are	 second	 only	 to	 the	 royal	 Argead	 family	 in	terms	of	available	information;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	332.	217	Suda,	 2704;	 Berve,	 Vol	 II.	 1926.	 p.	 46;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 38;	 Baynham,	 in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	333;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	35.	218	Heckel,	1992.	p.	39;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	333.	219	Suda,	2703.	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	17.	220	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	335;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	35;	221	Kanatsulis,		Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	17.	222	Din.	Dem.	28;	Just.	9.4.5.	
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hostilities	and	the	Third	Sacred	War	to	a	close.223		 In	addition	to	these	military	positions,	 Antipater	 would	 take	 a	 more	 politically	 focussed	 role	 when	 he	assumed	 the	 position	 of	 regent	 during	 times	 when	 Philip	 was	 away	 from	court.224	The	 significance	 of	 Antipater’s	 role	 in	 these	 proceedings	 cannot	 be	overstated.	Bringing	 the	politically	 charged	 and	 sensitive	 talks	 to	 a	 favourable	conclusion	 demonstrates	 not	 only	 that	 Antipater	 possessed	 the	 ability	 to	represent	 Macedonian	 interests,	 but	 also	 that	 he	 was	 trusted	 by	 Philip	 II	 to	conduct	 political	 embassies	 with	 the	 Greek	 cities.225	This	 provided	 Antipater	with	vital	experience	that	would	later	be	beneficial	to	his	tenure	as	regent	under	Alexander	III.	
	Heckel	has	suggested	that	it	was	during	his	time	in	Athens,	after	the	negotiation	of	 the	 peace	 treaty,	 that	 Antipater	 came	 into	 contact	with,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	befriended,	 eminent	 figures	 in	 Athenian	 politics.226	This	 engagement	 with	 the	politics	of	southern	Greece	would	give	him	the	experience	and	ability	to	interact	with	influential	figures	and	to	understand	political	sentiment	in	ways	that	were	vital	to	implementing	and	maintaining	Macedonian	control	over	the	Greek	cities	during	 Alexander’s	 absence	 from	 Europe	 during	 his	 expansion	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	into	the	east.	
	Among	 the	 surviving	 letters	 of	 the	 philosopher	 Isocrates	 is	 one	 written	 to	Antipater	on	the	behalf	of	one	of	 the	philosopher’s	students,	Diodotus.227	If	 the	letter	is	genuine,228	it	offers	valuable	insight	into	Antipater’s	direct	interactions	and	 engagement	 with	 Athens,	 particularly	 those	 within	 the	 Athenian	philosophical	community.	The	date	of	 the	 letter	has	been	placed	around	340	–	
																																																								223	Plut.	Phoc.	26.4,	30.4;	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	17,	34;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	40;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	336;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	35.	224	Isoc.	Ep.	4.	Garnjobst	argues	that,	because	the	Isocrates	letter	was	addressed	to	 Antipater	 rather	 than	 Philip,	 Antipater	 had	 already	 assumed	 the	 regency.	Garnjobst,	2006.	p.	274.	225	This	trust	by	Philip	of	Antipater	is	echoed	in	Plutarch,	Plut.	Mor.	179B.	226	Heckel,	2006.	p.	35.	227	Isoc.	Ep.	4.	228	Kanatsulis,	 Hellenika.	 16.	 (1958/59).	 p.	 25,	 26;	 Baynham,	 in	 Worthington,	1994.	p.	336;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	35.	
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339,	during	the	recommencement	of	hostilities	between	Athens	and	Macedon,229	demonstrating	that	even	during	times	of	conflict,	Antipater	maintained	contact	with	eminent	members	of	Athenian	society.	
	While	 the	 letter	 is	 presented	 as	 official	 and	 unemotional,	 Isocrates	 highlights	and	emphasises	the	goodwill	that	exists	between	the	two	men	and	the	fondness	he	 felt	 towards	 Antipater.230	The	 closeness	 implied	 by	 this,	 as	 well	 as	 his	connection	 with	 Aristotle,	 suggests	 that	 Antipater	 was	 engaged	 with	 the	Athenian	 philosophical	 community	 and	 also	 that	 sections	 of	 that	 community	were	 willing	 to	 maintain	 personal	 correspondence	 with	 him	 even	 during	 the	conflict	 between	 Athens	 and	 Macedon.	 These	 connections	 demonstrate	 that	Antipater	 both	 forged	 and	maintained	 strong	 ties	 within	 the	 Greek	 Peninsula	throughout	 his	 life.231	A	 number	 of	 conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 this.	 First,	that	 Antipater	 was	 an	 educated	 man.	 Second,	 that	 he	 had	 the	 warmth	 and	emotional	 intelligence	 to	 develop	 and	 sustain	 friendships	 under	 difficult	conditions	 and	 third,	 that	 he	was	 both	willing	 and	 able	 to	 use	 these	 personal	skills	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 ruler	 of	 Macedon.	 	 Given	 the	 later	 significance	Cassander	placed	on	gathering	support	 from	Southern	Greece,	 it	seems	that	he	had	 learned	 from	 his	 father’s	 connections	 with	 eminent	 members	 of	 Greek	society	and	the	importance	placed	on	maintaining	these.	After	Antipater’s	death	in	319,	Cassander	made	good	use	of	his	father’s	influence	among	the	Greek	cities	within	 the	Greek	 Peninsula	 to	 build	 his	 own	 support	 base	 in	 the	 conflict	with	Polyperchon	for	the	regency	of	Macedon	
	It	 is	 prudent	 at	 this	 time	 to	 touch	 on	 the	 connection	 between	 Antipater	 and	another	eminent	Greek	philosopher,	Aristotle.	 	Aristotle’s	tutelage	of	Alexander	is	 well	 known	 to	 modern	 scholarship.232	While	 only	 briefly	 referred	 to	 in	 the	ancient	sources,	it	can	be	deduced	that	a	long-standing	rapport	existed	between	Aristotle	 and	 Antipater,	 most	 likely	 beginning	 when	 Antipater	 undertook																																																									229	Van	Hook,	1945.	p.	411.	230	Isoc.	Ep.	4.12-13;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	336.	231	cf.	Baynham,	in	Palagia	&	Tracy.	2003.	p.	24.	232	Ael.	VH.	3.17;	D.L.	5.4;	Dio.	Chr.	49.4;	Just.	12.6.17,	12.16.8;	Plut.	Alex.	7;	Plut.	
Mor.	327e;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	20-1;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	51.	
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tutelage	 under	 the	 philosopher.233	Their	 political	 enemies,	 such	 as	 Olympias,	would	later	use	the	long-standing	relationship	between	the	two	after	the	death	of	 Alexander	 in	 323,	 to	 discredit	 them	 and	 accuse	 them	 of	 Alexander’s	assassination.234	Accusations	would	also	be	brought	against	Cassander,	who	was	also	present	at	Babylon	and	was	accused,	particularly	by	Alexander’s	mother,	of	being	the	facilitator	of	the	king’s	death.235	
	The	evidence	for	this	relationship	comes	from	the	accounts	of	Arrian,	Diodorus	and	the	biographies	of	Plutarch’s	Life	of	Alexander	and	Diogenes	Laertius’	Life	of	
Aristotle.	 These	 accounts	 for	 the	most	 part	 refer	 to	 events	 towards	 the	 end	 of	Aristotle’s	 life	 and	 in	Diogenes’	 case,	 after	 his	 death.	 	However,	 the	 context	 of	each	 of	 these	 references	 implies	 that	 Antipater	 and	 Aristotle	 were	 well	acquainted.	 Given	 this,	 and	 knowing	 that	 Cassander	 was	 of	 a	 similar	 age	 to	Alexander	and	that	Antipater’s	position	and	influence	within	the	court	may	have	allowed	 Cassander	 to	 receive	 his	 education	 there	 and	 to	 act	 as	 one	 of	Alexander’s	 paides,236	it	 is	 plausible	 that,	 along	 his	 association	with	 Antipater,	the	 philosopher	 also	 tutored	 Cassander	 during	 his	 tenure	 in	Macedon.237	This	would	suggest	that	Cassander,	was	roughly	the	same	age	as	Alexander	and	that	knew	 the	young	prince	as	 the	 two	grew	up	and	 that	he	 received	an	education	similar	to	that	of	the	future	king.		The	relationship	between	Alexander	III	and	Antipater	began	amicably.	As	one	of	the	most	powerful	elites	in	Macedon	under	Philip	II,	Antipater	had	a	great	deal	of	 contact	with	 the	 young	prince.	During	 the	 year	 of	 340,	when	Philip	was	 on	campaign	against	Byzantium,	Antipater	was	called	away	 to	Thrace	and	 left	 the																																																									233	Suda.	2703;	D.L.	4.8-9,	5.11-13,	6.44,	66;	Baynham,	 in	Worthington.	1994.	p.	335.	n.	16;	Baynham,	in	Palagia	&	Tracy,	2003.	p.	24.	234	Bosworth,	1988.	pp.	174-5.	235	cf.	Diod.	19.11.8;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	171.	236	Antipater	 himself	 was	 recorded	 as	 a	 student	 of	 Artistotle	 (cf.	 Suda.	 2703;	Berve,	Vol.	1.	pp.	4-5;	Adams,	1975.	p.	43-44).	For	recent	evaluation	of	the	Paides	
Basilikoi	 see:	 Carney,	 in	 Howe	 &	 Reames,	 2008.	 pp.	 145-164,	 particularly	 in	regards	to	the	composition	of	the	group.	pp.	148-149.	237	This	position	too	is	supported	by	Cassander’s	time	in	Babylon	in	323,	when	during	 a	 confrontation	 between	 the	 pair;	 Alexander	 accuses	 Cassander	 of	employing	Aristotelian	rhetoric	(Plut.	Alex.	74;	Adams,	1975.	pp.	44-45).	
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regency	in	Alexander’s	control.238		The	decision	for	Antipater	to	leave	Alexander	as	 an	unsupervised	 regent	while	 both	he	 and	Philip	 II	were	 absent	 from	Pella	does	suggest	that	significant	trust	had	developed	in	the	young	royal’s	ability	to	command.	
	Following	 the	 assassination	 of	 Philip	 II	 in	 336,	 Antipater	 was	 an	 influential	supporter	of	Alexander,	playing	a	key	role	 in	his	claim	to	the	throne.	Antipater	would	 aid	 the	 young	 prince	 in	 securing	 his	 position	 as	 the	 next	 king	 of	 the	Macedonian	 Empire.	 Just	 as	with	 his	 father,	 Antipater	would	 also	 serve	 as	 an	advisor	to	the	young	king	and	continue	to	maintain	Macedonian	interests	in	the	Greek	Peninsula.	The	assassination	of	Philip	II	at	Aegae	in	336	created	a	volatile	political	 situation	 for	 Alexander. 239 	He	 faced	 a	 hostile	 court	 with	 various	prominent	 Macedonians	 in	 place	 with	 enough	 support	 to	 challenge	 his	 claim.		Alexander	was	also	concerned	by	a	possible	revolt	from	the	Greek	cities	during	this	 period	 of	 unrest	 and	 uncertainty	 when	 lack	 of	 clear	 control	 could	 lessen	Macedonian	 dominance	 of	 the	 region.240 	While	 there	 were	 other	 potential	claimants	 for	 the	 throne	 in	 the	 highly	 pragmatic	 Macedonian	 Court,	 it	 seems	likely	 that	 Philip	 II	 had	 been	 grooming	 Alexander	 for	 succession	 since	 his	youth.241	Although	Alexander	would	have	been	seen	as	the	favoured	choice	over	other	possible	contenders	such	as	his	half	brother	Arrhidaeus,	whose	disability	saw	him	discounted	as	a	serious	rival,242	the	volatile	nature	of	Macedonian	royal	succession	 would	 mean	 that	 Alexander’s	 claim	 to	 the	 throne	 would	 not	 go	unchallenged.	Alexander	needed	a	strong	support	base	 from	powerful	political	and	 military	 figures	 among	 the	 Macedonian	 aristocracy	 to	 bolster	 his	 claim.	During	this	time	of	uncertainty,	Antipater	brought	the	political	ability	honed	in	foreign	 political	 affairs	 to	 bear	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 Court	 to	 secure	 the	ascension	 of	 Philip’s	 son.	 Soon	 after	 Philip’s	 murder,	 Antipater,	 the	 young	
																																																								238	Plut.	Alex	9.1;	 cf.	 Diod.	 16.76.3;	 Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	 (1958/59).	 p.	 27;	Heckel,	2006,	p.	35.	239	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	25;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	337.	240	Diod.	17.3.2.	241	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	19.		242	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	28.	
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Alexander	 and	 one	 Alexander	 Lyncestes, 243 	moved	 swiftly	 to	 remove	 any	opposition	 within	 the	 court	 by	 arranging	 the	 deaths	 of	 the	 influential	Heromenes	and	Arrhabaeus,244	Alexander’s	half-brother	Attalus245	and	Amyntas	IV,	the	son	of	Perdiccas	III,	the	king	deposed	by	Philip	II.246	Their	deaths	would	cement	Alexander’s	claim	as	successor	to	Philip	II.247	
	Antipater’s	 actions	 in	 securing	 Alexander’s	 succession	 were	 not	 without	 self-interest.	The	fact	that	he	was	so	closely	aligned	with	Philip	II	and	Alexander	III	meant	that	he	risked	dangerous	repercussions	if	a	rival	to	Alexander	was	able	to	build	 a	 substantial	 support	 base	 and	make	 a	 successful	 claim	 to	 the	 throne	 of	Macedon.248	Therefore,	 shortly	 after	 Philip	 II’s	 murder,	 Antipater	 was	 key	 to	engineering	 a	 strong	 support	 base	 for	 Alexander	 III	 by	 instructing	 Alexander	Lyncestes	 to	 proclaim	 Alexander	 III	 as	 the	 new	 King	 of	 Macedon. 249 	By	engineering	 this	 support	 without	 being	 the	 initiator	 of	 Alexander’s	 claim,	Antipater	demonstrated	to	the	wider	court	that	Alexander’s	support	base	among	the	 Macedonian	 political	 sphere	 was	 greater	 than	 may	 have	 been	 initially	perceived.		This	he	did	in	an	attempt	to	mitigate	potential	claims	of	others	who	still	 had	 a	 desire	 to	 seize	 the	 throne.	 The	 move	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 Antipater	protecting	 himself	 against	 any	 possibility	 of	 Alexander’s	 claim	 failing.	 He	was	not	 the	 first	 person	 to	 proclaim	 Alexander’s	 rule,	 but	 there	 were	 two	 results	from	 the	 support	 that	 he	 offered.	 By	 organising	 others	 to	 be	 open	 in	 their	support	of	Alexander	before	he	was,	Antipater	reduced	the	level	of	personal	risk	that	 he	 would	 have	 faced	 should	 Alexander	 face	 serious	 opposition	 to	 his	succession.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 he	 was	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 his	 support	 and	continue	 to	 maintain	 the	 close	 ties	 with	 the	 king	 that	 had	 been	 established	during	Philip	II’s	reign.																																																									243	Heckel,	1992.	p.	40;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	337;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19.	244	Arr.	1.25.1.	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	26;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	52.	245	Diod.	17.2.3-6;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	62.	246	Arr.	1.5.4;	Just.	12.6.14;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	23.	247	Carney,	2006.	p.	43.	248	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	339.	249	Just.	11.2.2;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	40;	Heckel,	2002.	p.	11,	35;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19;	Bosworth,	 1988.	 p.	 26.	Arrian’s	 account	 (1.25,	 1-2)	 relays	 that	Amyntas’s	wife	Cyanna	was	widowed	and	available	for	marriage	by	summer	of	335.		
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Under	 the	new	king,	Antipater	was	able	 to	 continue	 in	 the	 role	of	 advisor	and	military	 leader	 that	 he	 had	 enjoyed	 under	 Philip	 II,	 making	 him	 a	 visibly	dominant	 figure	 within	 the	 capital.	 	 While	 not	 attested	 directly	 within	 the	ancient	sources,	but	because	of	his	previous	experience	in	the	role	under	Philip	II,	 Antipater	 would	 continue	 to	 assume	 the	 regency	 on	 behalf	 of	 Alexander	during	 the	 new	 king’s	 absence	 from	 Pella.250	As	 one	 of	 Alexander’s	 strongest	supporters	 the	 close	 relationship	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 trust	 that	 had	 previously	existed	between	the	new	king	and	Antipater	were	still	in	place.		
	The	eastward	expansion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire	would	test	the	relationship	between	 Alexander	 and	 Antipater,	 who	was	 left	 in	Macedon	 as	 regent	 during	Alexander’s	 absence.	 The	 strain	 that	 was	 now	 placed	 on	 the	 relationship	between	the	two	can	be	attributed	to	the	growing	demands	placed	on	Antipater	by	 Alexander	 for	 fresh	 supplies	 of	 Macedonian	 troops	 for	 the	 army.251	At	 the	same	 time,	 Antipater	 also	 had	 the	 unenviable	 task	 of	 maintaining	 a	 peaceful	home	front	with	the	Greeks	with	fewer	military	resources.	The	Greeks	had	been	subjugated	by	Macedonian	 rule	but	 this	did	not	mean	 that	 they	were	pacified.	There	were	 a	 number	 of	 instances	 during	Alexander’s	 reign	when	unrest,	 and	even	 revolt,	 was	 threatened	 in	 Greece.	 The	 person	who	was	 expected	 to	 deal	with	this	Greek	unrest	while	Alexander	was	absent	from	Europe	was	Antipater	and	he	had	to	do	this	despite	the	diminishing	military	strength	at	his	disposal	as	troops	were	diverted	into	the	east	 in	response	to	the	king’s	orders.	 In	order	to	maintain	control	in	the	Greek	Peninsula,	Antipater	was	required	to	use	both	his	dwindling	military	strength	and	his	substantial	political	skills	and	cunning.	
	Antipater	 was	 under	 greatest	 pressure	 during	 the	 spring	 of	 336	 with	 the	commencement	of	Alexander’s	great	expansion	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 into	the	 east.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 Alexander	 from	 Macedon	 itself,	 Antipater	 was	assigned	 the	 regency	 of	Macedon,	 giving	 him	 command	 of	 both	Macedon	 and	
																																																								250	Heckel,	1992.	p.	40;	Heckel,	2002.	p.	35.	251	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10	(1984).	p.	79;	Hammond,	JHS.	109.	(1989).	pp.	62-64;	cf.	Diod.	17.17.3-5;	Just.	11.6.2;	Plut.	Alex.	15.1	
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Greece,	making	him	the	most	powerful	single	person	in	the	region.252	In	addition	to	the	regency,	Antipater	assumed	Alexander’s	title	of	hegemon	of	the	Corinthian	League,	 thereby	giving	him	authority	over	 the	 garrisons	 throughout	Greece.253	The	task	for	Antipater	was	clear.	He	was	to	maintain	peace	within	Macedon	and	the	Greek	Peninsula	and	quell	 any	hint	of	 revolt	 should	 this	occur.	 In	addition	Antipater	was	 expected	 to	 provide	 Alexander	 and	 his	 army	with	 fresh	 troops	and	supplies	during	the	indeterminate	period	of	time	that	the	campaign	would	take,	allowing	Alexander	to	continue	his	endeavours.254	
	In	order	to	achieve	these	objectives,	Alexander	left	Antipater	in	charge	of	a	force	consisting	of	12,000	infantry	along	with	1,500	cavalry,	while	taking	roughly	the	same	 number	 of	 troops	 over	 the	Hellespont	 into	 Anatolia.255	Alexander	would	have	 been	 confident	 of	 winning	 the	 support	 of	 Macedonian	 mercenary	phalanxes	 already	 stationed	 within	 Asia	 Minor,256	ultimately	 expanding	 the	strength	of	his	army	with	regional	additions	as	his	invasion	against	the	Persian	Empire	progressed,	from	a	size	of	between	30,000	infantry	and	4,000	cavalry	up	to	40,000	and	5,500	respectively.257	There	was	still	the	very	real	possibility	of	a	Greek	 revolt	 while	 Alexander	 III	 was	 absent	 from	 Macedon	 and	 with	 little	chance	of	reinforcement	from	the	king	should	a	general	revolt	occur,	a	force	of	roughly	 13,500	 men	 might	 seem	 undersized	 for	 the	 task	 facing	 Antipater.	 In	addition	to	this	Macedonian	core	of	troops,	Antipater	would	also	have	also	been	able	 to	 recruit	 levies	 from	 the	 various	 garrisons	 and	 militias	 from	 the	neighbouring	 Greek	 cities.	 If	 his	military	 strength	was	 left	 intact,	 quarantined																																																									252	Diod.	17.17.5.	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	35;	cf.	Badian,	Phoenix.	17.	(1963).	p.	248.	253	Kanatsulis,	 Hellenika.	 16.	 (1958/59).	 p.	 37.	 For	 more	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	Corinthian	League,	see:	Bosworth,	1998.	pp.	187–197.	254	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	45.	255	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	45;	Bosworth	suggests	(1988.	p.	259)	that	Alexander’s	 forces	 consisted	 of	 about	 15,000	men	once	he	had	 arrived	 in	Asia	Minor.	For	a	concise	record	of	the	size	of	Alexander’s	army	throughout	his	campaigns,	as	reported	in	the	ancient	sources,	see:	Heckel,	2008.	pp.	158-163.	256	Diod.	17.7.10.	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	259.	257	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	259.	Berve	Vol.	I.	1926.	pp.	177-8;	Brunt,	JHS.	83.	(1963).	pp.	32–6;	Bosworth	1980a.	pp.	98-9.	The	disparities	within	modern	scholarship	are	understandable	considering	the	various	numbers	of	troops	Alexander	had	in	334	 in	the	ancient	sources.	For	a	recent	catalogue	of	 the	reports	on	the	size	of	Alexander’s	army	throughout	his	campaign,	see:	Heckel,	2008.	p.	158–163.	
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from	Alexander’s	 constant	demands	 for	 fresh	 troops,	 the	 task	of	maintaining	a	peaceful	home	front	with	the	available	military	resources	may	have	been	more	possible	 for	 Antipater.	 However,	 this	 would	 not	 be	 the	 case	 and	 Alexander	would	make	 a	 constant	 series	 of	 requests	 for	 resupply	 by	 Antipater	 over	 the	coming	years.	These	requests	for	reinforcement	would	put	serious	strain	on	the	relationship	between	Antipater	and	Alexander.	As	Antipater’s	military	reserves	were	drawn	off	into	Persia,	he	was	also	occupied	in	simultaneously	engaging	in	mitigating	threats	to	the	security	of	the	heartland	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.	
	Antipater	must	have	known	that	a	sizable	portion	of	his	relatively	small	military	force,	and	the	body	of	Macedonian	citizens	who	could	be	pressed	 into	military	service,	 would	 be	 expected	 to	 go	 to	 replenish	 the	 royal	 army’s	 dwindling	numbers	 in	 the	 east,	 numbers	 that	 were	 constantly	 being	 diminished	 by	 the	rigours	of	a	military	campaign.	This	removed	vital	resources	from	his	command	that	he	could	use	against	resistance	to	Macedonian	hegemony	within	Greece.	He	would	 therefore	 need	 to	 use	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 him	 effectively	 and	economically.	By	relying	on	the	existing	relationships	with	the	Greek	cities	that	he	 had	 developed	 during	 Philip	 II’s	 expansion	 of	 Macedonian	 hegemony	 and	using	political	policy,	rather	 than	military	strength,	Antipater	would	be	able	 to	effectively	 manage	 the	 region	 during	 the	 absence	 of	 both	 Alexander	 and	 the	majority	of	the	Macedonian	military	forces.	
	An	 insight	 into	 how	 Antipater	 was	 able	 to	 manage	 the	 Greek	 Peninsula	 by	political	means,	rather	than	by	direct	military	intervention,	can	be	found	within	the	 statutes	 of	 the	 Corinthian	 League.	 Should	 one	 of	 the	 signatory	 city-states	choose	to	violate	the	general	peace	in	the	region	and	rebel	against	Macedonian	rule,	 the	 other	 members	 of	 the	 league	 were	 compelled	 to	 provide	 military	strength	 in	 order	 to	 reinstate	 a	 peaceful	 status	 quo.258	However	 in	 order	 to	encourage	 a	 willingness	 amongst	 the	 Greek	 cities	 to	 subjugate	 dissidence,	Antipater	would	 still	need	 to	engage	politically	with	 the	Greek	 cities	and	 their	garrisons.	He	needed	 to	maintain	a	strong	and	close	relationship	at	a	personal	level	to	maintain	and	nurture	favourable	pro-Macedonian	sentiment	in	order	to																																																									258	IG.	II2	236.	
	 60	
avoid	 the	very	real	possibility	of	a	general	 rebellion	 throughout	 the	Peninsula.		In	 order	 to	 keep	 close	 contact	within	 the	Greek	 cities	 and	 strengthen	his	 own	influence	 with	 the	 Peninsula,	 Antipater	 began	 to	 appoint	 men	 who	 were	personally	loyal	and	dedicated	to	him,	rather	than	to	the	royal	household,259	to	the	 position	 of	 governor	 of	 the	 various	 Greek	 city-states.	 These	 appointments	have	been	seen	as	a	manoeuvre	by	Antipater	to	centralise	power	around	himself	and	as	a	possible	threat	to	Alexander	III’s	rule	within	the	region.260		While	 it	 is	certain	 that	 the	appointment	of	men	personally	 loyal	 to	him,	rather	than	 to	 the	 monarchy,	 did	 increase	 Antipater’s	 personal	 influence	 within	 the	Greek	 Peninsula,	 there	 is	 little	 to	 suggest	 that	 any	 attempt	 was	 made	 by	 the	regent	 to	 break	 away	 from	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 or	 to	 subvert	 the	 rule	 of	Alexander.	 As	 regent,	 the	 relatively	 small	 military	 force	 available	 to	 him	required	Antipater	to	employ	strategic	political	tactics	to	maintain	a	quiet	home	front	 during	 the	 absence	 of	 Alexander	 and	 the	 greater	 component	 of	 the	Macedonian	 military	 machine.	 With	 the	 various	 Macedonian	 garrisons	 within	Greece	being	 led	by	men	on	whom	he	was	able	 to	depend,	Antipater	would	be	able	 to	 react	 swiftly	 and	deal	with	any	possible	 issues	 that	may	arise,	without	the	need	to	defer	to	Alexander’s	authority	and	the	problems	resulting	from	the	time	 delays	 involved	 in	 communication	 with	 the	 king.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	creation	of	a	personal	powerbase	centred	on	him,	rather	than	on	Alexander	III,	was	 done	 for	 pragmatic	 reasons,	 rather	 than	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 subvert	Argead	rule	within	Macedon	and	the	Greek	Peninsula.	There	is	also	no	reason	to	believe	that	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 Antipater	 meant	 that	 the	 newly	 appointed	governors	 were	 not	 also	 loyal	 to	 Alexander.	 If	 this	 were	 so,	 then	 Antipater’s	actions	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 him	using	 his	 personal	 network	 of	 loyalties	 to	 support	Alexander’s	 position	 as	 ruler.	 Alexander	must	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 Antipater’s	skills	 as	 an	astute	politician	and	 this	was	one	of	 the	 reasons	 that	he	had	been																																																									259	See	 for	 example,	 the	 record	 of	 Rhodian	 garrison	 (Diod.	 18.8.1-4.)	 and	 the	garrison	of	Munychia	(Diod.	18.18.4;	Plut.	Phoc.	27.3.).	260	Particularly	by	Olympias,	who	attempted	to	use	these	appointments	to	undermine	Antiapter	in	the	eyes	of	Alexander	during	his	eastern	expansion	of	the	Macedonain	Empire	(cf.	Arr.	7.12.4;	Diod.	17.117.1;	Just.	12.12.9).	For	more	discussion	of	the	rivalry	between	Olympias	and	Antipater,	see	below.	
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entrusted	with	 the	position	of	 regent	 in	Alexander’s	absence.	These	actions	by	Antipater	 would	 influence	 Cassander	 in	 his	 behaviour	 immediately	 after	 his	father’s	 death	 in	 319.	 While	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 relatively	 little	 initial	support	for	him	in	the	Macedonian	Court	itself	after	Polyperchon’s	appointment	as	 Antipater’s	 successor,261	it	 is	 clear	 that	 Cassander	 was	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 his	father’s	existing	base	of	support	within	the	Greek	garrisons	to	bolster	his	claim	to	the	Regency	of	Macedon.		It	was	not	long	before	Antipater	faced	unrest	within	the	Greek	Peninsula.	During	Alexander’s	 absence	 from	 Macedon,	 Sparta	 and	 its	 king	 Agis	 III	 had	 been	 in	negotiations	 with	 the	 Persian	 Empire	 for	 financial	 aid	 in	 order	 to	 continue	hostilities	with	 the	Macedonian	 forces	 back	 in	Greece.262	This	was	 achieved	 in	333	when	the	Persians	provided	Agis	with	money	and	warships	in	order	to	open	up	 a	 second	 front	 against	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 and	 potentially	 stall	Alexander’s	 progression	 eastwards.263	However,	 after	 the	 news	 of	 Alexander’s	victory	at	Issus	in	332	was	known,	the	Spartan	king	chose	to	defer	direct	action	in	Greece	and	 instead	 focus	his	attentions	on	bringing	Crete	under	his	control,	which	it	seems	he	was	able	to	do.264	Control	of	Crete	would	serve	as	a	vital	link	between	 Sparta	 and	 the	 Persian	 Empire	 and	would	 also	 allow	 Agis	 to	 recruit	mercenary	 troops	 to	bolster	his	 own	 forces.265	Agis	 initiated	hostilities	 against	Macedon	in	the	summer	of	331	in	the	Peloponnese	by	laying	siege	to	the	city	of	Megalopolis.266	For	Antipater,	it	was	vital	to	remove	Agis	and	Sparta	as	a	threat	as	soon	as	possible.	If	he	failed	to	do	so,	he	risked	possible	defection	from	Greek																																																									261	cf.	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	162-166.	262	Arr.	2.13.4-6;	Curt.	4.1.38-40;	Diod.	17.48.	1.	Bosworth	(Phoenix	29	(1975),	p.	27)	 correctly	 highlights	 that	Agis’s	war	 should	not	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 revolt	 against	Macedonian	 dominion	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	 but	 as	 an	 aggressive	 action	 against	one	of	 the	Macedonian	allies.	This	 is	because	Sparta	was	not	 a	member	of	 the	Corinthian	League,	nor	was	it	a	signatory	to	the	Common	Peace	after	the	battle	of	 Chaeronea	 in	 338	 (cf.	 Aesch.	 3.254;	 Bosworth,	 1988.	 p.	 198.);	 Adams,	 Anc.	
World.	10	(1984).	p.	81.	263	Curt.	4.8.15;	Diod.	17.48.1-2;	Bosworth,	1988.	pp.	199-200.	264	Arr.	2.13.6;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	200.	265 	Arr.	 2.12.6;	 Curt	 4.1.38-40;	 Diod.	 17.48.2;	 Kanatsulis,	 Hellenika.	 16.	(1958/59).	p.	55;	Potter,	ABSA.	79.	(1984).	p.	233.	266	For	 the	various	dating	 issues	of	 the	Agis	 campaign,	 see:	Bosworth,	Phoenix,	29.	(1975).	pp.	35-38.	
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cities	 over	 to	 Agis,	 thereby	 destabilising	 the	 region	 and	 resulting	 in	 further	unrest.	
	However	 events	 closer	 and	more	 immediate	 to	Macedon	 itself	 would	 distract	Antipater	from	sole	focus	on	the	war	with	Agis	in	the	Peloponnese.	At	much	the	same	 time	 as	 Agis’s	 declaration	 of	 war,	 trouble	 in	 Thrace	 arose	 when	 the	Macedonian	 governor	 of	 the	 region,	 Memnon,267	instigated	 an	 uprising	 by	 the	population	against	Alexander	and	the	Macedonian	Empire.268	For	Antipater,	the	prospect	of	a	 full-scale	 revolt	 in	Macedon’s	neighbouring	province	would	have	been	 daunting	 and	 the	 ramifications	 devastating	 if	 it	 was	 successful.	 Should	Memnon	 be	 able	 to	 break	 the	 Thracians	 away	 from	 Macedonian	 control,	 the	supply	 lines	to	Alexander	 in	Asia	would	be	cut.	 In	addition,	Macedon	would	be	isolated	 with	 only	 half	 the	 military	 strength	 needed	 to	 defend	 itself.	 This	isolation	would	present	Macedon	in	a	weakened	position	and	would	also	risk	the	unacceptable	prospect	of	 further	unrest	 in	 the	Greek	Peninsula.	Antipater	was	swift	to	react	to	the	revolt.	As	Diodorus	states,	Antipater	mobilised	the	entirety	of	his	military	strength	and	marched	swiftly	against	Thrace	in	order	to	quell	the	unrest.269	Diodorus’s	account	specifically	mentions	that	Antipater	took	with	him	the	 entire	 military	 force	 available	 to	 him.270	This	 suggests	 that	 Antipater	 was	keen	 to	 see	 the	 rebellion	 subdued	 as	 swiftly	 as	 possible.	His	 reaction	 can	 also	have	 been	 seen	 as	 a	 demonstration	 of	 Macedonian	 military	 strength	 to	 the	Greeks	whose	 commitment	 to	 the	 peace	 treaty	with	Macedon	may	 have	 been	weakened	by	Alexander’s	absence.	
	
																																																								267	Memnon	 had	 been	 appointed	 to	 the	 Governorship	 of	 Thrace	 by	 Alexander	before	embarking	into	Asia	(Berve,	Vol	II.	1926.	p.	254.).	268 	Diod.	 17.62.	 4.	 The	 account	 of	 Memnon’s	 revolt	 is	 solely	 recorded	 by	Diodorus	 (Bosworth,	 1988.	 p.	 201),	 though	 it	 is	 alluded	 to	 within	 Curtius’	account	 (6.1),	 which	 seems	 to	 mirror	 Diodorus’	 summation	 of	 events	 once	hostilities	 with	 Thrace	 were	 concluded	 (Diod.	 17.63.1).	 Diodorus’	 account	 is	highly	compressed	and	sparse,	but	there	does	exist	enough	information	to	allow	some	postulations	to	be	made	with	regard	to	the	events	that	took	place.	269	Diod.	 17.62.6.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 Antipater	would	 have	 also	 brought	with	 him	allies	from	the	neighbouring	Greek	cities	in	his	march	on	Thrace.			270	Diod.	17.62.6:	“…πᾶσαν	ἀναλαβὼν	τὴν	δύναμιν	προῆλθε.”	(trans.	Geer,	1947).	
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It	was	 at	 this	 time,	when	Antipater’s	 attentions	were	 focussed	on	Thrace,	 that	Agis	chose	his	moment	to	begin	hostilities	against	Macedonian	rule.	He	began	by	appealing	to	other	Greek	cities	to	form	a	greater	alliance	in	order	to,	as	Diodorus	states	that	Antipater	sought	then	“…to	unite	for	in	defense	for	their	freedom.”271	It	seems	 that	 Agis’s	 appeal	 was	 received	 favourably	 by	 a	 number	 of	 the	 Greek	cities,	especially	within	the	immediate	area	around	Sparta	in	the	Peloponnese.272	Curtius	states	 that	 the	only	cities	within	 the	Peloponnese	not	 to	 join	with	Agis	were	Megalopolis	 in	Arcadia	and	Pellenê	 in	Elis	because	of	 their	 loyalty	 to	 the	Macedonians	 (“…fida	Macedonibus	 propter	 Philippi	memoriam,	 a	 quo	 beneficiis	
affecta	 fuerat.”) 273 	Agis	 responded	 to	 the	 Megalopians’	 refusal	 to	 join	 his	coalition	against	the	Macedonians	by	laying	siege	to	the	city,	thus	initiating	the	war	against	Macedon.	
	For	Antipater,	the	news	from	the	south	left	him	in	a	dire	position.	To	divide	his	forces	 between	 the	 Thracian	 campaign	 and	 the	 growing	 dissidence	 in	 the	Peloponnese	would	be	to	risk	failure	in	either	or	both	fields	of	conflict	with	his	already	 depleted	 military	 resources. 274 	While	 Diodorus’	 account	 does	 not	specifically	state	as	much,	 it	seems	likely	that	Antipater	employed	a	diplomatic	approach	to	end	Memnon’s	revolt	in	Thrace.275	There	has	been	much	discussion	of	 the	conclusion	 to	Memnon’s	 revolt,	with	next	 to	no	evidence	 to	 support	 the	respective	 theories.	 However	 Bosworth’s	 postulation	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	plausible.	 Bosworth	 hypothosizes	 that	 Memnon	 may	 have	 lost	 control	 of	 the																																																									271	Diod.	17.62.6-7:	“…συμφρονῆσαι	περὶ	τῆς	έλευθεριας.”cf.	Curt.	6.1.		272	Curt.	 6.1a.1;	 Diod.	 17.62.7.	 The	 Athenians	were	 conspicuously	 absent	 from	the	 Agis	war.	 Athens	 had	 been	 contacted	 by	 Agis	 to	 join	 in	 a	war	 against	 the	Macedonians	 (Diod.	 19.63.7)	 and	 the	 appeal	 to	 overthrow	 the	 yoke	 of	 foreign	domination	 would	 have	 been	 received	 well	 by	 the	 Athenian	 demos,	 whose	sentiment	 can	 be	 seen	 in	Demosthenes’	 Treaty	with	Alexander	with	 its	 call	 to	declare	 war	 on	 Macedon	 (Dem.	 17.).	 However	 Athens	 remained	 inactive	 and	chose	 instead	 to	 not	 engage	 with	 the	 conflict,	 due	 to	 discouragement	 from	Demosthenes	 (Aesch.	 3.166)	 and	 the	 actions	 of	Demades,	who	highlighted	 the	financial	 implications	 and	 consequences	 of	 any	 engagement	 in	 the	 war	 (Plut.	
Mor.	 818e-f;	 Bosworth,	 1988.	 p.	 202.).	 The	 concept	 of	 Greek	 freedom	 was	 a	powerful	 political	 tool	 and	 would	 be	 one	 that	 Polyperchon	 would	 play	 upon	throughout	the	war	against	Cassander.	For	more	discussion,	see	Ch.	6.2.	273	Curt.	6.1a.1.	274	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	201.	275Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	53.	
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revolt	he	was	leading,	and	sought	the	aid	of	Antipater	to	bring	the	hostilities	to	a	close.276	By	ending	the	conflict	with	Memnon	by	non-military	means,	Antipater	was	not	only	able	to	bring	about	a	swifter	end	to	the	hostilities	than	may	have	been	achieved	from	a	potentially	long	and	protracted	military	campaign,	but	was	also	 able	 to	 preserve	 his	 army	 for	 the	 march	 south	 against	 Agis. 277 	The	diplomatic	 end	 to	 Memnon’s	 revolt	 demonstrates	 Antipater’s	 abilities	 as	 a	political	 negotiator	 as	 well	 as	 his	 skill	 in	 managing	 the	 complex	 range	 of	responsibilities	 that	were	part	of	his	role	as	regent	of	Macedon.	For	Cassander	the	 lesson	was	 clear.	 Antipater’s	 swift	 end	 to	 the	 Thracian	 campaign	 via	 non-military	means	was	 clearly	 a	 viable,	 and	 -	 if	 peace	was	 secured	 -	 a	 preferable	option	 to	 an	arduous	military	operation.	These	were	 lessons	Cassander	would	take	with	him	into	his	struggle	for	the	regency	after	319.278	
	With	the	trouble	in	Thrace	dealt	with,	Antipater	was	now	able	to	turn	his	focus	to	Agis	and	the	troubles	in	the	Peloponnese.	It	is	clear	from	Arrian’s	account	that	Alexander	and	Antipater	were	still	 in	communication	with	each	other,	and	that	Alexander	was	 aware	of	 the	war	with	 Sparta	 and	 its	Greek	allies	 and	 the	king	treated	the	threat	seriously.279	In	response,	Alexander	sent	some	three	thousand	talents	 to	 Antipater	 for	 recruitment	 of	mercenary	 corps,	 showing	 the	 level	 of	concern	 felt	 by	 both	 the	 king	 and	 his	 regent.280	It	 would	 have	 taken	 many	months	for	Antipater	to	recruit	these	troops,281	most	likely	men	drawn	from	the	
																																																								276	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	201.	contra.	Berve,	Vol	II.	1926.	p.	254;	Badian,	1967.	pp.	179-180.	277	Diod.	17.63.1.	While	the	terms	of	the	conclusion	of	the	revolt	are	not	known,	it	seems	that	Memnon	was	able	to	retain	his	position	as	Governor	of	Thrace.	This	is	because	the	same	Memnon	is	recorded	as	leading	Thracian	troops	to	India	so	as	to	reinforce	Alexander’s	army	(Curt.	9.3.21.).	278	An	example	of	this	can	be	seen	in	Cassander’s	eventual	conclusion	to	the	civil	war	 with	 Polyperchon	 in	 309,	 when	 he	 presented	 Polyperchon	 with	 the	command	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 under	 his	 rule	 in	 exchange	 for	 peace	 being	declared	in	the	region	(cf	Ch.	8.3.	pp.	284-287.).	Additionally,	the	lessons	taught	to	 Cassander	 by	 his	 father	 would	 shape	 his	 political	 persona	 and	 modus	operandi	during	his	career	(passim.	Adams,	1975).	279	Arr.	3.16.10.		280	Badian,	in	Worthington.	1994.	p.	272.	281	Bosworth	 (1988.	 p.	 202)	 suggests	 that	 Antipater	was	 not	 able	 to	 begin	 his	march	south	until	the	early	spring	of	330.	
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northern	barbarian	tribes	and	the	levies	from	the	northern	Greek	cites.282	With	the	 addition	 of	 these	 mercenaries	 to	 the	 core	 of	 his	 army	 -	 an	 army	 almost	certainly	composed	of	Macedonian	troops	-	the	final	size	of	Antipater’s	army	has	been	said	to	be	at	least	40,000	men.283	This	was	double	the	force	led	by	Agis,	an	army	 of	 roughly	 21,000	 in	 total.284	Even	 though	 the	 core	 of	 the	 force	 was	composed	 of	Macedonian	 troops,	with	Antipater	 in	 command,	 the	 presence	 of	troops	 from	 the	 Greek	 cities	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 oath	 of	 the	 Corinthian	League	was	in	effect.	With	one	of	its	signatories,	Megalopolis,	attacked	by	Sparta,	ostensibly	a	foreign	power,	the	other	members	were	obliged	to	come	to	the	aid	of	their	ally	and	restore	peace	within	the	region	as	soon	as	possible.	Instead	of	his	march	south	being	seen	as	a	Macedonian	reaction	 to	aggression	 from	Agis,	Antipater	took	care	to	turn	his	response	into	an	action	by	the	Corinthian	League	to	aid	an	ally	that	had	been	attacked.	
	Once	Antipater	had	formed	his	army,	he	marched	south	in	order	to	confront	Agis	who	was	still	occupied	with	the	siege	of	Megalopolis.285	After	Antipater	arrived	a	brief,	but	bitterly	fought,	conflict	ensued	between	the	two	forces.286	The	conflict	resulted	in	an	overwhelming	Macedonian	victory	and	the	death	of	Agis.287	With	Sparta’s	total	defeat,	Antipater	could	have	been	at	the	forefront	of	negotiations	with	the	defeated	alliance	to	achieve	the	most	satisfactory	outcome	for	Macedon.	However,	instead	of	directly	arbitrating	the	terms	for	their	surrender,	Antipater	delegated	the	task	to	the	Corinthian	League	for	them	to	decide	the	fate	of	Sparta	and	 its	allies.288	This	decision	to	refer	 the	terms	that	would	be	 imposed	on	the																																																									282	Diod.	17.63.1;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	202-203.	283	Diod.	17.63.1;	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika.	16.	(1958/59).	p.	58.	284	Diod.	17.62.7;	Kanatsulis,	Hellenika,	16	(1958/59).	p.	58;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	201.	285 	Curt.	 6.1;	 Diod.	 17.63.1:	 Diodorus	 is	 keen	 to	 highlight	 the	 strength	 of	Antipater’s	forces	stating	that	once	again	he	brought	the	entirety	of	his	military	reserves	(“...μετὰ	πάσης	τῆς	δυνάμεως”)	against	Sparta;	Just.	12.1.8-12.	286	Curt.	6.1.1-16;	Diod.	17.63.2-4;	Just.	12.1.8-11.	287	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	203;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	42;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	8.	288	Curt.	6.1.20:	The	conclusions	reached	by	the	League	stated	that	the	Acheans	and	the	Eleans	were	to	pay	120	talents	in	compensation	to	the	primary	victims	of	the	Spartan	led	aggression,	Megalopolis.	The	Tegeans,	on	the	other	hand,	who	seemed	 to	 have	 been	 compelled	 by	 a	 minority	 of	 the	 polis	 to	 take	 up	 arms	against	Macedon	(Bosworth,	1988.	p.	203.),	were	pardoned	for	their	role	in	the	
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defeated	 Spartans	 and	 their	 allies	 to	 the	 pro-Macedonian	 Greek	 cities	 is	 an	important	 one	 in	 understanding	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Antipater	 maintained	Macedonian	 control	 in	 the	 Greek	 Peninsula.289	It	 demonstrated	 to	 the	 League,	and	more	widely	 to	 the	 greater	 Greek	 cities	 that	 Antipater,	 in	 his	 position	 as	regent	of	Macedon	and	hegemon	of	the	Corinthian	League,	was	able	and	willing	to	allow	the	Greeks	to	have	a	significant	say	in	their	own	political	affairs	without	direct	 intervention	 from	 Macedon.	 There	 were	 a	 number	 of	 benefits	 for	Antipater	 in	doing	 this.	Allowing	 the	Greek	 cities	 to	have	 some	 freedom	and	a	practical	voice	within	the	Greek	political	sphere,	rather	than	having	Macedonia	completely	dictate	all	political	affairs,	would	result	in	a	more	peaceful	region.290	It	 would	 strengthen	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 cities	 and	 Pella	 as	 well	 as	making	it	an	easier	task	for	him	to	govern	the	region	in	Alexander’s	absence.	
	With	the	destruction	and	subjugation	of	Spartan	aggression	by	Antipater	and	the	Corinthian	League	 complete,	 the	 regent	was	able	 to	 reinstate,	 via	 the	League’s	authority,	 the	 status	 quo	 within	 the	 Peninsula.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 the	 League																																																																																																																																																															revolt.	 The	 Spartans	 were	 forced	 to	 provide	 fifty	 hostages	 to	 Antipater	 as	security	 against	 any	 further	 military	 aggression	 (Plut.	 Mor.	 235B).	 Curtius	presents	an	unlikely	explanation	 for	Antipater’s	 reasoning	behind	 the	move	 to	allow	the	Corinthian	League	to	dictate	the	peace	terms	to	Sparta.	In	his	account	(Curt.	 6.1.17-19),	 the	 historian	 states	 that	 Alexander	 was	 displeased	with	 the	extent	 of	 the	 victory	 by	 Antipater’s	 army	 over	 the	 Spartan	 coalition,	 “Quippe	
Alexander	 hostes	 vinci	 voluerat.	 Antipatrum	 vicisse	 ne	 tacitus	 quidem	
indignabatur,	suae	demptum	gloriae	existimans	quidquid	cessisset	alienae.”	(Curt.	6.1.18.)	This	account	seems	unlikely	given	that	Antipater	had	at	the	initiation	of	hostilities	 gone	 to	 great	 lengths	 to	 present	 the	 reaction	 to	 Agis’	 War	 as	 one	conducted	by	the	Corinthian	League,	and	not	one	of	Macedonian	conquest.	Given	this,	 the	 act	 of	 allowing	 the	 League	 to	 determine	 the	 peace	 terms	would	 be	 a	natural	 conclusion	 to	 the	war;	 Kanatsulis,	Hellenika,	16	 (1958/59).	 pp.	 61-63;	Baynham,	in	Worthington.	1994.	p.	342.	289	This	was	not	the	first	time	that	a	Macedonian	leader	had	given	this	power	to	the	Corinthian	League.	Greek	inclusion	had	previously	been	used	by	Alexander	after	the	defeat	of	Thebes	in	335	(Bosworth,	1988.	p.	33,	195).	The	aftermath	of	the	League’s	decision	(see:	Arr.	1.9.9;	Diod.	17.14.1;	Just.	11.3.8;	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	195)	must	have	been	known	to	Antipater	as	hegemon,	as	well	as	the	political	results	 that	were	 likely	 to	occur	 if	employed	again;	allowing	the	Greek	Cities	a	voice	in	their	political	affairs	would	bring	a	measure	of	placation	to	the	members	of	the	League,	thereby	aiding	Antipater	in	maintaining	the	status	quo	during	his	tenure	as	regent.	290	Baynham,	1998.	pp.	167-168.		
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proved	 a	 shrewd	 tactic	 versus	 one	 of	 overt	 Macedonian	 military	 operations.	However,	the	numbers	of	Macedonian	troops	available	to	Antipater	afforded	him	little	choice	but	to	work	with	the	League,	rather	than	against	it.	Despite	concerns	for	possible	unrest	 in	Greece,	Alexander	was	 still	 continuing	 to	make	 constant	demands	for	fresh	troops	to	be	sent	to	maintain	his	armies	in	the	east.	While	it	is	true	that	there	were	movements	of	troops	both	to	the	east	and	returning	west,	the	shift	was	disproportionally	in	Alexander’s	favour.	The	series	of	requests	for	fresh	troops	between	334	and	331	may	mark	the	point	where	the	relationship	between	 Antipater	 and	 Alexander	 began	 to	 fray.	 Therefore,	 the	 movement	 of	troops	away	from	Macedon	deserves	attention.	
	As	 early	 as	 the	 winter	 of	 334,	 Alexander	 began	 sending	 requests	 for	reinforcements	 from	 Macedon.291	This	 resulted	 in	 the	 embarkation	 of	 3000	Macedonian	men	accompanied	by	500	cavalry	and	other	Greek	auxiliaries	led	by	Ptolemy	the	son	of	Seleucus,292	Coenus	the	son	of	Polemocrates293	and	Meleager	the	 son	of	Neoptolemus294	from	Macedon	 to	Alexander	 in	 the	 spring	of	333.295	That	such	high-ranking	officers	commanded	the	mission	shows	the	importance	that	Alexander	placed	on	its	success.	296		It	was	not	long	after	this	initial	request	was	 met	 that	 Curtius	 states	 Alexander	 saw	 the	 arrival	 of	 more	 soldiers	 from	Macedon	joining	the	army	prior	to	its	journey	to	Cappadocia.297																																																									291	Arr.	1.29.4;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	80.	292	Heckel,	2006.	p.	234.	293	Heckel,	2006.	pp.	91-2.	294	Heckel,	2006.	p.	159.	295	Arr.	1.29.4.	Here	Arrian	clearly	states	 that	 the	soldiers	were	Macedonian	 in	origin	as	opposed	to	Greek	 levies	who	began	their	 journey	from	Macedon.	The	majority	of	the	Macedonian	troops	that	left	Macedon	in	333	were	newly	married	men	(Arr.	1.29.4)	who	had	spent	the	winter	of	334/3	sojourning	in	the	country	presumably	to	reduce	the	decline	in	birth	rates	in	the	region	while	the	majority	of	 men	 of	 fighting	 age	 were	 on	 campaign	 with	 the	 king	 (Bosworth,	 JHS,	 106	(1986).	p.	5.).	296	Adams	(Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	80)	states	that	Coenus	and	Meleager	both	held	 the	 rank	 of	 taxiarch,	 while	 Ptolemy	 was	 assigned	 the	 position	 of	
somatophylakes.	297	Curt.	3.1.24:	Unlike	Arrian	(cf.	Arr.	1.29.4),	Curtius’	account	does	not	provide	the	numbers	 that	 joined	 the	 army,	who	 led	 them	or	 any	 information	detailing	their	 composition.	 Bosworth	 (JHS.	 106.	 (1986).	 p.	 6.)	 correctly	 highlights	 the	possibility	that	the	reinforcements	in	Curtius’	account	may	be	the	same	as	those	
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	Soon	 afterwards	 Polybius’	 account	 reports	 that	 another	 contingent	 of	Macedonian	 troops	 consisting	 of	 5000	 infantry	 and	 800	 cavalry	 arrived	 in	Alexander’s	 camp	prior	 to	his	 invasion	of	Cilicia.298	This	account,	however,	has	been	 either	 questioned	 or	 dismissed	 entirely	 by	 some	 scholars.	 Berve, 299	suggests	that	the	high	number	of	troops	is	unlikely	and	is	more	plausibly	a	count	of	the	entirety	of	troop	movements	from	the	Hellespont	and	Issus.	Doubt	is	also	cast	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 Antipater’s	 ability	 to	 send	 such	 a	 vast	 force	 to	Alexander	at	this	time,	considering	the	difficult	task	of	maintaining	peace	within	Greece.300	In	discussion	of	 the	details	 in	Polybius’	account,	Bosworth	dismisses	these	reservations,	highlighting	that	the	credibility	of	the	source	is	dubious	and	notes	 the	 difficulty	 in	 the	 summation	 that	 Polybius	 had	 compounded	 the	respective	 reinforcements	 into	 a	 single	movement.301	It	may	 be	 that	 Antipater	was	 not	 pleased	 to	 be	 sending	 vast	 troop	 numbers	 so	 early	 on	 in	 Alexander’s	campaigns;	however,	future	reinforcements	in	the	subsequent	years	do	suggest	that	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 availability	 of	 manpower	 was	 beginning	 to	 occur	 and	eventually	alternative	reservoirs	of	men	needed	to	be	tapped.		In	the	same	year,	another	account	of	troops	moving	from	Macedon	to	join	with	Alexander	 is	 recorded	 in	 Curtius.	 The	 account	 states	 that	 there	 was	 an	unspecified	 number	 of	 reinforcements	 en	 route	 to	 Alexander	 that	 had	 yet	 to	reach	him	prior	to	the	battle	of	Issus.302	As	with	the	record	of	Polybius,	Curtius’	account	too,	has	been	dismissed	as	fictitious.303	However	the	accusation	that	this	was	 an	 invention	 by	 the	 historian	 does	 not	 seem	 plausible	 and	 there	 is	 no	obvious	reason	to	disbelieve	the	claims	being	made.304	Therefore,	by	the	end	of	333,	a	little	over	a	year	after	its	commencement,	the	ancient	sources	record	that																																																																																																																																																															who	were	detailed	in	Arrian	(1.29.4),	however	the	brevity	and	lack	of	specifics	within	 Curtius	means	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 state	 this	with	 certainty	 one	way	 or	 the	other.	298	Polyb.	12.19.2.	299	Berve.	Vol.	I.	1926.	pp.	179-180.	300	Berve.	Vol.	I.	1926.	p.	180.	301	Bosworth,	JHS.	106.	(1986).	p.	6.	302	Curt.	3.7.8.		303	Atkinson,	1980.	p.	181.	304	Bosworth,	JHS.	106.	(1986).	p.	6.	
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four	 separate	 groups	 of	 troops	 had	 journeyed	 from	 Macedon	 to	 reinforce	Alexander’s	eastern	campaigns.	Of	those	four	accounts,	the	accounts	of	Arrian305	and	Polybius306	provide	detailed	and	reliable	information	about	the	scale	of	the	respective	 groups,	which	 combined	 consisted	 of	 over	 8,000	 infantry.	With	 the	addition	of	Curtius’	account,307	it	 is	expected	that	the	number	would	have	been	far	greater.	From	the	initial	division	of	Macedonian	military	strength	that	set	out	the	previous	 year,	with	 roughly	 equal	 numbers	 granted	 to	 both	Antipater	 and	Alexander,	 the	 sources	 indicate	 a	 general	 shift	 in	 the	 concentration	 of	Macedonian	military	strength	eastwards.	Without	evidence	of	returning	troops	being	repatriated	back	to	Macedon,	a	disparity	in	the	available	troops	between	Antipater	and	Alexander	begins	to	emerge.	For	Antipater,	the	loss	of	such	a	large	number	of	men	of	serving	age	would	have	caused	concern.	The	number	of	men	leaving	 Macedon	 for	 the	 east	 would	 not	 be	 sustainable	 if	 the	 requests	 from	Alexander	continued,	especially	 if	 the	 task	of	maintaining	Greek	pacification	 in	the	face	of	rebellion	was	to	continue.	
	Unfortunately	 for	 Antipater’s	 troop	 reserves,	 the	 year	 of	 332	 saw	 further	requests	 for	military	support	by	Alexander.	These	requests	were	necessary	 for	Alexander	 following	 the	 fierce	 fighting	at	 the	Battle	of	 Issus	 in	 late	333,308	and	the	 protracted	 sieges	 of	 Tyre 309 	and	 Gaza. 310 	In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	reinforcement	 of	 his	 army,	 Alexander	 dispatched	 one	 of	 his	 senior	 officers,	Amyntas,	the	son	of	Andromenes,	to	Macedon	with	orders	to	raise	a	new	army	from	 men	 of	 military	 age.311	It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 ancient	 sources	 that	 swift	replenishment	of	troops	was	required,	as	Amyntas	was	dispatched	to	Macedon	via	the	swiftest	route	possible,	the	sea.312	This	was	despite	the	usual	avoidance	of	sea	travel	in	the	Mediterranean	during	the	winter	months.	That	Amyntas	was																																																									305	Arr.	1.29.4.	306	Polyb.	12.19.2.	307	Curt.	3.7.8.	308	Arr.	2.11.1;	Curt.	3.8.22-3.11.12;	Just.	13.9.9.	309	Arr.	2.18.3-2.24.6;	Curt.	4.2.2-2.24,	4.4.6-20;	Diod.	17.40.4-17.46.6;	Plut.	Alex.	24.4-8.	310	Diod.17.48.7	311	Diod.	17.	49.	1;	Curt.	4.	6.	30.	312	Arr.	1.29.4;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10	(1984).	p.	80.	
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sent	in	this	manner	demonstrates	the	urgency	placed	on	his	recruitment	of	fresh	forces	for	Alexander.	After	several	months,	the	newly	raised	force	set	out	from	Macedon.313	Diodorus	provides	details	of	its	size	and	composition.	The	historian	states	 that	 of	 the	 15,000	 men	 who	 comprised	 Amyntas’	 force	 6,000	 were	Macedonian	 footmen,	 accompanied	 by	 500	Macedonian	 cavalry.314	This	would	be	 the	 last	 substantial	 embarkation	 of	Macedonian	 troops	 leaving	Macedon	 to	bolster	 Alexander’s	 army	 recorded	 in	 the	 ancient	 sources.	 Antipater	 was	 no	longer	 able	 to	 risk	 further	 weakening	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 military	 presence	within	 Greece.	 	 The	 past	 two	 years	 had	 seen	 a	 large	 percentage	 of	Macedon’s	serving	 men	 leaving	 the	 country	 either	 in	 the	 initial	 force	 accompanying	Alexander,	or	in	the	successive	large	scale	reinforcements	seen	in	333	and	332	comprising	 at	 least	 14,000	 infantry	 plus	 800	 cavalry	 being	 reported	 in	 the	ancient	 sources.315	The	 following	 years	 would	 see	 a	 change	 in	 the	 nature	 of	troops	 being	 sent	 to	 Alexander	 by	 Antipater.	 Pressure	 was	 being	 put	 on	 the	reserves	of	manpower	in	Macedon	itself	by	the	turbulent	political	environment	in	 the	 European	 sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	 following	 Memnon’s	rebellion	 in	 Thrace	 and	 the	 war	 with	 Agis	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.	 Despite	 this	Antipater	still	needed	to	keep	the	supply	of	fresh	troops	heading	eastwards.	In	order	 to	achieve	 this,	 the	 regent	 looked	 to	other	avenues	 in	order	 to	maintain	the	king’s	army.		
	The	 year	 of	 331	 saw	 the	 end	 of	 Macedonian	 troops	 moving	 eastwards	 to	Alexander.316	The	 lack	of	any	further	significant	movement	of	troops	was	to	be	expected	 as	 Antipater	 was	 facing	 simultaneous	 military	 actions	 that	 required	what	manpower	he	had	at	his	disposal	to	focus	on	affairs	in	Thrace	and	Greece.	Alexander	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 situation	 facing	 Antipater.317	He	 also	 knew	 that	Amyntas	was	 leading	a	newly	 formed	army,	 currently	en	route	 to	his	position,																																																									313	Arr.	1.29.4;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10	(1984).	p.	80.	314	Diod.	17.65.1.	315	It	is	highly	likely	that	smaller	scale	movement	of	troops,	both	east	and	west,	was	 occurring	 throughout	 the	 campaign.	 However,	 given	 the	 size	 of	 these	movements	 and	 their	 relative	 insignificance,	 they	 were	 likely	 ignored	 or	unrecorded	by	the	ancient	writers.	316	Bosworth,	JHS.	106.	(1986).	p.	7;	Hammond,	JHS.	109.	(1989).	p.	64.	317	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	82;	Hammond,	JHS	.109.	(1989).	p.	64.	
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and	finally	relented	from	further	requests	for	reinforcements	until	the	situation	was	resolved	thus	temporarily	easing	pressure	on	the	regent	to	allow	Antipater	to	effectively	secure	the	home	front.	
	Despite	 this	 brief	 lull	 in	 demand	 for	 new	 troops,	 renewing	 the	 flow	 of	 fresh	troops	was	necessary	to	support	Alexander’s	campaign	and	was	still	an	integral	part	 of	 Antipater’s	 role	 as	 regent.	 However	 the	 recent	 military	 campaign	 in	which	 he	 had	 been	 engaged,	 combined	 with	 the	 progressive	 syphoning	 off	 of	Macedonian	manpower,	forced	Antipater	to	turn	to	the	alternative	groups	under	Macedonian	 control	 to	 fill	 the	 levies	 needed	 to	maintain	Alexander’s	 army.	By	329,	 Antipater	 was	 once	 again	 able	 to	 resume	 dispatches	 to	 the	 east	 as	evidenced	by	Curtius’s	report	of	a	contingent	of	some	3,000	Illyrians	arriving	at	Alexander’s	camp.318		Again,	Antipater	demonstrated	his	political	aptitude	by	the	dispatching	 of	 non-Macedonian	 troops,	 and	 there	 were	 benefits	 that	 resulted	from	this	for	the	stability	of	Macedon’s	borders.			Since	 the	 7th	 century,	 Illyria	 had	 engaged	 in	 various	 states	 of	 conflict	 with	Macedon	 over	 territorial	 holdings,319 	and	 had	 been	 a	 constant	 concern	 for	Macedonian	 interests.	Philip	had	conducted	military	campaigns	 to	bring	 Illyria	under	Macedonian	 subjugation	 since	 359.320	Antipater,	 being	 one	 of	 Philip	 II’s	closest	confidants,	had	experience	in	these	campaigns.	With	the	events	of	331	in	his	mind,	 the	prospect	of	weakening	the	military	strength	of	potential	enemies	close	 to	Macedon	 itself,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 continuing	 the	 supply	 of	 fresh	men	 to	 Alexander	 presented	 an	 excellent	 opportunity	 to	 ease	 any	 political	instability.		This	was	an	opportunity	that	Antipater	could	ill-afford	to	miss.		The	 negative	 impact	 that	 troop	 movements	 had	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	Antipater	 and	 Alexander	 was	 a	 by-product	 of	 the	 vastly	 different	 focus	 and	objectives	 of	 the	 two	 most	 powerful	 members	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	Alexander	wanted	to	expand	the	dominion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire;	Antipater																																																									318	Curt.	 6.6.35;	 Baynham,	 in	 Worthington,	 1994.	 p.	 342;	 Bosworth,	 JHS.	 106.	(1986).	p.	7.	319	Ellis,	1976.	p.	35.	320	Ellis,	1976.	p.	56.	
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sought	to	preserve	the	borders	and	holdings	that	the	empire	possessed	prior	to	Alexander’s	 embarkation	 of	 the	 Persian	 Campaign	 in	 334.	 Personal	 conflict	between	the	two	was	not	a	factor	by	331.	Any	tension	that	was	present	resulted	from	the	task	with	which	each	man	was	charged.		What	would	impact	positively	on	the	task	confronting	Alexander	had	a	negative	impact	on	the	task	confronting	Antipater	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Both	 men	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 their	counterpart’s	role	and	they	went	to	great	efforts	to	support	each	other.	This	can	be	 seen	 in	 Antipater’s	 continuance	 of	 reinforcements	 to	 the	 east,	 and	Alexander’s	 shipment	 of	 funds	 to	 Antipater	 to	 aid	 in	 combating	 Memnon’s	rebellion	 and	 the	 war	 with	 Agis	 in	 331.	 Troop	 movements	 were	 not	 the	dominant	 factor	 in	 explanation	 of	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	the	king	and	the	regent.	A	more	active	factor	may	instead	be	found	in	the	person	of	 Olympias,	 the	 mother	 of	 Alexander.	 Her	 actions	 during	 Alexander’s	 reign	would	evolve	into	a	passionate	feud	between	herself	and	the	Antipatrid	house.		Throughout	 her	 son’s	 life,	 Olympias	 had	 maintained	 a	 close	 relationship	 to	Alexander	 and	 was	 a	 powerful	 voice	 in	 his	 decision-making.321	The	 ancient	sources	suggest	that	Olympias	had	problematic	relationships	with	the	influential	people	 who	 made	 up	 the	 inner	 circle	 and	 acted	 as	 advisors	 of	 Alexander’s	court.322	Considering	Antipater’s	central	role	in	securing	Alexander’s	succession	to	 the	 throne	 in	combination	with	 the	 influential	 role	he	played	 in	Alexander’s	early	reign,	friction	between	Antipater	and	the	royal	mother	was	inevitable.		The	feud	 with	 Olympias	 constituted	 the	 most	 strained	 point	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 regent	 and	 the	 king.	 The	 antipathy	 that	 grew	 between	 Olympias	and	the	Antipatrids	had	devastating	consequences	for	both	sides.	For	Olympias,	the	growing	enmity	with	Antipater	saw	her	 flee	 from	Macedon	to	her	home	 in	Epirus.323	From	here	 she	would	 continue	 to	 undermine	Antipater’s	 position	 as	regent,	 which	 in	 part	 resulted	 in	 his	 replacement	 by	 Craterus	 in	 324.324	In																																																									321	Carney,	2006.	pp.	27-8,	41;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	182.	322	As	 exemplified	 by	 her	 conflict	 with	 Hephaiston,	 cf.	 Diod.	 17.114.3;	 Carney,	2000.	p.	88;	Carney,	2006.	p.	57,	126;		323	Carney,	2006.	p.	52;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	182.	324	Arr.	 7.12.4;	 Just.	 12.12.9;	Ashton,	 in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	 108;	 cf.	Ch.	3.	p.	77.	
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addition	to	facilitating	the	installation	of	Craterus	as	regent,	Olympias’	hatred	of	Antipater	saw	her	 level	accusations	of	regicide	and	responsibility	 for	her	son’s	death	 against	 him	 and	 his	 family	 following	 Alexander	 III’s	 death	 in	 323.325	Cassander’s	 thinking	was	particularly	shaped	by	his	negative	 interactions	with	Olympias	and	 the	events	 in	Babylon	 in	324-323.326	As	a	 result	of	 these	events,	Cassander	would	 distance	 himself	 from	 Argead	 support	 throughout	 his	 initial	struggle	with	Polyperchon	in	319.		In	contrast,	Polyperchon	sought	to	exploit	the	wedge	 between	 Olympias	 and	 the	 Antipatrids	 to	 support	 his	 own	 position	 as	regent	once	Antipater	appointed	him	to	the	role.327		As	one	of	Philip’s	closest	advisers,	Antipater	was	likely	present	at	the	marriage	between	 Olympias	 and	 the	 king	 in	 357	 and	would	 have	 had	 contact	with	 her	during	 their	 time	 in	 court.	 If	 tensions	 existed	 between	 the	 two,	 these	 do	 not	become	explicit	 in	the	sources	until	Alexander	left	Macedon	in	334.	During	her	son’s	 absence,	 Olympias	 remained	 in	 Macedon	 at	 Pella	 with	 Antipater.328	The	point	at	which	hostilities	between	Antipater	and	Olympias	began	 is	difficult	 to	ascertain.	Carney	suggests	that	the	most	likely	period	when	this	took	place	was	during	 Alexander’s	 reign	 between	 336	 and	 323.329	Diodorus	 too	 asserts	 that	both	 parties	 were	 at	 loggerheads	 for	 a	 substantial	 period	 of	 time	 during	Alexander’s	 time	 on	 the	 throne,330	however	 this	 account	 only	 records	 that	 the	variance	took	place,	not	when	it	began.331	One	possible	point	for	the	ignition	of	the	feud	may	have	been	during	the	turbulent	final	years	of	Philip’s	reign.	The	last	two	years	of	Philip’s	rule	saw	tensions	rise	between	Alexander	and	his	mother	against	Philip.	This	saw	Alexander	depart	from	Pella	and	enter	a	period	of	self-imposed	 exile	 in	 Illyria. 332 	While	 the	 two	 factions	 were	 able	 to	 reconcile	formally,	 Philip	was	 still	wary	 of	 Olympias	 as	 a	 political	 adversary	within	 the	
																																																								325	cf.	Diod.	19.11.8;	Carney,	2006.	p.	79.	326	See.	Ch.	6.1.	p.	158.	327	See	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	154-165.	328	Carney,	2006.	pp.	48-49;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	182.	329	Carney.	2006.	p.	30.	330	Diod.	17.118.1.	331	Diod.	17.118.1.		332	Ath.	13.557d-e;	Just.	9.7.3-6;	Plut.	Alex.	9.4-5;	
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Macedonian	court.333	As	one	of	Philip’s	closest	confidants	and	a	member	of	his	inner-circle,	Antipater	was	privy	to	the	private	machinations	of	the	royal	family.	Early	 lessons	 of	 the	 danger	 and	 political	 weight	 that	 would	 accompany	Olympias’	 displeasure	 were	 there	 for	 him	 to	 learn,	 and	 she	 became	 a	 known	quantity	 as	 a	 political	 adversary	 in	 terms	 of	 her	 influence	 over	 her	 son.	 The	period	between	334	and	331	pitted	Olympias	and	Antipater	against	each	other	and	it	was	at	this	time	that	their	quarrelling	came	to	the	forefront.	Both	were	in	contact	 with	 Alexander	 expressing	 their	 displeasure	 with	 each	 other,334	but	instead	 of	 arbitrating	 the	 issue	 between	 the	 two,	 Alexander	 chose	 not	 to	interfere	in	the	matter.		Olympias’	status	at	court	during	this	time	is	unclear,	but	it	is	likely	that	she	did	not	hold	an	official	office,	but	rather	relied	upon	her	 familial	 ties	to	Alexander,	her	former	status	as	Philip’s	great	wife	and	her	royal	Molossian	heritage	to	gain	influence	in	the	political	environment	within	Macedon,	her	home	of	Epirus	and	greater	Greece.335	Olympias	participated	directly	 in	Greek	politics	and	religious	debates,	 notably	 her	 actions	 as	 described	 by	 the	 Attic	 orator	 Hyperides,336	where	she	is	seen	claiming	her	ownership	to	the	Molossian	state	in	discussion	of	practices	 taking	place	at	 the	 temple	at	Dodona.337	Additionally,	Olympias	made	requests	 to	 the	 Athenians	 on	 the	 matter	 of	 Harpalus’338	extradition	 back	 to	Macedon.339		The	relationship	between	Antipater	and	Olympias	would	continue	to	deteriorate	over	 the	 course	 of	 their	 time	 in	 Macedon.	 Olympias	 may	 have	 wished	 that	Antipater	 were	 more	 subservient	 to	 the	 royal	 family	 and,	 more	 directly,	 to	herself.	This	would	explain	her	 claims	of	 irreverence	against	 the	 regent	 in	her																																																									333	Carney,	2006.	p.	37.	334	Diod.	17.117.1	335	Carney.	2006.	p.	50.	336	Heckel,	2006.	p.	141.	337	Hyp.	Eux.	24-25;	Whitehead,	2000.	p.	228.	338	Heckel,	2006.	p.	130.	339	Diod.	 17.108.7;	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 51;	 Worthington,	 LCM.	 9.	 (1984).	 p.	 48;	Blackwell,	1999.	p.	88;	Whitehead,	2000.	p.	388.	Diodorus	also	records	Antipater	making	the	same	request	for	Harpalus	to	return	to	Macedon.	Whether	this	was	made	in	conjunction	or	in	co-operation	with	Olympias	is	unclear.	
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correspondence	 to	 Alexander.	 She	 may	 have	 regarded	 any	 reluctance	 by	Antipater	to	respond	to	her	wishes	and	those	of	Alexander	as	a	sign	of	defiance	against	Argead	rule.	As	previously	stated,	Antipater’s	main	objective,	as	regent,	was	 the	 maintenance	 of	 Macedon	 while	 Alexander	 was	 away.	 He	 did,	 in	 fact,	comply	 with	 the	 requests	 made	 by	 the	 king	 when	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 do	 so	without	jeopardising	the	safety	and	peace	of	the	lands	under	his	jurisdiction.	It	was	 Alexander,	 not	 Olympias,	who	 had	 appointed	 Antipater	 and	 it	was	 to	 the	king	 that	 Antipater	 was	 accountable.	 He	 would	 not,	 and	 did	 not,	 accept	interference	 in	 the	 running	 of	 the	 country	 from	 anyone	 save	 the	 king,	 even	 if	they	were	members	of	the	royal	family.		As	a	result,	Antipater	reacted	negatively	to	Olympias’s	attempts	to	directly	interfere	in	the	management	of	his	office.	
	Though	the	date	 is	uncertain,	 in	either	331	or	330,	Olympias	 left	Macedon	and	returned	 to	 her	 home	 in	 Molossia.340	It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 a	 possible	explanation	for	her	departure	was	 fear	 for	her	personal	safety	 from	attacks	by	the	 regent.341	However	 it	 is	more	 likely	 that	 her	departure	was	 a	 result	 of	 the	tense	 relationship	 with	 the	 regent.342	The	 notion	 of	 Antipater	 attempting	 to	assassinate	 Olympias	 is	 problematic;	 although	 Antipater	 was	 not	 opposed	 to	removing	political	rivals	in	the	court	who	had	proved	a	threat	to	his	position,343	the	 removal	 of	 Olympias	was	 not	 a	 viable	 or	 appealing	 option	 for	 the	 regent.	Despite	 the	 problematic	 relationship	 between	 the	 two,	 Alexander	 would	 not	have	accepted	the	murder	of	his	mother.	Antipater	would	have	expected	to	face	swift	and	terrible	retribution	had	he	followed	this	course	of	action.	
	Antipater	was	without	question	one	of	the	most	powerful	and	influential	figures	in	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	 but	 the	 notion	 that	 he	 was	 able	 to	 act	 with	 total																																																									340	Plut.	 Alex.	 68.4;	 Diod.	 18.49.4;	 Pau.	 1.1.3.	 The	 exact	 timing	 of	 Olympias’	journey	 to	Epirus	 is	unclear	 from	 the	accounts,	however	Carney	 (2006.	p.	52.)	suggests	that	it	took	place	some	time	between	the	death	of	her	brother,	the	King	of	Epirus	Alexander	 (Just.	 12.2.14.)	 and	 the	defeat	of	Agis	by	Antipater	 in	330	(See	above).	341	Paus.	1.1.3;	Carney,	2006.	p.	52;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	182.	342	Diod.	18.49.4.	343	As	can	be	seen	 in	his	removal	of	potential	rivals	when	securing	Alexander’s	succession	to	the	throne	after	Philip	II’s	assassination	in	356.	
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impunity	is	not	persuasive.	While	Alexander	was	alive,	Antipater	was	ultimately	responsible	and	accountable	to	him	and	Olympias	would	be	safe	 from	physical	harm.344 	What	 can	 be	 deduced	 is	 that	 Olympias	 departed	 for	 Epirus	 and	Molossia	 around	 331/0,	 when	 Antipater’s	 focus	 was	 upon	 the	 more	 pressing	issues	 of	 re-establishing	 Macedonian	 domination	 in	 Greece	 and	 restoring	 the	
status	quo	among	 the	 Greek	 cities.	 The	most	 plausible	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 leave	was	 the	 hostility	 that	 existed	 with	 Antipater,	 combined	 with	 Alexander’s	reluctance	 to	 either	 arbitrate	 the	 matter,	 or	 to	 support	 her	 position.	 Her	displeasure	with	Antipater	did	not	end	after	Olympias	had	left	the	capital.	Even	after	she	had	reached	her	homeland,	she	persisted	in	criticising	the	regent	in	her	correspondence	with	her	son	and	seeking	Antipater’s	replacement	with	another,	more	acceptable,	figure.	These	requests	would	continue	until,	in	324,	Alexander	finally	 gave	 in	 to	his	mother’s	wishes	and	 replaced	Antipater	with	Craterus	as	regent	of	Macedon.345		The	 timeframe	 immediately	prior	 to	323	saw	 the	period	of	greatest	 tension	 in	the	relationship	between	Antipater	and	Alexander.	Antipater	had	been	replaced	as	regent	in	Macedon	by	another	of	Alexander’s	generals,	Craterus,	and	had	been	summoned	 to	 the	 new	 capital	 of	 the	 Empire,	 Babylon.	 Antipater	 however	remained	 steadfast	 in	 Macedon	 and	 sent	 Cassander	 in	 his	 stead,	 leading	 to	Cassander’s	infamous	encounter	with	Alexander	at	court	in	Babylon.346	While	it	may	be	that	Antipater	had	feared	for	his	safety	should	he	have	ventured	to	the	Babylonian	 court,	 there	 is	 another,	 more	 plausible,	 explanation	 for	 why	 he	dispatched	 his	 son	 to	 Alexander,	 rather	 than	 making	 the	 journey	 himself.	Antipater	would	 have	 been	well	 aware	 of	 the	 political	 implications	 of	 leaving	Macedon	while	Craterus	was	still	en	route	 to	Pella.	Given	his	understanding	of	the	tense	political	situation	in	Greece	Antipater	would	have	realised	that	to	leave	Pella	in	order	to	journey	to	Babylon	would	be	to	create	a	power	vacuum	thereby	risking	civil	unrest	and	possible	rebellion	amongst	the	Greek	Cities.																																																											344	Carney,	2006.	p.	42.	345	Arr.	7.12.4;	Just.	12.12.9;	Ashton,	Makedonia,	5	(1993).	pp.	126-127;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	108.	346	See	Ch.	4.	pp.	88-91.	
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While	 it	 is	 true	 to	 say	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 Antipater	 and	 Alexander	came	under	strain	as	would	be	expected	from	the	two	men	who	each	had	very	different	 agendas,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 mistaken	 for	 hostility	 between	 them.	Antipater	 continued	 to	 supply	Alexander	 and	his	 army	with	 both	 soldiers	 and	supplies;	 he	 also	 continued	 to	 implement	 potentially	 volatile	 political	 decrees	within	 an	 already	 troublesome	 Greece.	 This	 support	 and	 loyalty	 Antipater	demonstrated	to	Alexander	is	evident	by	the	promulgation	of	Alexander’s	Exile’s	Decree	 in	 the	 summer	 324.347	While	 the	 decree	 may	 have	 had	 elements	 that	could	decrease	the	chances	of	another	Greek	uprising	like	those	led	by	Agis	and	Memnon,348	it	 is	critical	 to	note	 that	Antipater	continued	 to	enforce	 the	decree	despite	Greek	discontent,349	even	after	he	had	been	replaced	by	Alexander	with	the	 younger	 Craterus. 350 	If	 Antipater	 and	 Alexander’s	 relationship,	 either	personally	 or	 professionally	 was	 beyond	 repair,	 it	 is	 puzzling	 why	 Antipater	would	continue	 to	maintain	Greece	on	 the	king’s	behalf	 in	 the	 face	of	hostility,	friction	 with	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 his	 replacement	 as	 regent.	 A	 more	 likely	scenario	would	 hold	 that	 even	 though	 tensions	may	 have	 arisen	 between	 the	king	and	his	regent,	Antipater	was	still	willing	and	able	to	maintain	the	office	he	had	been	assigned	until	a	time	when	his	replacement	was	able	to	take	effective	control	of	Europe.		This	chapter	has	provided	an	overview	of	the	career	of	Antipater	as	well	as	his	relationship	 with	 the	 royal	 Argead	 family,	 covering	 Antipater’s	 prominence	within	the	Macedonian	political	and	military	spheres,	his	significance	during	the	reign	 of	 Philip	 II	 and	 the	 role	 he	 played	 in	 securing	 and	mentoring	 the	 young	Alexander	 as	 well	 as	 his	 time	 as	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 during	 Alexander’s	 great	expansion	east.	Despite	Antipater’s	 long	support	of	Alexander	during	his	youth	and	 during	 the	 king’s	 time	 in	 office,	 tensions	 emerged	 between	 the	 two	men.																																																									347	Diod.	18.8.3-4;	Just.	13.5.2-4;	Heckel,	2008.	p.	146,	189.	n.	13;	Dmitriev,	2011.	p.	423;	Proddighe,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	231;	Pitt	&	Richardson,	
CQ.	67	 (forthcoming	 2017).	 contra.	Mendels,	 1984.	 p.	 146;	 Blackwell,	 1999.	 p.	157	348	Blackwell,	1999.	p.	146;	Heckel,	2008.	p.	147.	349	Especially	expressed	by	Athens	and	Aetolia	(Diod.	18.8.6-7;	Heckel,	2008.	p.	147;	O’Sullivan,	2009.	p.	22).	350	Poddighe,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2012.	p.	231.	
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Alexander’s	 requirement	 for	 re-enforcements	 and	 resupply	 put	 great	 strain	upon	the	resources	available	to	Antipater	and	his	mission	to	maintain	a	peaceful	home	 front	 during	 Alexander’s	 absence.	 While	 these	 tensions	 are	 better	explained	by	the	conflicting	demands	of	Alexander’s	and	Antipater’s	respective	offices,	 than	 by	 personal	 animosity,	 these	 strains	 were	 exacerbated	 by	 the	interference	of	Olympias,	ultimately	resulting	in	Antipater’s	replacement	in	324.	The	lack	of	personal	animosity	and	familial	hostility,	at	least	prior	to	Alexander’s	death,	 indicates	 that	Cassander’s	 future	unwillingness	 to	actively	 seek	 support	from	 the	 royal	 family	 in	 319	 was	 not	 based	 on	 some	 long-held	 inter-familial	feud.	Instead,	the	cause	of	his	initial	lack	of	interest	in	Argead	support	was	more	likely	 based	 on	 events	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	Alexander	 III’s	 expansion	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	and	the	king’s	return	to	the	new	capital	in	Babylon.	
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Chapter	4:	Cassander	in	Babylon.351	
	The	 previous	 chapter	 of	 this	 investigation	 focussed	 on	 the	 interpersonal	interactions	between	Antipater	and	Alexander	during	Antipater’s	 initial	 tenure	as	 regent	 of	 Macedon.	 This	 was	 in	 order	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 the	 tensions	between	 these	 two	 powerful	 men	 could	 help	 to	 explain	 Cassander’s	 future	aversion	 to	 seeking	 Argead	 support	 after	 his	 father’s	 death	 in	 319	 during	 the	ensuing	struggle	for	dominance	against	Polyperchon.	This	chapter	continues	this	investigation	 and	 engages	 with	 the	 inter-familial	 interactions	 between	 the	Antipatrids	and	Argeads	after	Antipater’s	replacement	as	regent	of	Macedon	by	Craterus	 in	 324.	 	 The	 chapter	 covers	 the	 period	 of	 time	 up	 until	 news	 of	Alexander’s	death	arrived	in	Greece	and	Macedon	in	323	that	occurred	within	a	period	 of	 weeks	 after	 the	 king’s	 death	 on	 June	 11th.	 Tensions	 still	 existed	between	Antipater	and	Alexander	as	a	result	of	the	conflicting	responsibilities	of	their	respective	offices	during	Alexander’s	eastern	expansion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire,	however	at	this	point	the	tensions	were	relatively	minor.		Each	man	still	held	respect	for	the	other	and	the	friction	that	existed	between	the	two	was	not	significant	enough	 to	explain	Cassander’s	actions	post-319,	nor	does	 it	 explain	the	rift	that	developed	between	the	Antipatrid	and	Argead	factions.	It	is	during	this	 time	 that	 Cassander	 enters	 the	 accounts	 of	 the	 ancient	 sources,	 when	 he	arrives	in	Babylon	at	the	behest	of	his	father.	The	purpose	of	his	journey	was	to	meet	 with	 Alexander	 and	 account	 for	 his	 father’s	 policies	 amongst	 the	 Greek	cities	as	well	as	to	answer	for	the	grievances	levelled	against	Antipater	by	Greek	emissaries	 to	 Babylon.	 Details	 of	 Cassander’s	 journey	 are	 relatively	 clear;	 he	began	his	journey	after	being	dispatched	by	his	father	in	Macedon,	concluding	in	Babylon	 at	Alexander’s	 court.352	Since	Alexander’s	 embarkation	 east,	Antipater	was	the	face	of	Macedonian	domination	within	Greece	and	the	European	sphere	of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire;	 because	 of	 this	 he	 had	 come	 to	 be	 the	 target	 for	Greek	dissatisfaction	with	their	subjugation.																																																									351	Sections	of	this	chapter	will	appear	in	a	forthcoming	publication	of	The	
Classical	Quarterly.	I	would	like	to	thank	the	editors	for	accepting	such	contribution.	352	Plut.	Alex.	74.2;	Metz.	§	89;	Ps.	-Kall.	3.31.4;	Curt.	10.10.16–17;	Fortina,	1965.	p.	9;	Adams,	1975.	p.	48;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	79.	
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Details	of	Cassander’s	relationship	with	his	father	are	sparse,	but	by	drawing	on	the	 nature	 of	 his	 mission	 to	 Babylon,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 draw	 some	 reasonable	infrences.	Since	Antipater	was	unable	to	 travel	 in	person	to	Babylon,	 therefore	the	man	sent	in	his	stead	needed	not	only	be	personally	trusted	by	him,	but	also	to	 have	 the	 appropriate	 political	 acumen	 to	 represent	 his	 interests	 in	 the	Macedonian	 court	 before	 the	 king.	 That	 Cassander	 was	 sent	 suggests	 that	 he	possessed	both	his	father’s	trust	and	the	ability	to	represent	his	father	within	an	increasingly	tense	diplomatic	situation.	Cassander	was	not	ordered	to	Babylon;	his	father	was.	Antipater	was	ordered	to	leave	Macedon	for	Babylon	at	the	head	of	 10,000	 soldiers	 who	 would	 replace	 the	 returning	 veterans	 of	 Craterus.353	However	 Antipater	 did	 not	 follow	 these	 orders,	 choosing	 instead	 to	 remain	within	Macedon.	 Because	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 prudent	 to	 consider	 the	 reasons	 behind	Antipater’s	actions.	Antipater	was	aware	of	the	consequences	that	might	result	from	his	departure	from	Macedon.	Craterus	and	his	troops	had	not	yet	arrived	in	Macedon	to	replace	him	and	the	men	he	would	be	taking	from	the	Macedonian	home	 front.	 In	 fact	 Craterus	 was	 no	 further	 than	 Cilicia	 by	 the	 time	 of	Alexander’s	 death.354	Should	Antipater	 have	 left	Macedon	 before	 the	 arrival	 of	his	 replacement	 and	 a	 handover	 of	 power,	 leading	 some	 10,000	 men	 fit	 for	military	 service	 away	 from	 the	 region,	 further	 depleting	 an	 already	 strained	resource	 that	 had	 been	 syphoned	 off	 over	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 risk	 of	 losing	control	of	the	Greek	cities	would	have	been	a	very	real	prospect.		The	timing	of	Cassander’s	departure	from	Babylon	westwards	is	also	unclear.	It	seems	 that	 he	 did	 however	 remain	 in	 the	 city	 until	 some	 time	 around	Alexander’s	death	on	June	11th	323.	The	period	between	Cassander’s	arrival	and	departure	 from	 Babylon	 saw	 hostile	 exchanges	 between	 Alexander	 and	Cassander,	 namely	 the	 infamous	 account	 of	 proskynesis	 within	 Plutarch’s	biography	of	Alexander	that	saw	Cassander	mock	the	Persian	practice	that	had	
																																																								353	cf.	Bosworth,	JHS.	106.	(1986).	p.	4;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	and	Baynham,	2015.	p.	108;	Pitt	&	Richardon,	CQ.	67	(forthcoming	2017).	354	Arr.	 7.12.4;	 Diod.	 18.14.1;	 Just.	 12.12.9;	 Bosworth,	 CQ.	 21.	 (1971),	 p.	 125;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	126;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	98.	cf.	Dunn	&	Wheatley,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	42;	Anson,	2014.	p.	14;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	108.	
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been	 introduced	 by	 Alexander.355	Plutarch	 clearly	 states	 that	 the	 encounter	affected	Cassander	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 he	was	physically	disturbed	 to	 even	see	 a	 statue	 of	 the	 king,	 even	 years	 later.356	This	 would,	 in	 part,	 provide	 an	explanation	for	Cassander’s	reluctance	to	engage	with	royal	supporters	 in	319.	However,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 significant	 issues	 surrounding	 Cassander’s	involvement	 in	 the	 proskynesis	 affair.	 This	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 various	accounts	 of	 proskynesis	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 court	 extant	 in	 the	 ancient	literary	sources	and	explores	why	Plutarch’s	account	involving	Cassander	can	be	dismissed.	Additionally,	the	depiction	of	Cassander	by	Plutarch	as	an	adversary	to	Alexander	is	evaluated.		Finally,	 the	 chapter	discusses	 the	events	 that	 took	place	 immediately	 after	 the	demise	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great.	 Of	 particular	 significance	 to	 this	 study	 are	 the	rumours	 and	 political	 jostling	 amongst	 the	 Successors,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	who,	or	what,	brought	about	the	young	king’s	death.	In	an	effort	to	discredit	the	Antipatrids,	 the	 rumour	 of	 a	 conspiracy	 involving	 a	 family	 plot	 to	 poison	Alexander	emerged	throughout	the	Empire.	This	rumour	gained	momentum	as	Alexander	 and	 Antipater	 had	 an	 increasingly	 difficult	 relationship	 since	 334	culminating	 in	 Antipater’s	 dismissal	 as	 Regent	 of	 Macedon.	 This	 was	 further	compounded	by	the	role	that	Olympias	played	after	her	son’s	death.	Once	news	had	 reached	 Greece	 of	 Alexander’s	 death,	 the	 already	 heated	 relationship	between	the	royal	mother	and	the	Antipatrids	developed	into	an	inter-dynastic	conflict	 that	would	 ultimately	 result	 in	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus,	 his	wife	 Eurydice	 and	 Olympias	 herself	 in	 316.357 	While	 tensions	 had	 existed	between	 Antipater	 and	 Alexander	 over	 the	 past	 decade,	 it	 was	 not	 until	Alexander	died	and	 the	rumours	 involving	 the	Antipatrids	became	widespread	that	 the	 fracture	between	 the	 two	 factions	 finally	emerged,	 thereby	explaining	Cassander’s	actions	in	319.		
																																																								355	Plut.	Alex.	74.2;	Plut.	Mor.	180F;	Adams,	1975.	p.	55	356	Plut.	Alex.	74.6;	Adams,	1975.	p.	55.	357	See	Ch.	7.2.	pp.	208-209.	
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Of	particular	interest	to	this	study	is	the	speed	at	which	the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	 travelled	 from	 Babylon	 to	 Greece,	 a	 journey	 of	 over	 two	 and	 a	 half	thousand	 kilometres. 358 	If	 this	 period	 of	 time	 can	 be	 established,	 then	 a	precedent	for	the	speed	at	which	news	could	travel	may	be	set.	This	is	significant	for	several	reasons.	Firstly,	 the	date	of	 the	 initiation	of	 the	Lamian	War	can	be	narrowed.	 Additionally,	 the	 precedent	 may	 be	 used	 for	 later	 aspects	 of	 this	study,	most	significantly	in	discussion	of	Cassander’s	first	unsuccessful	invasion	of	Macedon	in	the	summer	of	317	and	Polyperchon’s	swift	reaction	to	this.359		Before	discussing	Cassander’s	arrival	in	Babylon	and	the	events	that	followed,	it	is	 prudent	 to	 investigate	 why	 Antipater	 chose	 to	 remain	 in	 Macedon	 and	dispatch	his	son	in	his	stead.	Antipater’s	presence	in	Babylon	had	two	different	aspects.	 Firstly,	 he	 was	 required	 to	 lead	 re-enforcements	 from	 Macedon	 to	replace	those	veterans	who	were	returning	under	the	command	of	Craterus,360	and	secondly,	he	was	to	answer	charges	laid	against	him.361	While	Plutarch	does	not	identify	who	the	originators	of	these	charges	were,	it	is	likely	that	they	came	from	 the	 Greek	 cities	 and	 the	 League	 of	 Corinth,	 a	 group	 that	 had	 grown	increasingly	 disgruntled	 with	 the	 regent	 over	 the	 previous	 years.	 Since	 the	conflicts	of	331/0	with	the	simultaneous	revolt	in	Thrace	and	the	war	with	Agis	of	 Sparta,	Antipater,	with	 the	diminished	 resources	 resulting	 from	Alexander’s	campaigns	 of	 the	 past	 decade,	 had	wanted	 to	maintain	 a	 peaceful	 Greece	 and	minimise	the	potential	for	further	rebellion	to	Macedonian	domination.	Initially,	Antipater	 had	 ruled	 Greece	 with	 a	 relatively	 light	 hand.	 However,	 after	 the	conflicts	of	331/0	with	the	status	quo	reinstalled,	he	increased	Macedonian	hold	on	 the	 region. 362 	He	 did	 this	 by	 placing	 further	 trust	 in	 pro-Macedonian	oligarchies	and	installing	men	who	were	personally	loyal	to	him	who	would	be	more	 easily	 able	 to	 quash	 dissent	 at	 a	 local	 level. 363 	As	 previously																																																									358	Talbert,	1985.	pp.	18-19.	359	See	Ch.	7.1.	pp.	183-200.	360	Just.	12.12.9;	Bosworth,	JHS.	106.	(1986).	p.	4.	361	Which	 is	 implied	 during	 the	 tense	 discussions	 between	 Cassander	 and	 the	king	found	in	Plutarch’s	narrative	(Plut.	Alex.	74.4-5).	362	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	83;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	339,	342.	363	Diod.	18.56.7.	
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demonstrated, 364 	the	 Greeks	 were	 already	 discontented	 with	 Macedonian	subjugation.	 Antipater’s	 new	measures	 to	 protect	Macedonian	 interests	 in	 the	region,	 combined	 with	 the	 installation	 of	 pro-Macedonian	 groups	 within	 the	Peninsula,	further	exacerbated	the	unrest.	These	measures	resulted	in	Antipater	becoming	the	face	of	Macedonian	oppression	in	Greece	and	the	target	of	Greek	dissatisfaction.	These	sentiments	and	grievances	against	the	regent	were	voiced	to	Alexander.		Despite	 the	 calls	 for	 his	 presence	 in	Babylon,	Antipater	 remained	 in	Macedon.	The	 reasons	 behind	 his	 decision	 to	 do	 so	 have	 been	 speculated	 upon	 by	 the	ancient	literary	sources;	however	their	accounts	are	not	completely	satisfactory.	Both	Diodorus	and	 Justin	 interpret	Antipater’s	 inaction	 to	be	as	a	 result	of	his	fear	of	reprisal	or	punishment	at	the	hands	of	Alexander.365	There	is	some	merit	to	 this	 reasoning.	 Since	 Alexander	 had	 returned	 from	 India	 to	 Babylon	 the	monarch	 had	 embarked	 on	 a	 series	 of	 executions	 and	 replacement	 of	 satraps	throughout	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire. 366 	The	 various	 replacements	 and	executions	 spread	 fear	 of	 incurring	 Alexander’s	 wrath	 for	 any	 indiscretion	among	 the	 governors	 of	 the	 Empire.367	Diodorus	 writes	 that	 two	 executions	especially	 affected	Antipater,	 those	 of	 Philotas	 and	 his	 father	 Parmenion,	who	were	killed	by	Alexander	in	330,	despite	evidence	of	their	guilt	being	tenuous	at	best.368		However	the	assertion	that	Antipater	remained	in	Macedon	solely	as	a	result	of	fear	for	his	safety	is	not	entirely	convincing	and	fails	to	address	two	key	factors	in	 Antipater’s	 character	 and	 his	 relationship	 with	 Alexander	 as	 well	 as	 the	practicalities	 of	 the	 governance	of	Greece	 and	Macedon.	Arrian’s	 evaluation	of	the	interpersonal	relationship	between	Antipater	and	Alexander	for	this	period	of	 time	 does	 not	 suggest	 ill	 will	 between	 the	 two,369	calling	 into	 question	 the																																																									364	See.	Ch.	3.	and	below.	365	Diod.	17.118.1;	Just.	12.14.5.	366	Arr.	7.27.1-2;	Curt.	10.1.37	–	39;	Diod.	17.118.1;	Just.	12.10.8.	367	Arr.	7.27.3;	Diod.	17.106.3.	368	Diod.	17.118.1;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	42.	369	Arr.	7.12.5-6.	
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likelihood	that	Antipater	would	be	harmed	should	he	 journey	to	Babylon.370	In	addition	 to	 Arrian’s	 account,	 there	 is	 the	 problem	 of	 Macedon’s	 governance	should	Antipater	embark	eastward.	The	order	requiring	Antipater’s	presence	in	Babylon	 does	 not	 survive;	 therefore	 its	 contents	 cannot	 be	 evaluated	 or	assessed.	 If	 the	 order	 had	 survived,	 much	 of	 the	 uncertainty	 around	 the	relationship	 between	 Antipater	 and	 Alexander,	 as	 well	 as	 Antipater’s	relationship	with	 Craterus,	would	 be	 resolved.	While	 no	 interpretation	 can	 be	stated	with	 any	 level	 of	 assertion,	 it	 is	 entirely	 possible	 that	 Antipater	was	 to	remain	in	Macedon	until	Craterus,	who	was	en	route	from	the	east	to	assume	the	office	of	regent,	arrived.	This	seems	unlikely	because	if	Antipater	were	expected	to	wait	until	his	replacement	arrived,	it	would	have	been	unnecessary	for	him	to	send	Cassander	to	Babylon	and	the	arguments	between	the	king	and	Antipater’s	son	 become	 even	 more	 inexplicable.	 Conversely,	 Antipater	 may	 have	 been	ordered	 to	 leave	 for	 Babylon	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 order	 was	 received	 and	 the	replacements	for	Craterus’s	veterans	raised.	This	seems	more	probable	since,	if	this	were	so,	Cassander’s	mission	to	Babylon	would	have	resulted	from	the	need	to	meet	with	Alexander	as	 soon	as	possible.	This	would	also	explain	 the	 tense	reception	 Cassander	 received	when	 he	 arrived.	 	 Because	 Cassander	 arrived	 in	Babylon	shortly	after	Antipater’s	replacement	was	announced,	we	may	assume	that	Antipater	was	required	to	leave	for	Alexander’s	court,	placing	someone	in	a	caretaker	position	as	regent	of	Macedon.		
	The	tense	political	environment	and	the	instability	in	the	Greek	City-States	was	another	vital	factor	that	Antipater	needed	to	take	into	account.	Antipater	would	have	 been	 aware	 that	 should	 he	 leave	 Macedon,	 a	 power	 vacuum	 would	 be	created	by	the	absence	of	a	strong	regent	in	situ.		Craterus	was	yet	to	arrive	to	fill	the	power	gap,	being	still	in	Cilicia	at	the	time	of	Alexander’s	death	the	following	
																																																								370	Ashton	(Makedonia.	5.	(1993).	p.	126;	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	pp.	108-109.)	 have	 suggested,	 quite	 plausibly,	 that	 due	 to	 his	 advanced	 age	 and	experience,	Antipater	may	even	have	been	expected	to	assume	a	governmental	position	 in	 the	 eastern	 regions	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 cf.	 Poddighe,	 in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2012.	p.	231.	
	 85	
year.371 	Should	 this	 have	 occurred,	 anti-Macedonian	 sentiment	 might	 have	fermented	 further	 and	 there	 was	 clear	 risk	 of	 civil	 unrest	 and	 revolt	 in	 the	region.	While	 this	 factor	 seems	 self	 evident,	 it	 has	 gone	without	 comment	 by	modern	 scholarship.372	Antipater	was	 all	 too	 aware	 that	 the	Greek	 cities	 could	revolt;	 his	 previous	 experiences	 with	 Sparta	 and	 Thrace	 had	 shown	 him	 as	much.	Consequentially,	it	is	in	no	way	surprising	that	Antipater	chose	to	remain	in	Macedon	until	a	time	when	he	could	be	relieved	of	his	position	by	Craterus.		The	question	then	is	why	Craterus	was	so	slow	in	returning	to	Macedon.373	The	details	of	his	mission	to	Macedon	are	unclear,	and	its	intended	purpose	difficult	to	 discern.	While	 the	 clear	 end	point	 of	 his	 orders	was	 to	 reach	Macedon	 and	replace	 Antipater	 as	 the	 regent, 374 	the	 timeframe	 within	 which	 Alexander	wished	 this	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 is	 less	well	 defined.	 If	 Craterus	was	 expected	 to	travel	 to	 Macedon	 with	 speed,	 thereby	 allowing	 Antipater	 either	 to	 lead	 the	troops	that	would	replace	Craterus’	force,	or	to	face	judgement	by	Alexander	for	his	indiscretions,	the	pace	that	Craterus	was	able	to	achieve	and	the	distance	he	covered	 is	 perplexing.	 His	 slow	 progression	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 a	 number	 of	factors	which	 indicate	 that,	 while	 his	mission	was	 important,	 it	 was	 for	more	pragmatic	 reasons	 than	 the	 personal	 animosity	 between	 Alexander	 and	Antipater.	 Bosworth	 attributes	 the	 time	 that	 Craterus	 spent	 in	 Cilicia	 to	 the	installation	 of	 a	 military	 framework	 in	 preparation	 for	 future	 military	endeavours	in	the	Mediterranean,375	a	task	which	is	likely	to	have	been	officially																																																									371	Arr.	7.12.4;	Diod.	18.14.1;	 Just.	12.12.9;	cf.	Badian	 JHS.	81.	 (1961).	pp.	35-6;	Bosworth,	 CQ.	 21.	 (1971).	 p.	 125;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 126;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 98;	Anson,	 2014.	 p.	 14;	 Ashton,	 in	 Wheatley	 &	 Baynham,	 2015.	 p.	 108;	 Pitt	 &	Richardson,	CQ	67	(Forthcoming	2017).	372	Errington	(2008.	p.	16.),	comes	close	to	this	interpretation,	however	does	not	assert	 the	 point	 that	 Antipater	 was	 unable	 to	 leave	 Macedon	 due	 to	 Greek	unrest.	For	more	on	the	situation	facing	Antipater	in	Macedon	and	the	impact	it	had	 on	 his	 ability	 to	 departmart	 for	 the	 east,	 see:	 Pitt	 &	 Richardson,	 CQ.	 67.	(Forthcoming,	2017).	373	For	discussion	of	this	topic	and	a	detailed	evaluation	of	the	scholarship,	see:	Pitt	&	Richardson,	CQ.	67.	(Forthcoming,	2017).	374	Arr.	 7.12.4;	 Just.	 12.12.9;	Ashton,	Makedonia.	5	 (1993).	 p.	 126;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	50;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	108.	375Bosworth,	 1988.	 p.	 161;	 cf	Badian.	 JHS.	81.	 (1961).	 p.	 36;	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	pp.	125-6.		
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sanctioned	by	Alexander.376	If	this	is	the	case,	the	need	for	Craterus’	immediate	return	to	Macedon,	as	well	as	for	Antipater’s	presence	in	Babylon	may	not	have	been	 as	 pressing	 as	 presented	 within	 the	 ancient	 texts.	 It	 has	 also	 been	suggested	that	desertion	may	have	plagued	Craterus’	ranks	 in	324,	slowing	his	progress,	as	time	would	be	required	to	replenish	the	depleted	ranks.377	Diodorus	states	 that	 “ἦγε	 δὲ	 πεζοὺς	 μὲν	 τῶν	 εἰς	 Ἀσίαν	 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ	 συνδιαβεβηκότων	
ἑξακισχιλίους,	 τῶν	 δ᾽	 ἐν	 παρόδῳ	 προσειλημμένων	 τετρακισχιλίους.” 378 	This	phrasing,	however,	is	not	precise	enough	to	determine	when	the	four	thousand	troops	 were	 recruited	 or	 by	 whom.379	It	 is	 entirely	 possible	 that	 Bosworth	 is	correct,	and	that	there	were	desertions	by	tired	veterans	longing	for	home	who	decided	 not	 to	 wait	 in	 Cilicia	 and	 left	 of	 their	 own	 accord.	 An	 alternative	interpretation	 of	 the	 four	 thousand	 in	 Diodorus	 may	 be	 that	 the	 historian	 is	merely	making	a	distinction	between	those	troops	that	Alexander	secured	after	he	had	entered	Asia	and	 those	who	comprised	his	original	 force,	meaning	 that	Craterus	 was	 leading	 a	 combined	 force	 of	 veterans	 back	 to	 Macedon.	 It	 is	possible	 that	 the	 former	 were	 recruited	 from	 the	 Macedonian	 mercenaries	operating	 in	 the	 region	 prior	 to	 334	 and	 Alexander’s	 invasion	 and	 that	 their	recruitment	had	been	factored	into	the	king’s	plan.380	By	324,	these	men	would	also	have	been	considered	Macedonian	veterans	of	Alexander’s	campaigns	and	Diodorus	may	have	been	providing	further	information	for	his	readers.	However	caution	 must	 be	 exercised,	 as	 the	 composition	 of	 Craterus’	 army	 is	 not	mentioned	in	any	other	entry	within	the	ancient	sources,	or	even	elsewhere	by	Diodorus	 himself.381	While	 this	 does	 not	 discount	 the	 possibility	 of	 desertion	occurring	on	a	large	scale	in	the	force	led	by	Craterus,	therefore	causing	him	to	remain	 in	Cilicia	 longer	than	he	or	Alexander	 intended,	 the	evidence	for	this	 is	not	as	convincing	as	has	previously	been	suggested.																																																									376	Bosworth,	1988.	p.	162.	377	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	p.	125.	378	Diod.	18.16.4.	379	Landucci	Gattinoni	(2008).	p.	97.)	does	not	provide	any	further	light	on	this	issue,	instead	focusing	upon	Craterus’s	later	actions	and	his	subsequent	meeting	with	Antipater	 in	Europe.	For	discussion	on	 the	4,000	 recruits,	 see:	Bosworth,	
JHS.	100.	(1980).	p.	19;	Hammond,	JHS.	109.	(1989).	p.	67;	Anson,	2004.	p.	68.	380	cf.	Ch.	3.	381	Diod.	18.3.4;	cf.	Arr.	7.12.4;	Curt.	10.4.3.	
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	An	 additional	 consideration,	 which	may	 explain	 Craterus’s	 slow	 advancement	was	his	 health,	 or	 rather	 lack	 thereof.	 	While	 not	 elderly,382	Craterus	was	well	advanced	in	years,	and	Arrian	states	that	by	the	time	of	his	despatch	to	Macedon,	he	was	an	invalid,383	a	situation	which	would	have	hampered	a	swift	 journey	if	Alexander	required	him	to	replace	Antipater	quickly.		Polyperchon	was	placed	as	Craterus’s	second	in	command	of	the	army	“so	that	
they	would	 not	 long	 for	 a	 leader.”384		 	 This	may	 imply	 that	 Alexander	 was	 not	confident	 that	 Craterus	 would	 survive	 the	 journey	 to	 Macedon.	 Additionally,	Alexander	must	 have	 regarded	 Polyperchon	 as	 sufficiently	 trustworthy	 to	 not	only	lead	Craterus’	veterans	home,	but	also	to	assume	all	of	his	duties,	including	those	 of	 the	 Regency.	 	 The	 high	 regard	 in	which	 Alexander	 held	 Polyperchon	may	also	have	 influenced	 the	decision	 later	made	by	Antipater	 in	choice	of	his	replacement	as	regent.	In	selecting	Polyperchon	he	was,	in	effect,	following	the	original	 choice	 that	 had	 been	made	 by	 Alexander.	 	 This,	 however,	 was	 in	 the	future.	 	 The	 more	 immediate	 question	 is	 whether	 Antipater	 would	 have	relinquished	 the	 regency	 to	 Craterus	 upon	 his	 arrival	 if	 Alexander	 were	 still	alive	 at	 this	 point.	 If	 Antipater	 was	 hostile	 towards	 Alexander	 and	 his	representative,	 it	may	be	expected	 that	he	would	have	attempted	 to	 retain	his	position	of	power.385	Diodorus	does	provide	an	account	that	states	Craterus	was	sent	 by	 Alexander	 to	 kill	 Antipater	 and	 that	 Craterus	 immediately	 decided	against	this	course	of	action	once	news	of	Alexander’s	death	had	reached	him.386	The	 initial	 order	may	 suggest	 hostility	 between	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus.	 	 This	was	later	compounded	by	Craterus’	lack	of	action	in	aiding	Antipater	during	the	Lamian	 War	 that	 had	 broken	 out	 in	 Greece,	 despite	 Antipater’s	 request	 for	assistance.387	Craterus	may	have	been	waiting	 for	 an	opportune	 time	when	he																																																									382	Being	born	ca.	370.	 cf.	Heckel,	1992.	p.	107;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	95;	Ashton,	 in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	109.	383	Arr.	7.12.4.	384	Arr.	7.12.4:	“…μὴ	ποθῆσαι	στρατηγὸν	τοὺς	ἰόντος.”	385	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	p.	125.	386	Diod.	18.4.1.	387	Diod.	18.12.1.	cf.	Diod.	18.14.4–5;	Plut.	Eum.	3.	Leonnatus	was	forced	to	travel	to	Antipater’s	aid	from	Phrygia.	
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would	 be	 able	 to	 enter	Macedon	when	 Antipater	was	 at	 his	weakest,	 thereby	enabling	 him	 to	 supplant	 the	 de	 facto	 regent	 with	 relative	 ease.388	However,	taking	into	account	the	distances	between	Cilicia	and	Macedon	as	well	as	his	ill	health,	Craterus’	ability	to	launch	a	swift	military	intervention	seems	unlikely.		The	 notion	 that	 Craterus	 was	 ordered	 to	 kill	 Antipater	 too	 seems	 unlikely.	Antipater	was	 to	 bring	 fresh	 troops	 to	 reinforce	Alexander	 in	Asia.	 Given	 this,	the	order	for	his	death	seems	illogical.	Although	caution	must	be	exercised	when	evaluating	 events	 with	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 the	 supposed	 assassination	order	 does	 seem	 to	 stand	 out	 as	 an	 anomaly	 in	 the	 sequence	 of	 events,	particularly	 considering	 how	 soon	 after	 it	 is	 suggested,	 it	 is	 dismissed	 by	Craterus.	 	 	 Because	 of	 the	 unrest	 that	may	 arise	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 powerful	officer,	Antipater’s	unwillingness	to	depart	for	Babylon	can	be	attributed	to	the	potential	 turmoil	 that	may	 arise,	more	 so	 than	 any	 personal	 concerns	 that	 he	had	for	his	safety.	 	An	alternative	explanation	is	that,	even	if	Antipater	did	fear	Alexander,	the	notion	of	a	leaderless	Macedon	and	an	unruly	Greece	provided	a	pragmatically	convincing	reason	for	his	reluctance	to	obey	Alexander	and	attend	him	in	Babylon.		If	this	reasoning	is	accepted,	the	level	of	animosity	between	the	two	then	becomes	redundant.		The	 events	 that	 took	 place	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Alexander	 are	 sparsely	recorded	 by	 the	 ancient	 sources,	 and	 the	 details	 that	 are	 available	 need	 to	 be	treated	with	caution.	Plutarch	is	the	only	source	that	provides	a	detailed	account	of	 Cassander’s	 actions	 once	 he	 arrives	 in	 Babylon. 389 	Arrian	 is	 silent	 on	Cassander’s	 time	 in	 Babylon,	 save	 that	 he	 was	 a	 member	 of	 a	 fictitious	conspiracy	 to	 murder	 Alexander,	 a	 statement	 which	 is	 echoed	 by	 Diodorus,	Curtius,	 and	 Justin. 390 	However,	 none	 of	 these	 sources	 make	 reference	 to	Cassander’s	actions	within	Babylon	to	represent	Antipater	other	than	Plutarch,	
																																																								388	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	p.	125.	389	Plut.	Alex.	74.4;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	2.	(1979).	p.	114.	390 	Arr.	 7.27.1;	 Curt.	 10.10.19;	 Diod.	 17.118.2;	 Just.	 12.14.6.	 The	 accounts	contained	 within	 the	 other	 ancient	 sources	 as	 well	 as	 a	 brief	 outline	 of	 the	Antiaptrid	conspiracy	to	murder	Alexander	are	discussed	below.	
	 89	
who	 provides	 the	 most	 extensive	 report	 on	 Cassander. 391 	The	 biographer	devotes	 an	 entire	 section	 of	 the	 Life	 of	 Alexander	 to	 the	 interactions	 between	Cassander	and	Alexander,	 a	detailed	account	when	compared	 to	 the	brevity	of	the	 other	 sources.	 The	 relationship	 between	 the	 pair	 presented	 by	 Plutarch	indicates	a	tense	dislike	between	the	two	that	results	in	both	physical	and	verbal	confrontations.392	It	has	been	suggested	that	Alexander	and	Cassander	may	have	been	 acting	 upon	 an	 old	mutual	 dislike	 of	 each	 other	 from	 their	 childhood,	 a	childhood	 which	 they	 may	 have	 spent	 together	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Court.393	Certainly	 there	 are	 references	 that	 suggest	 as	much,	 both	 in	 Plutarch’s	Life	of	
Alexander	and	Moralia,	with	references	to	Cassander’s	tutelage	under	Aristotle,	when	 Alexander	 states	 “ταῦτα	 ἐκεῖνα	 …	 σοφίσματα	 τῶν	 Ἀριστοτέλους	 εἰς	
ἑκάτερον	 τὸν	 λόγον.”394	The	 Moralia	 records	 a	 dinner	 party	 of	 uncertain	 date	with	 both	 Alexander	 and	 Cassander	 being	 present,	 where	 Alexander	 becomes	enraged	with	Cassander’s	behaviour	as	he	forced	a	flautist	he	lusted	after	to	kiss	him,	 leading	 the	king	 to	exclaim,	 “ἀλλ᾽	οὐδ᾽	ἐρασθῆναί	τινος	ἔξεστι	δι᾽	ὑμᾶς.”395	The	 most	 violent	 encounter	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Alexander	 recorded	 by	Plutarch	 is	 centred	 around	Cassander’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 practice	 of	proskynesis,	after	 Alexander	 introduced	 the	 practice	 into	 his	 court.	 Soon	 after	 arriving	 in	Babylon,	 Cassander	 witnessed	 Alexander	 taking	 part	 in	 “βαρβάρους	 τινὰς	
προσκυνοῦντας.” 396 	Plutarch’s	 account	 conveys	 a	 significant	 rift	 between	Cassander	 and	 Alexander,	 which	 according	 to	 Plutarch,	 affected	 Cassander	 so	deeply	 that	 he	 carried	 the	 mental	 scars	 of	 this	 long	 after	 the	 king’s	 death	 in	323.397	This	 could	 also	 explain	 Cassander’s	 aversion	 to	 seeking	 royal	 support	against	 Polyperchon	 after	 319.	 However,	 there	 are	 issues	 with	 Plutarch’s	account	 that	 require	 closer	 scrutiny	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 its	 usefulness.	 As	previously	 stated,	 Plutarch’s	 information	 is	 not	 corroborated	 by	 any	 other																																																									391	Plut.	Alex.	74.4.	392	Plut.	Alex.	74.3;	Plut.	Mor.	180F.	393	Adams,	1975.	p.	44;	Possibly	stemming	from	Cassander’s	time	as	Alexander’s	companion	 during	 their	 youth.	 cf.	 Berve,	 Vol.	 I.	 1926.	 pp.	 37-39;	 For	 a	 recent	discussion	 of	 importance	 and	 role	 of	 the	 Paides	 Basilikoi	 in	 the	 Macedonian	Court,	see:	Carney,	in	Howe	&	Reames,	2008.	pp.	145-164.	394	Plut.	Alex.	74.5.	395	Plut.	Mor.	180F.	396	Plut.	Alex.	74.2.	397	Plut.	Alex.	74.6.	
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ancient	 account	 and	 a	 picture	 of	 general	 animosity	 between	 Alexander	 and	Cassander	is	evident	throughout	his	work.			That	 Alexander	 was	 prone	 to	 outbursts	 of	 physical	 and	 verbal	 violence,	 as	recorded	by	Plutarch	in	the	description	of	his	behaviour	towards	Cassander,	 is	not	an	isolated	account.	Contained	within	the	histories	of	Arrian	and	Curtius	are	similar	 accounts	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 elites’	 mockery	 of	 the	 practice	 of	
proskynesis. 398 	Arrian	 preserves	 an	 interaction	 between	 Alexander	 and	Leonnatus	 in	 327,	 where	 the	 king	 reprimands	 Leonnatus	 for	 his	 mockery	 of	Persian	 dignitaries	 who	 prostrated	 themselves	 before	 the	 king.399	There	 has	been	 some	 debate	 over	 which	 Leonnatus	 is	 involved	 within	 Arrian’s	 account.	Berve	suggests	he	was	the	son	of	the	otherwise	unknown	Antipater	of	Aigai,400	however	 Badian	 and	 Heckel	 correctly	 identify	 him	 as	 the	 famous	
somatophylax.401	Curtius	 recalls	 a	 violent	 attack	 against	 Polyperchon	 at	 the	hands	 of	 Alexander	 for	 a	 similar	 reaction	 to	 the	 foreign	 practice,	 which	 took	place	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 Arrian’s	 account.402 	After	 mocking	 the	 practice,	Polyperchon	 is	 thrown	 to	 the	 ground	 and	 subsequently	 himself	 mocked	 by	Alexander.	 Both	 the	 versions	 by	 Arrian	 and	 Curtius	 are	 strikingly	 similar	 to	Plutarch’s	 account	 involving	 Cassander	 in	 324.403 	Therefore	 three	 separate	accounts	exist	of	Alexander’s	rebuking	of	Macedonian	officers	for	the	mockery	of	
proskynesis	 within	 his	 court,	 two	 of	 which	 are	 said	 to	 have	 occured	simultaneously	 in	 327	 and	 another	 in	 324.	 Each	 of	 the	 recording	 sources	provides	 a	 different	 name	 for	 the	 victim	 of	 the	 king’s	 rage	 and	 all	 lack	corroborating	evidence	that	could	help	in	strengthening	their	historicity.	While	these	reports	are	isolated	and	lack	corroboration	by	other	ancient	writers,	this	is	not	enough	to	automatically	dismiss	them.	Issues	and	questions	are	raised	that	require	further	examination	in	order	to	determine	how	best	they	can	be	used	in																																																									398 	Arr.	 4.12.2;	 Curt.	 8.5.22.	 For	 a	 detailed	 evaluation	 of	 the	 practice	 of	proskynesis,	see:	Bowden,	BICS	56.	(2013).	pp.	55-77.	399	Arr.	4.12.2;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978)	p.	459.	400	Berve,	Vol.	II.	1926.	p.	235.	cf.	Arr.	Ind.	18.6;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	147.	401	Badian,	TAPA.	91.	(1960)	p.	337,	n.	34;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	p.	459;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	147.	s.v.	Leonnatus	[2].	402	Curt.	8.5.22;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	p.459.	403	Plut.	Alex.	74.2-5;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	p.	461.	
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relation	 to	 this	 study,	 in	 particular	 how	 Plutarch’s	 version	 of	 Cassander’s	interaction	 with	 Alexander	 might	 explain	 his	 later	 actions.	 If	 historical,	Alexander’s	assault	on	Cassander	within	the	Macedonian	Court	would	provide	a	fitting	 cause	 for	 Cassander’s	 later	 reluctance	 to	 engage	 with	 royals	 after	Antipater’s	death	in	319.		There	is	some	concern	regarding	the	similarity	of	the	accounts	of	Arrian,	Curtius	and	Plutarch.	The	question	is	then	raised	as	to	whether	they	are	in	fact	separate	isolated	 accounts,	 with	 separate	 recordings	 by	 separate	 authors	 that	 record	Alexander’s	 punishment	 of	 three	 separate	 men,	 or	 whether	 in	 fact	 some	confusion	has	 taken	place	within	 the	 ancient	 literary	 tradition.	 If	 confusion	or	mistakes	 have	 occurred,	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 of	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	accounts	 of	 mockery	 against	 proskynesis	 conducted	 by	 Macedonian	 elites.	Problems	 are	 immediately	 raised	with	 Polyperchon’s	 involvement.	 Heckel	 has	identified	 two	 specific	 issues	 that	 suggest	 that	 Polyperchon’s	 proskynesis	account,	 which	 is	 found	 in	 Curtius,	 can	 be	 redirected	 into	 Arrian’s	 account	involving	 Leonnatus. 404 	First	 is	 the	 contradiction	 that	 takes	 place	 within	Curtius’s	 own	 narrative;	 the	 historian	 had	 placed	 Polyperchon	 away	 from	Alexander	and	his	court	during	the	period	of	time	in	which	his	proskynesis	event	is	 supposed	 to	 have	 occurred. 405 	This	 placement	 of	 Polyperchon	 also	 has	supporting	 evidence	 from	 Arrian,	 who	 clearly	 states	 that	 Alexander	 left	Polyperchon	behind	in	Sogdiana	as	he	departed	for	Bactria	with	the	majority	of	Macedonian	 forces,	 along	 with	 fellow	 infantry	 commanders,	 Attalus406 	and	Alcetus,407	who	 were	 under	 the	 overall	 command	 of	 Craterus.408	Arrian	 then	goes	on	 to	write	 that	 their	mission	 in	Sogdiana	was	 to	subdue	rebellion	 in	 the	region	of	Pareitacenae.409	Heckel	suggests	that	Curtius,	or	his	source,	may	have	confused	 Polyperchon	 for	 Leonnatus,	 and	 dismisses	 the	 possibility	 that	 the																																																									404	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	pp.	459-460.	405 	Curt.	 8.5.2.	 “Polypercon	 quoque	 regionem,	 quae	 Bubacene	 appellatur,	 in	
dicionem	redegit.”;	Heckel.	AJP.	99.	(1978).		p.	460.	406	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	63.	407	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	8.	408	Arr.	4.22.1.	409	Arr.	4.22.1;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).		p.	460;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227.	
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versions	 by	 Curtius	 and	 Arrian	 can	 both	 be	 historical,	 particularly	 as	 there	 is	persuasive	 evidence	 for	 Polyperchon’s	 absence	 from	 court	 at	 this	 time.410	The	most	 plausible	 explanation	 for	 the	 account	 by	 Curtius	 is	 that	 both	 Arrian	 and	Curtius	 are	 referring	 to	 the	 same	 instance	 of	 proskynesis	 mockery,	 which	occurred	 in	327.411		Combined	with	the	physical	 impossibility	of	Polyperchon’s	simultaneous	presence	at	Alexander’s	court	and	his	mission	with	Craterus,	it	can	be	 argued	 that	 Curtius,	 or	 his	 source	 material,	 is	 mistaken	 in	 his	 account	 of	Polyperchon’s	 involvement	 in	 the	proskynesis	affair.412	Given	 this,	 it	 is	possible	to	assimilate	the	accounts	of	both	Arrian	and	Curtius	into	a	single	episode.		It	has	been	persuasively	argued	that	Arrian	and	Curtius	have	both	described	the	same	 event,	 and	 there	 is	 cause	 to	 think	 that	 Plutarch,	 or	 his	 original	 source	material	may	 have	 done	 so	 as	well.	 Plutarch’s	 version	 of	 events	 also	 requires	further	dissection	and	a	differentiation	needs	to	be	made	between	Cassander’s	arrival	 in	 Babylon	 in	 324	 and	 his	 supposed	 mockery	 of	 proskynesis	 being	practised	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 court.	 The	 arrival	 of	 Cassander	 in	 order	 to	defend	Antipater’s	policies	within	Macedon	is	historical,413	and	while	entangled	within	Plutarch’s	 version	of	proskynesis	mockery,	 can	be	 treated	 as	 a	 separate	time	marker	 for	 Cassander’s	movements	 in	 324.	 There	 is	 a	 striking	 similarity	between	Plutarch’s	account	and	that	of	Curtius414	and	though	this	is	not	enough	in	 and	 of	 itself	 to	 dismiss	 Cassander’s	 treatment	 by	 Alexander,	 caution	 is	required	 in	 its	 evaluation.	 Plutarch’s	 account	has	 received	 some	acceptance	 in	respect	 to	 its	 historicity;	 it	 has	 also	 been	 met	 with	 more	 convincing																																																									410 	Heckel,	 AJP.	 99.	 (1978).	 p.	 460.	 The	 confusion	 and	 misattribution	 of	Polyperchon	is	not	isolated	to	Curtius.	Justin	regularly	makes	the	same	mistake,	confusing	Craterus	with	Polyperchon	on	 four	 separate	occasions,	 Just.	 12.10.1.	cf.	Yardley	&	Heckel,	1997.	p.	276;	 Just.	13.8.5,	 cf.	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	 p.	 158;	 Just.	 13.8.7.	 cf.	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 159;	 Just.	15.1.1.	 cf.	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 218.	 In	 this	 case	 though,	Leonnatus	 cannot	 be	 substituted	 with	 Polyperchon	 in	 Curtius’	 text,	 as	Polyperchon	 was	 also	 assigned	 duties	 that	 required	 him	 to	 be	 away	 from	Alexander	(Arr.	4.22.1;	Plut.	Alex.	55.6;	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	 	p.	460;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	148.	411	Bowden,	BICS.	56.2.	(2013).	p.	73.	412	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).		p.	460,	461;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227.	413	Heckel,	1988.	p.	10.	414	Heckel,	AJP.	99.	(1978).	p.	461.	
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scepticism.415	Heckel	 dismisses	 the	 account	 as	 “…a	 clumsy	 reworking	 of	 the	
famous	 episode	 involving	 Leonnatos…”, 416 	and	 Bowden	 highlights	 the	interchangeable	 nature	 of	 Alexander’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 mockery	 of	 proskynesis	within	 the	 court.417 	Both	 these	 evaluations	 detract	 from	 the	 historicity	 of	Plutarch’s	account.		The	reason,	as	much	as	it	can	be	speculated	upon,	for	Plutarch’s	transfer	of	the	
proskynesis	 event	 to	 Babylon	 and	 Cassander’s	 insertion	 into	 the	 work	 is	 for	literary	purposes	rather	than	historical.	The	event	is	placed	in	the	74th	of	the	77-section	biography,	which	is	immediately	prior	to	Alexander	being	taken	ill,418	an	illness	 ultimately	 resulting	 in	 his	 death.419	It	 must	 be	 highlighted	 that	 this	narrative	 sequencing	 by	 Plutarch	 should	 not	 be	 confused	 with	 the	 historic	chronological	 sequence,	 as	 the	 biographer	 has	 highly	 compressed	 Cassander’s	activities	 in	 Babylon,	 placing	 his	 arrival	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 proskynesis	event	 and	Alexander’s	death	in	close	proximity.	Cassander’s	arrival	has	already	been	stated	as	 taking	place	 in	 324	with	 the	proskynesis	 event	 occurring	 shortly	 thereafter.	The	 date	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 has	 generated	 a	 great	 degree	 of	 scholarly	evaluation,	and	is	set	firmly	to	the	11th	of	June	the	following	year.420	The	transfer	may	 be	 deemed	 an	 attempt	 to	 locate	 Cassander	 and	 the	 Antipatrids	 in	 closer	thematic	proximity	to	Alexander’s	death;	Plutarch	names	Antipater	in	discussion	of	possible	causes	for	the	king’s	demise,421	however	he	does	explicitly	highlight	the	issues	with	the	poisoning	plot.422	While	the	plausibility	of	Plutarch’s	version	of	proskynesis	involving	Cassander	taking	place	is	improbable,	the	passages	still	have	 significance	 to	 this	 study	 as	 they	 are	 indicative	 not	 only	 of	 the	 existing	inter-familial	 tensions	 between	 the	 Argeads	 and	 Antipatrids,	 but	 also	 of	 the	
																																																								415	Blackwell,	 1999.	 p.	 158;	 Bowden,	 BICS.	 56.	 (2013).	 p.	 73;	 Heckel,	 AJP.	 99.	(1978).	p.	460;	Heckel,	1988.	p.	10.	416	Heckel,	1988.	p.	10.	417	Bowden,	BICS.	56.2.	(2013).	p.	73.	418	Plut.	Alex.	75.5.	419	Plut.	Alex.	75.6.	420	Boiy,	2007.	p.	41.	421	Plut.	Alex.	77.3.	422	Plut.	Alex.	77.1.	For	further	discussion	of	Plutarch’s	treatment	of	Alexander’s	death,	see	below.	
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propaganda	campaign	to	discredit	the	Antipatrids	which	took	place	amongst	the	Didochoi	after	June	323,	both	of	which	are	not	Plutarchean	inventions.423		While	it	is	possible	to	deduce	from	our	ancient	sources	that	Cassander	arrived	in	Babylon,	details	of	what	 took	place	 thereafter	are	 less	 certain.	The	majority	of	accounts	compress	Cassander’s	time	in	Babylon	and	conflate	the	period	of	time	he	was	 there	 into	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 and	 the	 rumours	 of	 a	 conspiracy	 to	murder	 him,	 rumours	 which	 place	 members	 of	 the	 Antipatrid	 house	 as	engineers	of	 the	plot.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	cause	of	Alexander’s	death	 is	not	a	central	focus	of	this	study,	nor	will	a	definitive	answer	to	the	question	of	the	 involvement	 of	 the	 Antipatrids	 be	 attempted.	 More	 important	 for	 this	discussion	are	the	effects	 that	 the	rumours	surrounding	Alexander’s	death	had	upon	Antipater	and	Cassander,	particularly	in	the	impact	of	these	on	Cassander’s	later	 attempts	 to	 secure	 a	 base	 of	 support	 after	 319.	 Arrian	 provides	 an	overview	of	the	conspiracy,	describing	Cassander’s	delivery	of	the	poison	to	his	brother	Iollas424	who,	as	Alexander’s	royal	cupbearer,	had	means	to	administer	it	 to	 the	 king.	 However,	 Arrian	 does	 not	 state	 outright	 that	 Alexander’s	 death	was	 the	 result	 of	 Antipatrid	 machinations,	 stating	 “πολλὰ	 δὲ	 καὶ	 ἄλλα	 οἶδα	
ἀναγεγραμμένα	 ὑπὲρ	 τῆς	 Ἀλεξάνδρου	 τελευτῆς,” 425 	though	 he	 does	 fail	 to	mention	what	 the	other	accounts	actually	are.	Curtius,	while	not	as	hesitant	 to	question	 the	 conspiracy’s	 validity,	 for	 the	most	part	 echoes	Arrian’s	 appraisal,	regarding	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 rumours.426	Justin	 is	 more	 direct,	 stating	 with	confidence	 that	 Alexander	 did	 indeed	 meet	 his	 demise	 through	 a	 conspiracy	involving	 Antipater	 and	 his	 sons,	 stating,	 “auctor	 insidiarum	Antipater	 fuit.”427	Diodorus	 does	 not	 name	 Cassander	 specifically	 as	 a	 participant,	 but	 does	acknowledge	 the	 family	 plot	 to	 murder	 Alexander,	 with	 Antipater’s	 son,	 this																																																									423	For	further	discussion	of	the	events	after	Alexander’s	death,	see	below.	424	Arr.	7.27.1.	425	Arr.	7.27.1.	426	Curt.	10.10.14.	“Veneno	necatum	esse	credidere	plerique.”	427	Just.	 12.14.1.	 cf.	 Just.	 12.13.10.	 “Amici	 causas	morbi	 insidae	 fuerunt,	quarum	
infamiam	 successorum	 potentia	 oppressit.”	 Heckel	 suggests	 that	 Justin’s	acceptance	of	the	poisoning	rumour	does	not	necessarily	indicate	that	it	was	the	shared	opinion	of	Trogus	and	urges	extreme	caution	 in	 taking	 Justin’s	opinion	for	that	of	Trogus	(Heckel,	in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	p.	266.).	
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time	referring	 to	 Iollas	 rather	 than	Cassander,	being	 the	one	 to	administer	 the	poison. 428 	However,	 while	 these	 accounts	 seem	 to	 demonstrate	 relative	consensus	as	to	the	cause	of	Alexander’s	death,	ancient	and	modern	writers	have	expressed	 scepticism	 as	 to	 the	 reality	 of	 Antipatrid	 involvement.	 Plutarch	provides	 a	 name	 for	 a	 possible	 originator	 of	 the	 rumour,	 the	 otherwise	unattested	 Hegnothemis,	 who	 narrated	 the	 episode,	 claiming	 to	 have	 heard	 it	from	 Antigonus	 (“Ἁγνοθεμίν	 τινα	 διηγεῖσθαι	 λέγουσιν	 ὡς	 Ἀντιγόνου	 τοῦ	
βασιλέως	 ἀκούσαντα”).429	He	 also	 goes	 so	 far	 to	 state	 that	 “οἱ	 δὲ	 πλεῖστοι	 τὸν	
λόγον	 ὅλως	 οἴονται	 πεπλάσθαι	 τὸν	 περὶ	 τῆς	 Φαρμακείας.”430	The	 reference	 to	Antigonus	 is	 telling,	 as	 is	 the	 time	 frame	 within	 which	 Plutarch	 states	 the	rumour	emerged.	The	rumours	that	surrounded	the	cause	of	Alexander’s	death	were	 many	 and	 complex,	 and	 were	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 political	 advancement	within	the	post-323	Macedonian	Empire.	The	impact	that	these	rumours	would	have	 on	 Antipater	 and	 Cassander	 was	 extensive,	 and	 it	 is	 to	 the	 events	 after	Alexander’s	death	that	this	study	now	turns.		The	 death	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 saw	 one	 of	 the	most	 tumultuous	 periods	 of	time	 in	 the	history	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire.	Without	a	satisfactory	heir	who	could	 assume	 effective	 control	 on	 the	 throne,	 it	 was	 left	 to	 his	 officers	 to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	Empire.		As	previously	stated,	it	is	not	the	intention	of	 this	 study	 to	 investigate,	 or	 contribute	 to	 the	 discussion	 surrounding	 the	cause	of	Alexander	the	Great’s	death	on	June	11th	323,	nor	to	state	a	definitive	cause	of	his	death.	Of	much	greater	significance	to	Antipater,	Cassander	and	to	a	lesser	 extent,	 Polyperchon,	 is	 the	 political	 turmoil	 into	which	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 was	 plunged	 and	 the	 power	 that	 the	 poisoning	 conspiracy	 achieved	within	the	European-sphere	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.	The	validity	of	the	plot	has	 already	 been	 questioned,	 but	 its	 historicity	 is	 not	 of	 significance	 to	 this	study.	 What	 is	 significant	 however	 is	 the	 large	 amount	 of	 currency	 that	 the	rumour	achieved	among	the	Greek	cites;	it	seems	to	have	been	accepted	without	question	by	Alexander’s	mother,	Olympias,	who	was	still	in	Molossia,	and	whose																																																									428	Diod.	17.118.1.	429	Plut.	Alex.	77.3.	430	Plut.	Alex.	77.5.	
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hatred	 of	 Antipater	 has	 been	 discussed	 previously. 431 	For	 Cassander,	 the	rumours	of	involvement	had	a	profound	effect	on	his	later	attempts	at	securing	support	 against	 Polyperchon	 in	 319;	 his	 avenues	 of	 potential	 support	 were	limited	 as	 pro-monarchical	 groups	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Argead	 royal	 house	would	not	be	willing	 to	enter	 into	alliances	with	him	against	Polyperchon,	 the	officially	appointed	regent	of	Macedon.432		Luckily	there	is	a	sizable	body	of	ancient	source	material	for	this	period	of	time,	as	 well	 as	 substantial	 modern	 scholarship	 devoted	 to	 the	 events	 surrounding	Alexander’s	 death	 and	 the	 jockeying	 for	 position	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	Diadochi,	 from	 which	 this	 study	 is	 able	 to	 draw.	 Much	 of	 the	 modern	scholarship,	 primarily	 the	 works	 of	 Errington,433	Bosworth,434	Anson,435	and	Meeus, 436 	have	 provided	 significant	 detail	 and	 clarification	 to	 the	 events	immediately	after	the	death	of	Alexander	and	the	heated	political	environment	that	it	created.		There	 were	 many	 rumours	 and	 theories	 regarding	 the	 cause	 of	 Alexander’s	death,	and	those	who	may	have	played	a	part	in	it.	437		However,	for	the	purposes	of	 evaluating	 and	 assessing	 the	 effects	 that	 the	 rumours	 of	 Antipatrid	involvement	 in	 the	murder	of	Alexander	had	on	the	 family	and	on	Cassander’s	future	endeavours	after	319,	 there	needs	to	be	a	delineation	and	separation	of	the	 rumours	 and	 propaganda	 circulating	 around	 Babylon	 and	 the	 greater	Macedonian	 Empire	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Alexander’s	 death,	 and	 those	 used	 in	 later	years	as	a	political	device	by	the	Diadochoi	 in	order	to	defame	and	undermine	their	respective	opponents	in	the	empire.	The	propaganda	campaign	conducted	against	 Cassander	 by	 Antigonus	 during	 Cassander’s	 consolidation	 of	 power	 in																																																									431	See:	Ch.	3.	432	See:	Ch.	6.1.	433	Errington,	JHS.	90.	(1970).	pp.	49	–	77.	434	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	pp.	112	–	136;	Bosworth,	2003.	435	Anson,	CP.	87.	(1992),	pp.	38	–	43.	436	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	pp.	39	–	82.	437	Heckel	 (2006.	p.	17.)	has	 collected	 the	various	 causes	proposed	by	modern	scholars,	 including,	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 “…typhus,	 malaria,	 alcoholism,	
pancreatitis,	 perforated	 bowel,	 West	 Nile	 Virus	 or	 even	 bereavement	 [after	 the	death	of	Hephaiston].”	
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316,	following	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus,	Eurydice	and	the	execution	of	Olympias438is	of	particular	significance	for	this	study.		Bosworth	has	clearly	highlighted	the	caution	that	is	required	in	investigating	the	influence	 of	 the	 propaganda	 on	 the	 ancient	 sources,	 when	 he	 discussed	 the	version	offered	by	Diodorus	of	accounts	based	upon	his	primary	sources	for	the	year	of	323,	Hieronymus	of	Cardia,		“…propaganda	is	not	always	clearly	labelled,	
and	it	can	be	difficult	to	detect,	particularly	when	politically	biased	interpretations	
are	 swallowed	 as	 factual	 by	 secondary	 [ancient]	 sources…the	 probability	 of	 our	
extant	 sources	 being	 fouled	 by	 propaganda	 is	 very	 high.”439	It	 is	 only	 with	 an	awareness	 of	 this	 integration	 and	 assimilation	 of	 propaganda	 and	 historical	narrative	 within	 the	 ancient	 sources	 that	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 rumour	 of	Alexander’s	poisoning	had	on	the	Antipatrids	can	be	assessed.		Plutarch	 provides	 evidence	 for	 a	 succession	 of	 propaganda	 campaigns	conducted	 by	 the	 Diadochi	 against	 each	 other.	 During	 his	 evaluation	 of	 the	poisoning	of	Alexander,	he	writes	“φαρμακείας	δὲ	ὑποψίαν	παραυτίκα	μὲν	οὐδεὶς	
ἔσχεν,	 ἕκτῳ	 δὲ	 ἔτει	 φασὶ	 μηνύσεως	 γενομέης	 τὴν	 Ὀλυμπιάδα	 πολλοὺς	 μὲν	
ἀναλεῖν,	 ἐκρῖψαι	 δὲ	 τὰ	 λείψανα	 τοῦ	 Ἰόλα	 τεθνηκότος,	 ὡς	 τούτου	 τὸ	 φάρμακον	
ἐγχέαντος.”440	With	this	account,	he	provides	a	historically	tenuous	authority	for	the	rumour,	the	unknown	Hagnothemis,	and	states	where	he	was	able	to	get	his	information,	 Antigonus	 (“Ἀντιγόνου	 τοῦ	 βασιλέως).”441	These	 two	 excerpts	 are	historically	 tentative	as	Plutarch	was	mistaken	 in	 the	belief	 that	 the	poisoning	theory	was	 a	 later	 invention	 and	 not	 present	 in	 Babylon	 in	 323,	 however	 his	account	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 series	 of	 propaganda	 campaigns	 employed	 by	 the	Diadochi,	in	this	case,	by	Antigonus	against	Antipater.			News	travels	fast,	and	the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	moved	swiftly	throughout	the	Empire,	and	with	it,	no	doubt,	the	suspected	cause.	The	speed	at	which	the	news	travelled	is	not	difficult	 to	ascertain,	so	that	a	terminus	ante	quem	can	be																																																									438	For	a	full	discussion	and	analysis	of	these	events,	see	Ch.	7.2.	439	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	pp.	112	–	113.	440	Plut.	Alex.	77.2.	441	Plut.	Alex.	77.3-4.	
	 98	
placed	 for	 its	 arrival	 into	 Greece	 and	 Macedon.	 The	 latest	 point	 at	 which	Alexander’s	death	could	have	become	known	in	Greece	was	the	initiation	of	the	Lamian	War	 in	323.442	For	Antipater	 in	Macedon,	an	 immediate	concern	would	have	been	the	possible	unrest	occurring	in	the	Greek	cities.	Just	as	with	Philip’s	assassination	 in	336,	Antipater	was	well	 aware	of	 the	 risks	 resulting	 from	 the	political	 instability	 caused	 by	 the	 death	 of	 a	 monarch.443 	Without	 an	 heir	apparent	 to	 succeed	 Alexander,	 combined	 with	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	Macedonian	military	 reserves	being	 spread	 throughout	 the	new	boundaries	of	the	empire,	there	was	need	for	swift	and	decisive	action.		Facing	unrest	in	Greece,	and	limited	military	reserves,	Antipater	knew	he	would	need	 to	 bring	 more	 reserves	 into	 Macedon	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 When	 news	arrived	of	Alexander’s	death,	Antipater	sent	word	to	Craterus,	who	was	still	 in	Cilicia,	to	bring	his	troops	to	Macedon,	to	assist	in	the	subjugation	of	civil	unrest.	The	 event	 that	 sparked	 the	 conflict	was	 the	 news	 that	Alexander	was	 dead.	 If	this	 is	 so,	 then	 the	 period	 of	 time	 that	 it	 took	 rumour,	 and	 subsequent	affirmation,	 to	 travel	 within	 the	 empire	 can	 be	 ascertained.	 However	determining	 when	 this	 was	 is	 less	 well	 defined.	 Our	 sources	 only	 state	 what	caused	the	Lamian	War,	but	not	how	much	time	passed	between	June	323	and	the	initiation	of	hostilities.	The	significance	of	the	timing	would	not	only	aid	 in	understanding	 the	 speed	 at	which	 news	 could	 travel	 through	 the	Macedonian	Empire,	 but	 also	 mark	 the	 point	 at	 which	 Cassander	 had	 potential	 support	groups	available.		His	support	at	this	time	was	limited.	Pro-monarchical	groups	within	the	European	sphere	of	the	Macedonian	Empire	would	not	have	wished																																																									442	Diod.	 18.9.1;	 Poddighe,	 2002.	 p.	 17;	 Green,	 in	 Palagia	 &	 Tracy,	 2003.	 p.	 1;	Bosworth	(in	Palagia	&	Tracy,	2003.	p.	19)	places	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	by	the	autumn	of	323;	Errington,	JHS.	90.	(1970).	p.	57.	Errington	states	that	news	of	Alexander’s	death	would	have	arrived	at	much	the	same	time	into	Macedon	as	it	did	in	Greece.	Justin	(13.5.7.)	states	that	the	hostilities	began	when	news	of	a	Macedonian	 force	 travelling	 from	 the	 east	 to	Greece	 in	order	 to	 subdue	Greek	revolt	arrived.	However,	within	 the	context	of	 the	his	narrative,	Alexander	has	already	 died	 (cf.	 12.16.1.)	 and	 a	 delineation	 between	 events	 in	 Greece	 taking	place	during	Alexander’s	 life	 and	events	 taking	place	after	 is	 implied	by	 Justin	(13.5.1;	Ashton,	Antichthon.	17.	(1984).	p.	52,	60;	Yardley,	Wheatley	and	Heckel,	2011.	p.	123.).	443	See	Ch.	3.	
	 99	
to	align	 themselves	with	Cassander	 if	he	had	 in	 fact	played	a	role	 in	 the	king’s	death.	Additionally,	if	the	time	that	it	took	for	the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	to	reach	 Greece	 and	Macedon	 from	 Babylon	 can	 be	 defined,	 the	 implications	 for	later	 events	 can	 be	 better	 understood,	 in	 particular	 the	 time	 taken	 for	Polyperchon	 to	 learn	of	 Cassander’s	 first	 invasion	of	Macedon	 in	317	while	 in	Asia	Minor	fighting	alongside	Eumenes	as	well	as	his	speedy	return.444			The	 ancient	 sources	 do	 not	 provide	 a	 well-defined,	 precise	 timing	 for	 the	initiation	of	hostilities	for	the	Lamian	War.445	Justin	merely	implies	that	conflict	broke	out	after	Alexander’s	death,446where	he	ties	the	war	with	Antipater’s	later	besiegement	at	Lamia	in	the	autumn	of	323.447	This	compression	of	events	and	time	between	the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	arriving	in	Greece	and	the	outbreak	of	the	Lamian	War	is	also	recorded	by	Diodorus,	who	states	that	conflict	broke	out	 not	 long	 after	 the	 news	 arrived.448	Plutarch	 refers	 to	 the	 Lamian	 War	 in	several	of	his	biographies.	Within	the	Demosthenes,	much	of	the	compression	in	Justin	and	Diodorus	can	be	also	found,	combining	the	outbreak	of	war	with	the	death	 of	 Alexander,	 linking	 these	 events	 to	 the	 siege	 of	 Antipater	 at	 Lamia.449	The	 Eumenes	 touches	 upon	 events	 in	 Greece	 after	 Alexander’s	 death	 after	hostilities	in	the	region	had	already	commenced,	beginning	his	account	of	events	with	Antipater	at	Lamia.450	Plutarch	does	provide	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	Athenian	 reception	 to	 news	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 in	 the	 Life	 of	 Phocion,451	however	 this	 is	of	 limited	use	 in	ascertaining	 the	passage	of	 time	between	 the	news	 arriving	 and	war	 taking	place.	 These	 accounts	 from	 the	 ancient	 sources,	while	vital	for	understanding	the	Lamian	War	itself,	and	the	significance	for	the	region,	do	not	aid	significantly	in	understanding	the	passage	of	time	between	the	11th	June	323	and	the	conflict	beginning.	It	 is	unreasonable	to	expect	this	from																																																									444	Polyperchon’s	campaign	in	Asia	Minor	as	well	as	Cassander’s	first	invasion	of	Macedon	in	317	are	both	discussed	in	detail	within	Chapter	6.	445	Schmitt,	1992.	p.	55.	n.	41;	Poddige,	2002.	p.	17.	446	Just.	13.5.1-8.	447	Heckel,	1992.	p.	44;	Heckel,	2006.	pp.	36-37.	448	Diod.	18.9.1.	449	Plut.	Dem.	27.1.	450	Plut.	Eum.	3.3.	451	Plut.	Phoc.	22.4.–23.4.	
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the	ancient	writers,	 as	 their	 focus	was	not	on	providing	 succinct	dating	 for	 all	events	within	the	respective	narratives.		
	Because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	 temporal	 accounts	 within	 the	 ancient	 sources,	modern	 scholarship	 has	 attempted	 to	 present	 a	 more	 defined	 date	 for	 the	commencement	of	the	Lamian	War.	Heckel	has	suggested	that	the	war	broke	out	during	the	summer	of	323	but	is	not	more	precise	than	this.452	Both	Adams	and	Boiy	offer	much	 the	same	conclusions,	with	a	general	dating	 to	 the	summer	of	323.453	Landucci	 Gattinoni	 has	 ventured	 slightly	 further	 than	Heckel	 and	Boiy,	proposing	 that	 the	Lamian	War	began	 in	 the	 late	 summer	of	323,	 roughly	 two	months	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander. 454 	Bosworth	 offers	 a	 narrow,	 albeit	tentative,	 date	 for	 commencement	 of	 the	 Lamian	War,	with	 a	 proposal	 of	 late	July	 323.455		 What	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 these	 conclusions	 is	 that	 the	 word	 of	Alexander’s	 death	 spread	 fast,	 taking	 no	more	 than	 two	months,	 possibly	 less	depending	on	the	definition	of	summer,	 for	the	news	to	travel	the	roughly	two	and	a	half	thousand-kilometres	between	Babylon	and	the	Greek	Peninsula.456		
	From	the	account	of	Diodorus	and	Plutarch’s	Phocion,	it	is	clear	that	there	were	two	 phases	 in	 the	 news	 regarding	 Alexander’s	 death	 arriving	 in	 Athens	 from	Babylon.457First,	 there	 was	 the	 news	 that	 arrived	 via	 messengers,	 most	 likely	travelling	 along	 communication	 lines	 through	 the	 empire.	 While	 originating	from	Babylon,	 these	messengers	were	 not	 eyewitnesses	 to	 events	 in	 Babylon,	and	 therefore	 could	 only	 provide	 the	 information	 contained	 within	 their	communications.	This	caused	this	initial	phase	of	news	to	be	treated	carefully	by	the	 Athenians;	 to	 go	 to	 war	 against	 Macedon	 based	 on	 incorrect	 information	regarding	 Alexander’s	 death	 would	 be	 disastrous	 for	 their	 cause.	 Despite	 the	news	 carried	 by	 the	messengers	 ultimately	 proving	 to	 be	 true,	 it	was	 deemed	prudent	for	Athens	to	wait	for	more	reliable	accounts	from	Babylon	to	arrive	in																																																									452	Heckel,	1988.	p.	77.	453	Boiy,	2007.	p.	148;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	209.	454	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	LII.	455	Bosworth.	2002.	p.	280.	456	Talbert,	1985.	p.	71.	457	Diod.	18.9.1-4;	Plut.	Phoc.	22.4	
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the	city	before	any	action	was	taken.458	This	should	not	be	taken	as	a	comment	on	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 news	 brought	 in	 this	 initial	 phase,	 but	more	 that	 the	Athenians	did	not	wish	to	commence	a	rebellion	without	complete	certainty	that	Alexander	was	dead.	The	two	phases	of	news	coming	to	Athens	came	at	different	times.	The	news	arriving	by	messenger	 could	 travel	more	 swiftly	 and	 came	 to	Athens	 in	 the	 space	 of	 a	 few	 short	 weeks.459This	 allowed	 Athens,	 already	preparing	 to	 overthrow	 Macedonian	 rule,	 to	 intensify	 their	 arrangements	 for	conflict	 should	 confirmation	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 arrive.460	This	 confirmation	arrived	in	the	beginning	of	August	323,	and	because	of	their	previous	readiness,	Athens	began	 the	war.461		Two	key	 factors	can	be	 learned	 from	the	date	of	 the	commencement	of	 the	Lamian	War.	First	 it	was	possible	 for	news	to	 travel	via	messenger	from	Babylon	to	Athens	in	a	few	weeks	and	secondly	it	was	possible	when	pressed	by	necessity	for	the	entire	journey	to	be	undertaken	in	just	under	two	months.462		No	war	begins	 in	an	 instant,	and	 the	Athenians	had	clearly	been	preparing	 for	conflict	secretly	for	some	time	prior	to	the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	arriving	in	the	city.463		 	Diodorus	states	that	Alexander’s	death	was	the	catalyst	that	began	the	hostilities.464	If	 the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	was	indeed	the	cause	for	the	war	to	break	out,	it	provides	a	set	date	for	the	latest	possible	time	that	this	news	arrived	in	Greece.	Additionally,	and	what	is	important	to	the	central	issue	of	this	study	and	the	struggle	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	is	that,	 if	the	news	arrived	in	Greece	and	Macedon	at	roughly	the	same	time,	it	is	likely	that	Eprius	
																																																								458	Diod.	 18.9.4;	 Plut.	 Phoc.	 22.3-4.	 Schmitt	 suggests	 these	 eyewitnesses	 may	have	 been	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Athenian	 Embassies	 returning	 from	 the	 court	 in	Babylon.	Schmitt,	1992.	p.	55-56.	459	Schmitt,	1992.	p.	55.	n.	41.	460	Diod.	18.9.4;	Plut.	Phoc.	22.4.	461	Diod.	18.9.1,5;	Plut.	Phoc.	23.1;	Schmitt,	1992.	p.	55.	462	For	more	 discussion	 of	 sailing	 and	 travel	 in	 the	 ancient	world,	 see	 Casson,	1974,	especially	pp.	150-162.	463	Diod.	18.9.1-4.	Plut.	Phoc.	21.3	464	Diod.	18.9.1.	
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would	have	learned	of	it	as	well.		This	in	turn	means	that	word	of	her	son’s	death	reached	Olympias,	who	was	still	in	Molossia,	in	323.465		When	 news	 reached	 Olympias	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 and	 the	 rumoured	involvement	of	Antipater,	her	political	adversary	for	the	last	thirteen	years,	and	his	 sons,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 the	 dynamic	 of	 their	 feud.	 The	proposition	 of	 Antipatrid	 involvement	 would	 not	 have	 been	 difficult	 for	Olympias	 to	 believe	 and	 she	 accepted	 the	 truth	 of	 their	 involvement	 without	hesitation.	 Her	 willingness	 to	 do	 so	 was	 due	 to	 the	 still	 ongoing	 tensions	between	Antipater	and	Olympias	that	had	existed	ever	since	Alexander	took	the	throne	 of	 Macedon	 in	 336.466		 That	 Olympias	 had	 departed	 from	 Macedon	 to	Molossia	 during	 Alexander’s	 absence	 in	 331	 was	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 her	dissatisfaction	with	Antipater’s	position	as	regent,	and	the	tensions	between	the	two. 467 	Her	 continuous	 correspondence	 with	 Alexander	 pleading	 for	 a	replacement	of	Antipater	as	regent	due	to	the	apparent	irreverence	he	displayed	towards	the	king	and	her	success	 in	this	endeavour,	having	Antipater	replaced	with	Craterus	 in	324,	gave	her	further	reason	to	believe	that	Antipater	and	his	family	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 the	 assassination	 of	 Alexander.	 Antipatrid	involvement	 in	Alexander’s	 death,	 regardless	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 this	 accusation,	added	to	the	growing	list	of	grievances	Olympias	held	against	Antipater.	As	she	would	have	seen	the	situation,	Antipater,	a	troublesome,	powerful	and	recently	supplanted	elite	within	the	Macedonian	Empire,	locked	in	an	increasingly	tense	relationship	 with	 the	 king,	 had	 sound	 reasons	 for	 plotting	 to	 eliminate	Alexander.	 	 Despite	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	 two	 being	 attributable	 to	 a	difference	 in	 agendas	 between	 Alexander	 and	 Antipater	 because	 of	 their	respective	goals	after	334,	Olympias	constructed	the	events	as	an	interpersonal	struggle	for	power	within	the	Macedonian	Empire.		This	event	marks	an	important	evolution	in	the	conflict	between	Antipater	and	Olympias.	 Cassander	 was	 explicitly	 tied	 to	 the	 reported	 conspiracy	 to	 poison																																																									465	Carney,	2000.	p.	121;	Carney,	2006.	p.	59.	For	Olympias’	 grief,	 see:	Ael.	VH.	13.30.	466	See	Ch.	3.	467	See	Ch.	3.	pp.	75-76.	
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Alexander,	as	it	was	he	who	had	supposedly	transported	the	deadly	agent	from	Macedon	to	Babylon.		Whether	Cassander	was	in	fact	responsible	for	Alexander’s	death	 cannot	 be	 known,	 nor	 is	 this	 a	major	 focus	 of	 this	 study.	 	 	 The	 story	 is	believable	 considering	 the	 negative	 atmosphere	 between	 Alexander	 and	Cassander	and	the	close	proximity	that	the	family	had	to	Alexander	prior	to	his	death.	 	What	 is	 important	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	study	 is	 the	 impact	 that	 the	rumours	had	on	the	already	tense	relationship	between	Antipater	and	Olympias.		It	resulted	in	the	feud	now	extending	beyond	Antipater	and	Olympias,	including	Cassander	and	other	members	of	the	family	as	targets	for	her	anger.	As	Carney	eloquently	states,	“[t]he	death	of	Alexander	would	transform	what	had	begun	as	a	
personal	 struggle	 between	 Antipater	 and	 Olympias	 into	 an	 increasingly	 deadly	
dynastic	dispute.”468	Alexander’s	 death	was	 a	 driving	 force	 for	Olympias’s	 later	actions.	 She	 entered	 into	 an	 alliance	 with	 Polyperchon,	 Cassander’s	 greatest	rival	 in	 Greece,	 facilitating	 her	 return	 to	 Macedon	 in	 317	 in	 order	 to	 act	 as	caretaker	for	her	grandson,	Alexander	IV.	During	her	time	in	Macedon,	Olympias	would	embark	upon	a	series	of	executions	and	murders	that	had	some	basis	in	retribution	for	her	son’s	death.469			The	period	between	324	and	323	was	a	pivotal	and	informative	time	in	the	life	of	 Cassander,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 his	 coming	 conflict	 with	Polyperchon	in	319.	It	is	clear	from	his	journey	to	Babylon	that	he	was	a	trusted	and	capable	diplomat	 in	the	eyes	of	his	 father,	who	was	unable	to	depart	 from	the	Macedonian	homeland	 following	his	replacement	with	Craterus,	due	 to	 the	unrest	 among	 the	 Greek	 cities,	 which	 was	 likely	 to	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 his	absence.	Cassander’s	time	in	Babylon	was	volatile,	given	his	previously	negative	experiences	 with	 Alexander	 III.	 The	 desire	 to	 throw	 off	 the	 shackles	 of	Macedonian	 hegemony	 in	 Greece	 was	 real,	 and	 with	 the	 news	 of	 Alexander’s	death	reaching	Europe,	Antipater’s	decision	to	remain	in	Macedon	was	justified	by	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Lamian	 War.	 While	 the	 hostile	 interactions	 with	Alexander	 may	 in	 part,	 account	 for	 the	 Cassander’s	 later	 aversion	 to	 seeking																																																									468	Carney,	2006.	p.	59.	469	For	discussion	of	the	multifaceted	nature	of	Olympias’	return	to	Macedon	in	317	at	the	behest	of	Polyperchon,	as	well	as	the	events	thereafter	see,	Ch.	6.	
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immediate	Argead	support	in	319,	his	perceived	involvement	in	the	conspiracy	to	 murder	 Alexander,	 and	 the	 traction	 that	 the	 rumour	 achieved	 within	 the	empire	would	also	turn	Cassander	away	from	the	royal	family	during	the	initial	years	of	 conflict	 against	Polyperchon.	The	 supposed	Antipatrid	 involvement	 in	Alexander’s	 death	 would	 not	 only	 affect	 Cassander,	 but	 also	 had	 a	 profound	impact	upon	Polyperchon’s	ability	to	secure	Argead	support	from	groups	hostile	to	Cassander’s	efforts	 to	build	his	powerbase.	Most	prominent	of	 these	groups	was	Olympias	and	her	Epirote	supporters,	who	would	go	on	to	actively	combat	Cassander,	 as	 the	 previously	 political	 hostility	 between	 Olympias	 and	 the	Antipatrid’s	evolved	into	a	violent	war.	With	the	sudden	and	unexplained	death	of	Alexander	III,	the	emerging	Diadochoi	would	refocus	the	empire,	capitalising	on	 the	 possibility	 to	 advance	 their	 own	 standing	 in	 this	 new	 period	 of	opportunity.				
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Chapter	5:	Antipater’s	choice	of	successor.470	
	After	 a	 protracted	 illness	 spanning	 several	months,	 Antipater	 died	 in	 the	 late	summer	or	early	autumn	of	319.471	Before	he	died,	he	appointed	his	 successor	for	 the	 regency	of	Macedon.472	Antipater	 chose	 to	 appoint	Polyperchon,	one	of	the	 oldest	 members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 as	 regent,473	and	 his	 son	 Cassander	 as	
chiliarch.	 During	 Antipater’s	 period	 of	 ill	 health,	 Cassander	 had	 assumed	 the	running	 of	 his	 father’s	 office,	 maintaining	 Antipatrid	 representation	 in	 the	Macedonian	political	sphere.	 	This	decision	by	Antipater	 to	name	Polyperchon,	an	experienced	war	veteran	who	was	trusted	by	Alexander,	rather	than	his	son,	was	 the	 catalyst	 for	 the	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 the	 newly	 appointed	regent.	The	war	between	them	ultimately	resulted	in	the	foundation	of	the	short	lived	 Antipatrid	 Dynasty	 and	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 royal	 Argead	 family.	 It	 is	clear	 that	Cassander	did	not	 accept	his	 father’s	 choice	 for	 successor.	Diodorus	states	 that	 he	 considered	 it	 “…	outrageous	that	one	not	related	by	blood	should	
succeed	to	the	command	of	his	father.”474	Rather	than	accept	his	father’s	decision,	Cassander	chose	to	leave	Macedon	for	Asia	Minor,	building	a	support	base	there	that	he	would	bring	to	bear	against	Polyperchon	on	his	return.		Diodorus’	 account	 suggests	 that	 Cassander	 may	 have	 viewed	 the	 position	 of	regent	 as	 a	hereditary	post,	 however	 this	 interpretation	may	be	 influenced	by																																																									470 	Portions	 of	 this	 chapter	 have	 been	 presented	 at	 the	 AMPHORAE.	 8.	Conference	 held	 at	 the	 University	 of	Melbourne,	 2014	 and	 the	AMPHORAE.	 9.	Conference	 held	 at	 Victoria	 University	 of	Wellington,	 2015.	 I	 offer	my	 sincere	thanks	and	gratitude	to	all	those	who	attended	and	the	feedback	they	provided.	471	Diod.	18.84.4;	Heidl.	Epit.	1.4	=	FGrH.	155.	F.1;	Plut.	Phoc.	31.1;	PM.	FGrH.	239.	B.	12;	Adams,	1975.	p.	73;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	48;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	 355;	 Poddighe,	 2002.	 p.	 171,	 173;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 27;	 Heckel,	2006.	p.	38;	Boiy,	2007.	pp.	136-137;	Hughes,	2008.	p.	215.	472 	Antipater’s	 position	 as	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 had	 been	 reaffirmed	 at	 the	Settlement	of	Triparadisus.	Prior	 to	 this	he	had	been	operating	as	 strategos	 of	the	 region	 under	 the	 meeting	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 at	 Babylon	 after	 Alexander’s	death.	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	84;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	135.	473	Heckel,	1992.	p.	193,	cf.	189;	Baynham,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	354;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227.	cf.	Diod.	18.48.4;	Hughes,	2008.	pp.	215-216.	474 	Diod.	 18.49.1:	 “...δεινὸν	 ἡγούμενος	 εἰ	 τὴν	 τοῦ	 πατρὸς	 ἡγεμονίαν	 ὁ	 μὴ	
προσήκων	κατὰ	γένος	διαδέξεται.”	(trans.	Geer,	1947.);	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	215.	
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Diodorus’	belief	that	Cassander’s	primary	goal	was	to	establish	himself	as	king.	However	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 regency	 of	 Macedon	 was	 not	 inherited,	 but	appointed.	 It	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 Cassander	 was	 unaware	 of	 this;	 he	 may,	however,	 have	 felt	 that	 he	 was	 more	 worthy	 of	 the	 appointment	 than	Polyperchon,	 particularly	 considering	 the	 political	 offices	 he	 had	 held	 after	Alexander’s	death.	In	order	to	gain	an	understanding	of	Antipater’s	choice,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 various	 aspects	 that	 influenced	 his	 decision.	Therefore,	this	chapter	is	separated	into	three	distinct	sections.			The	first	section	is	devoted	to	Cassander	and	his	movements	after	his	mission	to	Babylon	in	323	until	his	father’s	death	in	319.	During	this	time,	Cassander	was	actively	engaged	with	the	political	environment,	not	only	within	Macedon	once	Antipater	fell	ill,	but	also	within	the	greater	Macedonian	Empire,	holding	varied	offices	 such	 as	 the	 command	 of	 the	 royal	 bodyguard,	 the	agema	 and	 chiliarch	under	 Antigonus	 after	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Triparadisus	 in	 321/0.	 Upon	 hearing	that	 Antipater’s	 ill	 health	 meant	 he	 was	 unable	 to	 act	 as	 regent,	 Cassander	returned	to	his	father’s	side	and	took	over	the	daily	running	of	Macedon	and	the	Greek	 cities	 until	 Antipater’s	 death	 in	 319.	 Despite	 this	 impressive	 political	experience,	there	were	issues	that	rendered	Cassander	an	unsuitable	candidate	to	 take	 over	 from	 his	 father,	 in	 particular	 his	 apparent	 lack	 of	 military	experience	and	his	perceived	immaturity	as	evidenced	by	his	behaviour	within	the	Macedonian	Court.	
	The	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 devoted	 to	 Polyperchon	 and	 the	 role	 he	played	during	his	return	to	Macedon	under	the	command	of	Craterus	after	the	opening	phases	of	the	Lamian	War	in	322	as	well	as	his	actions	during	the	First	Diadoch	War	from	321	to	320.	Polyperchon’s	return	to	Macedon	under	Craterus	demonstrated	the	faith	placed	in	him	by	Alexander.	As	previously	discussed,475	it	was	by	no	means	certain	that	Craterus	would	be	able	to	return	to	Macedon.	Due	to	his	ill	health,	there	was	a	real	possibility	that	he	may	die	on	the	road,	leaving	the	 veterans	 he	 led	 without	 a	 leader	 and	 the	 position	 of	 regent	 vacant.																																																									475	For	the	nature	of	Craterus’	return	mission	to	Macedon	to	relieve	Antipater	of	the	Regency,	see	Ch.	4.	pp.	83-91.	
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Polyperchon’s	appointment	under	Craterus	in	324	suggests	that	he	was	trusted	and	considered	able	to	assume	Craterus’	role	and	offices	should	his	superior	die.	There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 suggest	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 any	 less	 capable	 as	 a	candidate	 for	 the	 regency	 five	 years	 later	 in	 319.	 During	 the	 Lamian	 War,	Antipater	and	Craterus	worked	in	close	conjunction	and	while	missing	from	the	ancient	 sources,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Polyperchon	 accompanied	 Craterus.	 That	Antipater	 and	 Polyperchon	 became	 acquainted	 during	 this	 time	 is	 a	 distinct	possibility.	Craterus	died	 in	321	during	 the	First	War	of	 the	Diadoch,	when	he	fell	 from	his	horse	during	an	engagement	against	Eumenes	 in	Asia	Minor	near	the	 Hellespont.	 After	 his	 death,	 Polyperchon	would	 have	 taken	 over	 Craterus’	position.	Due	to	his	extensive	military	experience	and	the	trust	that	was	placed	in	 him	 by	 Alexander,	 Polyperchon	 was	 a	 prime	 candidate	 as	 Antipater’s	successor.	 In	 addition	 Polyperchon	 was	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 traditional	 old	guard,	a	 combination	with	made	his	appointment	 to	 replace	Antipater	an	easy	and	uncontroversial	option	within	the	context	of	the	greater	empire	and	the	way	in	which	the	appointment	would	be	perceived.	
	The	 third	and	 final	 section	of	 this	 chapter	 is	 concerned	with	Antipater	himself	and	evaluated	his	decision	to	promote	Polyperchon	to	the	regency	following	his	death	with	Cassander	placed	as	the	new	regent’s	subordinate.	While	it	is	not	the	aim	 of	 this	 investigation	 to	 evaluate	 Antipater’s	 mindset	 or	 impose	 an	understanding	 upon	 his	 thought	 process,	 the	 outcome	 of	 Polyperchon’s	appointment	is	contextualised	within	the	political	state	of	play	in	319.		The	 role	 of	 Perdiccas,	 and	 the	 factors	 leading	 to	 the	 First	War	 of	 the	Diadoch	must	also	be	considered.	There	was	the	fear	that	Perdiccas,	in	his	guise	as	regent	of	Macedon,	had	centralised	power	around	himself	to	the	point	where	he	could	have	attempted	to	seize	the	Throne	of	Macedon.	There	was	also	the	issue	of	the	wedding,	 which	 Olympias	 had	 planned	 between	 Perdiccas	 and	 Alexander’s	sister,	 Cleopatra,	 a	 plan	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 rejection	 of	 Antipater’s	 daughter,	insulting	the	Antipatrid	house.	The	removal	of	Perdiccas	in	321	was	still	fresh	in	the	 minds	 of	 all	 the	 Diadochoi,	 not	 least	 of	 all	 Antipater,	 who	 was	 named	 at	Triparadisus	 to	 take	 Perdiccas’	 place	 as	 regent	 of	 the	 empire.	 The	 Diadochoi	
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were,	 in	321,	wary	of	 the	notion	of	a	non-Argead	assuming	both	the	Throne	of	Macedon	and	other	monarchical	positions	within	the	empire.	These	factors	are	vital	in	understanding	Antipater’s	course	of	action.	Should	he	appoint	Cassander	as	 the	 next	 regent,	 the	 appointment	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 an	 effective	foundation	 for	 an	 Antipatrid	 Dynasty	within	Macedon	 in	 319,	 risking	 political	repercussions,	 much	 as	 those	 set	 against	 Perdiccas.	 The	 appointment	 of	Polyperchon	helped	avoid	this	predicament;	the	move	was	also	politically	astute.	Although	 Cassander	 still	 held	 a	 sizable	 amount	 of	 power	 and	 influence	 in	Macedon,	 the	 move	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 statement	 of	 intent	 by	 Antipater,	 one	designed	to	ease	the	tensions	between	the	Antipatrid	and	Argead	Houses,	dispel	any	 notion	 of	 Antipatrid	 dominance	 with	 the	 region	 and	 as	 expression	 of	intention	 to	 keep	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	 preventing	 it	fragmenting	into	various	fiefdoms.		
5.1:	Cassander	
	Just	 as	 with	 the	 period	 of	 time	 prior	 to	 his	 arrival	 in	 Babylon,	 references	 to	Cassander	after	Alexander’s	death	within	the	accounts	of	the	ancient	sources	are	almost	non-existent.	The	timing	of	his	departure	from	the	city	is	also	unknown	and	no	reliable	record	of	it	taking	place	exists.476	Nor	is	there	any	information	as	to	his	 journey.	There	does	exist	within	the	highly	fictionalised	and	problematic	
Alexander	 Romance	 a	 reference	 to	 Cassander	 leaving	 Babylon	 shortly	 before	Alexander’s	death,	suggesting	that	he	fled	to	Cilicia.477	This	excerpt	 is	placed	in	the	 context	 of	 the	 supposed	 Antipatrid	 conspiracy	 to	 have	 the	 king	 poisoned,	placing	 Cassander’s	 journey	 to	 Cilicia	 at	 the	 time	 after	 he	 had	 delivered	 the	poison	to	his	brother	Iollas.	This	account	of	the	Romance,	however,	does	little	to	assist	in	understanding	the	movements	of	Cassander	in	323.	The	account	needs	to	be	considered	with	caution	and	can	be	dismissed	when	placed	in	the	greater	context	of	the	ancient	extant	sources.	More	reliable	accounts	do	not	match	with	the	Romance,	 and	 therefore	 the	 account	 of	 Cassander’s	 travel	 to	 Cilicia	 can	be	disregarded.																																																									476	Bosworth,	2002.	p.	32.	n.	17.	477	Metz.	Epit.	100;	Ps.	Call.	3.32.2.	
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	The	 day	 after	 Alexander’s	 death	 in	 323,	 the	 Diadochoi	 convened	 in	 order	 to	determine	 how	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 would	 continue	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	monarch’s	 unexpected	 death.	 The	 ultimate	 result	 of	 these	 meetings	 was	 the	Settlement	 of	 Babylon.478	While	 no	 record	 exists	 of	 his	 active	 participation	 in	these	discussions,	it	is	possible	that	Cassander	was	present	at	the	meetings	as	a	representative	of	his	father,	in	much	the	same	way	as	in	his	original	presence	in	Babylon	the	previous	year.479	A	central	focus	of	these	meetings	was	maintaining	the	 effective	 administration	 and	 continuation	 of	 the	 Empire,	 as	 well	 as	 the	crowning	 of	 Arrhidaeus	 as	 Philip	 III	 as	 one	 of	 the	 successors	 to	 Alexander’s	throne	along	with	the	unborn	child	of	Roxane,	Alexander’s	wife.480	It	was	during	this	time	that	the	management	of	a	number	of	satrapies	within	the	Empire	took	place.481 	These	 redistributions	 of	 power	 are	 recorded	 in	 the	 narratives	 as	compressed	lists	and	a	reference	to	Cassander	can	be	found	in	the	manuscripts	of	 these	 sources.	 In	 Photius’	 account	 of	 Arrian, 482 	Curtius, 483 	Diodorus, 484	Justin485	and	 Orosius,486	Cassander	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 been	 appointed	 the	satrapy	 of	 Caria.	 This	 assignment	 provides	 insight	 into	 not	 only	 Cassander’s	standing	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Political	 Sphere,	 as	 the	 son	 of	 one	 of	 the	 most	powerful	men	 in	 the	Empire,	but	also	suggests	 that	he	was	 judged	 to	have	 the	administrative	 capability	 to	 govern	 the	 region	 in	 Asia	Minor	 in	 his	 own	 right.	
																																																								478	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	p.	40.	479	Certainly	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	 is	 not	 implausible	 (cf.	 Bosworth,	 CQ.	 21.	(1971).	p.	21.),	 though	reservations	have	been	raised	that	Cassander	remained	in	Babylon	following	Alexander’s	death	have	been	raised	(Adams,	1975.	p.	66.).	480	For	 a	 full,	 in	 depth	 discussion	 of	 the	 events	 that	 took	 place	 during	 the	formation	of	 the	Settlement	of	Babylon,	 see:	Errington,	 JHS.	90.	 (1970);	Anson,	
CPh.	87.	(1992);	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	481	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.5–9;	Curt.	10.10;	Diod.	18.3–4;	Just.	13.4;	Oros.	3.23.	482	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.6:	 “Καρῶν	δὲ	Κάσανδρος.”	 This	 passage	 has	 been	unhelpfully	 amended	 by	 Jacoby,	 who	 removed	 the	 kappa	 in	 order	 to	 supply	Asander’s	name	(FGrH.	156.	F	1.6.	 cf.	FGrH	Kommentar	pp.	557–558,	where	he	asserts	the	corruption	of	Arrian	by	Photius.).	483	Curt.	10.10.2.	“in	Cariam	Cassander.”	484	Diod.	 18.3.1.	 “Κασάνδρῳ	μὲν	Καρίαν.”	 Also	 note	 Fischer’s	 1906	 Tuebner	 of	Diodorus’	History,	which	follows	the	manuscript	tradition,	reading	Asander.	485	Just.	13.4.15.	“Cariam	Cassander.”	486	Oros.	3.23.9.	“Cariam	Cassander.”	
	 110	
However,	 despite	 the	 relative	 consensus	 in	 the	manuscript	 tradition,487	issues	have	 been	 raised	with	 regard	 to	 the	 accuracy	 of	 this	 appointment	 to	 Caria	 in	323.488	The	central	concern	raised	is	whether	it	was	Cassander	who	was	in	fact	the	 recipient	 of	 the	 satrapy	 of	 Caria,	 or	 Asander,	 the	 son	 of	 Agathon	 who	received	the	position.489		While	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 manuscript	 tradition	 attributes	 Cassander	 to	 the	Carian	 satrapy,	 not	 all	 the	 sources	 are	 in	 agreement.	 Photius’	 recording	 of	Dexippus,490	later	fragments	of	Arrian’s	Successors,491	as	well	as	the	Testmonia492	ascribe	the	position	to	Asander.	This	 leaves	a	divergence	 in	the	sources,	which	requires	 discussion.	 Both	 Cassander	 and	 Asander	 were	 seemingly	 equally	qualified	 for	 the	 position,	 as	 neither	 had	 received	 a	 significant	 administrative	position	within	the	Macedonian	Empire	prior	to	June	323.493	Although	the	issue	is	 contentious,	 given	 the	 divergence	 in	 accounts	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	 a	 scribal	error	 has	 taken	 place	 at	 some	 stage	 during	 the	 transmission	 of	 the	 ancient	sources.	 That	 such	 an	 error	 occurred	 within	 the	 manuscript	 tradition	 is	 the	position	that	has	been	taken	by	modern	scholarship,	as	Adams	aptly	describes,	“from	 Droysen	 on.”494	This	 was	 initially	 based	 on	 source	 criticism	 and	 upon																																																									487	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	27.	488	See	Adams,	1975.	p.	194.	489	For	more	on	Asander,	see:	Heckel,	2006.	p.	57.	s.v.	Asander	[2].	The	possibility	for	 who	 received	 the	 appointment	 is	 only	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Asander	(Adams,	1975.	p.	192.).	490	Phot.	82.64A.40	491	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.37.	 The	 origin	 of	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 Arrian	 is	difficult	 to	 attribute,	 but	 has	 been	 blamed	 on	 a	 scribal	 error	 that	 occurred	 at	some	stage	 in	the	duplication	of	 the	ancient	texts	over	the	centuries.	For	more	comments	on	 the	possibility	of	 a	 scribal	 error	 in	 the	manuscript	 tradition,	 see	below.	Gorlanski	 (Anc.	World.	19.	 (1989).	 p.	 83.),	 states	 that,	 in	 regards	 to	 the	historical	worth	 of	 his	 recording,	 Photius	was	 “mostly	correct	 in	substance.”	cf.	Henry,	Vol.	I.	1959.	pp.	XXIII-ΧΧV.	492	LM.	117.	493	Adams,	1975.	p.	198;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	57.	494	Adams,	1975.	p.	194.	 (It	must	be	noted	 that	Adams	takes	an	opposing	view	within	his	doctoral	dissertation	to	the	general	opinion	of	modern	scholars).	Cf:	Droysen,	 Vol.	 II.	 1878.	 pp.	 17-18	 and	n.	 1.	 p.	 18;	 Jacoby,	FGrH	Kommentar.	pp.	557	–	558;	Beloch,	 IV2	1924.	pp.	65-	66	and	p.	307;	Berve.	Vol.	 II.	1926.	p.	87;	Stähelin,	 s.v.	 “Kassandros	 (2)”,	 RE.	 212,	 2293-2294;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 15-16;	Bosworth,	CQ.	43.	(1993).	pp.	421-422;	Blümel,	EA.	29.	(1997).	p.	139;	O’Sullivan,	
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dismissal	 of	 the	 questionable	 reliability	 of	 various	 ancient	 literary	 sources,	particularly	 the	 accounts	 of	 Curtius	 and	 Justin.495In	 more	 recent	 years,	 the	weight	of	 evidence	 coming	 from	 inscriptions	has	 removed	all	doubt	as	 to	who	was	 appointed	 the	 satrap	 of	 Caria	 in	 323.	 SIG3	 311	 contains	 a	 decree	 by	 the	Koarendians	 in	 Caria,	 and	 opens	 with	 the	 lines,	 “[ἔτο]υ̣ς	 πρώτου	 Φιλίππου	
βασιλεύοντος,	 Ἀσάνδρου	 σατραπεύοντος·”496	There	 is	 also	 the	 discovery	 of	 an	inscription	from	Latmos,	first	published	by	Blümel,497	which	details	the	naming	of	 a	 new	 tribe	 of	 the	 city	 in	 honour	 of	Asander	during	his	 tenure	 as	 satrap	of	Caria.498 	The	 inscription	 evidence	 supports	 Photius’	 recording	 of	 Dexippus’	attribution	of	the	satrapy	of	Caria	to	Asander	and	not	Cassander.	As	a	result,	it	is	clear	that	the	son	of	Antipater	is	not	the	person	referred	to	from	the	manuscript	tradition	in	relation	to	Caria	in	323.		There	 has	 been	 little	 argument	 among	 modern	 scholars	 regarding	 the	appointment	of	Asander	to	the	satrapy	of	Caria	in	323.	The	supporting	evidence	supplied	 by	 inscriptions	 confirms	 that	 it	 was	 indeed	 he	 who	 received	 the	position.	 However	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 the	 misappropriation	 of	appointments	within	the	manuscript	tradition	when	understanding	Cassander’s	career	prior	 to	319.	Given	 that	he	 can	be	discounted	 from	 the	 appointment	 at	Caria,	 it	 is	possible	to	look	elsewhere	for	clues	to	understand	where	Cassander	was	and	what	position	he	occupied	prior	to	returning	to	Macedon.	Helpfully,	one	does	 not	 need	 to	 look	 far	 for	 an	 alternative	 for	 Cassander’s	 placement	 during	323.	 Contained	 within	 the	 account	 of	 Justin	 and	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 the																																																																																																																																																															
ZPE.	 119.	 (1997).	 pp.	 107-108;	Wheatley,	Phoenix.	52.	 (1998).	 p.	 269;	Wörrle,	
Chiron.	33.	(2002).	pp.	137-139;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	57;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	27;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	101.	495	Adams,	1975.	p.	193.	Though	the	endeavors	of	Errington	(JHS.	90.	(1970).	p.	47)	 and	 more	 recently	 Baynham	 (1998.	 p.	 100)	 have	 shown	 that	 Curtius’	account	 should	 not	 be	 dismissed	 out	 of	 hand	 and	 is	 more	 reliable	 than	previously	credited.	496	SIG3	311.1–3.	=	IStr.	501.1-3.	The	Philip	referred	to	in	this	inscription	is	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus,	thereby	placing	the	temporal	context	firmly	after	323/2.		497	Blümel,	EA.	29.	(1997).	pp.	135-142.		498	Blümel,	EA.	29.	(1997).	cf.	p.	139.	This	work	has	been	built	upon	by	Wörrle	(Chiron.	33.	(2002).	pp.	121-143).	Latmos	was	not	the	only	city	to	pay	honour	to	Asander,	 Athens	 is	 also	 known	 to	 have	 paid	 tribute	 to	 him	 in	 314/3,	 cf.	 Diod.	19.68.2-7;	IG.	II2	450	(=	SIG	I3	320);	O’Sullivan,	ZPE.	119.	(1997).	p.	107.	
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misappropriation	 of	 Cassander	 to	 Caria,	 is	 another	 reference	 which	 has	significant	 consequences	 not	 only	 for	 his	 standing	 within	 the	 Macedonian	Empire,	 but	 which	 also	 accounts	 for	 all	 of	 Cassander’s	 movements	 until	 the	council	 of	 Triparadisus	 in	 320.	 Justin	 13.4.18	 states:	 “Stipatoribus	 regis	
satellitibusque	 Cassander,	 filius	 Antipatri,	 praeficitur.” 499 	While	 the	 earlier	reference	to	Cassander	in	13.4.15,	which	as	previously	shown	can	be	dismissed,	was	made	in	passing	within	the	distribution	of	satrapies	by	Perdiccas,	this	entry	regarding	Cassander	 is	 qualified,	 clearly	 identifying	 the	 appointee	 of	 the	 royal	bodyguard	 and	 entourage	 as	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 this	excerpt	 of	 Justin	 is	 not	 supported	by	 corroborating	 evidence	within	 any	other	ancient	source,	save	Orosius,	possibly	due	to	the	confusion	with	the	satrapy	so	common	 in	 the	 manuscript	 tradition.	 However	 the	 probability	 that	 Justin	 is	correct	is	difficult	to	argue	against	as	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	Justin	(or	Trogus)	would	be	mistaken	twice	in	such	a	narrow	section	of	their	works.500	Cassander’s	nomination	to	the	royal	bodyguard	and	entourage	firmly	places	him	in	Babylon	post-June	323	holding	a	significant	and	important	role	in	the	Macedonian	Court.	
	There	 is	 an	 event	 that	may	aid	 in	 identifying	 the	 location	of	Cassander	during	322,	that	being	the	marriage	between	his	sister,	Nicaea	and	Perdiccas.	Soon	after	Alexander	 the	Great’s	 death,	 arrangements	were	made	between	Antipater	 and	Perdiccas	to	form	a	familial	alliance.501	The	initial	 intent	of	Perdiccas	to	forge	a	working	alliance	with	 the	Antipatrids	seems	genuine.502	Diodorus	states	 that	 it	was	in	fact	a	ruse	employed	to	lull	Antipater	into	a	false	sense	of	security	before	spurning	Nicaea	and	marrying	 into	 the	Argead	 family	 through	a	marriage	with	
																																																								499	This	passage	is	duplicated	nearly	verbatim	by	Orosius	3.23.10.	500	cf.	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	107	501	Just.	 13.6.5;	 Diodorus	 (18.23.1-2)	 explicitly	 states	 that	 the	 marriage	 was	made	to	further	strengthen	Perdiccas’	uncertain	position.	This	suggests	a	timing	prior	 to	 the	Settlement	of	Babylon	 (Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	 2011.	p.	140;	Nielse	 (Vol.	 II.	 (1896).	 p.	 195.),	 suggests	 that	 it	 took	 place	 prior	 to	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 satraps	 within	 the	 empire.	 Because	 of	 the	 close	 temporal	proximities	 of	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 and	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Babylon,	 both	Antipater	 and	 Perdiccas	 may	 have	 been	 open	 to	 the	 prospects	 of	 an	 inter-familial	marriage	prior	to	June	323;	Carney,	Historia.	37.	(1988).	p.	399.	502	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	140.	
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Alexander’s	sister,	Cleopatra.503	However,	it	is	also	recorded	that	Antipater	was	not	 fooled	 by	 the	 Perdiccan	 plot.504	Nicaea	 left	 Macedon	 for	 the	 east	 in	 323,	escorted	by	her	brother	Iolaus,	and	Archias.505	She	had	arrived	in	Asia	Minor	by	322,	 and	 shortly	 thereafter	married	 Perdiccas.506	It	 is	 possible	 that	 Cassander	may	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 marriage	 during	 his	 time	 in	Babylon,	waiting	for	Nicaea	to	arrive.507	This	would	place	Cassander	in	Babylon	during	322	and	321	at	the	time	of	the	divorce	when	Perdiccas	took	Cleopatra	as	his	wife,	aiding	in	an	understanding	of	his	movements	between	323	and	320.		It	 is	 prudent	 to	 discuss	 what	 the	 office	 of	 bodyguard	 entailed,	 as	 well	 as	comment	 on	 the	 ambiguity	 that	 the	 term	 bodyguard	 (stipatores	 and	
σωματοφύλακες)	 has	 received	 from	 the	 ancient	 sources.	 It	 has	 been	 noted	 by	modern	scholars	that	the	use	of	this	term	‘bodyguard’	has	been	used	somewhat	haphazardly	and	applied	to	a	number	of	groups	within	the	Macedonian	Empire	over	time.508	At	least	three	groups	are	referred	to	as	bodyguards	by	the	ancient	sources.	These	are,	as	Heckel	highlights:	“…the	Royal	Pages	(normally	the	παῖδες	
βασιλικοί),	the	infantry	bodyguard	(the	ἄγημα	of	the	hypaspists)	or	the	seven-man	
elite	 bodyguard	 (always	 known	 as	 the	 σωματοφύλακες).”509	However,	 in	 this	instance,	 the	most	 likely	 possibility	 for	 Cassander	was	 a	 position	 of	 command																																																									503	Diod.	18.23.2-3;	Carney,	Historia.	37.	(1988).	p.	399.	504 	Just.	 13.6.7;	 Diod.	 18.23.3.	 Diodorus	 records	 that	 Antipater	 learned	 of	Perdiccas’	plans	from	Antigonus,	who	had	fled	Asia	Minor	to	Macedon.	However	Antigonus’	 flight	 could	not	have	 taken	place	prior	 to	321;	Carney,	Historia.	37.	(1988).	pp.	399-400.	505	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 F.9.21;	 Phot.	 92.69B.1;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 66;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	140;		506	Diod.	18.23.3.	Heckel,	2006.	p.	175.	507	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 67.	 Jacoby	 (FGrH.	 Kommentar.	 156.	 F.	 9.	 p.	 561.	 n.	 156.)	suggests	 that	Cassander	was	best	man	 (brautführer)	 during	 the	marriage.	The	marriage	 would	 be	 short	 lived,	 as	 Perdiccas	 was	 also	 presented	 with	 the	opportunity	 of	marrying	 Cleopatra	 (Diod.	 18.23.3,	 25.3;	 Just.	 13.6.4-8;	 Carney,	2000.	 p.	 120,	 124-125;	 Carney,	 2006.	 pp.	 66-7;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 90;	 Perdiccas	would	 spurn	Nicaea,	 and	 by	 extension	Antipater,	 in	 order	 to	marry	 Cleopatra.	For	a	greater	discussion	on	this	topic,	see	below.	508	Adams,	1975.	p.	193;	Heckel,	Historia,	27.	(1978).	p.	224;	Heckel,	Phoenix.	40.	(1986).	p.	279;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	107.	509	Heckel,	Phoenix.	40.	(1986).	p.	279.	cf.	Berve,	Vol.	I.	1926.	pp.	122-126.	For	a	full	discussion	of	 the	various	uses	and	roles	of	 the	somatophylakes,	 see	Heckel,	
Phoenix.	40.	(1986).	pp.	279-294.	
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within	 the	agema,510	an	elite	group	 from	 the	hypaspists	but	operating	 separate	from	 them,	 which	 accompanied	 the	 king	 as	 his	 personnal	 bodyguard. 511	Cassander	 took	 over	 this	 position	 from	 Selecus,	 who	 had	 been	 promoted	 by	Perdiccas	to	chiliarch	of	the	Companion	cavalry.512		The	exact	composition	of	these	royal	foot	troops	has	been	difficult	to	define	and	has	 been	 the	 basis	 of	 some	 discussion	 amongst	modern	 scholars.513	However,	Heckel	correctly	identifies	that	the	agema	of	the	hypaspists	should	be	considered	as	an	infantry	equivalent	to	the	ile	basilikes	and	the	famed	Companion	cavalry	of	the	 Macedonian	 Army.514	That	 is,	 as	 an	 infantry	 formation	 under	 the	 direct	command	of	the	king	which	kept	close	to	him	to	ensure	his	personal	security.515	The	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	 king	 required	 of	 the	 agema	 has	 profound	consequences	for	this	study	in	gaining	an	understanding	of	Cassander’s	career.	While	Cassander	 is	not	explicitly	referred	to	within	 the	ancient	sources	during	this	 time,516	that	 the	agema	were	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 the	movements	 of	 the	king,	 or	 after	 323,	 kings	 of	 Macedon	 means	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 connect	 his	location	 between	 323	 and,	 at	 the	 very	 latest,	 321	 with	 the	 Council	 of	Triparadisus.	If	the	movements	of	the	kings	during	this	time	can	be	defined,	then	it	is	possible	to	also	know	Cassander’s	movements.	
	Conveniently,	 not	 only	 are	 the	movements	 of	 Philip	 III	 and	Alexander	 IV	 both	known,	 they	 are	 the	 same,	 as	 during	 this	 time	 they	 travelled	 together.	 This	increases	the	precision	with	which	it	 is	possible	to	understand	the	movements																																																									510	Heckel,	 Phoenix.	 40.	 (1986).	 p.	 288;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 300.	 n.	 197;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	107.	511	Heckel,	Phoenix.	40.	(1986).	p.	287;	Heckel,	2008.	p.	153-154.	contra:	Berve,	Vol.	I.	1926.	p.	126;	Milns.	CP.	78.	(1983).	p.	49;	For	references	to	the	use	of	the	
agema,	see:	Just.	12.12.4;	15.3.11;	Curt.	10.7.17;	Diod.	17.110.1.	512	Arr.	7.14.10;	Diod.	18.3.4;	Just.	13.4.17;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	257;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	247;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	pp.	106-107	513	Heckel,	Phoenix.	40.	(1986).	p.	286;	cf.	Berve.	Vol.	I.	1926.	pp.	122-126;	Tarn	Vol.	II.	1948.	pp.	148-154;	Miln,	CP.	78.	(1983).	pp.	47-50.	514	Heckel,	 Historia.	 27.	 (1978),	 p.	 227;	 Heckel,	 Phoenix.	 40.	 (1986),	 p.	 286;	Hatzopoulos,	2001.	p.	37.	515	Heckel,	Phoenix.	40.	(1986),	p.	287;	cf.	Arr.	1.1.11,	1.5.10,	1.6.9,	3.1.4,	3.17.2,	3.18.5.	516	Adams,	1975.	p.	66.	
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of	 Cassander	 and	 because	 the	 kings	 remained	 together,	 attempting	 to	 assign	Cassander	 to	 either	 one	 of	 them	 is	 unnecessary.	 The	 kings	 would	 remain	 in	Babylon	 until	 the	 spring	 of	 322,	 when	 they	 both	 accompanied	 Perdiccas	 to	Cappadocia	 to	 aid	 Eumenes,	 bringing	 the	 region	 under	Macedonian	 control.517	Cappadocia,	 faced	 with	 the	 might	 of	 the	 Perdiccan	 forces,	 was	 swiftly	subdued.518	Diodorus	states	definitively	that	Philip	III	was	with	Perdiccas	during	the	 regent’s	 time	 in	Cappadocia	 (ἔχων	μεθ᾽ἑαυτοῦ	τόν	τε	βασιλέα	Φίλιππον).519	Though	there	is	no	mention	of	Alexander	IV	accompanying	him	in	this	account,	there	 is	mention	 of	 the	 son	 of	 Alexander	 (Alexandri	Magni	 filium)	 in	 Justin,520	described	as	leaving	Cappadocia	for	Pisidia	in	321.521		It	is	after	the	return	of	Perdiccas	and	the	kings	to	Babylon,	in	the	first	half	of	321,	which	offers	the	most	plausible	period	for	Cassander’s	departure	from	Babylon	and	the	agema.	Tensions	between	Antipater	and	Perdiccas	had	been	on	the	rise	since	Alexander’s	death	and	by	321,	the	marriage	alliance	involving	Nicaea	was	not	 as	 politically	 vital	 or	 appealing	 as	 it	 had	 been	 in	 323.	 Perdiccas’	 position	prior	 to	 his	 appointment	 to	 the	 guardianship	 of	 the	 kings	 (prostates)	was	 not	secure.	Having	Antipater	as	an	ally	by	marrying	into	the	Antipatrid	house	would	have	secured	the	control	of	fresh	Macedonian	troops	if	these	could	be	spared	by	
																																																								517	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 	 F.9.11;	 Diod.	 18.22.1;	 Just.	 13.6.1;	 Plut.	 Eum.	 3.6.	Eumenes	had	been	appointed	to	the	satrapies	of	Cappadocia	and	Phaphlagonia	(Curt.	 10.10.3;	 Plut.	 Eum.	 3.2.).	 Cappadocia	 had	 never	 formally	 submitted	 to	Macedonian	 rule	 during	 Alexander’s	 lifetime	 and	 for	 the	most	 part	 Alexander	had	 by	 passed	 the	 northern	 parts	 of	 the	 region	 (Anson,	 2004.	 pp.	 65	 -	 66.).	Eumenes	 did	 not	 command	 enough	 power	 to	 take	 the	 region	 on	 his	 own	 and	therefore,	Perdiccas	had	ordered	both	Antigonus	and	Leonnatus	to	aid	Eumenes	in	 this	 endeavor	 (Plut.	Eum.	3.2-3.).	However,	 Plutarch	 records	 that	Antigonus	dismissed	 the	 command	 outright	 and	 Leonnatus,	 after	 receiving	 an	 urgent	request	 for	 help	 from	Antipater	who	was	 besieged	 in	 Lamia,	 chose	 to	 journey	into	 Europe	 to	 aid	 Antipater	 (Plut.	 Eum.	 3.4-5.).	 Eumenes	 then	 returned	 to	Babylon	and	Perdiccas	in	the	early	spring	of	322	(Plut.	Eum.	3.10-11.	cf.	Nepos,	
Eum.	2.4-5;	Anson,	2004.	p.	72).	518	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.9.11;	Diod.	18.16.2.	519	Diod.	18.16.1.	520	Just.	 13.	 6.	 10.	 It	must	 be	 noted	 that	 Justin	 has	 conflated	 the	 campaigns	 of	Cappadocia	and	Pisidia	(Yardley	&	Develin,	1994.	p.	128.	n.	10;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	18.	521	Diod.	18.22.1.	
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Antipater, 522 	the	 Lamian	 War	 having	 soaked	 up	 the	 few	 reserves	 at	 his	disposal.523	Another	 option	 had	 presented	 itself	 to	 Perdiccas	 in	 his	 bid	 for	control	within	the	Macedonian	Empire,	in	the	person	of	the	sister	of	Alexander	the	Great,	Cleopatra.	Cleopatra	had	journeyed	to	Sardis	at	much	the	same	time	as	Nicaea	in	323,524	and	by	321,	the	prospect	of	marrying	into	the	Argead	house,	rather	than	continuing	a	seemingly	worthless	alliance	to	Antipater,	had	become	the	 more	 attractive	 option.525	Perdiccas’	 actions	 in	 breaking	 the	 alliance	 to	Antipater	 led	 to	a	declaration	of	war	against	him	by	Antipater	 resulting	 in	 the	First	Diadoch	War.526		That	Cassander	would	have	stayed	in	Babylon	after	the	divorce	of	his	sister	and	the	conflict	 resulting	 from	this	 is	 improbable.	Though	not	mentioned	 in	any	of	the	 ancient	 sources,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Cassander	 left	 Babylon,	 accompanied	 by	Nicaea	 shortly	 or	 immediately	 after	 the	 decision	 was	 made	 by	 Perdiccas	 to	pursue	 Cleopatra.	 Their	 destination	 once	 they	 had	 left	 Babylon	 is	 again	 a	mystery,	but	there	are	two	likely	options.	First	was	the	court	of	Ptolemy	in	Egypt	which	 itself	 was	 in	 alliance	 with	 the	 Antipatrid	 family,	 after	 another	 of	Antipater’s	 daughters,	 Eurydice	had	married	Ptolemy	 in	321/0.527	Second,	 and	possibly	 more	 likely,	 Cassander	 and	 Nicaea	 may	 have	 made	 a	 direct	 journey	back	to	Macedon	and	Antipater.528	The	appointment	of	Cassander	to	the	agema,	while	not	filling	the	gap	in	time	between	June	323	and	his	return	into	the	ancient	record	in	320	at	Triparadisus	in	its	entirety,	however	does	significantly	diminish	the	period	of	time	that	his	movements	remain	unknown	to	modern	scholars	to	a	space	 of	 roughly	 six	months.	What	 the	 appointment	 also	 demonstrates	 is	 that																																																									522	Errington,	JHS.	90.	(1970).	p.	58;	Carney,	2000.	p.	125;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	47.	523	Adams,	Anc.	World.	10.	(1984).	p.	84;	cf.	Ch.	4.	pp.	99.	524	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	9.26.	525	Diod.	18.23.3.	cf.	Just.	13.6.5.	Perdiccas	must	surely	have	known	that	to	spurn	Antipater’s	family	in	such	a	way	was	to	invite	conflict	between	the	two,	however,	it	 seems	he	was	 confident	 that	he	would	be	able	 to	prevail	 over	 any	 response	that	could	arise	from	marrying	Cleopatra.	526 	Carney,	 Historia.	 37.	 (1988).	 p.	 440;	 It	 should	 however	 be	 noted	 that	hostilities	 did	 not	 occur	 until	 Ptolemy	 took	 custody	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	body	in	Syria.			527	Diod.	18.14.2;	Pau.	1.6.8;	Carney,	2000.	p.	160;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	122,	238.	528	contra.	Adams,	1975.	p.	66.	
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Cassander	was	capable	and	trusted	with	not	just	a	military	command,	but	also	a	command	that	was	vital	in	ensuring	the	personal	safety	of	the	kings	of	Macedon.	
	Following	 the	 defeat	 of	 the	 Perdiccan	 faction	 during	 the	 First	 War	 of	 the	Diadochoi,529	the	 council	 of	 Triparadisus	 served	 as	 the	 meeting	 point	 for	 the	Diadochi	as	well	as	for	the	kings	of	Macedon.530	As	with	the	meeting	in	Babylon	two	 years	 prior,	 the	 meeting	 at	 Triparadisus	 was	 called	 to	 decide	 how	 the	administration	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 would	 continue.	 Here,	 Antipater’s	position	 in	Macedon	was	 officially	 confirmed;	 he	would	 become	 the	 regent	 of	Macedon	(strategos	autokrator)	and	the	guardian	of	the	kings	(epimeletes),	once	again,531	holding	a	powerful	position	close	to	the	royal	family	as	he	had	done	for	much	of	his	career.532		Cassander,	 who	 was	 also	 present	 at	 the	 meeting, 533 	was	 appointed	 to	 a	prominent	 office	 in	 the	 Empire;	 it	 would	 be	 the	 last	major	 position	 he	would	occupy	prior	to	his	arrival	to	Macedon	with	his	father	in	mid-320.	Antipater	had	grown	weary	 of	 Antigonus’	 ambition	 in	 the	 east.	 After	 the	 death	 of	 Perdiccas,	Antigonus	was	arguably	 the	most	powerful	man	 in	 the	Empire	after	Antipater.	Because	of	 this,	Antipater	placed	Cassander	as	a	chiliarch	of	 the	 cavalry	under	Antigonus. 534 	In	 effect,	 this	 position	 amounted	 to	 a	 promotion	 within	 the	Macedonian	 hierarchy,	 taking	 over	 from	 Seleucus,	 who	 at	 the	 time	 had	 been	given	 the	 satrapy	 of	 Babylon	 as	 a	 reward	 for	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 Perdiccan	
																																																								529	For	the	defeat	of	Perdiccas:	Diod.	18.36.6;	Just.	13.8.10,	14.1.1,	14.11,	15.1.1;	Nepos,	Eum.	5.1;	Pau.	1.6.3;	Heidl.	Epit.	FGrH.	155.	1.1;	For	thorough	overviews	of	 the	 First	 War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 see:	 Errington,	 JHS.	90.	 (1970).	 pp.	 49-77;	Anson,	2014.	pp.	47-82.		530	Arr.	 Succ.	FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.30;	 Curt.	 10.7-8;	 Diod.	 18.	 36.	 6-7;	 Just.	 13.4.-For	discussion,	see:	Errington,	 JHS.	90.	(1970).	pp.	49-77;	Bosworth,	2002.	pp.	29	–	63;	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	pp.	39-82.	531	Diod.	18.39.1-2.	532	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.3;	Diod.	18.3.2,	18.12.1;	Just.	13.4.5;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	43;	 Baynham,	 in	Worthington,	 1994.	 pp.	 346-347;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 36;	Meeus,	
Anc.	Soc.	38	(2008).	pp.	52-54.	533	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH	156.	F.	9.32;	Diod.	18.39.3-4;	Phot.	92.71B.	40.	534	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.38;	Diod.	18.39.7;	Billows.	1990.	p.	69;	Heckel,	2006.	79;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	47.	
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faction	during	the	First	Diadoch	War.535	Once	again,	Cassander	was	called	upon	to	take	on	an	important	and	politically	sensitive	position.	He	was	required	to	not	only	 fulfil	 the	political	 and	military	demands	of	his	new	office,	but	 it	was	vital	that	he	do	 this	while	providing	his	 father	with	 information	on	 the	movements	and	intentions	of	Antigonus.		Cassander’s	time	under	Antigonus	was	short	lived.	Photius’	recording	of	Arrian	states	that	the	two	had	a	disagreement	shortly	after	the	meeting	at	Triparadisus	concluded.536	The	 nature	 of	 the	 disagreement	 is	 difficult	 to	 define.	 The	 only	mention	of	the	variance	between	Cassander	and	Antigonus	is	in	Photius’	Arrian,	so	 a	 distinct	 lack	 of	 corresponding	 literary	 evidence	means	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	confirm	 this	 account.	 Billows	 has	 asserted	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 dispute	 was	Cassander’s	 accusations	 that	 Antigonus	 seemed	 to	 be	 lacking	 in	 effort	 and	enthusiasm	in	bringing	the	war	against	Eumenes	to	an	end.537	Certainly	events	after	 Antipater’s	 death	would	 suggest	 that,	 if	 a	 disagreement	 had	 taken	 place	between	 Cassander	 and	 Antigonus,	 it	 did	 not	 divide	 them	 to	 the	 extent	 that	would	 render	 future	 co-operation	 impossible.538	The	 likelihood	of	unnecessary	discord	 within	 an	 already	 delicate	 political	 environment	 forced	 Antipater’s	intervention.	 He	 ordered	 that	 Cassander	 cease	 his	 criticism	 and	 obey	Antigonus.539	Following	 this,	 Cassander	 left	 to	 meet	 with	 his	 father,	 who	 was	located	in	Phrygia,	while	in	transit	back	to	Macedon.540	It	was	at	this	meeting	of	father	and	son	that	Cassander	urged	Antipater	to	bring	the	royals	with	him	back	
																																																								535	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH	 156.	 F.	 1.35;	 Heidl.	 Epit.	 FGrH.	 155.	 F.	 1.4;	 Diod.	 18.33.2.	Heckel,	2006.	p.	247.	536	Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	156.	 F.	 1.43	 =	 Phot.	 92.72B.14-16.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 date	exactly	when	the	disagreement	took	place.	However,	due	to	subsequent	events	(see	 below),	 a	 window	 of	 time	 can	 be	 provided	 to	 position	 Antipater	 when	Cassander	was	reunited	with	his	father.	537	Billows,	1990.	p.	72.	538	For	events	that	took	place	after	Antipater’s	death,	see	Ch.	6.	However,	Hughes	(2008.	p.	207.)	asserts	that	Antigonus	and	Antipater	were	still	on	friendly	terms	up	until	the	regent’s	death.	539	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.40	540	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.42.	Once	again	Photius	provides	the	most	extensive	account	of	Cassander’s	movements	in	the	period	immediately	after	the	meeting	at	Triparadisus.	
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to	Macedon.541	This	then	provides	a	marker	for	Cassander’s	return	to	Macedon,	which	can	be	dated	to	roughly	mid-320.		
	If	Antipater’s	decision	to	bring	the	royal	 family	back	to	Macedon	from	the	east	can	 be	 attributed	 to	 Cassander’s	 advice,	 there	 are	 several	 important	 points	 of	significance	 that	 can	 be	 extrapolated.	 Cassander’s	 advice	 was	 valuable	 to	Antipater;	 he	 had	 enough	 confidence	 in	 his	 son’s	 judgement	 to	 act	 upon	 the	information	 he	 provided.	 Despite	 his	 intervention	 between	 Antigonus	 and	 his	son,	 Antipater	 still	 had	 faith	 in	 Cassander’s	 ability	 to	 understand	 the	 ever-changing	 political	 environment	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 Additionally	 there	was	the	potential	problem	that	bringing	the	royals	out	of	the	eastern	portion	of	the	Empire	may	create.	If	Cassander	were	the	person	who	convinced	Antipater	that	the	royal	family	should	be	relocated	to	Macedon	after	he	left	Triparadisus,	this	would	imply	that	the	regent	had	originally	planned	for	the	kings	to	remain	in	 Asia,	 presumably	 in	 the	 custody	 of	 Antigonus.542	The	 removal	 of	 the	 kings	away	 from	 the	 control	 and	 influence	 of	 Antigonus543	could	 result	 in	 tensions																																																									541	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.42.	 cf.	Diod.	18.39.7;	Heidl.	Epit.	FGrH.	155.	F.	2.2:	Diodorus	and	the	unknown	writer	of	the	epitome	do	not	credit	Cassander	with	the	 inspiration	 for	 Antipater	 to	 bring	 the	 royal	 family	 back	 to	 Macedon.	 The	possibility	of	a	substantial	lacuna	existing	in	the	section	of	the	narrative	written	by	Diodorus	 that	 leaves	out	Cassander’s	 involvement	 in	bringing	 the	 royals	 to	Macedon	 has	 been	 raised	 (Geer,	 1947.	 p.	 124-125.	 n.	 1.)	 What	 does	 exist	 in	Diodorus’	 account	 is	 a	 clue	 into	Antipater’s	 reasoning:	 “αὐτὸς	δὲ	τοὺς	βασιλεῖς	
ἀναλαβὼν	καὶ	τὴν	ἰδίαν	δύναμιν	προῆγεν	ἐπὶ	Μακεδονίαν,	κατάξων	τοὺς	βασιλεῖς	
ἐπὶ	 τὴν	 πατρίδα.”(Diod.	 18.39.7.).	 By	 transporting	 the	 royal	 family	 back	 to	Macedon	 from	 the	 east,	 Antipater	 would	 also	 return	 the	 epicentre	 of	Macedonian	 politics	 back	 the	 homeland	 of	 the	 empire	 after	 the	 years	 of	 the	Alexander’s	expansion.		542 	Antigonus	 had	 been	 appointed	 satrap	 of	 Greater	 Phrygia,	 Lycaonia,	Pamphylia	and	Lycia	at	Triparadisus	(Diod.	18.39.6;	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.37.	cf.	 Billows,	 1990.	 p.	 69;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 291.	 n.	 68.).	 Additionally,	 he	 was	appointed	 hegemon	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Army	 (Diod.	 18.39.7;	 Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	156.	 F.	 1.38.)	 and	 most	 likely	 strategos	 of	 the	 greater	 eastern	 portion	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	(App.	Syr.	53).	This	would	make	him	the	most	powerful	man	in	the	Empire	save	for	Antipater.	543	It	must	 be	 noted	 however	 that	 this	 did	 not	 include	 the	 entire	 royal	 family.	Perdiccas’	 potential	 bride	 to	 be	 Cleopatra	 would	 remain	 in	 Sardis	 under	 the	control	of	Antigonus	until	308,	when	she	was	killed	after	quarrelling	with	him	and	 siding	 with	 Ptolemy	 (Diod.	 20.39.1;	 20.39.5;	 Billows,	 1990.	 pp.	 144-145;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	90).	
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emerging	between	the	Antipatrid	and	Antigonid	families,	arguably	the	two	most	powerful	 families	 in	 the	 empire	 after	 Alexander’s	 death	 in	 323.	 However	tensions	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 arisen	 between	 the	 families.	 Antipater	 left	 a	significant	 portion	 of	 his	 own	 army	 that	 he	 brought	with	 him	 into	Asia	Minor	with	Antigonus	 in	order	 to	aid	 in	a	speedy	end	to	 the	war	against	Eumenes.544	Antipater	knew	from	experience	that	conflict	was	always	a	possibility	and	if	he	was	 in	 fact	hostile	 towards	Antigonus,	 the	notion	of	 supplying	an	army	with	a	significant	 amount	 of	 his	 own	 military	 reserves	 would	 have	 been	 counter	intuitive.	 The	 disagreements	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Antigonus	 are	 not	mentioned	by	any	extant	ancient	literary	source	apart	from	Photius’	account	of	Arrian.	This	is	not	to	say	that	it	did	not	happen;	however	what	it	does	highlight	is	 that	 the	argument	was	not	 sufficiently	 important	 to	 cause	hostility	between	the	 Antipatrids	 and	 Antigonids	 in	 320.	 For	 this	 study,	 the	 significance	 of	Cassander	rejoining	his	 father	 in	Phrygia	 is	not	 in	 the	arguments	he	may	have	had	 with	 Antigonus	 and	 the	 reprimand	 he	 received	 from	 Antipater,	 but	 the	geographical	 location	it	provides	for	Cassander’s	movements	 in	320.	One	point	that	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 the	 disagreement	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Antigonus	which	 is	 pertinent	 to	 this	 discussion	 is	 the	 effect	 that	 it	may	 have	 had	 on	 the	choice	Antipater	was	to	make	in	the	future.	While	it	 is	clear	that	he	trusted	his	son	and	valued	his	advice,	he	may	have	been	concerned	about	his	ability	to	work	co-operatively	with	others.	
	It	 was	 not	 long	 after	 Antipater	 and	 Cassander’s	 return	 to	 Macedon	 that	 the	regent	 fell	 ill	with	 the	ailment	 that	would	ultimately	result	 in	his	death.545	The	exact	nature	of	Antipater’s	sickness	is	difficult	to	define,	as	the	only	information	that	survives	is	in	the	narrative	by	Diodorus,	that	states	it	was	one	which	usually	proved	 fatal	 for	 the	 elderly.546	The	 time	 at	 which	 Antipater	 became	 unwell	 is	equally	difficult	 to	ascertain.	What	 is	apparent	 is	 that	 it	 took	place	prior	to	the	arrival	of	the	Athenian	embassy	of	June	319,	headed	by	the	politician	and	orator,																																																									544	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.43;	Billows,	1990.	p.	72-73.	545	Diod.	 18.48.1;	 Adams.	 1975.	 pp.	 69-70;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 48;	 Baynham,	 in	Worthington,	 1994.	 p.	 355;	 Heckel.	 2006.	 p.	 38;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington,	2010.	p.	212.	546	Diod.	18.48.1:	“…τοῦ	βίου	γήρως	συνεργοῦντος	πρὸς	τὴν	ἀπόλυσιν	τὺ	βίου.”	
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Demades.547	By	 the	 time	 of	 the	 arrival	 of	 Demades,	 Antipater	 was	 already	gravely	 ill	 and	 unable	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 daily	 affairs	 required	 in	 the	 office	 of	regent.548	As	to	where	Cassander	was,	and	in	what	capacity	he	operated	after	his	return	 to	Macedon,	 no	mention	 is	made	 by	 the	 ancient	 sources.	 It	 is	 however	likely	that	he	occupied	a	prominent	position	within	the	court	at	Macedon.	While	unsupported	by	ancient	evidence,	considering	 the	offices	he	occupied	between	323	 and	 320,	 namely,	 the	 command	 of	 the	 agema	 and	 the	 chiliarchy	 under	Antigonus,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Cassander	 continued	 in	 a	 similar	 role,	 either	 in	 a	position	 of	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	 kings,	 or	within	 the	military	 until	 Antipater	became	ill.		As	Antipater’s	health	failed,	he	was	no	longer	able	to	maintain	effective	control	of	the	regency.	It	was	at	this	point	that	Cassander	began	to	operate	in	his	father’s	stead,	maintaining	 the	office	of	 regent	when	his	 father	was	unable	 to	do	so.549	Due	to	the	nature	of	Antipater’s	illness,	Cassander	may	have	believed	that,	while	he	was	 for	 the	 time	 being	 operating	 in	 an	 unofficial	 capacity	 as	 the	 regent	 of	Macedon,	 a	 transition	 into	 an	official	 role	would	not	 be	 far	 away	 as	his	 father	came	 closer	 to	 death.550	After	 the	 assumption	 of	 Antipater’s	 duties,	 the	 most	prominent	 reference	 to	 Cassander	 after	 his	 return	 to	 Macedon	 and	 prior	 to	Antipater’s	death	took	place.	The	event	was	the	Demades	affair.	This	may	have	been	 the	deciding	 factor	 in	Antipater’s	 decision	 to	 appoint	 Polyperchon	 as	 his	successor	to	the	regency	of	Macedon.	Demades	was	a	prominent	Athenian	with	a	pro-Macedonian	 bias	who	 had	 a	 long	 history	 of	 productive	 co-operative	work	
																																																								547	Diod.	18.48.2;	Plut.	Phoc.	30.5;	Plut.	Dem.	31.4-6;	cf.	IG.	II.2	383B;	Tritle,	1988.	p.	138;	Heckel.	2006.	p.	292.	n.	88.	548	For	further	discussion	of	the	Demades	affair,	see	below.	549	Fortina.	 1965.	 p.	 23;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 70;	 Stähelin.	 RE.	 102	 2294;	 Hughes,	2008.	p.	206.	550	This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Cassander’s	 reaction	 to	Antipater’s	 appointment	 of	 the	regency	 to	Polyperchon	 (see:	Ch.	 6.1.),	 as	well	 as	 the	 replacement	of	Menyllus	with	Nicanor	as	 the	 commander	of	 the	garrison	at	Munychia	 (for	more	on	 the	replacement	 of	 officers	 by	 Cassander,	 see	 below	 p.	 147).	 The	 possibility	 that	Antipater	was	 using	 the	 embassy	with	Demades	 as	 a	 chance	 for	 Cassander	 to	prove	his	political	merit	has	also	been	raised	by	Hughes	(2008.	pp.	206-207.)	
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with	 Macedon.551	He	 was	 sent	 to	 treat	 with	 Antipater,	 requesting	 that	 the	Macedonian	 garrison	 positioned	 at	 Munychia	 be	 removed.552 	It	 seems	 that	Demades	 had	 expected	 to	 meet	 with	 Antipater,	 rather	 than	 Cassander.	 This	expectation	may	provide	some	indication	of	the	timing	of	the	regent’s	infirmity	and	worsening	condition	as,	while	Antipater’s	condition	may	have	been	known	in	 Athens	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Demades’	 departure,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 his	 health	deteriorated	significantly	while	the	embassy	was	en	route	to	Pella.553	As	a	result,	it	 was	 Cassander	 that	 would	 meet	 and	 treat	 with	 the	 Athenians	 and	 not	 his	father.554		Events	 did	 not	 go	well	 for	 the	Demades	 embassy.	 Upon	 his	 arrival,	 Cassander	presented	 correspondence	written	by	Demades	 that	 had	previously	 come	 into	his	 possession.555	This	 was	 said	 to	 be	 between	 the	 Athenian	 and	 Perdiccas,	during	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Lamian	 War.	 The	 letter	 asked	 Perdiccas	 to	 send	troops	to	Greece,	freeing	the	Greek	cities	from	Antipatrid	rule.556	This	act	places																																																									551	cf.	Diod.	16.87.3;	17.15.3;	Plut.	Phoc.	1.1;	16.5;	Ath.	6.251B;	Ael.	VH.	5.12;	Plut.	
Cleo.	27.1;	Plut.	Mor.	191E;	Plut.	Mor.	818E;	Heckel.	2006.	p.107.	552	Diod.	 18.48.1;	 Plut.	 Phoc.	 30.	 1;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 23;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 70;	Tritle,	1988.	p.	138;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	209-210;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	107;	Hughes.	2008.	p.	203.	553	Plut.	Phoc.	30.5.	offers	some	comment	on	the	timing	of	the	Demades’	embassy	arriving	in	Pella	and	the	timing	of	Antipater’s	sickness.	Suggesting	that	Demades	journey	conencided	with	Antipater	taking	ill.	554	There	is	a	discrepancy	at	this	point	in	the	ancient	sources	as	to	whom	it	was	who	 received	 Demades	 and	 the	 Athenian	 embassy.	 Diodorus	 suggests	 that	Antipater	was	the	one	with	whom	Demades	negotiated	(Diod.	18.48.2-	3),	while	Plutarch	 states	 that	 it	 was	 Cassander	 (Plut.	 Phoc.	 30.5;	 Plut.	 Dem.	 31.6)	 who	greeted	 the	 embassy	 in	 mid-319	 (Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.14).	 The	 latter	position	has	been	accepted	by	modern	scholarship	(Fortina,	1965.	p.	23;	Adams.	1975.	p.	 70;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2003.	p.	 27;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2008.	p.	 209;	Hughes	(2008.	p.	205.	n.	515.)	suggests	that	the	cause	for	the	discrepancy	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 source	 material	 used	 by	 Diodorus,	 as	 opposed	 to	 that	 of	Plutarch	and	Arrian.	555	The	supplier	of	the	letter	to	Cassander	has	been	attributed	by	Plutarch	to	the	Corinthian,	Dinarchus	 (Plut.	Dem.	31.6;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 107;	Hughes.	 2008.	 p.	205.	n.	513.)	556	Plut.	Phoc.	30.5;	Plut.	Dem.	31.3;	Diod.	18.48.2;	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.14.	Once	again,	 there	exists	a	 slight	variation	 in	 the	 sources	as	 to	whom	Demades	was	in	correspondence.	Plutarch’s	Demosthenes	states	it	was	Perdiccas	that	was	contacted	by	Demades	(Plut.	Dem.	31.3),	which	is	further	supported	by	Diodorus	(Diod.	18.48.2),	while	Plutarch’s	biography	of	Phocion	curiously	suggests	that	it	
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Demades	 in	 an	 unescapable	 position	 and	 his	 fate	 was	 sealed.557	Cassander	became	 enraged	 and	 in	 the	 full	 view	 of	 the	 court,	 killed	 Demeas,	 the	 son	 of	Demades,	 who	 had	 travelled	 north	 with	 his	 father.	 Following	 this,	 Cassander	ordered	the	immediate	execution	of	Demades.558		 	 It	 is	not	the	intention	of	this	study	 to	 justify	Cassander’s	actions	at	 this	 time	although	 they	were,	at	 least	 in	Plutarch’s	opinion,	warranted.559	Modern	scholars	disagree,	suggesting	that	the	events	are	evidence	of	Cassander’s	immaturity	and	would	not	have	taken	place	if	Antipater	 had	 been	 well	 enough	 to	 receive	 Demades	 upon	 his	 arrival	 in	Macedon.560	The	murder	of	Demades	and	his	son	may	also	have	raised	the	ire	of	the	Macedonian	military	establishment,561	who	were	concerned	that	the	death	of	political	ambassadors	could	exacerbate	 the	 tense	political	environment	as	well	as	 threatening	 the	uneasy	peace	 that	 existed	between	Macedon	 and	Athens	 in	the	aftermath	of	the	Lamian	War.562		The	 period	 following	 Alexander’s	 death	 until	 Antipater’s	 own	 demise	 saw	Cassander’s	further	rise	to	prominence	within	the	Macedonian	Empire.	It	was	a	period	that	afforded	him	a	number	of	prestigious	and	vital	offices,	providing	him	with	 significant	 political	 experience,	 both	 concerning	 internal	 Macedonian	politics,	 with	 his	 appointment	 to	 the	 commander	 of	 the	 agema	 and	 also	 as	Antiognus’	chiliarch	 following	the	Settlement	of	Triparadisus	in	320.	Cassander	also	gained	direct	experience	with	Greek	politics,	as	evidenced	by	his	role	in	the	Demades	 Affair	 and	 his	 capacity	 as	 Antipater’s	 adjutant	 as	 his	 father’s	 health																																																																																																																																																															was	Antigonus	whom	Demades	had	contacted	(Plut.	Phoc.	30.5).	However,	due	to	the	historical	context	and	timing	of	the	communication,	 it	 is	most	likely	that	the	recipient	of	Demades’s	request	was	Perdiccas	(Adams.	1975.	p.	70;	Hughes.	2008.	p.	205;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	79,	107.)	557	Plut.	Dem.	31.3.	558	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	9.15;	Plut.	Dem.	31.4;	cf.	Diod.	18.48.2.	559	Plut.	Dem.	31.5.	560	Adams.	1975.	p.	71;	cf.	Hughes,	2008.	p.	205-206.	561	Hughes.	2008.	p.	207.	562	Hughes.	2008.	p.	207.	Hughes	does	highlight	however	that	while	the	death	of	Demades	was	unexpected,	 it	did	yield	effective	results.	No	 further	requests	 for	the	removal	of	the	garrison	at	Munychia	were	made	by	Athens	for	the	time	being	(cf.	Hughes.	2008.	p.	207.	n.	519).	Hughes	 is	correct	 in	his	observation,	 though	the	short	period	of	time	after	the	execution	of	Demades	to	the	death	of	Antipater	may	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 new	 embassies	 traveling	 to	Macedon	 from	Athens.	
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declined.	 Additionally,	 it	 was	 this	 period	 when	 Cassander	 forged	 the	connections,	 especially	 with	 Antigonus,	 that	 would	 go	 on	 to	 aid	 his	 efforts	against	 Polyperchon	 once	 the	 forthcoming	war	 against	 the	 new	 regent	 began.	While	Cassander’s	 behaviour	was	not	 beyond	 reproach	 and	his	 actions	during	the	 Demades	 Affair	 were	 clearly	 excessive,	 this	 alone	 would	 not	 have	 been	enough	 to	 account	 for	 Antipater’s	 decision	 to	 favour	 Polyperchon	 as	 the	 next	regent	of	Macedon	in	319.	 	Antipater’s	choice	to	overlook	his	son	for	the	older	Polyperchon	was	 not	 based	 on	 Cassander,	 or	 his	 career	 up	 until	 this	 point	 in	time,	 in	 isolation.	 External	 factors	 also	 played	 a	 major	 role	 for	 the	 dying	Antipater	and	because	of	these	external	factors,	it	is	vital	to	also	engage	with	the	career	of	Polyperchon	during	this	time,	in	order	to	gain	a	greater	understanding	of	the	choice	facing	Antipater	in	319.		
5.2:	Polyperchon	
	Despite	 the	 extended	 period	 of	 time	 in	which	 Cassander	 occupied	 an	 office	 of	significant	importance	between	323	and	319,	Antipater	overlooked	his	son	as	an	appropriate	 successor	 to	 the	 regency	 of	 Macedon.	 Instead	 Antipater	 chose	 to	appoint	 Polyperchon.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 engage	 with	 Polyperchon’s	career	 over	 the	 same	 period	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 what	 may	 have	 caused	Antipater	to	make	the	choice	he	did.	This	period	marks	the	point	in	time	during	which	Antipater	and	Polyperchon	came	 into	close	contact	with	each	other	and	engaged	in	a	co-operative	and	effective	working	relationship.			Though	it	 is	possible	that	the	two	had	become	acquainted	prior	to	Alexander’s	Persian	 Campaign	 in	 334,	 explicit	 references	 to	 their	 association	 are	 extant	within	 the	 ancient	 literary	 sources	 in	 the	 post-323	 Macedonian	 Empire,	particularly	 in	 the	 accounts	 of	 Diodorus	 and	 Justin.	 Much	 like	 Cassander,	Polyperchon	was	appointed	to	significant	military	and	political	offices	between	323	and	319.	Cassander	spent	the	majority	of	this	time	in	Asia	Minor	serving	in	the	agema	and	as	chiliarch	under	Antigonus.	Polyperchon	spent	the	entirety	of	this	 period	 under	 the	 command	 of	 Craterus,	 in	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire.	As	Craterus’	second	in	command,	Polyperchon	would	play	a	
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significant	 role	 during	 the	 First	 War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 most	 notably	 in	 his	military	activities	against	the	Aetolians	and	the	Thessalians.		In	 much	 the	 same	 way	 as	 references	 to	 Cassander,	 explicit	 references	 to	Polyperchon	 at	 this	 time	 are	 few	 and	 far	 between.	 This	 does	 not	 prove	 as	fundamentally	problematic	 for	 this	 investigation	as	 it	 initially	appears.	As	with	Cassander’s	 appointment	 to	 the	 agema	 between	 323	 and	 322	which	 attached	him	to	 the	nearby	vicinity	of	 the	royals,	 thereby	providing	a	helpful	 fixture	 for	his	 whereabouts,	 Polyperchon’s	 position	 operates	 in	 much	 the	 same	 manner.	Because	 Alexander	 had	 placed	 Polyperchon	 under	 Craterus	 to	 assume	 his	position	should	he	fall,	Polyperchon	was	required	to	maintain	close	proximity	to	Craterus.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 not	 unreasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 if	 Craterus’	 location	can	be	determined,	 and	unless	 an	 explicit	 reference	places	him	away	 from	his	commander,	Polyperchon’s	orientation	can	also	be	ascertained.		The	 outbreak	 of	 the	 First	 Diadoch	 War	 in	 321	 brought	 Polyperchon	 to	 the	forefront	in	the	chaotic	political	environment	of	the	post-Alexander	Macedonian	Empire.	When	Antipater	 and	Craterus	 embarked	 into	Asia	Minor	 to	 lend	 their	strength	against	the	Perdiccan	faction	they	required	a	capable	and	effective	man	who	could	be	trusted	to	take	temporary	control	of	the	regency	in	their	absence.	This	 was	 more	 vital	 than	 ever	 in	 light	 of	 the	 recent	 Greek	 uprising	 that	 had	destabilised	 Macedonian	 control	 over	 the	 region.	 The	 man	 chosen	 was	Polyperchon.	 That	 he	 was	 appointed	 to	 this	 position	 is	 an	 indication	 that	Polyperchon	was	seen	to	have	the	skills	and	personal	abilities	need	to	carry	out	important	and	potentially	problematic	duties.	
	It	must	be	kept	in	mind	that	Polyperchon’s	original	appointment	under	the	frail	Craterus	 by	 Alexander	 in	 324	 was	 so	 that,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Craterus’	 death,	Polyperchon	would	be	able	to	assume	Craterus’	position	as	leader	of	the	10,000	veterans	returning	to	Macedon,	as	well	as	the	regency	itself.	While	Craterus	did	in	 fact	make	a	successful,	albeit	delayed,	return	to	Macedon	 in	322,	he	met	his	end	 during	 the	 period	 under	 investigation.	 During	 the	 First	 Diadoch	 War,	Craterus	was	killed	 falling	 from	his	horse	while	on	campaign	against	Eumenes	
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near	the	Hellespont.	His	death	resulted	in	Polyperchon’s	further	elevation	in	the	political	hierarchy	in	Macedon.	His	connection	to	Craterus	may	have	influenced	Antipater’s	 ultimate	 decision	 to	 name	 Polyperchon	 as	 the	 next	 regent	 of	Macedon.		As	 previously	 stated,563	at	 the	 time	 of	 Alexander’s	 death,	 Polyperchon	 was	 in	Cilicia,	 accompanying	 Craterus	 and	 his	 returning	 veteran	 force	 back	 to	Macedon.564	It	 is	 appropriate	 at	 this	 time	 to	 discuss	 the	 nature	 of	 Alexander’s	appointment	 of	 Polyperchon	 to	 Craterus’	 returning	 army.	 This	 discussion	 is	fundamental	 in	understanding	Polyperchon’s	career	between	323	and	319.	His	connection	to	Craterus	and	Alexander	would	define	his	approach	to	gaining,	and	maintaining,	power	in	Macedon	after	the	death	of	Antipater.	Alexander	was	not	confident	that	Craterus’	health	would	allow	his	safe	return	to	Macedon.	Due	to	this	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 Craterus’	 strength,	 Alexander	 knew	 that	 careful	consideration	 was	 needed	 before	 naming	 the	 man	 to	 be	 Craterus’	 second	 in	command.	Polyperchon	and	Craterus	were	familiar	with	each	other,	having	been	together	 during	 Alexander’s	 expansion	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire. 565 	The	relationship	which	existed	between	 them	may	have	been	seen	as	aiding	 in	 the	transition	 of	 power	 should	 Polyperchon	 be	 required	 to	 take	 Craterus’	 place	thereby	 minimising	 delay	 in	 the	 veterans’	 return	 to	 Macedon,	 another	 factor	making	him	an	appealing	choice	for	Craterus’	second	in	command.	
	More	significant	are	the	consequences	that	may	have	arisen	from	the	hand	over	of	 power	 from	 Craterus	 to	 Polyperchon	 once	 he	 had	 led	 the	 army	 back	 to	Macedon.	 Arrian’s	 account	 provides	 some	 insight	 into	 the	 expectations	
																																																								563	cf	Ch.	4.	p.	81.	564	Arr.	 7.12.4;	 Diod.	 18.4.1;	 Just.	 12.12.8;	 Badian,	 JHS.	 81.	 (1961).	 pp.	 35-6;	Berve,	Vol.	II.	1926.	p.	225;	Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	(1971).	p.	125;	Errington,	JHS.	90.	(1970).	p.	55;	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	p.	78.	565	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 227,	 p.	 335.	 n.	 623;	 cf.	 Arr.	 4.23.5,	 4.24.6-7,	 2.26.1-27.4,	5.11.3,	6.5.5.	The	closeness	of	the	pair	towards	the	end	of	Alexander’s	campaigns	could	 explain	 for	 the	 confusion	 between	 Craterus	 and	 Polyperchon	 that	regularly	appears	in	Justin’s	account	(Just.	13.8.5,	13.8.	7,	15.1.1,	Heckel,	2006.	p.	335.	n.	623;	cf.	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	158,	189,	218.).	
	 127	
Alexander	 had	 of	 Polyperchon	 once	 he	 had	 taken	 control	 of	 Craterus’	men.566	This	 excerpt	 implies	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 expected	 to	 continue	 Craterus’	orders	in	the	transfer	of	troops	to	Macedon.	By	guiding	the	veterans	from	Opis	home,	Polyperchon	would	then	have	enabled	Antipater	the	possibility	to	embark	eastwards	with	 the	 levies	 he	was	 ordered	 to	 bring	 to	 Alexander.	What	 is	 not	known	 is	 Polyperchon’s	 role	 once	 he	 arrived	 in	 Macedon.	 This	 can	 only	 be	speculated	upon,	as	Craterus	was	able	to	complete	his	mission,	in	322,	although	substantially	 delayed. 567 	Polyperchon’s	 appointment	 by	 Alexander	 was	 not	without	thought;	it	was	deliberate	and	calculated,	and	it	should	not	be	dismissed	as	an	unimportant	short-term	military	appointment.	As	Arrian	states,	Alexander	was	well	aware	of	Craterus’	frailty	before	his	embarkation	to	Macedon	where	he	would	 replace	 Antipater	 as	 regent.568	The	 possibility	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	merely	 expected,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 Craterus’	 death,	 to	 lead	 the	 army	 back	 to	Macedon	 and	 await	 a	 new	 replacement	 for	 Antipater	 to	 arrive	 from	 Babylon	does	not	seem	likely	as	it	dismisses	Polyperchon’s	political	and	military	acumen.		If	he	were	not	expected	to	assume	Craterus’	regency,	further	delays	would	face	Antipater	with	regard	to	his	command	from	Macedon	into	the	east.	Craterus’	ill	health	 was	 known	 prior	 to	 his	 departure	 to	 Macedon.	 That	 Polyperchon	 was	appointed	as	second	in	command	suggests	that	 in	the	event	of	Craterus’	death,	Polyperchon	would	assume	all	duties	originally	intended	for	Craterus.	Not	only	would	he	lead	the	veterans	back	to	Macedon,	he	would	also	relieve	Antipater	of	the	regency	of	Macedon.	This	possibility	needs	 to	be	entertained	as	 if	 this	was	not	 what	 was	 expected	 of	 Polyperchon,	 his	 appointment	 by	 Alexander	 is	puzzling.	 A	more	 likely	 alternative	 is	 that,	 because	 Alexander	was	 aware	 that	Craterus’s	 safe	 return	 to	 Macedon	 was	 uncertain,	 that	 a	 substitute	 would	 be	required	 was	 a	 real	 possibility.	 To	 insure	 against	 further	 delay	 of	 Antipater’s																																																									566	Arr.	7.12.4.	567	See	below.	568	Arr.	7.12.4;	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	126-7;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	95,	98;	Polyperchon	was	not	 the	 only	 senior	 officer	 accompanying	 Craterus.	 Justin	 asserts	 that	 Clitus,	Gorgias,	 Polydamus	 and	 Antigenes	 were	 also	 with	 the	 veterans	 of	 Opis	 (Just.	12.12.8;	cf.	Heckel,	2006,	p.	31,	87,	127,	226;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2001.	pp.	 276-277.).	 Justin	 says	 nothing	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 position,	 however,	 when	used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 evidence	 from	 Arrian,	 any	 confusion	 about	 the	hierarchy	among	the	officers	is	removed.		
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departure	east,	as	well	as	 to	avoid	the	need	to	send	an	additional	replacement	for	 Craterus,	 Alexander	 named	Polyperchon	 as	 second	 in	 command,	 a	man	he	trusted	 to	 assume	 Craterus’	 role	 in	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	Empire	should	Craterus	die	before	reaching	Macedon.	News	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	 would	 have	 reached	 the	 pair	 within	 days	 due	 to	Cilicia’s	 placement	 along	 the	 famed	 Royal	 Road	 of	 the	 Persian	 Empire.569	The	news	 presented	 a	 difficult	 quandary	 for	 Craterus.	 	 Should	 he	 continue	 on	 his	journey	 to	Macedon	 relieving	Antipater	 of	 the	 regency,	 return	 to	Babylon	 and	lend	 his	 voice	 to	 the	 court,	 or	 remain	 in	 Cilicia	 as	 the	 political	 situation	developed?	 This	 lack	 of	 certainty	 left	 Craterus	 and	 Polyperchon	 in	 a	 state	 of	limbo.570	While	Alexander	was	alive,	Craterus’	return	to	Macedon	was	backed	by	royal	authority,	but	soon	after	receiving	news	of	Alexander’s	demise,	word	came	to	Craterus	that	Perdiccas	had	chosen	to	end	his	journey	to	replace	Antipater,571																																																									569	Hdt.	 5.52.2;	 French,	 Iran.	 36.	 (1998).	 p.	 16;	 Graf,	 Achaemenid	 History.	 8.	(1994).	 p.	 175.	 Young,	 PAPHS.	 107.	 (1963).	 p.	 348.	 For	 a	 collection	 of	 maps	devoted	to	the	Persian	Royal	Road,	see:	French,	Iran.	36.	(1998).	pp.	34-42;	After	Alexander’s	 defeat	 of	 the	 Persian	 Empire,	 the	 Royal	 Road	 did	 not	 go	 unused.	Alexander	 continued	 employing	 the	 Road	 to	 great	 effect	 for	 the	 relay	 of	communications	 as	well	 as	 allowing	 the	 swift	movement	of	 troops	 throughout	the	empire	(Graf,	Achaemenid	History.	8.	(1994).	p.	174;	Lane	Fox,	1973.	p.	103).	Indeed,	 Alexander	 had	 used	 the	 Road	 himself	 when	 conducting	 his	 campaign	against	Darius	(Arr.	2.4.2-3;	Brunt,	CQ.	12.	(1962).	p.	142.).	It	is	highly	likely	that	not	only	did	Craterus	and	Polyperchon	use	the	Royal	Road	to	make	their	march	back	to	Macedon,	but	Cassander	may	have	travelled	via	this	way	as	well	during	his	 pressing	 journey	 to	 represent	 Antipater	 in	 Alexander’s	 court	 in	 324.	 The	precise	date	at	which	the	news	reached	Craterus	and	Polyperchon	is	unknown.	However,	 given	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 initial	 word	 of	 Alexander’s	 death	reaching	Athens	 and	Macedon	within	 the	 space	 of	 a	 few	 short	weeks,	 thereby	initiating	 the	 Lamian	 War	 (cf.	 Ch.	 4.	 p.	 101.)	 combined	 with	 the	 renowned	swiftness	 that	 the	 Road	 was	 able	 to	 facilitate	 correspondence	 (Hdt.	 5.52-53	(Herodotus	states	the	journey	between	Susa	and	Sardis	would	take	some	ninety	days	on	 foot);	8.98;	Xen.	Cyrop.	8.17-19;	Young,	PAPHS.	107.	 (1963),	p.	349),	 it	can	 be	 assumed	 that	 the	 time	 required	 for	 word	 to	 reach	 Cilicia	 would	 be	dramatically	 less	 than	 that	 taken	 to	 reach	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	Macedonian	Empire.	570	Heckel,	1992.	p.	127;	Schachenmeyr,	1973.	p.	149.	suggest	that	Craterus	was	trapped	between	“Staatsrecht”	and	“Faustrecht.”	571	Diod.	 18.4.1:	 states	 “τοῖς	 δαιδόχοις	 ἔδοξε	 μὴ	 συντελεῖν	 τὰ	 βεβουλευμένα”,	though	 as	 Meeus	 correctly	 identifies,	 this	 equates	 to	 the	 wishes	 of	 Perdiccas	(Meeus,	Anc.	 Soc.	38.	 (2008).	 p.	 78).	 It	 is	 unknown	whether	 or	 not	 Perdiccas’	orders	arrived	in	Craterus’	camp	at	the	same	time	as	word	of	Alexander’s	death.	It	would	be	 expected	 that	 as	 the	political	 situation	 in	Babylon	developed	over	
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forcing	Craterus	to	sojourn	in	Cilicia.572	This	political	limbo	did	not	last	for	long.	Communications	between	Babylon	and	 the	rest	of	 the	empire	were	swift,	with	new	 information	arriving	 to	Craterus	and	Polyperchon	constantly.	They	would	have	 known	 that	 the	 Diadochoi	 in	 Babylon	 had	 convened	 to	 plan	 the	continuation	 of	 the	 empire.573	While	 not	 having	 any	 input	 or	 voice	 in	 the	decisions	made	by	the	Diadochoi	in	Babylon,	the	order	to	cease	his	journey	east	suggests	that	Craterus	was	receiving	updates	from	the	capital,	informing	him	of	the	proceedings	of,	and	the	decisions	reached	by,	the	council.		Although	 absent	 from	 the	 talks	 taking	 place	 in	 Babylon,	 Craterus’	 name	 was	prominent	 throughout	 the	 proceedings.	 During	 the	 proposition	 for	 the	continuation	of	 the	Empire’s	administration,	Craterus	was,	with	 the	support	of	Meleager,	 named	 as	 prostates	 of	 Philip	 III’s	 empire,574placing	 him,	 at	 least	 in	theory	and	in	light	of	Philip	III’s	inability	to	rule	in	his	own	right,	in	a	position	of	power	 over	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.575	However	 this	 position	was	not	to	be	his	for	long.	Even	before	word	reached	Craterus	of	his	new	office,	the	 situation	 at	Babylon	had	 changed.	 Perdiccas,	 tired	of	Meleager’s	 perceived	interference	 in	 the	 negotiations,	 ordered	 his	 death.	 This	 removed	 him	 as	 a	potential	threat	but	also	meant	that	the	compromise	they	had	reached	was	now	in	 ruins.576	As	 a	 result,	 Craterus	 lost	 his	 position	 as	 regent	 of	 the	 Empire.	Following	Meleager’s	death,	a	new	direction	was	taken.	Perdiccas	assumed	the	
																																																																																																																																																														the	time	immediately	after	Alexander’s	death	that	a	number	of	dispatches	were	sent	 throughout	 the	 empire	 by	 the	 convening	 Diadochoi.	 Though	 it	 must	 be	noted	that	the	placement	in	the	sequence	of	correspondence	of	Perdiccas’	orders	halting	Craterus’	march	west	again	is	not	known.	If	it	did	not	arrive	at	the	same	time	 as	 news	 of	 Alexander’s	 death,	 it	 must	 have	 arrived	 shortly	 thereafter.	Motivation	 for	Perdiccas’	 order	has	been	understood	as	part	of	his	 strategy	 to	win	the	support	of	Antipater.	572	Diod.	 18.4.1;	 Bosworth,	CQ.	21.	 (1971).	 p.	 125;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 98;	Meeus,	
Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	p.	78;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	40.	573	See	below.	574	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.3,	1.4;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	52.	For	details	of	the	office	of	prostates,	see:	Anson,	CP.	87.	(1992).	pp.	38-43.	575	Anson,	 CPh.	 87.	 (1992).	 pp.	 38-43;	 Anson,	Historia.	 58.	 (2009).	 pp.	 280-5;	Anson,	AHB	26.	(2012).	p.	52.	576	Anson,	CPh.	87.	(1992).	p.	42;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	161,	199;	Meeus,	Anc.	Soc.	38.	(2008).	pp.	57-58	
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regency	 himself,577	while	 Craterus	was	 to	 receive	 a	 different,	 less	well-defined	role.	 Along	 with	 Antipater,	 he	 was	 given	 co-command	 of	 affairs	 in	 Europe.578	This	 new	 appointment	 would	 give	 Craterus	 cause	 to	 move	 into	 Europe	 with	haste.	Polyperchon	would	follow,	marking	the	point	at	which	he	would	re-enter	the	European	Sphere	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.	No	mention	of	Polyperchon	is	made	 during	 the	 proceedings	 at	 Babylon.	 Nor	 is	 there	 any	 mention	 of	 the	position	 he	 would	 occupy	 under	 the	 new	 administrative	 regime.	 It	 is	 likely,	however,	 that	 he	 continued	 in	 the	 original	 appointment	 given	 to	 him	 by	Alexander	in	324	as	his	second	in	command	under	Craterus.		Returning	 to	 Craterus	 in	 Cilicia,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 he	 was	 in	 political	 limbo	 after	receiving	 word	 that	 Alexander	 was	 dead,	 news	 that	 halted	 his	 advance	 into	Macedon.	 However	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 his	 position	 was	 not	 substantial	 and	should	not	be	exaggerated.	From	first	meeting,	the	day	after	Alexander’s	death,	to	 final	 agreement	 among	 the	 Diadochoi,	 a	 period	 of	 only	 six	 days	 passed.579	Considering	the	speed	at	which	news	would	be	reaching	him	in	Cilicia,	combined	with	the	time	that	the	settlement	took	to	ratify,	Craterus	would	have	known	of	his	new	office	by	the	end	of	June,	323.		The	 results	 from	 the	 Settlement	 at	 Babylon	 have	 several	 implications	 for	Craterus.	Rather	than	replacing	Antipater	as	ordered	by	Alexander,	he	was	now	required	to	move	into	Greece,	working	in	co-operation	with	Antipater	 in	order	to	manage	affairs	in	Greece	and	Macedon.	While	Craterus	may	have	seen	this	as	a	 slight	 to	his	 standing	 in	 the	Empire,	 he	 seems	 to	have	 accepted	 the	position	without	 complaint.580	Even	 though	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus	 were	 now	 to	 work																																																									577	Diod.	 18.2.2,	 18.3.1,	 18.23.2;	 Anson,	 Historia.	 58.	 (2009).	 p.	 284;	 Meeus,	
Historia.	58.	(2009).	pp.	296-7;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	52.		578	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.7;	cf.	Diod.	18.4.1-6;	Just.	13.4.5;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	81.	579	Curt.	10.10.9;	cf.	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2014).	p.	51;	Bosworth,	2002.	p.	55.	contra	the	account	 found	 in	Aelian	(VH.	12.64),	which	suggest	a	 longer	period	of	 time	for	the	deliberations	to	take	place.	580	Anson	(AHB.	26.	(2014).	p.	52),	states	that	in	addition	to	Craterus’	compliance	with	his	new	position,	he	did	not	view	Perdiccas’	assumption	of	the	regency	of	Macedon	as	an	act	of	usurpation	on	the	part	of	the	new	regents	(cf.	Diod.	18.2.4;	18.3.1.).	
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together,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 Polyperchon	was	 still	 acting	 as	 Craterus’	direct	subordinate.	Additionally,	Craterus’	connection	to	the	dead	Alexander	was	still	 strong.	 He	 was	 the	 last	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 named	 by	 Alexander	 and	Antipater	was	well	aware	of	this.	By	his	compliance,	Craterus	brought	a	sense	of	legitimacy	and	authority	to	Antipater’s	continuation	of	command	in	Macedon.	As	Alexander’s	last	appointed	regent,	Craterus’	willingness	to	work	with	Antipater	would	aid	him	in	maintaining	pro-Antipatrid	garrisons	and	oligarchies	in	Greece.	Craterus’	close	ties	with	the	royals	and	other	groups	sympathetic	to	their	cause	would	also	help	to	mute	any	criticism	from	groups	at	Pella	hostile	to	Antipater.	For	the	time	being,	Antipater’s	position	as	strategos	in	Macedon	was	safe.		Craterus’	appointment	to	Europe	had	given	him	cause	to	resume	his	march	west.	With	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Lamian	 War,	 that	 cause	 was	 exacerbated.	 News	 of	Alexander’s	 demise	 had	 reached	 Europe,	 and	 the	 Greek	 cities	 found	 the	opportune	moment	to	launch	their	revolt	against	Macedonian	hegemony.	Facing	a	 Greek	 revolt	 with	 the	 depleted	 military	 reserve	 resulting	 from	 Alexander’s	campaigns	was	 the	 very	 situation	 Antipater	 had	 feared.	 The	 only	Macedonian	troops	in	the	region	apart	from	the	depleted	supply	in	Macedon	itself,581	were	to	be	 found	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 garrisons	 placed	 by	 Alexander	 and	 Antipater	 in	Greece.	Relocating	the	garrisons	from	relatively	passive	regions	to	more	volatile	areas	was	not	an	appealing	option,	as	this	risked	the	possibility	of	further	unrest	spreading	 throughout	 Greece.	 Antipater	 needed	 to	 react	 quickly,	 and	 knew	external	 help	 would	 be	 required	 if	 Macedonian	 control	 of	 Greece	 was	 to	continue.	As	soon	as	he	learnt	of	Alexander’s	death,	he	dispatched	messengers	to	at	least	two	generals	in	Asia	Minor	who	had	the	potential	to	lend	swift	support,	those	being	Craterus,	and	Leonnatus,	who	received	the	satrapy	of	Hellespontine	Phrygia.582	
	
																																																								581	Adams,	Anc.	Soc.	10.	(1984).	p.	84.	582	Diod.	 18.12.1;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 36.	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 (18.12.1)	makes	 an	error	with	who	occupied	Hellespontine	Phrygia,	stating	that	it	was	Philotas,	not	Leonnatus	 (cf.	 Diod.	 18.16.4;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 36;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2008.	 p.	77.).	
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The	 account	 by	 Diodorus	 suggests	 that	 news	 of	 the	 division	 of	 the	 satrapies	following	the	Settlement	of	Babylon	and	Alexander’s	death	arrived	in	Macedon	at	 the	 same	 time.583	This	would	not	have	been	 the	 case	 and	 is	more	 likely	 the	result	of	a	compression	of	events	in	the	historian’s	narrative.	As	with	Craterus,	Antipater	 would	 have	 learnt	 of	 unfolding	 events	 in	 Babylon	 via	 a	 series	 of	correspondence	 from	 the	 east,	 rather	 than	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 single	messenger.	News	of	Alexander’s	death	would	 force	him	to	 turn	his	attentions	south	 to	 the	Greek	cities,	as	the	potential	of	unrest	was	likely.	As	for	Antipater’s	regency	and	his	replacement	by	Craterus,	the	prospect	of	departing	from	Macedon	before	his	replacement	arrived	with	10,000	soldiers	further	depleting	much	needed	troops,	was	gone.	
	Once	Antipater’s	request	for	aid	reached	Cilicia,	Craterus	began	preparations	to	depart	for	Macedon.584	Anson	has	identified	that	Craterus	could	not,	and	would	not,	 have	 refused	 Antipater.	 Additionally,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 significant	emphasis	 has	 been	 placed	 on	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 slow	 progression	 made	 by	Craterus	 in	 the	 journey	 west	 during	 this	 period. 585 	When	 it	 is	 placed	 in	comparison	 with	 the	 far	 swifter	 response	 to	 the	 uprising	 in	 Greece	 by	Leonnatus,586	Craterus’	own	mission	appears	tardy.	The	cause	of	the	delay	is	not	known	 and	 can	 only	 be	 speculated	 on.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 Craterus	 waited	 in	Cilicia	 to	 assess	how	 the	developing	 situations	would	play	out	 in	Babylon	 and	Macedon.587	Another	 explanation	 for	 Craterus’	 sluggish	 progression	 could	 be	that	 he	 was	 waiting	 to	 gauge	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 support	 offered	 by	Leonnatus	in	relieving	the	besieged	Antipater	in	the	Thessalian	city	of	Lamia.588	There	may	 exist	 elements	 of	 truth	 in	 each	 of	 these	 postulations	 which,	 when	
																																																								583	Diod.	18.12.1.	584	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	55.	585	Ashton,	Makedonia.	5.	(1993).	pp.	127-128;	Anson,	2004.	p.	74;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012),	p.	53;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	&	Baynham,	2015.	p.	109.	586	Leonnatus	 was	 able	 to	 reach	 Antipater	 at	 Lamian	 by	 the	 spring	 of	 322,	several	 months	 ahead	 of	 Craterus,	 who	 achieved	 the	 same	 feat	 during	 the	summer	of	322	(Diod.	18.15.5;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	45,	148.).	587	Heckel,	2006.	p.	98;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	44;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	53.	588	Heckel,	2006.	p.	98.	
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used	in	combination,	can	explain	Craterus’	supposed	slow	progress.589	However,	another	key	 issue	 that	may	have	 factored	aid	 in	Craterus’	 slow	progression	 to	the	Hellespont	requiring	consideration	is	once	again	his	ill	health.		It	 must	 be	 remembered	 that	 it	 took	 Craterus	 and	 his	 forces	 three	 months	 to	make	the	 journey	 from	Babylon	to	Cilicia,	 some	1000	kilometres.	The	distance	between	 Cilicia	 and	 the	 Hellespont	 is	 roughly	 1200-1500	 kilometres,	 which	would	require	around	fifty	to	sixty	days	travel.590	If	Craterus’	slow	progression	to	Cilicia,	which	took	three	months	in	324-323,	was	due	to	his	physical	frailty,	it	is	 possible	 that	 this	 weakness	 may	 have	 continued	 after	 Alexander’s	 death,	necessitating	 a	 greater	 length	 of	 time	 to	 cover	 roughly	 the	 same	 distance	 as	Leonnatus.	 Despite	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 time	 taken	 by	 Craterus	 to	 travel	 any	distance,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	difference	in	his	rate	of	progress	and	that	of	other	travellers	is	not	vast.	
	Craterus	had	returned	to	Macedon	with	Polyperchon	at	his	side	by	the	summer	of	322.591	Prior	to	this	Antipater	had	been	able,	with	the	aid	of	the	forces	led	by	Leonnatus,	to	break	the	siege	of	Lamia	conducted	by	the	Athenians	in	the	spring	of	 the	 same	 year.592	It	 is	 at	 this	 point	 that	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus	 embarked	upon	their	collaborative	endeavours	to	re-establish	Macedonian	hegemony	over	the	 rebelling	 Greek	 city-states.	 Combined,	 their	 forces	 were	 substantial,	numbering,	 if	 Diodorus’	 numbering	 scheme	 can	 be	 trusted	 to	 provide	 any	indication,	some	48,000	men.593	Once	their	forces	had	combined,	the	dynamic	in	the	joint	command	of	Antipater	and	Craterus	changed.	In	order	to	facilitate	more	
																																																								589	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012),	p.	53.	590	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012),	p.	53.	591	Diod.	18.16.4;	Plut.	Phoc.	25.1.	592 	Diod.	 18.15.1-2.	 Somewhat	 conveniently	 for	 Antipater,	 Leonnatus	 had	perished	during	the	fighting	that	had	taken	place	outside	the	city	(Diod.	18.15.3-4;	Plut.	Phoc.	25.3;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	151.)	Not	only	did	this	mean	that	Antipater	had	 one	 fewer	 powerful	 rival	 in	 the	 region	 with	 whom	 he	 would	 need	 to	contend,	 he	was	 able	 to	 absorb	Leonnatus’s	 army	 into	 his	 own	 ranks,	 an	 easy	means	 to	 increase	 his	 limited	 troop	 supply	 (Arr.	 Succ.	 FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.9;	 Just.	13.5.15;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	37.)	593	Diod.	18.16.5;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	97;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	37.	
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effective	 leadership	 of	 the	 combined	Macedonian	 forces	 against	 the	 rebellious	Greek	cities,	Craterus	transitioned	into	a	supporting	role	under	Antipater.	594		This	shift	in	command,	if	it	can	be	defined	as	such,	was	for	pragmatic	reasons.	In	order	 to	 avoid	 confusion	 in	 the	newly	 integrated	Macedonian	 troops,	 a	 clearly	defined	hierarchy	of	command	needed	to	be	established.	It	must	be	remembered	that	 only	 a	 short	 time	had	passed	 since	Craterus,	 presumably	with	 his	 10,000	veterans	 behind	 him,	 had	 arrived.	 Now	 that	 the	 dynamic	 in	 command	 had	shifted,	it	was	essential	to	remove	any	hints	of	dissent	within	the	army	before	it	arose.	It	was	at	this	point	that	Antipater	and	Craterus	began	to	share	control	of	Europe	between	 them,	with	Antipater	 taking	 the	more	 forward	 role.	 This	was	the	most	 practical	 option	 for	 both	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus.	 Antipater	 had	 held	command	of	Greece	and	Macedon	for	more	than	a	decade,	which	afforded	him	a	more	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 political	 environment	 than	 that	available	 to	 Craterus.	 Additionally,	 Antipater	 also	 held	 the	 loyalty	 of	 the	 pro-Macedonian	oligarchies	that	he	had	installed	during	his	time	in	office.	A	change	in	 command	 may	 have	 resulted	 in	 needless	 complications	 for	 Antipater	 and	Craterus	 in	 subduing	 the	 rebellion	 as	 the	 political	 structure	 implemented	 by	Antipater	since	336	were	already	well	established.	While	the	chance	of	the	pro-Macedonian	oligarchies	choosing	to	no	longer	support	Macedon	with	Craterus	as	its	 leader	 in	 Europe	was	 remote,	 particularly	 during	 a	 time	 of	 insurrection,	 it	was	a	possibility	that	could	be	easily	avoided.	For	Craterus,	this	alteration	of	his	role	in	Macedon	was	not	an	issue.	He	was	aware	of	the	need	to	bring	the	Greeks	back	under	control	and	he	accepted	this	secondary	role	under	Antipater	without	apparent	 resentment.	 His	 continued	 ill	 health	 may	 have	 impacted	 on	 his	willingness	 to	 do	 so,	 as	 may	 the	 difference	 in	 age	 between	 the	 two,	 Craterus	being	some	twenty-six	years	younger	than	Antipater.595		With	 Antipater	 freed	 from	 Lamia,	 he	 and	 Craterus	 turned	 their	 attention	 to	tackling	 the	 cities	 individually	 rather	 than	 collectively,	 allowing	 Macedonian																																																									594	Diod.	18.16.5;	Ashton,	Makedonia.	5.	(1993).	p.	129;	Heckel,	2006.	98;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	and	Baynham,	2015.	pp.	111-112.	595	Ashton,	Makedonia.	 5.	 (1993).	 p.	 127;	 Ashton,	 in	 Wheatley	 and	 Baynham,	2015.	p.	109.	
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power	to	come	back	into	effect	more	easily	and	at	a	swifter	pace.	What	followed	shortly	 thereafter	 involved	 the	 pair	 moving	 into	 Thessaly,	 and	 their	 victory	against	the	Greek	at	the	battle	of	Crannon	in	the	middle	of	322.596	The	defeat	of	the	Greeks	at	Crannon	ultimately	led	to	the	capitulation	of	Athens	to	Macedonian	rule.597	One	of	 the	results	of	Macedon’s	 re-subjugation	of	 its	dominance,	 in	 the	case	of	Athens,	was	the	installation	of	the	garrison	at	Munychia,598	which	in	turn	led	 to	 the	Demades	Affair	of	319.599	The	 important	point	 to	be	 taken	 from	this	sequence	 of	 victories	 is	 that	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus	 worked	 well	 together	 in	swiftly	 bringing	 the	 rebellious	 Greeks	 back	 under	 Macedonian	 control,	 a	partnership,	 which	 would	 not	 have	 been	 possible	 without	 a	 close	 and	 co-operative	relationship	between	the	two.	
	In	 order	 to	 further	 strengthen	 the	 already	 close	 ties	 with	 his	 counterpart,	Antipater	entered	into	another	marriage	alliance.	In	much	the	same	manner	as	his	alliance	with	Perdiccas,600	Antipater	chose	another	of	his	daughters,	Phila,	to	wed	Craterus	around	322/1.601	It	is	difficult	to	know	the	early	life	of	Phila.	What	is	 known	 is	 that	 she	 was	 a	 recent	 widow,	 her	 husband,	 the	 satrap	 of	 Cilicia,	Balacrus,	 being	 killed	 in	 324.602	Her	 location	 after	 the	death	 of	Balacrus	 too	 is	unknown	and	can	only	be	speculated	on.	She	may	have	returned	to	Macedon	and	her	 father,	 or	 she	may	have	 remained	 in	Cilicia.	 If	 the	 latter	 is	 true,	 there	 is	 a	possibility	 that	 she	 may	 have	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 Craterus	 during	 his	extensive	 time	 in	 the	 region.	 Though	 the	marriage	 took	 place	 before	 Craterus	entered	 into	Asia	Minor	with	Antipater	 against	 Perdiccas,	 negotiations	 for	 the	alliance	may	have	had	earlier	origins,	possibly	even	during	324,	shortly	after	the																																																									596	Diod.	18.17;	Plut.	Phoc.		26.1;	Plut.	Dem.	28.1;	Plut.	Cam.	19.5;	Pau.	10.3.4;	cf	Arr.	Succ	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.12;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	55;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	46,	147;	Bosworth,	 in	 Palagia	&	Tracy,	 2003.	 p.	 14;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 37.	 The	 suggested	dating	come	from	Plutarch’s	Camillus	 (19.8.)	and	Demosthenes	(28.1.),	with	the	battle	reported	to	have	taken	place	on	7	Metageitnion.	597	Baynham,	in	Palagia	&	Tracy,	2003.	p.	23.	598	Bosworth,	in	Palagia	&	Tracy,	2003.	p.	14.	599	cf.	Ch.	5.1.	pp.	116-119.	600	cf.	Ch.	5.1.	pp.	107-108.	601	Diod.	18.	18.	7;	Carney,	2000.	p.	165;	Dunn	&	Wheatley,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	42.	n.	22;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	208.	602	Diod.	18.	22.	1;	Carney,	2000.	p.	165;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	69,	208.	
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death	of	Balacrus.603	If	discussions	did	begin	not	 long	after	this	death,	 it	would	suggest	that	both	Antipater	and	Craterus	were	willing	to	forge	strong,	long-term	alliances	with	each	other,	even	before	Alexander’s	death.	However,	this	position	is	entirely	based	on	speculation	and	hypothetical	reconstruction	and	while	 the	implications	are	appealing,	they	should	not	be	pressed	beyond	conjecture.		Polyperchon’s	 movements	 during	 the	 Lamian	 War	 are	 not	 referred	 to	 in	 the	ancient	 literary	 corpus,	 however	 his	 participation	 in	 the	 conflict	 itself	 is	most	probable.	It	can	be	assumed	that	he	continued	to	function	in	a	military	capacity	under	 Craterus	 during	 the	 campaign.	 Though	 not	 referred	 to,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	during	 the	 progression	 of	 the	 war,	 Polyperchon	 was	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 his	ability	 to	 Antipater,	 with	whom	 contact	must	 have	 been	made.	 This	 can	 been	drawn	 from	Polyperchon’s	next	 attested	position	which	 took	place	 in	321,	 the	position	in	question	being	the	regency	of	Macedon.604	
	In	order	 to	combat	Perdiccas,	Antipater	and	Craterus	both	 invaded	Asia	Minor	with	 their	 forces.	 From	 there,	 they	would	 divide	 their	 strength	 to	 combat	 the	Perdiccan	 faction.605	As	 with	 his	 original	 appointment	 in	 324	 as	 second	 in	command	 to	 Craterus	 and	 his	 potential	 substitute	 in	 324,	 Polyperchon’s	 first	regency	 was	 not	 an	 arbitrary	 decision.	 While	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that	Polyperchon	had	the	support	of	Craterus	due	to	the	long	career	they	had	shared	together,	Polyperchon	would	not	have	received	the	position	without	Antipater’s	consent.	 For	 Polyperchon	 to	 assume	 a	 caretaker	 role	 in	 the	 regency	 until	 the	return	of	Antipater	and	Craterus,	he	required	their	trust	that	he	was	capable	of	holding	 the	 position.	 The	 Greek	 cities	 had	 only	 recently	 been	 brought	 back	under	Macedonian	 control,	 and	 with	 the	 departure	 of	 a	 significant	 portion	 of																																																									603	While	not	explicitly	stating,	this	is	tentatively	suggested	by	Carney	(2006.	p.	165).	604	Diod.	18.38.6;	Just.	13.6.9;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	167;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227;	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 144;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni	 (2008.	 p.	168),	 notes	 the	 similarity	 between	 Polyperchon’s	 appointment	 to	 the	 regency	and	Antipater’s	own	position	given	to	him	when	Alexander	left	Macedon	in	334,	suggesting,	at	least	hypothetically,	that	Polyperchon	may	have	been	expected	to	engage	with	the	office	in	much	the	same	capacity	as	Antipater	had.	605	Diod.	18.29.6;	Plut.	Eum.	6.4;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	47,	132;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	37,	99.	
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Macedon’s	 military	 reserves	 into	 Asia	 Minor,	 the	 possibility	 of	 further	insurrection	 increased.	 Clearly	 careful	 thought	 had	 gone	 into	 the	 selection	 of	Polyperchon	 to	 manage	 Macedon	 and	 Greece.	 To	 do	 otherwise	 would	 have	demonstrated	extreme	negligence	on	 the	part	of	 the	 two	 strategoi.	The	notion	that	 Polyperchon	 was	 selected	 as	 interim	 regent	 only	 because	 there	 was	 no	other	 alternative	 does	 not	 seem	 likely.	 Antipater	 would	 not	 have	 left	 him	 in	charge	of	the	region	if	he	were	not	confident	of	Polyperchon’s	capacity	to	quell	unrest	from	the	south.	If	there	was	no	faith	in	Polyperchon,	the	display	of	neglect	on	behalf	of	Antipater	and	Craterus	is	profound	and	would	seem	out	of	step	with	the	political	astuteness	that	Antipater	had	demonstrated	throughout	his	career.	More	 likely	 than	 an	 arbitrary	 appointment,	 seemingly	 selected	 at	 random,	Polyperchon’s	 appointment	 as	 regent	 during	 the	 First	 Diadoch	 War	demonstrates	 not	 only	 that	 he	 was	 able	 to	 manage	 the	 position,	 but	 also	 the	favourable	 light	 in	 which	 he	 was	 regarded	 by	 both	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus,	valuing	both	his	political	ability	 to	 run	 the	office	and	his	capacity	 to	engage	 in	military	endeavours	should	the	need	arise.	
	It	was	not	long	before	Polyperchon’s	administration	of	Macedon	and	Greece	was	tested.	 Soon	 after	Antipater	 and	Craterus	had	 crossed	 into	Asia,	 the	Aetolians,	led	 by	 one	 Alexander,606	who	 had	 entered	 into	 an	 alliance	with	 the	 Perdiccan	faction	 against	 Antipatrid	 Macedonian	 hegemony	 in	 Europe,	 began	 to	 agitate	against	the	status	quo	in	Greece	with	a	force	of	roughly	12,500.	The	objective	of	Aetolian	 aggression	was	 to	 distract	 the	 Antipatrid	 forces	 in	 Asia	with	 the	 not	insignificant	 threat	 of	 chaos	 among	 the	 Greek	 cities	 and,	 potentially,	Macedon	itself.607	The	 exact	 result	 the	 Aetolians,	 or	 perhaps	 more	 precisely	 Perdiccas,	wished	to	achieve	beyond	Antipater’s	distraction	is	difficult	to	discern	from	the	brief	 account	 offered	 by	 Diodorus.	 Potentially	 it	 may	 have	 been	 their	 goal	 to	draw	 Antipater	 back	 from	 Asia,	 relieving	 pressure	 on	 Perdicca’s	 main	 ally	 in	Asia,	 Eumenes	 who	 would	 then	 only	 be	 required	 to	 face	 Craterus.608 	The																																																									606	Diod.	18.38.1;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	166.	607 	Diod.	 18.38.1:	 “ἀντιπερισπάσαι	 βουλόμενοι	 τὸν	 Ἀντίπατρον.”;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	166;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227.	608	This	method	or	intent	bears	striking	similarities	to	Cassander’s	first	invasion	of	Macedon,	in	the	summer	of	317.	For	more	on	this	venture,	see	Ch.	7.1.	
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Aetolian	 forces	 began	 by	 besieging	 the	 city	 of	 Amphissia	 in	 Locris	 and	subsequently	moving	into	Thessaly.609		Polyperchon’s	 initial	 reaction	 to	Aetolian	aggression	 is	not	recorded.	However,	Macedonian	forces	were	not	idle	in	confronting	the	insurrection.	The	Aetolians	met	a	Macedonian	army	led	by	Polycles	in	Thessaly.	During	the	ensuing	conflict	both	the	Macedonian	forces	and	its	 leader	were	defeated	and	destroyed	by	the	Greeks.610 	The	 exact	 relationship	 between	 Polyperchon	 and	 Polycles	 is	 not	known.	Polycles	served	as	one	of	Antipater’s	subordinates,611	however	whether	or	not	he	had	been	ordered	to	Thessaly	by	Polyperchon	in	reaction	to	Aetolian	movements	 or	 whether	 he,	 and	 the	 forces	 at	 his	 command,	 were	 already	stationed	in	Thessaly	as	part	of	the	process	to	reinstall	Macedonian	rule	 in	the	wake	of	the	Lamian	War.		While	the	possibility	exists	that	Polyperchon	may	have	dispatched	Polycles	against	the	Aetolians,	what	is	more	certain	is	his	subsequent	reaction	to	the	unrest	in	Greece.	In	order	to	put	an	end	to	Aetolian	insurrection,	Polyperchon	led	a	substantial	Macedonian	army	into	Thessaly.612	Following	his	entry	 into	 Thessalian	 territory,	 Polyperchon’s	 army	 met	 with	 and	 shortly	thereafter	 destroyed	 the	 Greek	 forces,	 now	 led	 by	 the	 Thessalian,	 Menon	 of	Pharsalus.613		Polyperchon’s	 effective	 action	 when	 engaged	 with	 the	 Aetolian	 led	 uprising	demonstrated	 that	 the	 faith	placed	 in	him	by	Antipater	 and	Craterus	was	well																																																									609	Diod.	18.38.3.	610	Diod.	18.38.2;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	166;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	225,	227.	611	Berve,	Vol.	II.	1926.	pp.	324-5;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	225.	612	Diod.	18.38.6.	613	Diod.	18.38.6;	Plut.	Phoc.	25.5;	Heckel,	2006.	pp.	166-7,	227.	It	must	be	stated	here	 that	 the	 Greek	 forces	 were	 significantly	 diminished,	 which	 preceded	Menon’s	 assumption	 of	 command	 of	 the	 Greek	 forces,	 at	 the	 time	 of	Polyperchon’s	 arrival	 in	 Thessaly.	 This	 was	 due	 to	 the	 Aetolian	 forces’s	abandonment	of	Thessaly	and	swift	return	to	Aetolia.	With	the	absence	of	more	than	12,000	men	 from	the	region,	Aetolia	presented	 itself	as	a	 tempting	 target	for	the	Acarnanians,	who	were	hostile	towards	Aetolia.	Diod.	18.38.4;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	167;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227.).	In	response	to	the	attack	on	their	home	soil,	the	Aetolian	departed	from	Thessaly	and	returned	home,	leaving	their	allies	to	face	the	Macedonian	response	alone.	While	the	Greek	strength	had	been	reduced,	 it	 was	 still	 a	 significant	 threat,	 consisting	 of	more	 than	 14,000	men.	(Heckel,	2006.	p.	167,	319.	n.	435;	cf.	Diod.		18.38.1,	18.38.3.).	
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founded.	He	was	able	to	identify	the	threat	presented	by	the	Aetolian	aggression	and	following	the	defeat	of	Polycles,	he	personally	engaged	with	the	Greek	forces	and	destroyed	 them.	This	engagement	would	have	provided	Antipater	with	an	understanding	 of	 how	 Polyperchon	 could	 manage	 the	 position	 of	 regent	folllwing	his	decision	to	name	him	as	his	successor	in	319.		Polyperchon’s	ability	to	manage	 the	 regency	 in	 his	 own	 right	 was	 also	 a	 quality	 already	 known	 to	Antipater,	due	to	 the	effective	administration	of	 the	office	during	the	time	that	he	held	 the	position.	Because	of	 this,	Antipater	may	have	seen	 the	selection	of	Polyperchon	 as	 a	 more	 secure	 choice	 than	 the	 comparatively	 younger	Cassander.	 Little	 information	 exists	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 first	regency.	What	can	be	understood	is	that	his	time	as	interim	regent	in	the	stead	of	Antipater	and	Craterus	was	short-term,	limited	to	the	point	at	which	the	two	
strategoi	returned	to	Macedon	and	the	conflict	conducted	against	Perdiccas	and	his	 supporters.	 The	 shared	 regency	 of	 Craterus	 and	 Antipater	 was	 not	 to	 be	resumed	 on	 their	 return.	 Craterus	 would	 not	 survive	 the	 First	 Diadoch	 War,	dying	as	the	result	of	a	falling	form	his	horse	while	engaged	against	the	forces	of	Eumenes	near	the	Hellespont.614	This	resulted	in	Antipater	taking	sole	command	as	 regent	 in	Europe	upon	his	 return	 to	Macedon	with	Cassander	 following	 the	proceedings	of	the	Settlement	of	Triparadisus	in	320.615		What	 can	 be	 understood	 from	 later	 events,	 exemplified	 by	 Antipater’s	 role	 of	authority	 during	 the	 Demades	 Affair,	 is	 that	 the	 transition	 of	 power	 from	Polyperchon	 back	 to	 Antipatrid	 hands	was	 smooth	 and	 effective.	 Polyperchon	does	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 unwilling	 and	 following	 the	 results	 from	Triparadisus,	which	officially	placed	Antipater	in	command	of	Europe,	it	can	be	assumed	that	the	regency	reverted	to	Antipater	without	complaint.	This	ease	in	transition	 is	 reinforced	 by	 Polyperchon’s	 ultimate	 selection	 as	 Antipater’s	successor	 in	319.	 If	problems	had	arisen	after	Antipater’s	 return,	he	may	have	
																																																								614	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	1.27;	Diod.	18.30.5;	Nepos,	Eum.	4.3-4;	Plut.	Eum.	7.6;	Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 133;	 Baynham,	 in	 Worthington,	 1994.	 p.	 352;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	146;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	99;	For	more	on	 the	 implications	 that	Craterus’	death	had	on	Antipater	as	well	as	Polyperchon,	see	Ch.	5.3.	615	cf.	Ch.	5.1.	p.	118.	
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been	given	cause	to	seek	an	alternative	to	Polyperchon	during	his	final	months	as	regent.	
	Polyperchon’s	 defeat	 of	 the	 rebellious	 Greek	 cities	 during	 his	 brief	 tenure	 as	regent	 is	 the	 last	 explicit	 reference	 made	 to	 his	 activities	 prior	 to	 his	appointment	to	the	regency	after	Antipater’s	death	in	319.	His	absence	from	the	literary	record	could	be	seen	as	a	critique	of	his	brief	regency	or	of	his	position	in	 the	 court	 following	 the	First	Diadoch	War.	However,	Polyperchon’s	absence	from	the	records	should	be	seen	as	simply	that,	an	absence.	In	what	capacity	he	continued	 during	 the	 period	 after	 320,	 through	 Cassander’s	 management	 of	Antipater’s	 office	 during	 the	 regent’s	 declining	 health	 can	 only	 be	 left	 to	unsupported	speculation.		During	 the	 years	 between	 324	 and	 321,	 Polyperchon’s	 career	 was	 extricably	linked	 to	 that	 of	 Craterus.	 Craterus’	 connection	 to	 Alexander	 and	 his	 royally	backed	position	needs	to	be	extended	to	Polyperchon.	Craterus’	health	was	still	questionable,	and	Polyperchon	would	need	to	be	close	to	his	side	should	he	be	unable	 to	 continue	 in	 his	 role,	 now	as	 co-strategos	 of	 Europe.	 The	 association	between	 Polyperchon	 and	 the	 royal	 Argead	 authority	 that	 Craterus	 embodied	would	 have	 an	 effect	 upon	 Antipater’s	 decision	 to	 name	 Polyperchon	 as	 his	successor	 in	 319.	 Polyperchon	 continued	 to	 follow	 his	 commander	 from	 his	position	 in	 Cilicia	 into	 the	 Macedonian	 Homeland	 when	 word	 from	 Antipater	reached	the	pair	following	the	outbreak	of	the	Lamian	War	when	Alexander	III’s	death	 became	 known	 throughout	 the	 empire.	 Once	 in	Macedon,	 and	with	 the	Greek	uprising	subdued,	little	is	known	of	Polyperchon’s	role.	However,	drawing	on	 his	 appointment	 to	 the	 interim	 regency	 once	 the	 tensions	 between	 the	Diadochoi	 turned	 violent	 in	 321,	 Polyperchon	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 respected	 and	capable	military	 and	 political	 figure,	 able	 to	manage	Europe	 in	 the	 absence	 of	both	Antipater,	Craterus	and	the	military	forces	under	their	command.	The	trust	placed	in	Polyperchon	by	the	regents	was	rewarded,	as	soon	after	the	Aetolian	uprising,	 the	 interim	 regent	 was	 able	 to	 put	 down	 the	 hostile	 Greek	 forces	without	 the	 requirement	 of	 reinforcement	 of	 the	 occupied	 Antipater	 and	Craterus.	
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5.3:	The	Successor	of	Antipater	–	Cassander	or	Polyperchon.	
	If	Diodorus’	evaluation	of	Antipater’s	ailment	as	being	one	that	usually	results	in	death	for	the	elderly	can	be	trusted,616	then	the	regent	would	have	been	aware	that	 his	 death	 was	 likely.	 This	 in	 turn	 must	 have	 made	 the	 question	 of	 his	successor	foremost	in	his	mind.	As	has	been	discussed,	the	most	practical	option	present	 for	Antipater	 in	319,	was	either	Polyperchon	or	Cassander.	Both	these	men	 had	 already	 demonstrated	 their	 abilities	 in	 managing	 the	 regency,	Polyperchon	 during	 the	 events	 of	 the	 First	 Diadoch	War	 when	 Antipater	 and	Craterus	 had	 entered	 Asia	 Minor,	 and	 Cassander	 during	 the	 final	 months	 of	Antipater’s	life.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	choice	might	be	seen	as	a	false	 dichotomy,	 excluding	 other	 options	 that	 may	 have	 been	 considered	 by	Antipater.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 neither	 Polyperchon	 nor	 Cassander	 were	Antipater’s	original	choice	as	successor	to	the	regency	of	Macedon.		While	 it	 is	 not	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 investigation	 to	 engage	 in	 constructions	 of	alternate	 histories	 based	 on	 either	 actively	manipulating	 or	 ignoring	 previous	events,	 if	 Craterus	 had	 not	 died	 in	 321,	 the	 quandary	 of	 who	 would	 become	Antipater’s	 successor	 would	 have	 been	 rendered	 moot.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 two	officially	appointed	commanders	of	Macedon	during	the	Settlement	of	Babylon,	it	 is	safe	 to	assume	that	Craterus	was	 the	obvious	choice	as	 the	next	regent	 to	succeed	Antipater.		This	 section	 of	 investigation	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 death	 of	Craterus	in	321	appears	on	Antipater’s	approach	of	a	successor	of	his	position	as	regent	of	Macedon.	It	is	not	possible,	given	the	severe	lack	of	available	evidence	to	 postulate	 on	 Antipater’s	 thought	 processes	 regarding	 the	 reasons	 why	 he	deemed	Polyperchon	 a	more	 suitable	 successor	 to	 the	 position	 of	 strategos	 in	Europe	 over	 Cassander,	 though	 it	 is	 a	 safe	 assumption	 on	 the	 ground	 of	Antipater’s	 long	 career	 and	 understanding	 of	 political	 machinations	 that	 the	decision	 was	 not	 made	 in	 haste	 or	 without	 proper	 consideration	 that	 the																																																									616	Diod.	18.48.1.	Antipater	was	well	into	his	seventies	by	319,	easily	placing	him	into	Diodorus’	age	bracket	(γήρως).	
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important	 office	 requires.	 Given	 this	 dearth	 of	 information,	 Polyperchon’s	promotion	from	whatever	office	he	occupied	prior	to	Antipater’s	death,	if	indeed	he	 occupied	 one,	 are	 impossible	 to	 know.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	interesting	 consequences	 that	 resulted	 from	 Antipater’s	 choice	 declaration	 of	Polyperchon	as	 the	succeeding	strategos	and	Cassander	as	chiliarch	 that	at	 the	very	 least,	 suggest	 Antipater	 expressing	 the	 desire	 to	 mating	 the	 integrity	 of	Macedonian	 power	 structures	 in	 Europe	 and	 further	 throughout	 the	 Empire	itself.	 From	 the	 position	 of	 hindsight,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 see	 that	 Antipater’s	 choice	failed	in	this	regard,	but	from	the	perspective	of	319,	this	is	not	as	evident	as	it	now	 appears.	 This	 section	 which	 follows	 concludes	 discussion	 of	 the	relationship	 between	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus,	 the	 factors	 impacting	 on	 the	choice	 of	 Polyperchon	 as	 regents	 and	 lays	 the	 groundwork	 for	 the	 coming	conflict	between	Polyperchon	and	Cassander.		After	 the	 Settlement	of	Babylon	was	 approved,	 the	dynamic	between	Craterus	and	 Antipater	 changed.	 Instead	 of	 one	 replacing	 the	 other,	 they	 became	colleagues.617 	The	 appointment	 brought	 stability	 to	 Antipater’s	 standing	 in	Macedon,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 suppressing	 the	 continued	 tensions	between	 himself	 and	 Olympias.	 Craterus,	 as	 the	 last	 regent	 appointed	 by	Alexander	 before	 his	 death,	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 having	 Argead	 authority	 and	Antipater	would	have	known	this.	Evidence	for	correspondence	or	other	explicit	interaction	 between	 Craterus	 and	Olympias	 does	 not	 exist.	 However,	 it	 is	 still	possible	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 royal	mother	was	 positively	 disposed	 to	working	with	 the	 newly	 appointed	 regent.	 As	 previously	 examined,	 Antipater’s	replacement	by	Alexander	with	Craterus	was	 the	 result	of	 a	 series	of	 requests	made	by	Olympias,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 result	 of	 any	personal	 animosity	between	Antipater	 and	 the	 king.	 Craterus’	 standing	 in	 the	Macedonian	 Court	 as	 one	 of	Alexander’s	most	 loyal	 supporters	 and	 friends618	suggests	 that,	 once	 given	 the	regency,	Craterus	would	be	able	to	represent	Argead	interests	in	Macedon.	This	was	 the	 exact	 reason	 the	 influence	 of	 Olympias	 had	 been	 suppressed	 during																																																									617	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	pp.	135-136.	618	cf.	 Plut.	Alex.	 47.10;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 107;	 Ashton,	Makedonia.	 5.	 (1993).	 p.	126;	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	49;	Ashton,	in	Wheatley	and	Baynham,	2015.	p.	111.	
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Antipater’s	regency,	 leading	to	her	desire	 for	a	new	regent	 to	be	 installed.619	It	must	be	noted	that	neither	the	ability	of	Craterus	to	represent	an	Argead	voice	in	the	court	at	Macedon,	nor	his	 links	 to	 the	royal	 family	ended	with	Alexander’s	death	in	323.	These	connections	to	Alexander’s	original	appointment	in	324	and	the	authority	it	carried	were	significant	factors	that	stayed	with	Craterus	for	the	remainder	of	 his	 life	 as	 they	would	 affect,	 and	be	 exploited	by,	 both	Olympias	and	Antipater.	
	As	 Carney	 correctly	 highlights,620	the	 primary	 concern	 of	 Olympias,	 after	 her	son’s	death	 in	323,	was	 the	welfare	of	her	grandson,	Alexander	 IV.	 In	order	 to	secure	 some	 influence	over	her	grandson’s	welfare,	 she	would	need	 to	engage	with	members	 of	 the	Diadochoi	who	held	 a	 pro-Argead	position.	One	of	 those	would	 have	 been	 the	 Macedonian	 patriot,	 Craterus.621	At	 the	 same	 time	 she	attempted	 to	 extend	her	 influence	 into	Babylon	 through	her	 relationship	with	Perdiccas,	in	another	attempt	to	subvert	Antipater’s	influence.		In	 addition	 to	 fulfilling	 Olympias’	 desire	 for	 greater	 Argead	 representation	within	the	court	at	Macedon,	Craterus	may	have	been	able	to	ingratiate	himself	with	 the	royal	mother	via	an	 intermediary.	The	most	 likely	person	to	 facilitate	this	was	Eumenes	of	Cardia.	Eumenes	had	maintained	close	ties	with	Olympias	since	 his	 time	 as	 Philip	 II’s	 servant	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 Court,622	and	 has	been	 aptly	 described	 as	 “…a	 lifelong	 supporter	of	 the	 royal	 family.”623	Eumenes	was	 also	 well	 acquainted	 with	 Craterus.	 Although	 they	 would	 become	adversaries	during	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi,	a	friendship	between	the	two	had	been	forged	during	Alexander’s	life.624	These	factors	suggest	that	Olympias	would	have	welcomed	the	news	that	a	pro-Argead	regent	had	been	installed	in	Macedon,	one	who	could	act	as	a	potential	and	very	powerful	ally.	
																																																									619	cf.	Ch.	3.	p.	72;	Carney,	2000.	p.	88.	620	Carney,	2006.	pp.	70-71.	621	Anson,	AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	57.	622	Diod.	18.58.1-4;	Plut.	Eum.	1.1-2;	Nepos.	Eum.	13.1;	Anson,	2004.	pp.	35-37;	Carney,	2006.	p.	54,	70-1.	623	Heckel,	2006.	p.	120.	624	cf.	Diod.	19.59.3;	Plut.	Eum.	5.6,	7.12;	Nepos.	Eum.	4.4;	Anson,	2004.	p.	47.	
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For	Polyperchon,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	same	 favour	 that	Olympias	and	her	supporters	 extended	 to	 Craterus	 would	 extend	 to	 him.	 Certainly	 if	 he	 was	intended	as	a	potential	substitute	for	Craterus	as	Alexander	had	wished	in	324,	he	would	share	the	same	affiliations	to	which	his	superior	had	access.	The	pro-Argead	 bias	 of	 Polyperchon	 prior	 to	 319	 has	 been	 tentatively	 suggested	 by	Carney.625	It	 should	 be	 noted	 however,	 that	 Carney’s	 proposal	 is	 based	 upon	Polyperchon’s	 later	 efforts	 to	 align	 himself	 with	 the	 royal	 family	 after	Alexander’s	 death	 and	 once	 hostilities	 had	 begun	 with	 Cassander.	 If	Polyperchon’s	appointment	in	324	is	taken	into	consideration	however,	further	support	for	the	possibility	that	Olympias	and	Polyperchon	could	work	together	can	be	considered.	 It	should	be	noted	however	that,	after	319,	Olympias	seems	to	have	been	unsure	of	 the	 intentions	of	Polyperchon.	 She	 consulted	Eumenes	who	 urged	 caution	 in	 her	 interactions	 with	 Polyperchon,	 advice	 that	 may	 be	connected	with	Polyperchon’s	unattested	campaign	into	Asia	Minor.626		It	should	also	be	remembered	that	although	Craterus	was	pro-Argead,	this	does	not	mean	that	 he	would	 automatically	 agree	with	 and	 support	Olympais.	 Craterus	 could	represent	Argead	interests	without	elevating	her	within	the	court,	an	approach	to	the	royal	mother	that	would	have	found	favour	with	Antipater.		Antipater	would	have	been	well	aware	of	the	Pro-Argead	stance	of	the	returning	Craterus,	 and	 following	 the	Settlement	of	Babylon	and	 their	 joint-appointment	to	the	regency	of	Macedon,	he	would	begin	to	cement	ties	with	his	counterpart.	By	 doing	 so,	 Antipater	 would	 minimise	 the	 criticism	 from	 his	 detractors,	reaffirming	 his	 position	 in	Macedon.	Once	 Craterus	 had	 returned	 to	Macedon,	and	 the	 turmoil	 among	 the	 Greek	 cities	 resulting	 from	 the	 Lamian	 War	 was	suppressed,	 Antipater	 intensified	 his	 efforts	 to	 build	 a	 close	 relationship	with	Craterus.	 In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 this	 end,	 he	 facilitated	 the	marriage	 alliance	between	Phila,	his	daughter,	and	his	younger	colleague.627		
																																																								625	Carney,	2006.	p.	54.	626	cf.	Ch.	7.1.	627	Diod.	18.18.7;	Memnon,	FGrH.	434.	F.	4.4;	Plut.	Demetr.	14.2;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	131;	Carney,	2000.	p.	165.	
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The	 alliance	was	 no	 doubt	 important	 for	 Antipater	 to	 establish,	 but	 it	 is	 clear	that	Craterus	also	placed	significant	 importance	upon	 it.	This	 is	evident	by	his	willingness	 to	 separate	 from	 his	 current	 wife	 Amastris	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 the	integration	between	 the	 families	 to	occur.628	Craterus	had	married	Amastris	 in	324	at	Susa,	as	part	of	Alexander’s	series	of	marriages	between	his	companions	and	 noble	 Persian	 and	 Mede	 women.	 At	 this	 time	 Craterus	 was	 married	 to	Stateira,	a	marriage	that	was	dissolved	to	allow	the	new	alliance	encouraged	by	Alexander.629	The	divorce	between	Craterus	and	Amastris	took	place	in	late	322,	just	prior	his	marriage	to	Phila,630	suggesting	that	there	was	only	a	brief	interval	before	Craterus	took	Antipater’s	daughter	as	his	wife.631	The	role	of	marriage	as	a	means	 of	 creating	 and	maintain	 strategic	 alliances	 is	 clear,	 but	 the	 question	remains	of	what	Craterus	had	 to	gain	 from	this	most	 recent	marriage.	That	he	was	content	 in	his	marriage	 to	Amestris	and	was	concerned	 for	her	welfare	 is	suggested	 by	 his	 willingness	 to	 allow	 her	 to	 remarry.	 Amestris	 was	 the	 wife	given	 Craterus	 by	 Alexander;	 the	 benefits	 to	 come	 from	 the	 alliance	 with	 the	family	of	Antipater	through	marriage	must	have	been	regarded	as	significant	for	Craterus	to	end	a	marriage	supported	by	the	recently	deceased	Alexander	III.	It	is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	 Craterus	was	 not	 a	 passive	 object	 upon	whom	Antipater	was	 exerting	pressure;	 he	was	 also	 active	 in	 the	 continuing	play	 for	power.		Though	part	 of	 Antipater’s	 greater	 efforts	 to	 establish	marriage	 alliances	with	various	 members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 one	 aspect	 of	 this	 endeavour	 to	 be	highlighted	is	the	intention	by	the	regent	to	create	strong	alliances	covering	an	extended	 period	 of	 time.	While	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Perdiccas’	 intended	marriage	 to	Nicaea	 this	was	 an	 abject	 failure	 that	 resulted,	 in	 part,	 to	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	First	War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 in	 322,	 the	marriage	 alliances	 themselves	 imply	 a	desire	to	 forge	amicable	relations	not	 just	 for	the	 immediate	period	thereafter,																																																									628	Memnon,	FGrH	434.	F.	4.4;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	21.	629	Arr.	7.4.4-6;	Diod.	20.109.7;	Memnon,	FGrH.	434.	F.	4.4;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	21.		630	Heckel,	2006.	p.	21.	631	Amastris	 was	 allowed	 by	 Craterus	 to	 marry	 one	 Dionysius	 of	 Heraclea	(Memnon,	 FGrH.	 434.	 F.	 4.4;	 Strab.	 12.3.10;	 Step.	 Byz.	 s.v.	 “Amastris”),	 which	implies	that	there	was	little	animosity	or	hostility	between	Craterus	and	his	now	former	wife.	
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but	 for	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 time.	 To	 this	 end	 Craterus	 appears	 ready	 and	willing	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 arrangement	with	Antipater,	 and	a	 long-term	alliance	between	the	pair	was	created	in	322.		There	 were	 several	 benefits	 for	 Craterus	 resulting	 from	 the	 alliance	 with	Antipater.	 He	 was	 more	 than	 a	 passive	 participant	 in	 the	 arrangement,	 but	actively	 contributed	 to	 creating	 the	 bonds	 with	 the	 Antipatrid	 house.	 The	marriage	 itself	would	 facilitate	 a	 close	bond	between	 the	 two	 strategoi,	 easing	the	management	of	Greece	and	Macedon.	Additionally,	the	possibility	of	Craterus	assuming	 the	 regency	 if	 his	 father-in-law	 died	 is	 substantial.	 The	 most	 likely	choice	for	the	regency	if	one	of	the	two	strategoi	were	to	die	in	office,	would	be	for	the	other	to	assume	the	office	in	full.	Given	that	this	is	exactly	what	happened	when	 Craterus	 died,	 it	 seems	 feasible	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 opposite	 may	 have	occurred	if	the	fortunes	of	the	two	men	had	been	different.	If	no	benefit	existed	for	 Craterus	 in	 marrying	 Philia,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 why	 the	 powerful	 and	popular	general	would	choose	his	course	of	action.	To	see	Craterus	as	a	passive	actor	after	the	death	of	Alexander,	one	helplessly	manipulated	by	the	scheming	Antipater,	would	 be	 to	 ignore	 or	 dismiss	 Craterus’	 long	 career	 in	Macedonian	politics	since	the	initiation	of	Alexander’s	expansion	east	in	334.			Antipater’s	reaffirmation	to	the	regency	of	Macedon,	albeit	with	the	addition	of	a	friendly	Craterus	would	not	have	been	welcome	news	to	Olympias.	Despite	her	efforts	to	remove	a	significant	political	adversary	from	Macedon,	and	seemingly	succeeding	 in	 this	 endeavour	 after	 years	 of	 self-imposed	 exile	 in	 Epirus,	 the	Settlement	 of	 Babylon	 dashed	 any	 hope	 she	 had	 of	 returning	 to	 Pella	 while	Antipater	 still	 lived.	 For	 the	 foreseeable	 future,	 Olympias	would	 remain	 away	from	Macedon.		Plans	 are	 not	 always	 realised	 and	 the	 death	 of	 Craterus	 in	 321	 while	 on	campaign	 in	Asia	Minor	dashed	any	 further	plans	Antipater	had	 for	him.	With	one	regent	dead,	the	other	assumed	the	regency	of	Macedon	in	full.	Antipater’s	hold	on	Europe	was	confirmed	shortly	after	the	conclusion	of	the	First	Diadoch	War	 at	 the	 council	 of	 Triparadisus	 in	 321.	 If	 fortunes	 were	 different,	 and	
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Antipater	had	died	during	the	conflict,	 it	 is	inviting	to	entertain	the	notion	that	Craterus	would	have	received	the	same	treatment.	The	death	of	Craterus	could	be	 initially	 seen	 as	 advantageous	 to	 Antipater,	 as	 it	 removed	 a	 popular	 and	powerful	 potential	 rival	 for	 him	 to	 contend	with	 in	 the	 post-323	Macedonian	Empire.		There	does	however	exist	an	issue	with	the	interpretation	that	Antipater	would	have	 welcomed	 this	 death,	 in	 that	 the	 significant	 problem	 that	 had	 plagued	Antipater’s	 regency	 since	 331	 would	 now	 re-emerge,	 that	 of	 pro-Argead	supporters	spearheaded	most	notably	by	Olympias.	Craterus	had	brought	a	brief	measure	 of	 security	 to	 Antipater’s	 position	 due	 to	 his	 popularity	 within	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	 and	 his	 connections	 to	 Alexander	 that	 would	 placate	 the	concerns	of	Argead	under-representation	in	the	court	at	Macedon	as	well	as	help	alleviate	the	anti-Antipatrid	sentiment	in	Greece.	With	Craterus	gone,	Antipater	would	 once	 again	 have	 to	 contend	 with	 his	 lack	 of	 popularity	 in	 Greece,	 a	problem	that	had	been	 festering	 throughout	his	 tenure.	He	would	also	need	to	confront	 the	difficult	 issue	 of	 considering	who	would	be	 best	 to	 take	 over	 the	position	of	regent	in	his	stead.	With	his	failing	health,	in	319,	Antipater	would	be	required	to	find	another	candidate	for	his	office.	
	After	Alexander’s	death,	Antipater	had	actively	engaged	in	preventing	members	of	 the	 Diadochoi	 from	 seizing	 the	 throne	 of	 Macedon	 for	 themselves.	 When	Perdiccas	accepted	the	offer	made	to	him	by	Olympias	 to	marry	Cleopatra,	 the	sister	of	Alexander	the	Great,	he	would	enter	the	royal	house,	a	decision	which	cost	him	his	alliance	with	Antipater.	As	the	custodian	of	the	two	kings,	Philip	III	and	 Alexander	 IV,	 and	 the	 supposed	 recipient	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	 royal	signet	ring	during	the	king’s	final	days,632	Perdiccas	was	well	positioned	to	seize	the	throne	of	Macedon	for	himself,	a	situation	familiar	to	that	presented	to	Philip	II	in	359	during	his	successor	usurpation	of	the	monarchy.633	As	one	of	Philip’s																																																									632	Curt.	10.5.4,	10.6.4,	10.6.17;	Diod.	17.117.3,	18.2;	Heidl.	Epit.	FGrH.	155.	F.1.2;	Just.	 12.15.12;	 Nepos,	 Eum.	2.1;	 LM.	112;	 cf.	 Wheatley,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	Anson,	2013.	p.	24.	633	cf.	 Ath.	 13.557B;	 Diod.	 16.1.3,	 2.1;	 Just.	 7.5.9-19;	 Griffith,	 in	 Hammond	 &	Griffith,	1979.	pp.	699-701;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	208.	
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closest	 advisors,	 Antipater	 would	 have	 been	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	aspirations	for	the	throne	being	held	by	Perdiccas.	Once	his	intention	to	marry	Cleopatra	 became	known,	Antipater	 and	his	 allies	 sought	 to	 remove	Perdiccas	from	power.		By	not	only	engaging	in	the	effort	to	halt	the	expansion	of	Perdiccan	power,	but	in	 fact	 leading	the	cause,	Antipater’s	action	may	be	viewed	as	an	expression	of	his	desire	 to	maintain	 the	 integrity	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire	 in	322,	 the	year	after	Alexander’s	death.	For	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	the	fracturing	of	the	Empire,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 would	 not	 be	 tolerated.	 Once	 the	 Settlement	 of	Triparadisus	 had	 concluded,	 Philip	 III	 and	 Alexander	 IV	 were	 both	 relocated	back	 to	 Macedon	 and	 placed	 under	 Antipater’s	 authority. 634 	While	 the	dissolution	of	the	Empire	itself	was	well	underway,	officially	the	Diadochoi	were	ostensibly	operating	in	a	caretaker	capacity	until	either	Philip	III	or	Alexander	IV	could	 rule	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 an	 open	 ruse	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 defended	 and	upheld	 if	 it	was	 to	work.	During	 this	 time,	 the	 regent	made	no	attempt	on	 the	throne	nor	did	he	engage	in	any	overtly	monarchical	acts.			Regardless	of	why	Antipater	chose	Polyperchon	of	over	Cassander,	the	death	of	Craterus	 in	 321	 forced	 Antipater	 to	 find	 a	 new	 heir	 apparent.	 With	Polyperchon’s	 promotion	 to	 control	 of	 Macedon,	 European	 affairs	 and	 the	Argead	family	and	the	apparent	slight	 that	 it	showed	Cassander,	 the	stage	was	now	 set	 the	 forthcoming	 conflict	 in	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	Empire,	with	Cassander	wasting	little	time	in	readying	himself	against	the	new	regent.				
	
	
																																																								634	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	 156.	 F.	 1.42,	1.44,	1.45;	Heidl.	Epit.	FGrH.	 155.	 F.	 2.1;	Diod.	18.39.7;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	18,	52;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	180-181.		
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Chapter	6:	‘Cry	Havoc!,	and	let	slip	the	dogs	of	war’:	319	–	318.	
	This	chapter	is	devoted	to	the	initial	stages	of	the	conflict	between	Polyperchon	and	 Cassander,	 following	 the	 death	 of	 Antipater	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 319	concluding	 with	 the	 defeat	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 fleet	 during	 a	 series	 of	 naval	conflicts	that	took	place	near	Byzantium	in	the	summer	of	318.	In	order	to	cover	this	period,	the	chapter	is	divided	into	two	separate	sections.	The	first	discusses	the	 immediate	 responses	 by	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 to	 the	 decision	made	 by	 Antipater	 prior	 to	 his	 death	 and	 the	 actions	 each	 man	 undertook	thereafter.		It	 is	 with	 these	 initial	 actions	 and	 reactions	 that	 distinct	 differences	 begin	 to	emerge	 between	 the	 methods	 of	 building	 support	 used	 by	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon.	 Cassander,	 as	 Polyperchon’s	 subordinate,	 did	 not	 accept	 the	position	 given	 to	 him	 by	 Antipater.	 Shortly	 after	 his	 father’s	 death,	 Cassander	fled	 from	Macedon	 for	 Asia	 Minor	 and	 the	 court	 of	 Antigonus.	 From	 here	 he	began	his	efforts	to	build	a	base	of	support	for	his	return	to	Europe.	Cassander’s	allies	 came	 from	 two	 main	 groups,	 the	 pro-Macedonian	 oligarchies	 installed	during	 Antipater’s	 tenure	 from	 which	 he	 could	 draw	 upon	 his	 familial	connections	 for	 support,	 and	 several	members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi.	 In	 particular	Cassander	sought	and	received	support	from	Lysimachus	in	Thrace,	Ptolemy	in	Egypt	and	most	notably	from	Antigonus	in	Asia	Minor.	These	two	groups	would	form	 the	 core	 of	 Cassandrean	 support	 in	 the	 conflict	 against	 Polyperchon.	 A	group	conspicuously	absent	from	Cassander’s	base	of	supporters	in	the	struggle	for	domination	in	Greece	and	Macedon	was	the	royal	family.	At	no	point	during	this	period	of	time	did	Cassander	make	any	effort	to	win	the	favour	of	the	royal	family,	rather	choosing	to	actively	distance	himself	from	Argead	support.		Following	Antipater’s	death,	Polyperchon	began	his	 regency	 in	much	 the	same	way	 as	 Craterus	 may	 have	 done	 had	 he	 survived	 to	 take	 the	 position.	 Given	Polyperchon’s	 original	 appointment	 as	 Craterus’	 second	 in	 command	 it	 is	 not	unexpected	that	his	approach	to	leadership	would	be	similar.	As	guardian	of	the	kings,	 Polyperchon	 chose	 to	 align	 himself	 with	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 their	
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supporters	as	closely	as	he	could.	With	royal	backing	leading	to	legitimisation	of	his	authority,	Polyperchon	could	then	continue	to	wield	significant	power	within	the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 Though	 Cassander	 chose	 to	find	a	substantial	portion	of	his	support	from	various	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	Polyperchon	 would	 only	 engage	 with	 those	 who	 still	 maintained	 Argead	sympathies,	 such	 as	 Eumenes.	 Having	 Eumenes	 as	 a	 supporter	would	 provide	several	 advantages	 for	 Polyperchon’s	 position	 in	 319.	 It	would	 aid	 in	 keeping	Antigonus	occupied	in	Asia	Minor	and	out	of	Europe	and,	more	significantly	for	Polyperchon’s	 regency,	 Eumenes’	 favour	 would	 aid	 in	 creating	 and	strengthening	 ties	 with	 Olympias,	 ties	 which	 would	 ultimately	 result	 in	facilitation	of	her	return	to	Macedon	in	317.		While	 Cassander	 would	 seek	 alliances	 with	 the	 oligarchies	 of	 Greece,	Polyperchon	went	to	great	effort	to	undermine	these	groups	via	implementation	of	 the	 Exiles	 Decree	 initially	 proposed	 by	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 in	 324.	Proclamation	of	this	decree	had	been	delayed	due	to	the	possibility	of	increasing	unrest	 that	 the	 return	of	 these	 exiles	 could	mean	 for	Antipatrid	 control	 of	 the	region	 but	 it	was	 ultimately	 proclaimed,	 though	 not	 enacted,	 by	 Antipater.	 By	using	 his	 influence	with	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 implementing	 the	 proclamation,	thereby	 allowing	 the	 return	 of	 the	 exiles,	 Polyperchon	 simultaneously	undermined	Cassander’s	oligarchic	supporters	and	attracted	sympathy	from	the	cities	themselves.		The	 second	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 engages	with	 the	movements	 of	 Cassander	and	 Polyperchon	 once	 hostilities	 began	 between	 the	 two	 during	 the	 Second	Diadoch	War.	The	changeover	of	power	following	the	death	of	such	a	powerful	figure	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 brought	 with	 it	 an	 expectation	 of	 conflict,	violence	 and	 death.635	Macedonian	 succession	 was	 rarely	 a	 straightforward	process,	and	 the	period	 that	 followed	Antipater’s	death	was	no	exception.	 It	 is	clear	 that	 Cassander	 did	 not	 accept	 his	 father’s	 arrangements,636	and	 shortly																																																									635	cf.	Ch.	3.	pp.	56-58.	636	Diod.	18.49.1;	cf.	Plut.	Phoc.	31.1-2;	Fortina,	1965.	p.	24;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	193-194;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	39;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	215;	Heckel,	
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after	Antiaper’s	death,	he	began	 to	 lay	 the	groundwork	 for	a	 future	attempt	 to	seize	power	in	Macedon.637	
	
6.1	Cassander	319	
	Plutarch’s	 Phocion	 conveys	 some	 of	 Cassander’s	 first	 activities	 in	 the	 late	summer	 of	 319,638	which	were	 designed	 to	 effect	 greater	 influence	within	 the	European	Sphere	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.	These	included	the	dispatching	of	Nicanor	 to	 Athens,	 replacing	 Menyllus	 as	 the	 commander	 of	 the	 garrison	 at	Munychia.639	This	 departure	 took	 place	 almost	 immediately	 after	 Antipater’s	death	 and	Nicanor	must	have	 travelled	with	 speed	as	he	 reached	 the	 garrison	and	took	on	his	command	before	news	of	the	death	became	public	knowledge	in	Athens.640	Such	a	move	could	not	have	escaped	the	notice	of	Polyperchon.	While	Polyperchon’s	 reaction	 to	 Nicanor’s	 appointment	 is	 not	 recorded,	 modern	scholars	have	interpreted	this	silence	as	an	apparent	lack	of	reaction	indicating	either	 a	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 his	 ability	 to	 respond	 effectively	 or	 that	Cassander’s	swift	actions	took	Polyperchon	by	surprise.641																																																																																																																																																																	2006.	p.	79;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	212;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	pp.	10-11.	637	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 78;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 194;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 79,	 178,	 227;	Hughes,	2008.	p.	217;	Adams,	2010.	p.	212;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	11.	638	Bosworth,	CQ.	44.	(1994).	p.	62.	639	Plut.	Phoc.	31.3;	Tritle,	 1988.	 p.	 139.	There	 is	 some	uncertainty	over	which	Nicanor	 was	 sent	 by	 the	 chiliarch.	 The	 two	 central	 candidates	 proposed	 are	either	Nicanor	of	Stageira,	the	adopted	son	of	Aristotle,	which	is	the	traditional	assumption	(See	for	example:	Droysen,	Vol.	II2,	1878.	p.	186;	Beloch,	IV2,	1927.	p.	100,	457;	Berve,	Vol	II.	1926.	pp.	276-7;	Hammond	&	Walbank,	1988.	p.	209;	cf.	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 177.	 s.v.	 Nicanor	 [4]).	 The	 alternative,	 cautiously,	 but	persuasively	 proposed	 by	 Bosworth	 (CQ.	 44.	 (1994).	 pp.	 57-65)	 is	 that	 the	reference	 is	 to	 the	 son	 of	 Balacrus,	 making	 him	 Cassander’s	 nephew	 and	Antipater’s	grandson	via	Philia’s	marriage	to	the	Satrap	of	Cilicia	(Bosworth,	CQ.	44.	(1994).	pp.	60-61;	cf.	Heckel,	2006.	p.	68.	s.v.	Balacrus	[2],	p.	177.	s.v.	Nicanor	[4],	[9],	p.	207.	s.v.	Philia	[3]).	However	Heckel	(2006.	p.	177;	further	expanded	on	 in	 GRBS.	 47.	 (2007)	 pp.	 401–412,	 particularly	 409	 -	 412)	 highlights	 the	uncertainty	of	both	 interpretations	 and	 caution	must	be	 employed	with	 either	interpretation.	For	a	more	comprehensive	evaluation	of	Nicanor’s	identity,	see:	Heckel,	GRBS.	47.	(2007).	For	more	on	Menyllus,	see:	Heckel,	2006.	p.	292.	n.	85.	640	Plut.	Phoc.	31.2;	Bosworth,	CQ.	44.	(1994).	p.	62.	641	Hughes,	2008.	p.	217.	
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Both	Diodorus642	and	Plutarch643	describe	Cassander’s	actions	immediately	after	Antipater’s	death	as	calculated	schemes,	designed	 to	undermine	Polyperchon’s	authority	 in	 his	 desire	 for	 power.644	There	 is	 no	 reference	 to	 Polyperchon’s	inability	 to	 manage	 Greece.	 In	 fact	 Diodorus	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 that	Polyperchon	held	the	support	of	the	majority	of	influential	Macedonians	before	he	left	for	Asia	Minor,645	implying	that	during	the	initial	phases	of	his	tenure	in	319,	he	was	a	capable	and	respected	leader.		Certainly	 the	notion	 that	Cassander	was	 already	planning	 to	 secure	power	 for	himself	before	Antipater	died	is	not	new,646	and	Cassander’s	hope	that	Nicanor	would	be	able	 to	 secure	Athens	 is	an	appealing	 interpretation,	when	placed	 in	the	 context	 of	 his	 later	 actions.	 Plutarch	 affirms	 that	 Cassander	 was	 entirely	responsible	 for	 Nicanor’s	 appointment,647	a	 position	 upheld	 by	 Bosworth	who	suggests	that	as	a	means	to	effect	the	change	he	would	“have	claimed	that	he	had	
Antipater’s	 mandate. 648 	However	 a	 possibility	 that	 has	 gone	 without	investigation	 that	 also	 needs	 consideration	 is	 that	 Nicanor’s	 command	 did,	 in	fact,	 have	 Antipater’s	 authorisation	 from	 the	 outset.	 If	 this	 were	 so,	 it	 would	account	for	the	speed	at	which	Nicanor	was	able	to	arrive	in	Athens,	as	he	would	have	already	begun	preparation	for	the	journey	south.	It	would	also	explain	the	lack	 of	 reference	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 change	 of	 office	 in	 the	narratives	of	the	ancient	sources.	The	exact	circumstances	of	Nicanor’s	dispatch	to	 Athens	 can	 only	 be	 left	 to	 speculation.	 What	 can	 be	 more	 firmly	 stated,	however,	 is	 that	 Cassander	 had	 a	 supporter	 in	Nicanor	whom	he	 could	use	 to	create	 a	 base	 of	 support	 for	 his	 cause	 in	 southern	 Greece.	 Additionally,	 the																																																									642	Diod.	18.49,	18.54;	cf.	Landucci	Gattinoni	(2004.	p.	215)	highlights	that	these	two	sections	of	Diodorus’	narrative	are	duplicated	by	the	historian.	Most	 likely	the	repetition	is	the	result	of	source	authority	used	by	Diodorus.	643	Plut.	Phoc.	31-32.	644	These	 positions	may	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 hostile	 literary	 tradition	 against	Cassander	 and	 his	 father	 emanating	 from	 Hieronymus’	 bias	 (Walsh,	 AHB.	26.	(2012).	p.	156.).	645	Diod.	18.54.1.	cf.	Diod.	18.48.4;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	228.	646	cf.	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	212.	647	Plut.	 Phoc.	 31.1:	 “εὐθὺς	 διαναστὰς	 ὁ	 Κάσανδρος	 καὶ	 προκαταλαμβάνων	 τὰ	
πράγματα.”	648	Bosworth,	CQ.	44.	(1994).	p.	62.	
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replacement	of	 such	an	 important	position	 following	 the	 tumultuous	Demades	affair	 and	 the	 possible	 reaction	 from	 Athens,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 recent	 death	 of	Antipater,	would	suggest	 that	Polyperchon	was	aware	of	Nicanor’s	movements	shortly	 after	 he	 assumed	 the	 regency.	 If	 Polyperchon	 did	 disapprove	 of	 the	appointment,	 he	 seems	 to	 have	 done	 nothing	 to	 stop	 it,	 suggesting	 that	 he	accepted	the	appointment	as	one	initiated	by	Antipater.		
	While	 Nicanor	 would	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 asset	 for	 Cassander	 in	 Southern	Greece,	especially	for	his	return	to	the	region	in	318,649	this	alone	would	not	be	strong	enough	support.	So,	in	order	to	facilitate	a	serious	attempt	to	seize	power	in	Greece	 and	Macedon,	Cassander	would	need	 to	 forge	 alliances	with	 various	members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi.	 Cassander	 was	 aware	 that,	 following	 Antipater’s	death,	 Polyperchon	 held	 the	 majority	 of	 support	 among	 the	 Macedonian	aristocracy. 650 	There	 is	 no	 evidence	 within	 the	 sources	 that	 tensions	 had	previously	 existed	 between	 the	 regent	 and	 his	 chiliarch.	 Therefore,	 Cassander	needed	 to	 exercise	 caution	and	maintain	 a	 guise	of	 secrecy	when	approaching	groups	within	 the	 empire	 so	 as	 not	 to	 disrupt	 the	 delicate	 balance	within	 the	court.		Cassander’s	caution	can	be	seen	in	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi	he	contacted	-Ptolemy,	 Lysimachus,651	and	 Antigonus.652	While	 all	 of	 them	were	 in	 relatively	close	geographical	proximity	 to	Macedon	by	 land	or	sea,	 there	 is	an	aspect	 for	each	that	explicitly	connects	them	to	Cassander.	Each	of	these	men	already	held	either	direct	ties	with	the	Antipatrid	family,	or	extended	familial	ties	in	the	case	of	 Antigonus,	 stemming	 from	 their	 respective	 marriages	 to	 daughters	 of	Antipater	 following	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 in	 323.	 Ptolemy	 had	 married																																																									649	For	further	discussion	of	Cassander’s	return	to	Greece,	see	p.	179.	650	Diod.	18.49.1-3.	651	Diod.	 18.49.3.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 there	 is	 no	 mention	 of	 Cassander’s	contact	with	Lysimachus	at	this	time.	However	there	is	little	doubt	that	he	was	part	 of	Cassander’s	 alliance	 from	early	on.	 Lysimachus	must	have	been	one	of	the	commanders	to	whom	Cassander	dispatched	envoys	for	support	as	referred	to	 in	Diodorus’	narrative	 (Diod.	18.49.3;	Lund,	1992.	p.	55).	By	 the	summer	of	318,	 Lysimachus	 was	 actively	 participating	 in	 the	 war	 against	 Polyperchon	(Diod.	18.79.9;	Billows,	1990	p.	84-85.	n.	7.)	652	Caroli,	2007.	p.	48.	
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Cassander’s	sister	Eurydice	in	321/0,653	and	had	maintained	his	connection	with	the	 family	 over	 the	 previous	 years.654	Lysimachus	 too	 held	 a	 connection	 via	marriage	 with	 Cassander’s	 family.	 Following	 her	 rejection	 by	 Perdiccas	 and	subsequent	 flight	 from	Babylon	 in	321,	Nicaea,	 like	her	sisters,	was	once	again	used	as	a	political	tool	serving	her	father’s	interests.	At	much	the	same	time	as	Eurydice’s	 marriage	 to	 Ptolemy,	 Nicaea	 married	 Lysimachus. 655 	With	 the	marriage	 in	place,	Antipater	had	a	 strategically	well-placed	ally	 in	Thrace	who	could	 manage	 the	 potentially	 problematic	 crossing	 point	 into	 Asia	 at	 the	Hellespont.		For	Cassander,	making	contact	with	both	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy,	his	brothers-in-law,	 would	 not	 in	 itself	 arouse	 suspicion	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 Court.	However,	 it	 was	 still	 necessary	 to	 maintain	 a	 level	 of	 secrecy	 during	 this	mustering	 of	 support.	 To	 further	 this	 aim,	 Cassander	 chose	 to	 remove	himself	from	the	court	in	Macedon	and	Pella	under	the	guise	of	a	leisure	trip	away	from	the	suspicion	and	intrigue	of	the	court.	Although	Cassander	was	able	to	contact	both	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy	for	support	while	still	within	Macedon,	the	same	was	not	possible	when	he	made	contact	with	 the	man	who	would	become	 the	key	 supporter	 of	 his	 efforts	 to	 gain	 supremacy	 in	 Greece	 and	 Macedon,	Antigonus	 Monophthalmus.	 Though	 the	 two	 had	 worked	 together	 for	 a	 short	period	of	time	following	the	Partition	of	Triparadeisus	in	320,	the	direct	familial	connection	 that	 Cassander	 shared	with	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 did	 not	 exist	with	 Antigonus.656 	However	 if	 any	 tension	 existed	 between	 Cassander	 and	
																																																								653		App.	Syr.	62;	Paus.	1.6.8;	Carney,	2000.	p.	178;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	122,	238.	654	cf.	Diod.	18.14.1-2;	25.4;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	238.	655	Strabo.	Geo.	12.4.7;	Heckel	(2006.	p.	155,	175)	provides	a	suggested	date	for	the	marriage	 taking	 place	 in	 321/0	 during	 Antipater’s	 life;	 Lund.	 1992.	 p.	 54;	Carney,	2000.	p.	160.		656	There	 was	 still	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 Antigonids	 via	 the	 marriage	 between	Cassander’s	sister	Philia	and	Antigonus’	son	Demertius	that	took	place	at	much	the	same	time	as	Cassander	was	appointed	as	Antiognus’	chiliarch	in	320	(Diod.	19.59.3;	Plut.	Demtr.	14.2-3	cf.	27.4;	Wheatley,	1997.	p.	33;	Carney,	2000.	p.	165;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	109.).	If	this	did	act	a	vehicle	via	which	Cassander	made	contact	with	 the	 Antigonids,	 there	 is	 no	 record	 of	 it	 taking	 place	 within	 the	 ancient	accounts.	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 does	 at	 least	 suggest	 that	 no	 prior	 contact	regarding	an	alliance	was	made	before	Cassander	had	departed	Europe.	
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Antigonus	 following	Cassander’s	 return	 to	Macedon	 in	320,	 it	was	no	 longer	a	factor	in	319.	It	must	be	stated	though,	before	continuing	discussion	of	Cassander’s	approach	to	Antigonus	 in	 319	 and	 their	 subsequent	 alliance	 that	 a	 temporal	 gap	 occurs	within	 the	 ancient	 accounts.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 distinct	 phases	 in	 which	Cassander	 sought	 support	 against	 Polyperchon,	 the	 first	 when	 he	 was	 still	located	 in	Macedon	where	 he	made	 contact	 with	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 as	well	 as	 the	 oligarchies	 in	Greece,	 and	 the	 second	 following	his	 crossing	 of	 the	Hellespont	later	in	the	same	year.	While	Diodorus’	account	states	that	Cassander	left	 Macedon	 unobserved	 and	 at	 a	 time	 of	 his	 choosing,657	it	 is	 clear	 from	Antigonus’	willingness	to	ally	with	the	son	of	Antipater	that	once	Cassander	had	left	Macedon,	 Polyperchon	was	 aware	 of	 his	 intentions	 and	 responded	 to	 this	new	 threat.	 The	 abrupt	 departure	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 chiliarch	 was	 a	 clear	rejection	 of	 the	 new	 regent’s	 authority	 and	 indicated	 that	 Cassander	 was	unwilling	 to	work	under	his	 jurisdiction.	 If	Diodorus’	narrative	can	be	 trusted,	the	period	between	Cassander’s	 journey	over	 the	Hellespont	and	his	arrival	 in	Antigonus’	 court	 in	Phrygia	 saw	a	number	of	 significant	political	machinations	implemented	by	the	new	regent	of	Macedon.	These	include	the	implementation	of	Philip	 III’s	Exiles	Decree	 in	Greece	as	well	as	Polyperchon’s	correspondence	with	 Eumenes	 of	 Cardia.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	events	 and	 maintain	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 thematic	 nature	 of	 this	 portion	 of	investigation,	these	factors	are	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	What	is	important	to	note	at	this	time	in	Cassander’s	search	for	support	is	that	it	did	not	occur	as	one	single	effort.	While	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 it	was	constantly	underway	during	 this	time,	when	applied	to	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	it	appears	to	have	occurred	in	two	distinct	phases.	
	Cassander	 had	 made	 contact	 with	 both	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 via	intermediaries,	who	acted	on	his	behalf,658	however	this	does	not	appear	to	have	occurred	with	Antigonus.	It	is	not	known	whether	this	was	done	out	of	necessity	to	 maintain	 the	 secrecy	 of	 his	 plans,	 whether	 his	 efforts	 were	 discovered	 by																																																									657	Diod.	18.54.3.	658	Diod.	18.53.2.	
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Polyperchon	 (something	 that	 is	 not	 suggested	 in	 the	 compressed	 account	 of	Diodorus)	or	whether	Cassander	was	confident	that	Antigonus	would	at	the	very	least	 provide	 him	 with	 asylum.	 What	 can	 be	 said	 though	 is	 that	 Cassander	travelled	 directly	 to	 Antigonus	 following	 his	 departure	 from	 Macedon	 in	 late	319.659		Once	 Cassander	 had	 arrived	 in	 Phrygia,	 Antigonus	 did	 not	 require	 much	convincing	 to	 support	 him.	 Once	 again,	 Diodorus	 provides	 the	 most	 detailed	account,	 describing	 Antigonus	 readily	 accepting	 Cassander’s	 approaches	 on	account	 of	 the	 friendship	 he	 had	 with	 Antipater	 as	 well	 as	 in	 response	 to	Polyperchon’s	support	of	Eumenes’	continued	efforts	against	his	position	in	Asia	Minor.	Curiously,	Diodorus	 implies	 that	Cassander	was	not	privy	 to	Antigonus’	desire	 to	 keep	 Polyperchon	 occupied	 in	 Europe	 and	 out	 of	 Asia	 Minor,	particularly	 in	 light	 of	 their	 apparent	 shared	 cause,	 that	 being	 the	 desire	 to	remove	Polyperchon	as	a	threat	to	their	respective	positions.	
	At	 the	 time	of	Cassander’s	arrival	at	 the	court	of	Antigonus,	 relations	between	Polyperchon	and	the	Satrap	of	Phrygia	were	at	an	all	time	low,	verging	on	open	warfare	between	the	two,660	stemming	from	the	regent’s	support	for	Eumenes	of	Cardia.661	In	 Cassander,	 Antigonus	 had	 a	 man	 of	 whom	 he	 had	 experience	commanding	 in	 320	 and	 who	 was	 willing	 to	 combat	 Polyperchon,	 this	 in	addition	to	the	authority	he	carried	as	the	son	of	Antipater.	Therefore,	Antigonus	provided	his	new	ally	with	the	two	things	he	needed	to	bring	the	war	to	Greece	and	 Macedon,	 financial	 support	 and	 a	 military	 force.662	It	 has	 been	 suggested	previously	 that	 Antigonus	 held	 few	 expectations	 of	 Cassander	 beyond	distracting	 Polyperchon,	 tying	 up	 his	 resources	 in	 Greece	 and	 out	 of	 Asia	Minor,663	and	 this	 may	 be	 so.	What	 is	 important	 to	 note	 is	 the	 comparatively	minor	risk	that	supporting	Cassander	in	Greece	posed	for	Antigonus.	Following	the	 regent’s	 backing	 for	 Antigonus’	 main	 adversary	 in	 Asia,	 Eumenes,	 the																																																									659	Diod.	18.54.3.	660	Billows,	1990.	p.	84.	661	See	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	169-170.	662	Diod.	18.54.4.	663	Adams,	1975.	p.	80.	n.	2;	cf.	Diod.	18.54.4.	
	 157	
expectation	 that	both	military	 and	 financial	 support	would	begin	 to	 flow	 from	Macedon	was	certain.	By	aligning	with	Cassander,	it	was	possible	for	Antigonus	to	 end	 a	 potential	 problem	without	 having	 to	 invade	 Greece	 himself.	 Because	Polyperchon	had	 already	declared	himself	 for	Eumenes	 against	Antigonus,	 the	risk	for	Antigonus	of	incurring	further	hostility	from	Pella	had	now	increased.	Caution,	 however,	 is	 required	 here	 with	 Diodorus’	 depiction	 of	 Antigonus’	intentions.	 Antigonus’	 hidden	 agenda	 could	 stem	 from	 Diodorus’	 authority	source,	Hieronymus	and	his	hostile	portrayal	of	Cassander’s	family,	as	his	patron	Antigonus	 may	 not	 have	 wished	 to	 be	 shown	 to	 accept	 an	 alliance	 with	Cassander	for	any	reason	other	than	that	of	convenience.		One	 group	 conspicuously	 absent	 from	 those	 that	 Cassander	 approached	 for	support	 was	 the	 royal	 Argead	 house	 and	 their	 sympathisers.	 While	 there	 is	reference	to	the	Greek	oligarchies	and	garrisons,	as	well	as	various	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	there	exists	no	evidence	in	the	ancient	sources	for	any	attempt	by	Cassander	to	gain	support	from	the	royal	family.	There	seems	little	chance	that	Cassander	 sought	 royal	 backing	 following	 Antipater’s	 death,	 or	 that	 he	 even	entertained	 the	 prospect	 of	 doing	 so.	 Numerous	 factors	 would	 explain	Cassander’s	 aversion	 to	 the	 royals	 in	 319. Apart	 from	 his	 concerted	 effort	 to	maintain	 secrecy	while	 building	 his	 base	 of	 support,	 something	 that	would	 be	jeopardised	should	his	proposal	be	rejected,	it	 is	 likely	that	Cassander	was	still	wary	of	the	impact	of	his	perceived	involvement	in	the	death	of	Alexander	four	years	 previously.	 A	 practical	 answer	 too	 exists	 for	 Cassander’s	 search	 for	backing	from	non-royal	groups	in	that	he	was	aware	that	both	the	royal	family,	and	 the	 elites	 of	 Macedon	 had	 already	 gathered	 around	 the	 new	 regent,	Polyperchon,664	meaning	 that	he	could	neither	rely	on	 them,	nor	expect	 to	win	them	over	 to	his	cause.	Because	of	 this,	 if	Cassander	wanted	 to	 take	control	of	Macedon	and	Greece,	he	needed	to	build	his	support	base	outside	Macedon.		By	the	end	of	319,	Cassander	had	formed	an	alliance	which	included	the	closest	and	arguably	most	powerful	members	of	the	Diadochoi	and	several	of	the	Greek																																																									664 	Diod.	 18.54.2;	 For	 further	 discussion	 on	 the	 initial	 support	 base	 of	Polyperchon,	see	Ch.	6.2.	
	 158	
garrisons,	but	what	value	was	he	to	 those	allied	with	him?	Unfortunately,	save	for	Antigonus,665	no	reference	to	the	motivation	of	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy	for	entering	 into	 an	 alliance	 with	 Cassander	 is	 recorded.	 Antigonus	 may	 have	viewed	 Cassander	 as	 simply	 the	 means	 to	 an	 end,	 as	 one	 who	 could	 keep	Polyperchon’s	attentions	and	resources	fixed	on	and	in	Europe.	However	there	were	also	substantial	benefits	that	would	apply	to	him,	as	well	as	to	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy.	If	Cassander	were	able	to	gain	control	of	Macedon	and	Greece,	then	he	may	also	be	able	to	take	custody	of	and	exert	influence	over	the	royal	family.	The	Diadochoi	were	all	acting,	 in	 theory	 if	not	 in	practice,	as	custodians	of	 the	empire	 until	 the	 kings	 were	 able	 to	 take	 their	 place	 as	 rulers	 of	 the	 new	empire.666	Keeping	 control	 of	 the	 kings	 would	 offer	 a	 measure	 of	 security	 for	Cassander	and	for	his	allies	if	they	chose	to	maintain	the	guise	of	royal	authority.		However,	 fear	of	 incurring	 the	wrath	of,	or	retribution	 from,	 the	royal	 factions	did	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 cause	 for	 concern	 for	 Cassander’s	 allies.	 Indeed,	aligning	 themselves	with	 Cassander	 against	 Polyperchon	would	 actively	 incite	exactly	that.	As	Adams	has	noted,667	this	must	have	 influenced	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi	whom	Cassander	chose	to	approach	for	support,	especially	in	the	case	of	Antigonus	and	Ptolemy.	Antigonus,	as	previously	discussed,	had	already	been	 placed	 in	 a	 position	 of	 conflict	 by	 Polyperchon’s	 support	 for	 Eumenes.	Ptolemy	 too	 had	 been	 operating	 aggressively	 outside	 his	 satrapy	 of	 Egypt,	having	 conquered	 both	 Syria	 and	 Palestine	 following	 the	 Partition	 of	Triparadeisus.668	While	the	expansion	of	Ptolemaic	power	in	the	Levant	does	not	equate	 to	 a	 rejection	 of	 Argead	 authority,	 it	 does	 indicate	 that	 Ptolemy	 was	willing	to	act	in	his	own	interests,	independently	from	Pella.	
	In	 order	 to	 build	 the	 foundation	 necessary	 for	 the	 coming	 war	 against	Polyperchon,	Cassander	knew	that	he	could	not	rely	solely	upon	the	support	of																																																									665	Antigonus’	 reasoning	was	most	 likely	 recorded	by	Diodorus’	because	of	 the	connection	his	authority,	Hieronymus	of	Cardia,	had	during	his	time	within	the	Antigonid	Court.	cf.	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	228-229.	666	cf.	Bosworth,	1988.	pp.	174-175.		667	Adams,	1975.	p.	79.	668	Diod.	 18.43;	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 79;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 26;	 Billows,	 1990.	 p.	 85;	Wheatley,	CQ.	45.	(1995).	p.	437-9.	
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groups	 within	 the	 homeland	 of	 the	 empire.	 Instead,	 he	 chose	 to	 employ	 the	connections	and	alliances	established	by	his	father	during	his	time	as	regent	of	Macedon	between	334	and	319	BC.	This	does	not	however	mean	that	Antipater	explicitly	created	these	ties	for	a	future	civil	war	in	Greece	and	Macedon	against	the	 royal	 house.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 the	 installation	 of	 garrisons	 and	oligarchies	 with	 sympathies	 to	 Antipater	 was	 most	 likely	 done	 out	 of	 the	practical	necessity	of	maintaining	Macedonian	hegemony	in	the	region	following	the	 depletion	 of	 the	 military	 reserves	 at	 Antipater’s	 disposal,	 rather	 than	because	 of	 any	 monarchical	 aspirations	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 former	 regent.	However,	Cassander	was	able	 to	exploit	 the	connections	made	by	his	 father	 to	create	his	support	base.	While	inviting	to	view	the	original	installation	of	these	oligarchies	as	a	grand	scheme	on	the	part	of	Antipater	 to	rebel	against	Argead	authority,	 it	 is	 prudent	 to	 avoid	 employing	 hindsight	 to	 interpret	 these	 as	 a	direct	 attempt	 on	 the	 throne	 of	Macedon.	 It	 has	 been	 previously	 identified	 by	Adams	 that	 viewing	 Cassander’s	 departure	 from	 Macedon	 in	 319	 as	 the	deliberate	 first	 steps	 on	 the	 road	 to	 his	 future	 as	 king	 in	 Macedon669	is	 very	much	 the	 result	 of	 looking	 back	 on	 these	 events	 with	 understandings	 made	possible	 by	 later	 knowledge.	 However,	 with	 this	 understanding	 in	 mind,	Cassander	was	still	able	to	build	himself	a	support	base	that	would	prove	vital	to	his	forthcoming	conflict	with	Macedon’s	new	regent.	
	
6.2:	Polyperchon	319	
	While	 Cassander	 chose	 to	 distance	 himself	 from	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 their	supporters,	seeking	instead	to	associate	himself	with	Antipatrid	supporters	from	the	 oligarchies	 in	 Greece	 and	 various	members	 of	 the	Diadochoi,	 Polyperchon	travelled	a	radically	different	path.	As	Antipater’s	successor,	and	the	understudy	for	 Craterus,	 Polyperchon	 adopted	 what	 could	 be	 described	 as	 a	 traditional	approach	to	support	for	his	regency.	In	doing	so	he	aligned	himself	closely	with	the	 royal	 family	 as	 well	 as	 their	 supporters.	 Of	 particular	 importance	 to	Polyperchon	were	the	kings,	Philip	III	and	Alexander	IV	and	Olympias,	who	had	
																																																								669	Adams,	1975.	p.	77.	
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continued	to	reside	in	Epirus	since	her	departure	in	331/0.670	The	support	of	the	royal	family,	or	possibly	Polyperchon’s	ability	to	exploit	their	image	rather	than	their	 actual	 support,	 was	 integral	 to	 his	 regency	 and	 his	 efforts	 against	Cassander.	 Without	 them,	 he	 would	 lose	 his	 main	 avenue	 of	 political	 and	military	support.	Because	royal	backing	was	vital	to	his	campaign,	Polyperchon	would	need	 to	placate	 and	 serve	 the	 royal	 interests	during	 the	 initial	 years	 of	conflict	with	Cassander.		It	is	important	to	note	that,	while	possible	to	view	Polyperchon’s	support	base	in	contrast	with	Cassander	as	this	study	does,	it	should	not,	in	the	autumn	of	319,	be	viewed	as	a	reaction	to	Cassander’s	dissatisfaction	and	future	departure	from	the	court	in	Macedon.	Rather,	 for	the	initial	period	of	Polyperchon’s	regency,	 it	appears	 that	he	conducted	himself	 in	much	 the	same	manner	 that	would	have	been	expected	of	Craterus,	that	being	as	a	regent	who	could	work	more	closely	with	the	royal	family	and	represent	their	interests	to	a	greater	extent	than	was	perceived	of	Antipater’s	regency.	While	Cassander	made	explicit	efforts	to	build	a	 support	 base	 in	 319	 with	 several	 members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 Polyperchon	embarked	on	only	one	such	effort	to	ally	with	a	member	of	the	Diadochoi,	that	being	 his	 alliance	with	 Eumenes	 of	 Cardia.	 Once	 again	 this	was	 not	 done	 as	 a	means	to	combat	Cassander,	but	rather	in	order	to	gain	the	favour	and	trust	of	Olympias,	with	whom	Eumenes	held	close	ties	throughout	his	life.671		Following	 Cassander’s	 departure	 from	Macedon	 to	 Asia	Minor	 and	 Antigonus,	Polyperchon	was	aware	of	the	threat	that	the	son	of	Antipater	now	posed.672	In	response,	he	reacted	swiftly	to	negate	the	immediate	threat	posed	by	the	Greek	oligarchies	that	held	personal	allegiance	to	Cassander’s	family.	This	came	in	the	form	of	Philip	III’s	Exile’s	Decree,	which	was	enacted	by	early	318.673		Not	only	was	 the	 decree	 aimed	 at	weakening	 Cassander’s	 supporters	 among	 the	 Greek	cities,	it	also	provided	the	chance	of	simultaneously	increasing	his	own	presence																																																									670	cf.	Ch.	3.	p.	76.	671	Anson,	2004.	pp.	42-43;	cf.	Diod.	18.58.2.	672	Diod.	18.55.2;	Anson,	2004.	p.	140	673	Diod.	18.56;	Heckel,	 1992.	pp.	194-5.	 and	n.	118;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2008.	pp.	231-233;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	52;	Boiy,	2007.	p.137;	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	95.		
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in	 the	 region	 by	 tapping	 into	 pre-existing	 Argead	 sympathies	within	 southern	Greece.	The	offer	on	the	table	for	the	Greeks	for	a	goal	they	had	desires	for	years,	as	Dmetriev	notes,	the	acts,	“appealed	to	Greek	cities	by	promising	to	restore	the	
same	mode	of	government	they	had	under	Philip	and	Alexander	and	to	return	to	
the	 “original	 stance”	 (τὴν	 ἐξ	 ἀρχῆς	 προαίρεσιν)	 of	 Alexander.” 674 	While	Polyperchon	was	the	first	of	the	Diadochoi	to	extend	such	an	offer	to	Greeks	in	return	for	their	favour,675	he	was	by	no	means	the	last,	nor	would	this	be	the	last	time	that	Polyperchon	employed	the	notion	of	freedom	to	gain	further	political	traction	with	his	Greek	allies.676			As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Cassander,	 there	 are	 only	 sparse	 records	 of	 Polyperchon’s	movements	 covering	 the	 year	 of	 319.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 no	 record	 of	Polyperchon’s	 location	 leading	 up	 to,	 or	 at	 the	 time	 of,	 Antipater’s	 death	survives.	 	 Nor	 is	 there	 record	 of	 his	 immediate	 actions	 once	 he	 assumed	 the	regency.	 However,	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 to	 gain	 some	 insight	 into	 his	 endeavours	from	accounts	found	later	in	the	literary	sources.	What	can	be	understood	from	Diodorus’	account	is	that	Polyperchon	was	able	to	gain	significant	support	from	the	Macedonian	nobility	swiftly,	and	seemingly,	with	ease.	This	can	be	inferred	from	Cassander’s	unwillingness	to	engage	in	open	hostilities	against	the	regent	prior	to	his	flight	from	Macedon	as	well	as	his	need	to	maintain	the	secrecy	of	his	endeavours	to	build	a	powerbase	solely	among	those	he	trusted.677		There	 are	 several	 scenarios	 that	 emerge	 when	 considering	 the	 way	 in	 which	Polyperchon	was	able	to	assemble	his	initial	support	base.	While	all	of	these	are	based	 on	 some	 level	 of	 speculation	 and	 hypothesis,	 it	 is	 still	 advantageous	 to	engage	 with	 these	 possibilities.	 It	 must	 be	 remembered	 that	 Polyperchon’s	official	position	in	Macedon	following	his	first,	short	tenure	as	regent	during	the	First	 Diadoch	War	 is	 unknown,	 but	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 he	 remained	 in	 the	 region																																																									674	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	97.	675	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	113.	Note	that	Dmetriev	dates	this	decree	to	the	summer	of	autumn	of	319,	immediately	after	Anitpater’s	death.	676	See	below,	Ch.		8.1,	8.2.	also:	Dmetriev,	2011.	pp.	112-124	for	an	overview	of	freedom	as	a	slogan	under	the	Diadochoi	during	the	period	of	time	covered	by	this	investigation.	677	Diod.	18.	54.	2.	
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after	 Antipater	 returned	 from	Asia	Minor	 until	 the	 regent’s	 death.	 This	would	result	in	Polyperchon	being	familiar	with	a	significant	section	of	the	Macedonian	nobility,	and	vice-versa	and	as	he	assumed	the	regency	in	319,	he	may	have	been	able	 to	 exploit	 these	 ties	 to	 create	 his	 early	 powerbase.	 Polyperchon’s	 initial	regency	 too	would	provide	a	 level	of	understanding	of	his	capacity	 to	hold	 the	office	in	319.	Though	short,	his	management	and	suppression	of	the	Aetolian	led	uprising,	with	limited	resources	and	without	the	realistic	possibility	of	support	from	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus,	 demonstrated	 that	 he	 would	 be	 a	 competent	regent.		Another	 explanation	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 initially	 strong	 powerbase	 may	 also	 be	found	in	the	legitimacy	of	his	appointment	that	emanated	from	the	authority	of	Antipater’s	 decree	 as	 well	 as	 the	 connections	 he	 held	 to	 Craterus	 during	 his	career.	 As	 Heckel	 has	 previously	 suggested,	 in	 324	 Alexander	 intended	Polyperchon	to	act	as	a	substitute	for	Craterus,	not	just	for	the	return	march	of	the	Opis	veterans,	but	also	for	the	regency	as	well.678	When	Antipater	was	dying,	attention	 again	 turned	 to	 Polyperchon	 as	 an	 approved	 option	 for	 the	 regency.	Events	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 empire,	 particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Antigonus	 and	Ptolemy,	 began	 to	 show	 signs	 that	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Argeads	 had	 begun	 to	waver	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Diadochoi’s	 ambition	 and	 self-interest;	 despite	 this	strong,	pro-monarchical	support	still	existed	in	Macedon	in	319	and	beyond.679	It	 is	 likely	 that	 Alexander’s	 approval	 of	 Polyperchon	 as	 the	 substitute	 regent	should	Craterus	be	unable	to	hold	office,	would	have	impacted	on	his	ability	to	draw	 support	 from	 the	 pro-Argead	 contingent	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 nobility.	 In	addition	 to	 Alexander’s	 approval,	 another	 possible	 explanation	 for	Polyperchon’s	 early	 support	 base	 may	 stem	 from	 Antipater’s	 appointment.	Antipater’s	 choice,	 as	 this	 study	 has	 previously	 suggested680	was	 a	 calculated	and	deliberate	one.	 It	 sent	 a	 strong	message	 to	 groups	 throughout	 the	 empire																																																									678	Heckel,	1992.	p.	192-193.	679	This	 can	be	 seen	 in	 the	 authority	 carried	by	Olympias	during	her	 return	 in	317	 and	 the	 battle	 fought	 against	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	 on	 the	 borders	 of	Epirus	and	Macedon	(Ath.	13.560F	=	FGrH	76.	F.	52;	Diod.	19.11.1-8;	Just.	14.5.1-10;	Paus.	 1.11.3-4;	Plut.	Alex.	 77.2)	For	 further	discussion	of	Olympias’	 return,	see	Ch.	7.2.	680	cf.	Ch.	5.3.	
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that	 Polyperchon	was	 the	man	 that	 Antipater	 believed	 to	 be	most	 suitable	 to	continue	 the	 governance	 of	 Macedon	 and	 Greece,	 rallying	 any	 neutral	 groups	within	Macedon	 that	did	not	have	 strong	 ties	 to	 either	 the	 royal	house,	 or	 the	Antipatrid	 family.681	It	 is	 true	 that	 Cassander	 relied	 heavily	 on	 those	 factions,	who	 were	 loyal	 to	 his	 father,	 but	 this	 in	 itself	 does	 not	 equate	 to	 Cassander	having	 the	 support	 of	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 pro-Antipatrid	 groups	 in	 Macedon.	While	 Antipater	 had	 spent	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 time	 and	 effort	 to	 foster	personal	loyalties,	the	fact	that	Cassander	was	not	confident	of	holding	enough	backing	to	push	his	own	cause	would	suggest	that	at	least	some	pro-Antipatrid	groups	had	followed	the	dying	regent’s	choice	and	thrown	their	support	behind	Polyperchon	in	319.		It	 is	 impossible	with	 the	 surviving	evidence	 to	know	 the	exact	 reason	 for,	 and	composition	 of,	 Polyperchon’s	 initial	 internal	 support	 base	 following	 his	promotion	to	the	regency	of	Macedon.	The	most	 likely	scenario	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	single	answer,	but	a	combination	of	several	factors	explaining	Polyperchon’s	early	powerbase	 in	319.	What	 is	clear	 is	 that,	by	 the	 time	of	Cassander’s	 flight	from	Macedon,	Polyperchon	was	able	to	draw	on	significant	levels	of	support.682	Once	 Cassander	 chose	 his	 moment	 to	 depart	 from	 Macedon,	 Polyperchon	reacted	 with	 speed	 to	 his	 second	 in	 command’s	 absence.	 Diodorus’	 account	makes	it	clear	that	Polyperchon	had	understood	the	implications	of	Cassander’s	flight	and	that	conflict	with	the	son	of	Antipater	was	to	come.683	He	was	able	to	identify	 the	 groups	 from	 which	 that	 Cassander	 would	 be	 able	 to	 draw	 the	majority	 of	 his	 support,	 including	 the	 oligarchies	 in	 Greece	 as	 well	 as	 the	alliances	to	both	Ptolemy	and	Antigonus.684		Like	 Cassander,	 who	 knew	 that	 there	was	 little	 support	 for	 his	 efforts	 within	Macedon,	Polyperchon	 too	knew	that	he	could	expect	 little	aid	 from	Greece	so	
																																																								681	Adams,	Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	pp.	18-19.	682	Diod.	18.55.1;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	195.	683	Diod.	18.55.2.	684	Diod.	18.55.2.	
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long	 as	 the	 pro-Antipatrid	 oligarchies	 held	 sway	 in	 the	 south.685	In	 order	 to	organise	his	 opposition	 to	Cassander,	 Polyperchon	demonstrated	his	 ability	 to	work	 within	 his	 regency,	 assembling	 a	 council	 of	 his	 officers,	 friends	 and	influential	men	in	Macedon.	In	doing	so	he	was	following	the	official	procedures	of	his	office	to	implement	the	most	effective	strategy	to	bring	against	his	rival.686		Throughout	 this,	 Polyperchon’s	 connections	 with	 the	 royal	 family	 were	 of	utmost	 importance.	 Because	 of	 his	 connections	 to	 Craterus,	 as	 well	 as	 his	willingness	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 official	 channels	 afforded	 by	 the	 regency,	Polyperchon	began	to	expand	on	his	initial	base	of	support.	Most	of	the	surviving	members	 of	 the	Argead	 family	were	 located	 in	Macedon	 in	 319,	 including	 the	two	kings,	Alexander	the	IV	and	Philip	III,	who	had	returned	there	following	the	Partition	of	Triparadisus	the	previous	year.687	This	however,	does	not	mean	the	entire	family	was	present.	A	conspicuously	absent	member	of	the	family,	whose	favour	would	provide	significant	political,	as	well	as	financial	and	military	aid	to	Polyperchon’s	 cause,	 was	 Olympias,	 who	 was	 still	 ensconced	 in	 Epirus.	 The	timing	of	his	initial	contact	with	Olympias,	and	where	it	should	be	placed	within	the	sequence	of	events	immediately	after	Antipater’s	death	in	319	is	difficult	to	define	 with	 certainty,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 whether	 it	 took	 place	 before	Cassander	had	departed	from	the	court	in	Macedon	for	the	countryside,	while	he	was	 still	 located	 in	 Macedon,	 or	 during	 his	 flight	 to	 Asia	 Minor.	 Diodorus’	narrative	 is	 unclear	 in	 this	 regard,	 vaguely	 stating	 that	 contact	with	Olympias	was	 made	 after	 Polyperchon	 had	 assumed	 the	 regency. 688 	It	 is	 clear	 that	Polyperchon	had	planned	and	made	efforts	to	align	himself	with	Olympias	early	on	in	his	career,	but	there	is	nothing	in	Diodorus’	narrative	to	clarify	the	matter	beyond	the	section	in	which	this	initial	contact	is	made.	It	may	be	possible	that	Polyperchon’s	contact	with	Olympias	was	what	forced	Cassander’s	departure,689	but	 general	 consensus	 among	 modern	 scholars	 holds	 that	 the	 more	 likely	scenario	 is	that	the	 initial	contact	took	place	during	Cassander’s	sojourn	in	the																																																									685	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	was	no	support	for	Polyperchon	in	Greece,	as	he	appears	to,	in	319,	have	received	popular	support	from	Athens,	despite	the	close	proximity	of	the	garrison	at	Munychia	(Nepos.	Phoc.	3.1;	Syll.3	=	IG	II2	387).	686	Diod.	18.55.2;	cf.	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	230	687	cf.	Hiedl.	Epit.	FGrH.	155.	F.	2.2.	688	Diod.	18.49.4;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	49.	689	cf.	Adams,	1975.	p.	76.	
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country,	but	before	his	departure	for	Asia	Minor.690	Polyperchon’s	early	contact	with	 Olympias,	 in	 the	 short	 period	 of	 time	 before	 explicit	 hostilities	 with	Cassander	 began	 demonstrates	 that	 his	 desire	 was	 to	 restore	 amicable	 ties	between	the	royal	 family	and	 the	office	of	 the	regency,	 in	an	attempt	 to	repair	the	 damage	 resulting	 from	 Antipater’s	 extended	 tenure	 as	 regent.	 This	 initial	contact	 with	 Olympias	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	 a	 deliberate	 insult,	 directed	towards	Cassander.691	While	Cassander	must	have	found	the	notion	of	Olympias	returning	to	Macedon	unpalatable,692	it	 is	likely	that	it	would	not	have	come	as	surprise.	 If	 Polyperchon	 was	 acting,	 as	 Craterus’	 replacement,	 to	 represent	Argead	 interests	 in	Macedon	as	Alexander	had	 intended	 in	324,	clearly	 it	must	have	 been	 expected	 that	 the	 ties	 between	 the	 regent	 and	 the	 surviving	 royals	were	 to	 strengthen.	 Landucci	 Gattinoni	 correctly	 identifies	 that	 Polyperchon’s	appointment	to	the	regency	was	a	watershed	moment	for	the	political	status	quo	in	Macedon.693	Polyperchon	was	not	going	to	operate	in	his	office	the	same	way	that	Antipater	had,	or	as	Cassander	would	have.	Therefore	Cassander	must	have	expected	an	attempted	reconciliation	with	Olympias,	headed	by	Polyperchon	to	take	place	shortly	after	his	father’s	death.	What	is	more	certain,	however	is	that	Polyperchon	 had	made	 contact	with	 both	 Olympias	 and	 Eumenes	 by	 the	 time	Cassander	had	reached	Antigonus,	as	Polyperchon’s	support	for	Eumenes	was	a	significant	factor	for	Antigonus	to	ally	with	Cassander.694		While	 there	was	no	 chance	of	Olympias	 returning	 to	Macedon	while	Antipater	was	alive,	with	her	old	adversary	 for	over	a	decade	now	gone,	 the	prospect	of	her	 return	 became	 more	 realistic.	 Carney	 has	 suggested	 the	 possibility	 that	Polyperchon	 and	 Olympias	 may	 have	 known	 each	 other	 prior	 to	 Alexander’s	
																																																								690	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 75;	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 69;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003,	 p.	 39;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	218.	691	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 75;	 Adams,	 1977.	 p.	 19;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 39;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	218.		692 	Indeed	 the	 same	 could	 also	 be	 expected	 of	 Olympias’	 feelings	 towards	Cassander.	Anson,	2004.	pp.	141-142.	n.	83.	693	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	39;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	218.	694 	For	 Cassander’s	 arrival	 in	 Asia	 Minor,	 see	 Ch.	 6.1.	 p.	 157.	 For	 the	circumstances	of	Polyperchon’s	contact	with	Eumenes,	see	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	168-169.	
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death	 in	 323.695	This	may	 be	 true,	 and	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 ancient	 sources	that	 would	 suggest	 otherwise,	 however	 this	 position	 is	 admittedly	 reliant	 on	their	 later	contact	 in	317	and	the	alliance	they	entered	into	at	that	time.	Given	the	relatively	small	size	of	the	Macedonian	aristocracy	as	well	as	Polyperchon’s	age	and	length	of	service	within	the	upper	echelons	of	the	Macedonian	court,696	it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 two	would	be	 familiar	with	each	other.	What	 can	be	stated	with	greater	certainty	is	that,	as	the	various	factions	began	to	emerge	following	the	 Settlement	 of	 Babylon	 in	 323,	 Olympias	 was	 cautious	 of	 anyone	 who	attempted	to	ally	themselves	with	her,	including	those	with	whom	she	may	have	been	previously	been	familiar.697	Despite	Polyperchon’s	efforts	to	gain	her	trust,	Olympias	would	not	leave	her	Molossian	home	for	the	Macedonian	Court	solely	in	response	to	the	regent’s	request.	 In	order	to	facilitate	both	Olympias’	return	and	 her	 support,	 Polyperchon	 needed	 to	 offer	 the	 mother	 of	 Alexander	 III	something	 of	 value.	 Therefore,	 Polyperchon	 offered	 Olympias	 the	 custody	(ἐπιμέλειαν)	of	her	grandson,	Alexander	IV,	until	the	young	king	came	of	age.698	As	 Carney	 notes,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 define	 what	 Polyperchon	 was	 offering	 to	Olympias	 once	 the	 conflict	 with	 Cassander	 had	 begun.699	Along	 with	 care	 of	Alexander	IV,	Polyperchon	must	have	also	offered	some	official	role	within	the	Macedonian	Court,	as	it	is	unlikely	that	Olympias	would	have	been	persuaded	to	return	 to	 Macedon	 without	 this.700	Should	 Polyperchon	 win	 the	 trust	 of	 the	mother	of	Alexander	the	Great,	he	would	have	a	powerful	member	of	the	Argead	family	with	whom	he	could	work	co-operatively,	rather	than	impose	upon.	This	was	important,	as	both	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus	and	Alexander	IV	were	not	able	or,	
																																																								695	Carney,	2006.	p.	54.	696	Heckel,	1992.	p.	189;	Adams,	Balkan	Studies.	34.	(1993).	p.	200.	697	Diod.	18.58.3-4;	cf.	Plut.	Eum.	13.2;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	242;	Carney,	2006.	 p.	 70;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 227;	 Adams	 (Balkan	Studies.	 34.	 (1993),	 p.	 201.)	suggests	 that	Olympias	may	 also	 have	been	unsure	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 intention	given	his	association	with	Antipater	over	the	previous	years.		698	Diod.	18.49.4,	18.57.2,	cf.	Diod.	18.65.1;	Carney,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	362;	Carney,	2006.	pp.	69-70;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	183;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	11.	699	Carney,	2006.	pp.	69-70.	700	See	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 70	 for	 a	 further	 discussion	 on	 the	 possible	 position	Olympias	was	to	occupy	upon	her	return	to	Macedon.	
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in	Philip’s	case	perceived	as	being	able,	to	rule	in	their	own	right.701The	contact	with	Olympias	had	further	flung	implications	for	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon,	 as	while	Cassander	had	 chosen	 to	distance	himself	 from	 the	royal	 family,	 Polyperchon	 instead	 chose	 to	 explicitly	 align	 himself	 with	 the	royals	and	their	supporters.702	This	would	maintain	the	pro-Argead	stance	that	was	 the	mandate	given	 to	him	as	Craterus’	 second	 in	 command	 in	324.	 It	was	from	these	groups	that	Polyperchon	would	draw	the	majority	of	his	support	for	at	least	the	next	three	years.		Despite	these	initial	efforts,	Olympias	was	unsure	of	Polyperchon’s	true	motives	and	 whether	 or	 not	 she	 would	 be	 able	 to	 trust	 this	 new	 regent.	 Soon	 after	receiving	 Polyperchon’s	 offer,	 Olympias	 contacted	 her	 trusted	 confidant,	Eumenes,	 asking	 for	 his	 evaluation	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 offer.703	It	 appears	 that	Polyperchon	may	have	been	aware	of	this	contact,	or	possibly	of	the	importance	Olympias	placed	on	Eumenes’s	advice.	Polyperchon	too	had	ties	with	Eumenes	and	sought	 to	contact	his	old	colleague	 from	Alexander’s	 campaign.704	Because	of	 the	 long,	 close	 ties	 between	Olympias	 and	Eumenes,705	if	 Polyperchon	were	able	 to	win	Eumenes	over	 to	his	cause,	 it	would	demonstrate	 to	Olympias	 that	his	offers	to	the	royal	mother	and	his	intentions	of	forging	an	alliance	with	her	were	genuine.		As	with	Olympias,	Polyperchon’s	offer	to	Eumenes	needed	to	be	significant,	and	it	 was. 706 	The	 regent	 offered	 the	 former	 royal	 scribe	 the	 opportunity	 of																																																									701	Indeed,	as	Carney	notes,	Macedonian	royal	women	were	used	as	appropriate	stopgap	rulers	without	 issue	during	 times	when	no	acceptable	 royal	male	was	available	(Carney,	CJ.	90.	(1995).	p.	381).	702	Adams,	Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	p.	19.		703	Diod.	18.57.2-3,	18.58.3;	cf.	Plut.	Eum.	12.2,	13.1.	704	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	188-9.	Anson,	2004.	p.	142.	n.	84.	705	cf.	Diod.	18.62.2;	Carney,	2006.	p.	70.	706	It	appears	that	Diodorus	has	glossed	over	much	detail	in	the	correspondence	between	 Polyperchon	 and	 Eumenes.	 Following	 the	 death	 of	 Perdiccas,	 the	faction	 he	 headed	 had	 been	 given	 a	 death	 sentence	 by	 the	 victors	 of	 the	 First	War	 of	 the	Diadochoi	 (Westlake,	 1969.	 pp.	 228-29;	Hadley	 1996.	 p.	 135,	 142;	Anson,	CPh.	103.	 (2008),	p.	144;	Meeus,	 in,	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	88;).	 We	 also	 know	 that,	 in	 320,	 Eumenes	 had	 sought	 to	 make	 amends	 by	returning	the	satrapies	put	under	his	control	in	323	to	Antigonus	and	Antipater	
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becoming	joint	regent	of	Macedon	in	much	the	same	fashion	that	Antipater	and	Craterus	 were	 able	 to	 successfully	 manage	 the	 region.	 Alternatively	 Eumenes	could	choose	to	remain	in	Asia	Minor	and	continue	his	efforts	against	Antigonus	with	significant	military	support	from	the	regent.707	It	is	clear	that	Eumenes	was	still	 a	 stalwart	 supporter	 of	 Olympias	 as	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 proposed	 oath	 he	wished	 to	 take	 following	 the	 siege	 of	 Nora.708	If	 Polyperchon	 could	 persuade	Eumenes	to	join	his	cause,	it	would	help	sway	Olympias,	dispelling	the	anxieties	she	still	had	in	319.709			Polyperchon’s	contact	with	Eumenes	was	not	without	unintended	drawbacks,	as	this	 contact	 was	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 Antigonus’	 alliance	 with	 Cassander	against	 the	 regent.	 This	 stemmed	 from	 the	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	 between	Antigonus	and	Eumenes	at	the	siege	of	Nora,	where	the	combatants	reaffirmed	their	friendship.710	The	timing	of	Polyperchon’s	letter	to	Eumenes	appears	to	be	a	case	of	bad	 timing,	something	outside	 the	control	of	 the	regent,	as	Diodorus’	narrative	 implies	 that	 the	correspondence	 to	both	Olympias	and	Eumenes	was	sent	at	much	the	same	time,	soon	after	Antipater’s	death	in	the	late	summer	or																																																																																																																																																															and	to	absolve	his	prior	offences	(Diod.	18.41.7.	cf.	Meeus,	in,	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 88).	 No	 rescinding	 of	 Eumenes’	 death	 sentence	 is	 recorded,	leading	to	the	assumption	that	it	was	still	in	effect	(Westlake,	1969.	pp.	228-29;	Hadley	1996.	p.	135,	142;	Anson,	CPh.	103.	p.	144).	If	this	were	so,	Polyperchon	either	 chose	 to	 ignore	 it	 as	Anson	 suggests	 (Anson,	CPh.	103.	p.	 144)	or	much	more	 likely,	 offered	 Eumenes	 a	 reprieve,	 at	 an	 early	 point	 in	 their	 contact	 in	order	to	gain	his	allegiance	(Heckel,	1992.	p.	195).	Because	Eumenes	was	so	vital	to	 Polyperchon’s	 cause,	 it	 is	 inconceivable	 that	 the	 regent	would	maintain	 his	death	sentence,	even	if	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi	did	(Meeus,	 in,	Alonso	Troncoso	 &	 Anson,	 2013.	 p.	 88;	 contra:	Westlake,	 1969.	 pp.	 228-29;	 Hadley	1996.	p.	135,	142;	Anson,	CPh.	103.	p.	144).	707	Diod.	18.	57.	3-4.	For	record	of	Polyperchon	fulfilling	the	promises	to	support	Eumenes	 see	 Diod.	 18.58.1;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 195.	 n.	 1;	 Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	 9.	(2008).	pp.	238-239.	708	Plut.	Eum.	12.	 3;	 Carney,	 2006.	 pp.	 70-71;	 For	more	 on	 events	 at	Nora,	 see	below.	709	It	must	also	be	noted	that	Eumenes	was	not	the	only	person	that	Polyperchon	contacted	in	Asia	Minor,	as	the	regent	also	sent	word	to	Argyaspids	stationed	at	the	 treasury	 in	 Cilicia	 (Diod.	 18.58.1),	 whose	 leader	 Antigenes	 was	 known	 to	Polyperchon	(cf.	Heckel,	1992.	p.	195).	710	Diod.	18.	41.	6-7;	Plut.	Eum.	10.	6;	Anson,	GRBS.	18.	(1977)	pp.	251-6;	Anson,	2004.	 p.	 131,	 especially	 n.	 53.	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2008.	 p.	 242	who	 suggest	 a	
terminus	ante	quem	of	March	or	April	for	the	arrival	of	Polyperchon’s	letter.	
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early	 autumn	 of	 319.711	If	 this	 is	 so,	 then	 hostilities	 between	 Antigonus	 and	Eumenes	were	active712	at	the	time	Polyperchon’s	letter	to	Eumenes	was	sent	in	319.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 letter	 of	 alliance	 arrived	 to	 Eumenes	 either	during	 the	 siege,	 or	 shortly	 after	 Antigonus	 had	 ended	 the	 siege.	 As	 Anson	observed,	Polyperchon’s	contact	with	Eumenes,	and	the	offer	of	either	asylum	in	Macedon,	 or	 support	 in	 Asia	 Minor	 were	 intended	 as	 gestures	 of	 good	 faith,	rather	 than	 to	 anger	 Antigonus.713	In	 addition,	 this	 initial	 contact	 took	 place	prior	 to	 Cassander’s	 arrival	 in	 Asia	 Minor,	 which	 provides	 a	 further	 level	 of	precision	 in	 dating	 Polyperchon’s	 offer	 to	 Eumenes.	Whether	 intended	 or	 not,	Antigonus	 was	 displeased	 with	 Polyperchon’s	 offer	 of	 support	 against	 him,	leading	to	him	being	in,	as	Billows	states,	near	open	war	with	the	regent	at	the	time	of	Cassander’s	arrival.714	Eumenes	appears	to	have	accepted	Polyperchon’s	offer	 of	 an	 alliance	 and	 support,	 thereby	 breaking	 his	 recent	 pact	 with	Antigonus,715	and	was	eager	 to	 resume	 the	conflict	against	Antigonus,716	which	took	place	shortly	after	 the	siege	of	Nora	had	concluded.717	Eumenes	would,	 in	319,	be	the	only	member	of	the	Diadochoi	that	Polyperchon	actively	pursued	for	an	alliance.	With	this	association,	Polyperchon	displayed	his	political	ability	by	identifying	 the	 people	 with	 whom	 he	 needed	 to	 ally	 himself	 in	 order	 to	 gain	Olympias’	favour,	trust,	and	ultimately,	her	return	to	Macedon.		While	the	alliance	between	Polyperchon	and	Eumenes	did	antagonise	Antigonus,	which	 resulted	 in	making	 him	more	 receptive	 to	 Cassander’s	 approaches,	 the	hostility	 itself	 may	 have	 been	 of	 less	 importance	 to	 Polyperchon	 than	 the	immediate	concern	of	gaining	 the	support	of	Olympias	and	 that	of	Cassander’s																																																									711	cf.	Ch.	6.2.	p.	161,	163.	712	Boiy,	 2007.	 p.	 51,	 118.	 The	 initiation	 of	 the	 siege	 at	 Nora	 is	 unanimously	agreed	 upon	 as	 taking	 place	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 319,	 regardless	 of	chronological	methods.	The	siege	would	conclude	in	early	318	(cf.	Anson,	2004.	p.	137.	Boiy,	2007.	p.	138,	149.)	713	Anson,	2004.	pp.	142-3.	n.	86.	714	Billows.	1990.	p.	84.	cf.	Diod.	18.54.4.	715	Anson,	in	Tronsoco	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	100.	716	Anson,	2004.	p.	147.	717	For	 further	 discussion	 on	 events	 in	 Asia	Minor	 after	 the	 Siege	 of	Nora	 and	Polyperchon’s	involvement,	see:	Ch.	7.1.	For	a	more	general	discussion	of	event,	see:	Billows,	1990.	pp.	81-109;	Anson,	2004.	p.	147-190.	
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allies	 in	Greece.	 Polyperchon	must	 have	 expected	Eumenes	 to	 keep	Antigonus	occupied	in	Asia	Minor	and	out	of	Europe	with	the	second	front	being	created	by	his	new	ally	against	the	Antigonids.	While	the	alliance	would	require	substantial	commitment	 by	 Polyperchon,	 including	 his	 presence	 in	 the	 region	 in	 318,718	what	the	alliance	provided	to	Polyperchon	was	an	influential	and	powerful	ally	in	 Asia	 Minor	 who	 would	 also	 aid	 in	 cementing	 his	 ties	 to	 the	 royal	 Argead	family.		Once	Cassander	had	chosen	his	moment	to	depart	 from	Macedon,	Polyperchon	acted	 swiftly.	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	immediately	aware	of	 the	 implications	of	Cassander’s	departure	as	well	 as	 the	threat	 he	 now	 posed	 to	 the	 political	 stability	 in	 Macedon.719	In	 addition	 to	understanding	the	threat	posed	by	his	new	rival,	Polyperchon	was	also	able	to	identify	the	groups	from	which	Cassander	would	draw	his	support,	those	being	the	oligarchies	set	up	by	his	father	in	Greece,	as	well	as	Antigonus,	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy.720	Just	as	Cassander	knew	there	was	little	support	for	his	cause	in	Macedon	 in	 319,	 so	 too	 did	 Polyperchon	 know	 that	 he	 could	 expect	 little	 aid	from	the	south	so	long	as	the	pro-Antipatrid	oligarchies	maintained	their	grasp	on	the	Greek	cities.		In	 order	 to	 build	 his	 stratagem	 against	 Cassander	 and	 his	 supporters,	Polyperchon	continued	 to	operate	within	 the	 traditional	power	 structures	and	channels	 afforded	 to	 his	 office.	 He	 summoned	 a	 council	 of	 officers,	 eminent	members	from	within	Macedonian	society	and	loyal	friends.721	Polyperchon	was	aware	 of	 Cassander’s	 lack	 of	 popularity	 in	 Greece,	 stemming	 from	Antipater’s	policies	 there	 during	 his	 time	 as	 regent	 of	 Macedon.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	during	the	course	of	his	regency,	Antipater	had	become	the	face	of	Macedonian	hegemony	 during	 Alexander’s	 expansion	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 into	 the																																																									718	See	Ch.	7.1.	719	Diod.	 18.55.1-2;	 Adams,	Balkan	Studies.	34.	 (1993).	 p.	 202;	 Anson,	 2004.	 p.	140;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	229.	720	Diod.	18.55.2.	For	Lysimachus,	see	above,	p.	149.	n.	635.	721	Diod.	18.55.1;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	230.	Polyperchon’s	council	 likely	contained	 members	 of	 the	 returning	 Opis	 veterans	 from	 324,	 hence	 Heckel,	1992.	p.	194.	
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east.722	Polyperchon	chose	to	exploit	the	feelings	of	these	dissatisfied	groups	and	attempted	to	rally	them	to	his	cause,	thus	weakening	the	position	of	Cassander’s	oligarchs	in	Greece.		The	method	by	which	this	was	facilitated	was	via	the	implementation	of	a	new	decree	in	southern	Greece	in	March	of	318.723	In	a	clear	statement	that	the	era	of	Antipatrid	 dominated	 rule	 was	 over,	 Polyperchon	 compelled	 Philip	 III	Arrhidaeus	to	announce	a	new	Exile’s	Decree	within	the	Greek	cities.724	In	a	rare	case	 of	 fortune,	 Diodorus’	 account	 includes	 an	 extensive	 record	 of	 the	 decree	presented	to	the	various	cities.725	Most	likely	this	can	be	explained	by	Diodorus’	authority	 Heironymus	 having	 access	 to	 copies	 of	 the	 decree	 that	 were	distributed	amongst	the	Greeks.		There	 was	 little	 confusion	 as	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 decree	 Polyperchon	 had	engineered.	While	 the	 regent	was	 not	 offering	 freedom	 to	 the	 Greeks,	 he	was	offering	 them	 the	 restoration	 of	 the	 statutes	 implemented	 under	 the	 rule	 of	Philip	 II,726	removing	 the	 unpopular	 policies	 enacted	 by	 Antipater	 during	 his	time	in	office,727	including	the	repatriation	of	those	exiled	to	their	homelands.728																																																									722	Pitt	&	Richardson,	CQ	67	(Forthcoming	2017);	cf.	Ch.	4.	723	Tritle,	1988.	p.	139;	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	195-196.	724 	Diod.	 18.56;	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 82-83;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 194;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2008.	 pp.	 231-232;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 227;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 213;	 Dmetriev,	 2011.	 p.	 113;	 cf.	 Carney	 (Syll.	 Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	11.)	who	makes	passing	reference	to	Polyperchon’s	political	efforts	in	Greece.	725	Diod.	 18.56;	 Adams,	 Balkan	 Studies.	 34.	 (1993),	 p.	 202.	 For	 commentaries,	see.	Rosen,	AClass.	10.	(1967);	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	231-233.	726 	Diod.	 18.56.2-3;	 Adams,	 Balkan	 Studies.	 34.	 (1993).	 p.	 202;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	ca.	231-232;	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	113.	727	Adams,	Balkan	Studies	34.	(1993).	p.	203.	728	There	 were	 however,	 multiple	 cities	 exempt	 from	 this	 decree,	 including:	Megalopolis,	 Amphissia,	 Triica,	 Pharcadon	 and	 Heraclea	 (Diod.	 18.56.5-6).	Adams	has	suggested	that	the	cities	were	not	included	in	the	decree	due	to	their	strategic	locations	within	Greece	and	their	likely,	though	unattested,	support	of,	or	control	by,	pro-Antipatrid	oligarchies	(Adams,	Balkan	Studies	34.	(1993).	pp.	203-205).	While	a	likely	scenario,	the	fact	that	Polyperchon	was	trying	to	build	his	support	base	in	Greece	must	also	be	taken	into	consideration,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	return	of	Samos	to	Athenian	control	(Diod.	18.56.7.)	although	the	explicit	 reason	 that	 the	 island	 was	 returned	 to	 Athens	 was	 that	 Philip	 II	 had	
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This	sentiment	echoed	the	Exiles	Decree	enacted	in	324,729	albeit	with	Antipater	as	 the	 arbiter	 of	 wrongdoing	 rather	 than	 Alexander.	 Though	 not	 explicitly	named,	it	is	clear	that	Antipater,	and	by	extension	Cassander,	are	the	targets	for	Philip’s	 decree	 in	 early	 318.	 This	 can	 be	 deduced	 in	 two	ways.	 Firstly	 a	 time	marker	 is	 present	 within	 the	 text	 stated	 that	 those	 affected	 by	 this	 new	proclamation	 are	 people	 who	 were	 exiled	 from	 their	 homelands	 after	Alexander’s	 departure	 from	 Europe	 into	 the	 East,730	in	 other	 words,	 from	 the	time	 of	 Antipater’s	 installation	 as	 regent	 in	 334.	 Secondly,	 the	 perpetrators	 of	the	wrongdoing	 following	 Alexander’s	 departure	 are	 clearly	 signposted,	 those	being	 the	 Macedonian	 generals	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 region.731	This	 reference	 has	clear	links	to	Antipater	as	the	man	in	charge	of	Greece	at	the	time,	as	well	as	to	Cassander.	While	the	indictment	of	Antipater	and	Cassander	was	a	clear	aim	of	Polyperchon,	 he	 was	 flirting	 dangerously	 with	 implicating	 himself	 with	 the	matter	 of	 Greek	 oppression	 after	 his	 short	 but	 volatile	 time	 as	 acting	 regent	during	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi.732	This	was	mitigated	by	the	designation	of	Polyperchon	as	the	man	to	deal	with	any	unrest	and	disruption	to	the	peace	stated	 by	 the	 decree.	 No	 doubt	 this	 was	 a	 not	 so	 thinly	 veiled	 threat	 to	
																																																																																																																																																														previously	 given	 it	 to	 them	 during	 his	 reign	 (Diod.	 18.56.7.	 cf.	 Diod.	 18.8.7,	18.9.).	The	recent	concern	that	Athens	had	expressed	in	324	with	the	potential	loss	 of	 Samos	 under	 Alexander’s	 decree	 must	 too	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	Polyperchon’s	 consideration.	 If	 he	were	willing	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 he	would	listen	 and	 engage	 with	 Athenian	 requests	 and	 their	 concerns,	 the	 chances	 of	gaining	 their	 support	would	 increase.	 Athens	was	 a	 powerbase	 for	 Cassander	should	 he	 return	 to	 Greece,	 demonstrated	 by	 his	 appointment	 of	 Nicanor	 as	Munychia’s	 commander	 around	 the	 time	 of	 his	 father’s	 death.	 If	 Polyperchon	could	 wrestle	 Athens	 away	 from	 Cassander	 via	 the	 offer	 of	 Samos	 then	 the	independence	of	Samos	would	have	been	of	little	concern.	While	the	significance	of	Athens	as	an	entity	in	the	ancient	world	can	become	over-emphasised	due	to	the	 amount	 of	 surviving	 literary	 sources	 from	 the	 region,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 Athens’	 central	 role	 in	 the	 early	stages	of	the	conflict	cannot	be	overstated.	Cassander’s	indication	of	the	city	as	his	base	of	 future	operations	 too	made	 the	city	a	 focal	point	 for	Polyperchon’s	attention.	It	therefore	would	come	as	no	surprise	that	Athens	received	a	special	status	within	the	policies	of	the	Exile	Decree	put	forth	in	early	318.	729	See:	Pitt	&	Richardson,	CQ.	67	(Forthcoming,	2017).	730	Diod.	18.56.4.	731	Diod.	18.56.4.	732	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	pp.	137-138.	
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Cassander’s	 supporters	 and	 neutral	 groups	 in	 Greece	 that	 they	 could	 expect	reprisals	should	they	side	with	the	son	of	Antipater.733		What	 the	 decree	 hoped	 to	 achieve	 was,	 that	 by	 offering	 the	 Greek	 cities	 the	policies	 of	 Philip	 and	 Alexander,	 instead	 of	 the	 iron	 grip	 that	 had	 been	 the	hallmark	of	Antipater’s	style	of	Macedonian	hegemony,	with	the	emphasis	on	the	generous	authority	of	the	royal	family	as	evidenced	by	Philip	III’s	promulgation	of	 the	 decree	 itself,	 Polyperchon	 could	 expect	 a	 simultaneous	 growth	 in	 his	presence	in	Greece	as	well	as	agitation	by	those	dissatisfied	with	the	oligarchies	that	 formed	 the	 core	 of	 Cassander’s	 powerbase	 in	 the	 region.	 However,	 as	Heckel	 has	 previously	 stated,734	Polyperchon	 was	 in	 fact,	 in	 a	 strong	 position	before	 the	 initiation	 of	 hostilities	 with	 Cassander.	 Not	 only	 did	 he	 hold	 the	Macedonian	homeland,	but	he	also	had	Eumenes	as	an	ally,	providing	him	with	support	outside	Europe	from	which	he	hoped	to	draw.	
	Antipater’s	 choice	 of	 Polyperchon	 as	 his	 successor	 set	 in	 place	 the	 conflict	between	the	new	regent	and	Cassander	that	would	rage	throughout	Greece	over	the	next	decade.	The	groups	that	formed	the	pillars	of	each	of	the	protagonist’s	support	base	reflected	not	only	their	backgrounds	coming	into	the	conflict,	but	would	also	define	the	ways	in	which	they	operated	during	the	opening	phases	of	the	 struggle.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 Antipater’s	 long-running	 hostility	 with	 Olympias,	tensions	with	Alexander	during	the	final	years	of	the	great	king’s	life,	combined	with	the	presence	of	Macedonian	garrisons	whose	authority	lay	in	the	backing	of	the	Antipatrid	house,	Cassander	chose	not	to	approach	or	align	himself	with	the	royal	house	to	build	the	momentum	he	required	to	create	support	for	his	cause.	Despite	holding	 a	 significant	 and	powerful	 office	 in	Macedon	as	Polyperchon’s	
chiliarch,	Cassander	did	not	have	 influence	or	control	over	any	member	of	 the	royal	Argead	family,	but	instead	chose	to	seek	his	support	from	less	traditional	avenues	through	his	contact	with	Ptolemy,	Lysimachus	and	Antigonus	as	well	as	to	employ	the	Greek	oligarchies	installed	by	his	father	to	conduct	the	war.																																																										733	Diod.	18.56.7-8.	734	Heckel,	1992.	p.	195.	
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In	 contrast	 Polyperchon’s	 approach	 followed	 more	 official	 and	 orthodox	channels	 in	 forming	 his	 powerbase.	 While	 he	 was	 already	 engaging	 with	 the	royals	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 than	his	 predecessor,	 once	Cassander	had	 fled	 from	Macedon	 to	Asia	Minor,	 the	need	 for	 the	 regent	 to	align	himself	 further	 to	 the	Argeads	and	 in	 turn	be	 seen	as	 acting	on	behalf	 of	Philip	 III	 and	Alexander	 IV	increased.	 This	 was	 demonstrated	 by	 his	 multiple	 correspondences	 with	Olympias	as	well	as	to	Eumenes.	In	order	to	destabilise	Cassander’s	foothold	in	Greece,	 Polyperchon	 employed	 Philip	 III	 to	 announce	 a	 new	 Exile’s	 Decree	thereby	 demonstrating	 that	 Cassander	 did	 not	 carry	 royal	 favour	 in	 the	 south	and	that	the	regent	was	the	official	representative	of	authority.		Both	Cassander	and	Polyperchon’s	actions	in	319	and	early	318	demonstrate	the	difference	 between	 the	 two.	 While	 it	 is	 appealing	 to	 view	 their	 searches	 for	support	 as	 polar	 opposites,	 they	 are	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 each	 other.	 As	 the	situation	 developed,	 even	 over	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time,	 both	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	adapted	and	reacted	to	best	position	themselves	against	their	rival.	This	 close	 course	 of	 action	 and	 swift	 reaction	would	 continue	 throughout	 the	conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 characterising	 the	 struggle	 and	would	continue	after	Cassander	made	his	return	to	Greece	in	the	spring	of	318	B.C.		
	
6.3:	The	Second	Diadoch	War	
	This	section	of	investigation	is	devoted	to	the	period	of	time	immediately	before	Cassander’s	return	to	Greece	in	the	spring	of	318,	with	Nicanor’s	occupation	of	the	Piraeus	and	Athens	until	 the	defeat	of	Polyperchon’s	 fleet	 at	Byzantium	 in	the	 summer	 of	 the	 same	 year.	 This	 was	 the	 point	 in	 time	 when	 the	 conflict	between	 Polyperchon	 and	 Cassander	 moved	 beyond	 political	 alliances	 and	posturing	with	hostilities	between	the	two	forces	coming	into	direct	and	deadly	contact	 with	 each	 other.	 In	 order	 to	 combat	 Cassander’s	 hold	 on	 southern	Greece,	Polyperchon	decided	 to	 launch	an	 invasion	of	 the	 region	alongside	his	son	Alexander,	first	into	Attica,	and	then	onto	the	Peloponnese	and	the	infamous	disaster	 at	 the	 siege	 of	 Megalopolis.	 The	 siege	 of	 Megalopolis	 was,	 quite	
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understandably,	the	most	prominent	event	during	Polyperchon’s	initial	venture	into	the	Peloponnese,735	however,	despite	the	sizable	focus	of	both	ancient	and	modern	writers,	 it	must	not	be	mistaken	as	being	representative	of	 the	overall	success	of	the	regent’s	campaign.		During	 this	 time,	 both	 Polyperchon	 and	 Cassander	 began	 to	 build	 on	 their	previously	 established	 support	 structures,	 employing	 them	against	 each	other.	In	 order	 to	 highlight	 his	 position	 as	 the	 official,	 legitimate	 regent	 of	Macedon,	Polyperchon	 endeavoured	 to	maintain	 a	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	 kings,	 thereby	continuing	 to	 link	 his	 public	 image	 to	 that	 of	 the	 royal	 family.	 This	 would	demonstrate	that	Cassander	was	actively	waging	a	war	not	against	Polyperchon,	but	against	the	royal	family.	In	contrast	Cassander	began	to	employ	what	Adams	has	aptly	described	as	a	“policy	of	coalition,”736	to	cement	his	position	in	Greece	and	combat	Polyperchon.	This	approach	emphasised	the	importance	Cassander	placed	on	working	in	cooperation	with	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi	during	military	 actions.	 By	 operating	 in	 conjunction	 with	 eminent	 figures	 such	 as	Antigonus,	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 and	 adding	 their	 military	 strength	 to	 his	own,	 Cassander	 would	 be	 able	 to	 operate	 with	 greater	 effectiveness	 and	increased	 military	 footprint	 against	 the	 regent.	 Cassander’s	 return	 to	 Greece,	with	 a	 fleet	 supplied	 to	 him	 by	 Antigonus,	 would	 see	 him	 focus	 on	 bringing	Athens	 itself	 under	 his	 control.	 From	 here,	 Cassander	would	 use	 the	 city	 as	 a	launching	point	to	expand	and	shore	up	his	influence	throughout	Greece.	Direct	military	conflict	between	Polyperchon	and	Cassander	would	eventuate	with	the	naval	conflicts	off	Byzantium,	where	Cassander	and	his	coalition	were	ultimately	victorious.			In	 southern	 Greece,	 it	 was	 imperative	 for	 the	 commander	 of	 Munychia’s	garrison,	Cassander’s	supporter	Nicanor,	to	secure	Athens	for	the	man	to	whom																																																									735	See	 for	example:	Fortina,	1965.	p.	32;	Adams,	1975.	p.	86;	Billows,	1990.	p.	86;	Bosworth.	Chiron,	22.	(1992).	pp.	69-70;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	198;	Carney,	2006.	p.	126;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	228;	Dixon,	 in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	p.	168;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	240;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Errington,	2010.	p.	213.	736	passim	 Adams.	 1975.	 more	 specifically	 for	 the	 events	 of	 318,	 see	 Adams,	1975.	pp.	78-87.	
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he	had	given	his	allegiance.737	This	needed	to	be	done	with	haste	as	he	expected	that,	 now	 that	 Cassander	was	 no	 longer	 in	 the	 Peninsula,	 Polyperchon	would	move	 down	 from	 Macedon	 into	 Attica	 with	 an	 army	 in	 order	 to	 attack	 the	supporters	 of	 Cassander.738	To	 facilitate	 Athenian	 acceptance,	 Nicanor	 played	upon	 the	 same	 sentiment	 that	 Polyperchon	 had	 used	 with	 Philip	 III’s	 exile	decree,	 offering	 Athens	 friendlier	 and	 more	 favourable	 circumstances	 should	they	 join	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater.	 The	 Athenians,	 however,	 rejected	 Nicanor’s	overtures.	 In	 order	 to	 keep	 the	 stability	 of	 Cassander’s	 powerbase	 intact,	Nicanor	responded	by	launching	an	attack	on	Athens.		By	the	winter	of	319/18	B.C.	he	had	secured	the	Piraeus.739		The	successful	acquisition	of	the	Piraeus	was	vital	 for	 Cassander.	 	 Possession	 of	 the	 harbour	 afforded	 him	 an	 entry	 point	through	which	he	could	return	from	Asia	Minor	with	the	military	forces	and	fleet	given	to	him	by	Antigonus.		During	 the	 course	 of	 318,	 a	 public	 relationship	 between	 Polyperchon	 and	Olympias	began	to	emerge.	While	it	appears	that	Olympias	was	still	unwilling	to	return	to	Macedon	in	318,	either	because	she	was	still	assessing	the	intentions	of	Polyperchon,	or	because	she	was	unable	to	make	the	journey,	she	was	willing	to	engage	with	diplomatic	affairs	beneficial	to	Polyperchon’s	cause.	Whether	her	goal	was	 to	demonstrate	her	support	 for	Polyperchon,	or	as	a	means	 to	attack	Cassander	and	his	 family	 for	 their	perceived	 role	 in	her	 son’s	death,	Olympias	became	an	active	 figure	 in	Greek	politics	and	 the	siege	of	Athens.	 	She	made	a	formal	request	for	Nicanor	to	respect	the	Athenians’	right	to	sovereignty	and	to	leave.	 Her	 actions	 were	 an	 explicit	 expression	 of	 Argead	 involvement	 in	 the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon,	an	involvement	which	positioned	Olympias	 in	 support	 of	 Polyperchon. 740 	Within	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 of	 the	involvement	 in	 siege	of	Athens	by	Olympias,	 the	historian	 states	 that	 “Nicanor																																																									737	Tritle,	1988.	p.	139.	738	Diod.	 18.64.1-2;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 pp.	 31-32;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 85;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 111;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2008.	 p.	 254,	 255-256;	 Adams,	 in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	213.	739	Diod.	18.64.3-4.	Though	the	city	itself	did	not	finally	capitulate	to	Cassander	until	the	winter	of	318/7	B.C.	Plut.	Phoc.	38.2;	cf.	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	245.	740	Diod.	18.65.1.	
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had	heard	that	the	kings	and	Polyperchon	were	going	to	bring	Olympias	back	to	
Macedonia…”741	This	may	be	the	result	of	the	benefit	of	hindsight	on	the	part	of	the	 historian	 given	 that	 Olympias	would	 eventually	 return	 to	Macedon	 in	 the	autumn	 of	 317	 B.C.742	Whether	 this	 is	 so	 or	 not,	 the	 letter	 sent	 to	 Nicanor	demanding	he	 resign	 from	his	 office	 in	Munychia	 and	 leave	 the	Piraeus	was	 a	clear	 statement	 of	 Olympias’	 desire	 to	 weaken	 Cassander’s	 position	 and	 to	support	Polyperchon.		Polyperchon	was	 not	 idle	 in	 the	 time	 Cassander	was	 absent	 from	Greece.	 Just	like	 Cassander,	 Polyperchon	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Piraeus	 in	relation	to	allowing	easier	movements	of	his	military	and	naval	resources.743	In	combination	with	 the	 letter	 that	Olympias	wrote	 to	Nicanor,	Polyperchon	sent	his	son	Alexander	to	Attica	with	an	army,	 in	the	spring	of	318	B.C.	744	This	was	done	with	the	goal	of	winning	the	support	of	the	Athenians	at	the	same	time	as	gaining	control	of	the	Piraeus.	For	Polyperchon,	the	support	of	the	Greeks	was	of	vital	 importance,	 and	 he	 embarked	 on	 a	 propaganda	 campaign	 into	 the	Peninsula	in	an	attempt	to	accomplish	this.745	Now	that	Cassander	had	the	open	support	 of	 Antigonus,	 Polyperchon	 would	 not	 have	 been	 able	 to	 draw	 on	support	 from	 Asia.	 This	 meant	 his	 only	 source	 of	 potential	 alliances	 and	additional	 strength	 would	 come	 from	 the	 Greek	 cities. 746 	The	 Athenians	welcomed	Alexander.	This	was	the	result	of	a	combination	of	the	decree	issued	by	 Philip	 III,	 which	 offered	 the	 city-states	 their	 freedom,	 and	 the	 respect	 the	Athenians	had	for	Olympias,747	who	the	Athenians	now	saw	as	being	in	alliance	with	Polyperchon.		Polyperchon	was	now	seen	as	a	liberator	who	would	return																																																									741	Dod.	 18.65.1.	 trans,	 Geer	 (1947):	 “ὁ	 [δὲ]	 Νικάνωρ	 ἀκούων	 ὅτι	 μέλλουσιν	 οἱ	
βασιλεῖς	καὶ	Πολυπέρχων	κατάγειν	εἰς	Μακεδονίαν	τὴν	Ὀλυμπιάδα…”	742	Diod.	 19.11.2;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 pp.	 35-36;	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 90-91;	 Heckel,	1992.	p.	199;	Carney,	2006.	pp.	75-76;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	183;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	pp.	213-214;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	 (2014).	p.	12;	cf.	Ch.	7.2.	pp.	213-214.	743	Diod.	18.66.2.		744	Diod.	 18.66.2;	 Plut.	 Phoc.	33.1;	 cf.	 Nepos.	 Phoc.	3.2-3;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 85;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	196;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20,	228.	745	Errington,	2008.	p.	23.	746	Green,	 in	 Palagia	&	Tracey,	 2003.	 p.	 6;	 Errington,	 2008.	 p.	 23;	 cf.	 Dmitriev,	2011.	pp.	113-114.	747	Diod.	18.65.2;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	256.	
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Munychia	 and	 the	 Piraeus	 to	 them.748	When	 Alexander	 had	 arrived	 near	 the	Piraeus,	he	held	a	series	of	diplomatic	meetings	with	the	Athenians,	discussing	whether	Polyperchon	meant	to	deliver	the	city	and	Munychia	back	into	Athenian	hands.749	It	was	made	clear	to	Nicanor,	via	secret	negotiation,	that	Polyperchon	had	 no	 intention	 of	 returning	 either	 the	 Piraeus	 or	 Athens	 itself	 back	 into	Athenian	 hands.750	This	 demonstrated	 that,	 even	 though	 Polyperchon	 wanted	Greek	support,	he	was	not	willing	to	hand	them	their	independence	in	return.	If	the	Greeks	were	 to	work	with	him,	it	was	 to	be	on	his	terms	and	in	accordance	with	the	exile’s	decree	proclaimed	by	Philip	III	earlier	in	the	year.	While	it	could	appear	that	Polyperchon	was	merely	offering	hollow	promises	of	freedom	to	the	Athenians	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 their	 allegiances,751	he	 must	 have	 hoped	 that	 the	special	status	he	had	given	to	 the	region	with	the	return	of	Samos	would	have	been	 enough	 to	 secure	 their	 support	 without	 giving	 the	 city	 independence.	 If	Polyperchon	allowed	Athens	to	shake	off	Macedonian	influence,	he	ran	the	very	real	 risk	 that	 the	 city	 may	 claim	 neutrality	 from	 the	 conflict,	 be	 overrun	 by	Cassander’s	forces	and	lost	to	his	own	efforts,	or	worse	begin	to	actively	support	Cassander	 against	 him.	 While	 the	 possibility	 of	 Cassander	 receiving	 popular	support	 from	 Athens	 is	 highly	 unlikely,	 given	 Athenian	 sentiment	 towards	previous	forms	of	Macedonian	subjugation	headed	by	Antipater,752	it	must	have	been	a	priority	for	Polyperchon	to	secure	Athens,	but	at	the	same	time	maintain	Macedonian	control,	albeit	in	a	less	rigid	form	than	it	had	experienced	in	recent	years.	 However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 true	 Greek	 freedom	 and	 independence	was	 of	little	concern	to	either	Cassander	or	Polyperchon.753	It	was	the	intention	of	both	
																																																								748	Diod.	18.65.3;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	257.	749	For	an	account	of	 these	events	and	Polyperchon’s	 time	 in	Athens,	 see	Diod.	18.65.4-6,	18.66;	Plut.	Phoc.	33.	750	Diod.	18.65.5;	Plut.	Phoc.	33.2-3.	Dixon	 (in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	pp.	 161-162)	 stresses	 the	 unlikelihood	 of	 Polyperchon	 ever	 truly	 offering	autonomy	 to	Athens.	 Tritle,	 1988.	 p.	 139;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2008.	 p.	 257;	 cf.	Dmetriev,	2011.	pp.	113-115.	751	Green,	in	Palagia	&	Tracey,	2003.	p.	5;	Errington,	2008.	p.24.	752	Particularly	 in	 light	 of	 the	 popular	 support	 for	 the	 regent	 as	 recorded	 by	Nepos	(Phoc.	3.1).	cf.	Blackwell,	1999.	p.	75.	n.	128.	753	Green,	in	Palagia	&	Tracey,	2003.	pp.	5-6.	
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men	 to	 use	 the	 southern	 Greek	 cities	 for	 their	 personal	 gain, 754 	to	simultaneously	 build	 their	 own	 influence	 while	 detracting	 from	 that	 of	 their	opponent.	
	It	 was	 during	 these	 negotiations	 between	 Alexander	 and	 the	 Athenians	 that	Cassander	arrived	from	Asia	Minor	to	the	Piraeus,	with	the	fleet	and	army	given	to	 him	 by	 Antigonus.	 From	 here	 he	 took	 over	 command	 of	 the	 Piraeus	 and	allowed	 Nicanor	 to	 return	 to	 his	 governorship	 of	 Munychia.755	When	 news	 of	Cassander’s	 arrival	 reached	 Polyperchon,	 he	moved	with	 his	 large	 army	 from	Phocis	where	he	had	been	staying	with	the	kings	to	Athens,	to	the	Piraeus,	with	the	intention	of	laying	siege	to	Cassander,	denying	him	access	into	the	interior	of	Greece.756	Polyperchon	had	been	travelling	with	the	kings	 in	order	 to	maintain	support	 for	 the	 Macedonian	 monarchy	 and	 by	 extension,	 build	 support	 for	himself,757	from	 royal	 sympathisers	 within	 the	 Greek	 Peninsula	 in	 his	 role	 as	regent.758		Polyperchon	 realised	 that	 he	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	maintain	 the	 siege	 against	Cassander	in	the	Piraeus.	Due	to	the	scale	of	his	military	forces,	he	was	unable	to	draw	on	enough	supplies	to	feed	his	troops	in	order	to	continue	the	pressure	he	was	 exerting	on	 the	harbour.	Therefore,	 he	 left	Attica	with	 the	majority	of	 his	troops	and	marched	to	the	Peloponnese,	with	the	goal	of	finding	fresh	supplies	from	among	the	city-states	located	there.759	Diodorus	uses	the	phrasing	“to	force	
obedience	 of	 the	 kings	 upon	 the	Megalopolis.”760	This	 reliance	 on	 the	 authority	conferred	 by	 the	 kings	 and	 military	 might,	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 the																																																									754	Plut.	 Phoc.	 32;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 85;	 Hughes,	 2008.	 pp.	 219-220;	 Dmitriev,	2011.	pp.	114-115.	755	Diod.	18.68.1.	756	Diod.	 18.68.2-3.	 Diodorus	 states	 that	 Polyperchon	 had	 an	 army	 of	 around	25,000	troops,	when	he	ventured	south	(cf.	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	213).	757	In	much	 the	 same	manner	 as	 Perdiccas	 had	 done	 with	 the	 kings	 when	 he	journeyed	to	Asia	Minor	in	323	(cf.	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	11;	Ch.	5.1.	p.	116).	758	Diod.	18.68.3.	759	Diod.	18.68.3;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	213.	760 	Diod.	 18.68.3.	 trans,	 Geer.	 1947:	 “…συναναγκάσων	 τοὺς	 Μεγαλοπολίτας	
πειθαρχεῖν	τοῖς	βασιλεῦσιν…”	
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Peloponnese	contained	several	pro-Cassandrian	oligarchies.	In	order	to	facilitate	his	 demands,761	Polyperchon	 needed	 to	 call	 on	 past	 understandings	 of	what	 it	meant	to	be	regent	and	to	work	within	the	capacity	of	his	office	as	regent	to	the	kings	in	order	to	further	his	own	personal	goals.	
	Polyperchon	now	focussed	his	attention	on	the	Peloponnese.	The	majority	of	the	cities	either	gave	him	their	support	or	were	destroyed	by	his	army.762	It	seems	that	 Polyperchon	 was	 neither	 able	 nor	 willing	 to	 take	 the	 time	 necessary	 for	lengthy	 negotiations	 with	 the	 cities,	 instead	 electing	 to	 take	 drastic	 action	against	 them.	Megalopolis	 was	 the	 only	 city	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 that	 held	 out	against	Polyperchon	and	refused	to	submit	to	his	demands.	The	oligarchy	of	the	city	 had	 been	 installed	 by	 Antipater	 and	was	 supportive	 of	 Cassander.763	This	pro-Antipatrid	support	does	at	 the	very	 least	suggest	that	Megalopolis	was	the	sole	 city	 within	 the	 region	 that	 was	 hostile	 to	 Polyperchon.	 Due	 to	 their	resistance,	Polyperchon	chose	to	lay	siege	to	the	city.764	The	siege	was	a	disaster.	He	 was	 unable	 to	 take	 the	 city	 within	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time	 and	 suffered	substantial	losses,	including	the	loss	of	several	of	his	war	elephants.765	Realising	that	he	would	not	be	able	to	take	the	city	as	quickly	as	he	wished,	Polyperchon	split	his	 forces,	 leaving	some	to	continue	the	siege,	while	taking	the	remainder	with	him	and	leaving.766	Diodorus	states	that	Polyperchon	left	in	order	to	pursue	more	necessary	business,767	though	he	does	not	say	exactly	what	 this	business	was.	Possibly	the	business	alluded	to	could	have	been	Polyperchon	returning	to	
																																																								761	Heckel,	1992.	p.	197.	762	Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 197;	 Diodorus’	 account	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 campaign	 in	 the	Peloponnese	is	brief	and	does	not	name	the	cities	in	question	that	turned	over	to	Polyperchon	or	were	destroyed.	763	Heckel,	1992.	p.	197.	764Diod.	18.69.4.	For	 the	account	of	 the	siege	of	Megalopolis,	 see	Diod.	18.70	–	72.	765	Diod.	 18.70.1-5.	 For	 the	 importance	 and	 role	 of	 elephants	 in	 Hellenistic	warfare,	see:	Epplett,	in	Heckel,	Tritle,	&	Wheatley,	2007.	pp.	209	–	232.	766	Diod.	18.72.1.	767	Diod.	18.72.1.	“ἐφ᾽ἑτέρας	ἀναγκαιοτέρας	πράξεις	ἐτρέπετο.”	
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Macedon	 in	 preparation	 for	 the	 planned	 expedition	 into	Asia	Minor	 to	 aid	 his	ally	Eumenes.768	
	Polyperchon’s	 inability	 to	 gain	 either	 control	 of	 or	 influence	 over	Megalopolis	would	have	 a	devastating	 effect	 upon	his	 relationship	with,	 and	 support	 from,	the	city-states.	As	a	result	of	this	failure,	he	lost	face	among	many	of	his	allies	in	Greece.	 He	 was	 treated	 with	 contempt,	 with	 many	 former	 allies	 deciding	 to	abandon	 their	 support,	 instead	 positioning	 themselves	 in	 support	 of	Cassander.769	However,	 as	 Beloch	 identifies,	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 regarding	 the	number	 of	 cities	 lost	 to	 the	 regent’s	 cause,	 is	 exaggerated. 770 	Certainly	Polyperchon	may	have	lost	a	number	of	supporters	due	the	failure	of	the	siege	of	Megalopolis,	 but	 Diodorus’	 assertion	 that	 most	 cities	 were	 lost	 is	 overly	accentuated.771	However	 loss	 of	 support	 from	 the	 Greek	 cities	 is	 important	because,	 without	 the	 ability	 to	 draw	 on	 military	 forces	 and	 resources	 from	within	 Greece,	 Polyperchon	 was	 restricted	 in	 his	 movements	 in	 Greece.	Additionally,	 by	 losing	 support	 to	 Cassander,	 Polyperchon	 would	 now	 face	 a	stronger	Cassander	while	his	own	position	was	greatly	weakened.			There	 is	 no	 question	 that	 the	 siege	 of	 Megalopolis	 was	 a	 failure	 for	Polyperchon’s	 efforts	 to	 secure	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 against	Cassander	 and	 his	 allies,	 but	 it	 must	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 regent’s	Peloponnesian	Campaign	in	318	was,	on	the	whole,	a	success.	Far	from	being	a	total	 disaster,	 as	 has	 been	 previously	 suggested,772	Polyperchon	 was	 able	 to	sway	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 cities	 in	 the	 region	 to	 his	 cause,	 creating	 a	 solid,																																																									768 	Paschidis,	 Tekmeria.	 9.	 (2008).	 p.	 240;	 cf.	 Diod.	 18.57.3-4;	 For	 more	discussion	on	Polyperchon’s	unattested	campaign	into	Asia	Minor,	see:	Ch.	7.1.	769	Diod.	18.73.1.	770	Beloch,	IV2	1924.	p.	440;	cf.	Heckel,	1992.	p.	198.	n.	139.	771		Indeed	it	was	around	this	time	that	Polyperchon	had	been	able	to	build	bases	of	 support	 in	 mainland	 Greece	 that	 would	 prove	 invaluable	 as	 the	 conflict	against	 Cassander	 progressed.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 with	 the	 Aetolians,	 who	would	play	a	pivotal	role	against	Cassander	following	his	successful	invasion	of	Macedon	in	317/16.	cf.	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	197-196.	For	more	discussion,	see:	Ch.	7.2.	772	see	 for	 example:	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	&	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 213;	 Carney,	
Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	11.	
	 182	
committed	 area	 of	 support.	 The	 perception	 that	 the	 campaign	was	 an	 overall	disaster	may	 lie	 in	 the	 sole	 account	 of	 the	 action	 as	 recorded	 by	 Diodorus.773	However	 the	 historian’s	 account	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 time	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 is	brief,	 transmitting	only	minimal	 information.	No	city	other	 than	Megalopolis	 is	mentioned,	resulting	in	a	distortion	in	the	importance	of	the	failed	siege	to	the	campaign	 overall.	 Whether	 the	 reason	 for	 Peloponnesian	 dissatisfaction	 was	with	Cassander’s	rule,	Polyperchon’s	appeal	or	a	combination	of	the	two,	is	not	known.774	But	 what	 is	more	 certain	 is	 that,	 despite	 the	 numerous,	 substantial	efforts	 Cassander	 would	 embark	 upon	 to	 extricate	 Polyperchon	 from	 his	position	 in	 southern	Greece,775	the	Peloponnese	would	 remain	 a	 stronghold	of	influence	 and	 stalwart	 support	 for	 Polyperchon,	 which	 would	 exist	 for	 the	remainder	of	the	conflict	with	Cassander.	
	During	 the	 time	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 campaigning	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	Cassander	was	 also	 acquiring	 Greek	 support	 in	much	 the	 same	 fashion	 as	 his	rival,	that	is	through	military	force.	Using	the	Piraeus	as	his	base	of	operations,	Cassander	sailed	his	fleet	to	Aegina	where	he	was	able	to	secure	the	allegiance	of	the	 city.776	Cassander	 subsequently	 moved	 on	 with	 a	 well-equipped	 army	 to	besiege	Salamis.777	Polyperchon	could	not	afford	 to	allow	Cassander	 to	 further	his	influence	in	southern	Greece	and	sent	a	relief	force	to	Salamis,	breaking	the	siege.	Cassander	chose	to	abandon	his	operations	for	the	time	being	and	return	to	 the	 relative	 security	 of	 the	 Piraeus,	where	 he	would	 remain	 until	 after	 the	siege	 of	 Megalopolis	 had	 concluded.778	Cassander’s	 expedition	 out	 from	 the	Piraeus	was	not	a	successful	one.779	However	it	did	demonstrate	the	strength	of	the	opposition	that	Polyperchon	offered.	Even	though	he	was	on	campaign,	with																																																									773	Diod.	18.69.3-18.72.	774	Dixon	 (in	 Heckel,	 Tritle	 &	 Wheatley,	 2007.	 pp.	 159-60)	 does	 suggest	 that	Polyperchon	may	 have	 achieved	 some	 support	 via	 diplomatic	means	with	 the	
synedroi	of	the	League	of	Corinth.	775	See	 Ch.	 7.1.	 for	 the	 unsuccessful	 invasions	 of	 317	 and	 316,	 Ch.	 8.1.	 for	Cassander’s	failed	efforts	of	315.	776	Diod.	 18.69.1;	 Polyaen.	 4.11.1-2;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 85;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	261.	777	Diod.	19.69.1.	778	Diod.	18.69.2.	779	Adams,	1975.	p.	85.	
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forces	in	both	the	Peloponnese	and	in	Athens,	Polyperchon	was	still	able	to	draw	on	 enough	 military	 strength	 to	 force	 Cassander	 to	 retreat	 to	 his	 base	 of	operations	in	the	Piraeus.		Knowing	 that	 Lysimachus,	 who	 controlled	 the	 Hellespont,	 was	 an	 ally	 of	Cassander,	Polyperchon	could	expect	additional	reinforcements	for	Cassander	to	come	from	Antigonus,	entering	into	Europe	from	Asia	Minor.	In	the	summer	of	318,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 this	 happening,	 Polyperchon	 sent	 his	 admiral	Cleitus	with	his	entire	fleet	to	the	vicinity	of	the	Hellespont	in	order	to	ambush	any	crossing	troops.780	Polyperchon	wanted	to	show	that	he	was	both	defending	and	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 royal	 house.	 	 To	 demonstrate	 that	 Antigonus	 and	Cassander	 were	 working	 against	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 simultaneously	 that	 he	was	working	for	their	benefit,	Polyperchon	ordered	Cleitus781	to	collect	Philip	III	and	his	 forces	 and	 take	 them	with	 him	 to	 the	Hellespont.782	This	was	 done	 so	that	 Phillip	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 active	 participant	 in	 any	 action	 against	Cassander’s	troops.783			Cassander	 reacted	 to	 this	 by	 sending	 the	 entirety	 of	 his	 own	 fleet	 under	 the	command	 of	 Nicanor	 to	 confront	 Polyperchon.784	The	 ensuing	 naval	 actions	would	 be	 pivotal	 to	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 in	 their	 battle	 for	domination	 of	 Greece	 and	Macedon	 itself.	 Because	 the	 entirety	 of	 each	man’s	fleet	would	 confront	 each	 other,	 naval	 supremacy	would	 be	 the	 result	 for	 the	victor.	This	would	mean	that	if	Cassander’s	forces	were	victorious,	he	would	be	able	 to	 draw	on	 forces	 from	Antigonus	without	 obstruction.	 Conversely,	 if	 the	victory	went	to	Polyperchon,	it	would	restrict	Cassander’s	movements	and	troop	numbers,	potentially	allowing	Polyperchon	to	drive	Cassander	out	from	Greece	and	cement	his	hold	on	the	Regency	of	Macedon.																																																										780	Diod.	18.72.2.	781	For	more	on	Cleitus,	see	Heckel,	2006.	p.	87	s.v.	“Cleitus	[3]”.	782	Philip	 III	 had	withdrawn	with	 his	 forces	 to	 Cianoi	 (Cius),	 presumably	 from	the	siege	at	Megalopolis	(cf.	Diod.	18.72.2.).	783	Diod.	18.72.2.	784	Diod.	18.72.2.	
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The	two	fleets	met	near	Byzantium,	where	at	first	Cleitus	was	the	victor	and	was	able	 to	 capture	 many	 of	 Nicanor’s	 ships.785	Despite	 his	 initial	 success,	 Cleitus	was	thwarted	the	night	after	the	battle	when	Antigonus	and	Nicanor	were	able	to	 combine	 their	 forces	 and	 attack	 under	 the	 cover	 of	 darkness.786	Because	 of	this	 action	 during	 the	 night	 by	 the	 forces	 of	 Nicanor	 and	 Antigonus,	Polyperchon’s	 fleet	 was	 either	 sunk	 or	 captured.	 Cleitus	 was	 killed	 by	Lysimachus’	 soldiers	 during	 his	 flight	 from	 the	 field.787 	Once	 Nicanor	 had	defeated	Polyperchon’s	naval	 forces,	Cassander	achieved	greater	control	 in	 the	Aegean,	and	would	now	be	able	to	bring	in	more	troops	to	bolster	his	presence	in	Europe	and	further	support	his	claim	to	the	regency	of	Macedon.	
	The	defeat	of	Polyperchon’s	naval	forces	off	Byzantium	would	go	down	as	one	of	the	regent’s	major	defeats	over	the	course	of	the	conflict	with	Cassander,	and	if	hindsight	is	employed,	can	be	seen	as	the	beginning	of	the	end	for	Polyperchon’s	effort	 to	 maintain	 his	 hold	 on	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	however,	 that	 if	 the	 approach	 of	 hindsight	 is	 used,	 the	 expectation	 that	Polyperchon	would	emerge	victorious	from	the	might	of	Cassander,	Antigonus,	Lysimachus	 and	Ptolemy	 once	 their	 forces	 combined	 is	 unrealistic.	 As	Hughes	has	already	noted,	Polyperchon	was	aware	that	he	was	not	on	an	equal	military	footing	to	Cassander,788	which	required	him	to	take	a	more	diplomatic	approach	to	 undermine	 Cassandrean	 support,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 embark	 upon	 military	endeavours	against	individual	Greek	cities	which	did	not	choose	to	side	with	the	regent.	 While	 there	 were	 examples	 of	 Polyperchon	 being	 unsuccessful	 in	securing	 an	 extensive	 support	 base	 in	 southern	 Greece,	 particularly	 in	 the	examples	of	Athens	and	Megalopolis,	it	must	be	noted	that	he	was	in	fact	able	to	build	 a	 body	 of	 support	 in	 southern	 Greece,	 centred	 around	 the	 Peloponnese,	which	would	remain	loyal	to	his	cause	for	the	entirety	of	the	conflict.	What	the	conflict	at	Byzantium	does	mark	however,	is	the	last	reference	to	Polyperchon’s	
																																																								785	Diod.	18.72.3.	Diodorus	claims	that	forty	of	Nicanor’s	ships	were	captured	by	Cleitus.	For	Diodorus’	complete	account	of	the	battles,	see	Diod.	18.72.	786	Diod.	18.72.3.	787	Diod.	18.72.3.	788	Hughes,	2008.	p.	219.	
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whereabouts	until	his	journey	to	Epirus	in	317	to	accompany	Olympias	back	to	Macedon.789		The	period	of	time	following	the	installation	of	Polyperchon	as	the	new	regent	of	Macedon	following	Antipater’s	death	demonstrated	stark	differences	in	the	way	Polyperchon	 and	 the	 rebellious	 Cassander	 would	 choose	 to	 structure	 their	respective	 efforts	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	 Europe.	 Polyperchon,	 as	 the	 regent	 of	Macedon	and	Argead	supporter,	chose	to	engage	with	the	royal	family	as	well	as	to	 draw	 on	 groups	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 Macedonian	 monarchy.	 In	 an	 almost	diametrically	opposed	approach,	Cassander	 sought	 support	 from	 the	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	forming	strong	alliances	with	Lysimachus,	Ptolemy	and	for	the	time	 being,	 Antigonus,	 as	 well	 as	 relying	 upon	 the	 oligarchies	 established	 by	Antipater	 during	 Alexander	 III’s	 expansion	 of	 the	Macedonian	 Empire.	 By	 the	time	of	Cassander’s	 return	 to	 the	European	Sphere	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire,	he	 was	 able	 to	 return	 to	 a	 region	 where	 support	 structures	 were	 already	 in	place,	while	Polyperchon	was	forced	to	react	to	Cassander’s	movements	rather	than	 pre-emptively	 forcing	 Cassander’s	 response.	 While	 Cassander	 would	continue	to	build	upon	the	achievements	of	319/318,	Polyperchon	would	do	the	same,	and	the	coming	year	would	see	him	attempt	to	strike	against	Cassander’s	main	military	 and	 financial	 backer,	 Antigonus.	 	 It	 would	 also	 see	 the	 entry	 of	Olympias	into	the	fray,	bringing	with	her	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	approaches	of	both	Polyperchon	and	Cassander	 in	 their	 struggle	 for	 control	 in	Greece	and	Macedon.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									789	For	more	on	Olympias’	return	to	Macedon,	see:	Ch.	7.2.	
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Chapter	7:	The	Changing	of	the	Guard.790	
	This	 chapter	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 events	 following	 Cassander’s	 victory	 over	Polyperchon’s	forces	at	Byzantium	and	his	successful	return	to	Macedon	in	the	winter	 of	 317/16	 after	 Olympias	 has	 returned	 to	 the	 region.	 The	 interval	between	the	summer	of	318	and	the	winter	of	317/16	would	see	a	massive	shift	in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 the	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	eventuate	 in	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	 Adea	 Eurydice,	 and	culminate	 in	 the	 expulsion	 of	 Polyperchon	 from	Macedon	 to	 his	 supporters	 in	the	 Peloponnese.	 As	 with	 previous	 chapters,	 this	 segment	 of	 investigation	 is	divided	into	three	sections.	This	first	of	these	covers	the	period	of	time	directly	after	the	defeat	of	Polyperchon’s	fleet	by	Cassander	and	his	allies	in	the	summer	of	318	until	Cassander’s	return	to	southern	Greece	following	his	first	incursion	into	 the	Macedonian	 homeland	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 317.	 The	 second	 segment	 is	devoted	to	the	events	surrounding	Cassander’s	successful	conquest	of	Macedon	after	the	return	of	Olympias	from	Epirus	and	the	spate	of	executions	within	the	Macedonian	Homeland	that	took	place	in	the	region	soon	after	her	arrival.	The	final	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 engages	 with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Cassander	consolidated	 his	 position	 within	 Macedon	 after	 the	 execution	 of	 Olympias,	marking	this	as	a	drastic	shift	in	his	interactions	with	the	Argead	family.	It	was	during	 this	 time	 that	 Cassander	 shifted	 from	 one	 who	 had	 distanced	 himself	from	the	royal	 family,	to	actively	engaging	with,	and	integrating	himself	within	this	family.	However,	the	situation	for	Cassander	was	not	entirely	favourable,	as	friction	within	the	alliance	with	Antigonus	began	to	emerge,	culminating	in	the	termination	 of	 the	 Antipatrid-Antigonid	 alliance	 in	 315	 with	 casus	 bellorum	being	levelled	by	both	sides.		
																																																								790	Portions	of	this	chapter	have	been	presented	at	the	ASCS.	34.	Conference	held	at	 Macquarie	 University	 in	 2013,	 the	 AMPHORAE.	 9.	 Conference	 held	 at	 the	University	of	Sydney	in	2013,	the	ASCS.	35.	Conference	held	at	Massey	University	in	2014	and	the	ASCS	36.	Conference	held	at	the	University	of	Adelaide	in	2015.	I	extend	my	 sincere	 thanks	 and	 appreciation	 to	 all	 those	who	 attended	 and	 the	feedback	they	provided.	
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Now	that	he	had	lost	his	supporter	in	Olympias,	Polyperchon	departed	Macedon	for	 the	 support	 base	 he	 had	 developed	 in	 southern	 Greece	 in	 319/18,	 from	where	 he	 continued	 his	 struggle	 against	 Cassander	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	conflict.	 Polyperchon’s	 cause	was	by	no	means	 lost	 as,	 even	 though	Antigonus	and	Cassander	had	ended	their	friendship,	this	did	not	result	in	the	cessation	of	Antigonid	 interests	 in	 Europe.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 Antigonus	 dispatched	 his	 officer,	Aristodemus,	 to	 the	Peloponnese	with	 the	 intention	of	 creating	a	new	alliance,	this	time	with	Polyperchon.		
7.1	Cassander’s	first	attempt	at	Macedon	
	Following	 Polyperchon’s	 defeat	 at	 Byzantium,	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 substantial	portion	of	his	naval	forces	and	more	importantly,	the	loss	of	prestige	among	the	Macedonian	 nobility	 and	 several	 of	 the	 Greek	 cities,	 the	 regent	 and	 his	movements	 disappear	 from	 the	 extant	 ancient	 literary	 accounts,	 and	 remain	absent	 from	 the	 records	 until	 his	 reappearance	 in	 Epirus	 and	 the	 return	 of	Olympias	to	Macedon	in	the	autumn	of	317.791	During	this	time,	in	the	summer	of	 317,792	Cassander	was	 able	 to	 launch	 his	 first	 venture	 into	 the	Macedonian	homeland	 from	 Athens.793	There	 is	 sparse	 reference	 to	 this	 action,	 with	 only	Diodorus	 as	 an	 authority,	 conveying	 the	 endeavours	 in	 a	 highly	 compressed	fashion	 providing	 little	 detail	 on	 the	 events	 that	 took	 place.	 One	 piece	 of	information	 conveyed	 from	Diodorus’	 narrative	 is	 that	 Cassander	was	 able	 to	take	possession	of	a	significant	number	of	Polyperchon’s	war-elephants.794	The	campaign	 itself	 has	 received	 little	 attention	 from	modern	 scholars	who,	when	engaging	 with	 Cassander’s	 actions	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 317,	 view	 his	 first	
																																																								791	Diod.	19.11.2;	cf.	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	81;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	141,	149.	792	Fortina,	1965.	p.	35;	Adams,	1975.	pp.	88-89;	Bosworth,	Chiron,	22	(1992).	p.	81;	 Adams,	 Balkan	 Studies.	 34.	 (1993).	 p.	 210;	 Boiy,	 2007.	 p.	 141;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	42-43;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	273;	cf.	Adams,	2010.	pp.	213-214;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25	(2014).	p.	12.	793	Diod.	18.75.1,	19.35.7.	794 	Diod.	 19.35.7:	 These	 in	 addition	 to	 already	 depleted	 numbers	 of	Polyperchon’s	 elephantine	 troops	 that	 resulted	 from	 the	 failed	 siege	 at	Megalopolis.	cf.	Ch.	6.3.	pp.	181-182.	
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expedition	 into	 the	 region	 as	 a	 failed	 invasion	 by	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater.795	The	brevity	of	the	account	by	Diodorus,	our	only	authority	on	the	matter,	means	that	all	evaluations	of	the	events	at	this	time	in	Europe	are	reliant	on	some	level	of	hypothetical	reconstruction	and	speculation.	While	an	argumentum	ex	silentio	is	never	a	desirable	endeavour,	if	the	limitations	are	kept	in	mind,796	it	is	possible	to	suggest	a	more	satisfactory	understanding	of	the	events	after	the	summer	of	318	and	Cassander’s	return	to	the	south	in	the	autumn	of	the	same	year.		So	what	information	can	be	gleaned	from	Diodorus’	account	that	could	allow	for	discussion	 and	 evaluation	 of	 Cassander’s	 first	 campaign	 into	Macedon?	While	the	historian	makes	reference	to	Cassander’s	first	venture	into	Macedon	on	two	separate	occasions,797	in	neither	instance	does	Diodorus	elaborate	on	the	action	beyond	 mentioning	 its	 occurrence. 798 	In	 the	 first	 reference,	 Cassander’s	movements	 north	 are	 contained	 within	 the	 concluding	 chapter	 of	 Diodorus’	Eighteenth	 Book.	 Here,	 the	 historian	 heavily	 compresses	 the	 period	 of	 time	following	 Nicanor’s	 victory	 off	 Byzantium	 and	 Cassander’s	 first	 campaign,	resulting	 in	 little	 information	being	 transmitted	 from	his	authoritative	 sources	into	 his	 text.	 Regarding	 the	 campaign,	 Diodorus	 states,	 “…he	 [Cassander]	
campaigned	 into	Macedon	 and	 brought	many	 of	 those	 there,	 because	 they	were	
there,	over	to	him.”799	The	timing	of	this	section	of	the	Bibliotheke	can	be	dated	to	the	 first	 half	 of	 317	 by	 the	 execution	 of	 Nicanor	 by	 Cassander	 following	 his	return	to	Athens	after	 the	Bosporus	engagements	on	the	grounds	that	Nicanor	had	 now	 fallen	 into	 disrepute	 with	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater.800		 This	 provides	 a																																																									795	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22	(1992).	p.	64;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	141;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	 p.	 243.	 Certainly	 Diodorus	 uses	 the	 term	 στρατεύω	 (Diod.	 18.75.2,	19.35.7)	 to	 describe	 the	 action	 by	 Cassander,	 which	 may	 lead	 to	 the	interpretation	of	Cassander’s	action	as	being	an	outright	invasion.	796	See	chapter	2.3	on	the	limitations	and	possibilities	of	so	called	“arguments	from	silence.”	797	Diod.	18.75.1-2,	19.35.7.	798	As	noted	by	Anson,	2014.	p.	99.	799	Diod.	 18.75.1:	 “ἐστράτευσε	 δὲ	 καὶ	 εἰς	 Μακεδονίαν	 καὶ	 πολλοὺς	 ἔσχε	 τῶν	
ἐγχωρίων	 ἀφισταμένους	 πρὸς	 αὐτον.”	 cf.	 trans.	 Geer.	 1947.	 “He	 also	 made	 a	
campaign	into	Macedonia	where	he	found	many	of	the	inhabitants	coming	over	to	
him.”	cf.	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	p.	273;	Anson,	2014.	p.	99.	800	Beloch,	IV.1	1924.	p.	106;	Fortina,	1965.	p.	34;	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	64;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	111;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	178;	Boiy,	2007.	p.	69.	with	
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relatively	firm	terminus	post	quem	 for	Cassander’s	first	venture	north	as	taking	place	after	Nicanor’s	death.	No	record	of	how	successful	 the	campaign	was	exists	 in	this	specific	section	of	Diodorus,	 but	 Cassander’s	 reappearance	 in	 the	 sources	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	during	 the	 siege	 of	 the	 city	 of	Tegea,801	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 he	was	not	 able	 to	conquer	the	Macedonian	homeland.	A	reason	for	Diodorus’	brevity	in	regards	to	Cassander’s	movements	during	the	summer	of	317	is	available.	Whether	or	not	more	 information	existed	regarding	 the	matter	 in	Diodorus’	 source	material	 is	not	 possible	 to	 answer	 with	 any	 satisfaction,	 but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Diodorus’	interests	not	longer	lay	in	events	occurring	in	Europe	during	the	middle	of	317.	Rather	his	aim	was	to	bring	his	eighteenth	book	to	an	end	in	order	to	shift	his	focus	 away	 from	Macedonian	 and	Greek	 affairs	 over	 to	Agathocles	 and	 events	taking	place	in	Syracuse	and	Italy.802	This	shift	of	focus	results	in	the	loss	of	vital	information	 that	 could	 shed	 further	 light	 on	 Cassander’s	 first	 mission	 into	Macedon.		The	only	other	reference	to	Cassander’s	movements	in	the	summer	of	317	is	found	later	in	Diodorus’	history	where	events	of	the	winter	of	317/16	are	discussed.	 Here	 the	 reference	 is	 contained	 within	 the	 context	 of	 events	preceding	 the	 siege	of	Pydna	 and	Cassander’s	 second	 campaign	 into	Macedon,	when	Cassander	had	confined	Olympias	and	her	forces	in	the	city.803		The	 lack	of	 information	provided	by	Diodorus’s	brief	references,	as	well	as	the	absence	of	corroborating	evidence	from	other	ancient	sources,	means	that	there	has,	 understandably,	 been	 little	 thorough	 discussion	 by	 modern	 scholars	regarding	 Cassander’s	 first	 venture	 into	 Macedon	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 317.	The	majority	of	evaluations	of	this	event	fall	into	two	categories;	either	the	event	is	 glossed	 over	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 focus	 on	 Cassander’s	 successful	 invasion	 of																																																																																																																																																															the	 installation	 of	 Nicanor’s	 successor,	 Demetrius	 of	 Phalerum.	 cf.	 Pol.	 Strat.	4.11.2;	Marmor	Parium,	FGrH.	239.		B.	13.		801	Diod.	 19.11.1,	 19.35.1.	 Presumably	 Tegea	was	 one	 of	 the	 cities	 that	 turned	over	to	Polyperchon’s	cause	during	his	Peloponnesian	campaigns	in	318	(cf.	Ch.	6.2.).	802	Diod.	18.75.3,	19.1;	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	 (1992).	p.	71;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	pp.	273-274;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	240.	803	Diod.	19.35.7.	 For	 further	discussion	of	Cassander’s	 return	 to	Macedon,	 see	Ch.	7.2.	
	 190	
Macedon	during	the	winter	of	317/16,	or	the	event	is	ignored	entirely.804	There	has	been	a	level	of	moderate	evaluation,	most	notably	by	Bosworth,805	and	more	recently	by	Paschidis.806	However,	it	must	be	stated	that	Cassander’s	movements	in	317	are	not	central	to	either	Bosworth’s	or	Paschidis’	arguments.		The	lack	of	attention	that	Cassander’s	first	campaign	into	Macedon	has	received	by	 both	 ancient	 and	modern	writers	 is	 understandable.	 The	 time	 he	 spent	 in	Macedon	was	short	and	on	the	whole,	unremarkable,	as	Bosworth	summarises	“Cassander’s	 invasion	 had	 been	 inconclusive.	 He	 failed	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 the	
country	and	withdrew,	but	he	withdrew	alive	and	in	possession	of	a	good	number	
of	 Polyperchon’s	 elephants.” 807 	Paschidis	 echoes	 Bosworth’s	 evaluation	 and	highlights	 the	 short	 time	 he	 spent	 in	Macedon,	 “We	know	 that	he	 [Cassander]	
enjoyed	 some	 success,	 since	 he	 captured	 some	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 elephants,	 but	
obviously	 failed	 to	consolidate	his	 sway	over	Macedonia,	otherwise	he	would	not	
return	 so	 hastily	 to	 the	 Peloponnese.”808	Cassander’s	 first	 campaign	 took	 place	between	two	significant	events	within	Greek	and	Macedonian	politics,	 the	high	profile	 execution	 of	 Nicanor	 and	 Cassander’s	 conquest	 of	 Macedon,	 some	 six	months	 after	 this	 initial	 venture.	 Both	 of	 these	 events	 drastically	 altered	 the	political	landscape	in	Greece	and	Macedon	and	would	draw	the	attention	of	the	ancient	sources.809	Because	of	the	perceived	banality	of	the	first	campaign,	with	no	 significant	 victories	 or	 gains	 other	 than	 Cassander’s	 gains	 in	 support	 from	various	cities	 in	Greece	 taking	place	or	being	recorded	by	 the	ancient	 sources,	the	venture	itself	can	easily	be	overlooked.		
																																																								804	But	also	see:	Beloch,	IV.1	1924.	pp.	105-106;	Fortina,	1965.	pp.	33-36;	Adams,	1975.	pp.	89-91,	though	Adams	later	explicitly	acknowledges	that	the	expedition	took	 place	 (Adams,	 Makedonia.	 3.	 (1977).	 p.	 20;	 Adams,	 Balkan	 Studies.	 34.	(1993).	 p.	 210;);	 Errington,	 Hermes.	 105.	 (1977),	 p.	 495;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	2003,	p.	42;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	80;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2008.	pp.	273-274.	805	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	pp.	55-81.	806	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	pp.	233-250.	807	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	64.	808	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	243.	809	For	 an	 in-depth	 investigation	 of	 Athens	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 Demetrius	 of	Phalerum,	see	O’Sullivan,	2009.	
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When	 placed	 in	 proximity	 to	 the	 later	 events	 during	 the	 winter	 of	 317/16,	Cassander’s	 first	 venture	 into	 Macedon	 can,	 and	 has,	 been	 viewed	 as	 a	 failed	attempt	by	the	son	of	Antipater	to	 launch	an	invasion	of	the	region	in	order	to	wrest	control	 from	Polyperchon	and	his	allies.810	The	invasion	had	some	initial	success,	however	it	soon	stagnated,	forcing	Cassander’s	return	to	the	south	and	onto	the	Peloponnese	where	he	re-emerges	into	the	source	tradition	at	the	siege	of	Tegea.811	The	nature	of	Cassander’s	mission	is	not	in	question;	Diodorus’	use	of	 the	 verbs	 στρατεύω812	and	 ἐμβολή813	make	 it	 clear	 that	 this	 was	 a	military	action,	although	the	hypothesis	that	the	action	was	explicitly	an	 invasion	 is	not	the	only	interpretation	available.		While	the	outline	of	events	set	out	by	Bosworth	and	expanded	upon	by	Paschidis	is	not	in	question,	there	are	a	number	of	unhelpful	issues	that	arise	from	such	an	interpretation,	 which	 require	 careful	 consideration	 if	 it	 is	 chosen	 to	 view	Cassander’s	 action	 specifically	 as	 an	 invasion.	 Interpretation	 of	 Cassander’s	actions	as	an	invasion	may	employ	a	collapsing	of	the	son	of	Antipater’s	ventures	into	Macedonian	territory,	taking	his	successful	subjugation	of	Macedon	later	in	317	as	an	authority	to	engage	with	his	earlier	actions.	While	a	return	to	Macedon	is	certainly	a	contral	concern	to	Cassander	during	his	conflict	with	Polyperchon,	a	 precise	 timeframe	 within	 which	 he	 wished	 to	 achieve	 this	 is	 not	 known.	Certainly	the	driving	factors	that	saw	him	march	north	in	the	winter	of	317/16	were	not	 based	upon	a	meticulously	planned	 and	organised	 invasion	 strategy,	but	rather	in	reaction	to	Olympias’	return	to	Macedon	in	the	autumn	of	317	and	the	spate	of	political	executions	and	assassinations	directly	aimed	at	Cassander’s	friends	and	family	as	well	as	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice,814	all	of	which	were	impossible	for	Cassander	to	know	of	in	the	middle	of	317.	Additionally,	 if	Cassander	 had	 planned	 the	 invasion	 of	 Macedon,	 he	 did	 so	 without	 active																																																									810	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	 (1992).	p.	64;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	pp.	241;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	197.	811	Diod.	19.35.1	812	Diod.	18.75.1.	813	Diod.	19.35.7.	814	Diod.	19.35.1;	Just.	14.5.9,	14.5.10;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	203,	204.	 For	 further	 discussion	 on	 Cassander’s	 successful	 conquest	 of	Macedon	 in	the	autumn	on	317,	see	Ch.	7.2.	
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assisstance	from	any	of	his	allies	among	the	Diadochoi,	a	policy	that	Adams	has	previously	 demonstrated	 was	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 Cassander’s	 strategem	 for	domination	in	Macedon	and	Greece.815	If	Cassander	had	planned	an	invasion,	the	apparent	lack	of	support	from	his	allies	is	difficult	to	explain.	The	interpretation	of	 invasion	 also	 implies	 Cassander	 had	 a	 level	 of	 security	 in	 his	 base	 of	operations	 in	southern	Greece,	at	 least	enough	to	allow	a	significant	portion	of	his	military	strength	to	depart	the	region	north.	While	it	is	clear	that	ever	since	his	return	to	Greece	in	318,	Cassander	had	expanded	his	influence	in	Athens	and	the	regions	surrounding	Attica,	 the	 loss	of	almost	the	entire	Peloponnese	must	have	 weighed	 heavily	 on	 his	 security	 concerns	 should	 he	 leave	 his	 base	 of	operations	in	a	weakened	military	state.		Finally,	the	assessment	of	Cassander’s	first	 venture	 into	Macedonian	 territory	 fails	 to	 engage	with	 concurrent	 events	occuring	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 empire	 that	 must	 have	 been	 influential	 on	 his	actions.	Macedon	 and	 Greece	 do	 not	 operate	 in	 a	 vacuum,	 be	 it	 economically,	militarily	 or,	 of	 particular	 importance	 for	 this	 investigation,	 politically.	 If	Cassander’s	 percieved	 invasion	 of	 Macedon	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 317	 is	 placed	within	 the	 greater	 context	 of	 simultaenious	 events	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 the	Macedonann	Empire,	then	a	more	satisfactory	interpretation	of	the	venture	may	be	possible.		As	 with	 previous	 phases	 of	 Cassander’s	 and	 Polyperchon’s	 conflict,	 it	 is	impossible	 to	 discuss	 the	 action	 of	 one	without	 reference	 to	 the	 other.	While	little	discussion	has	been	devoted	to	Cassander’s	movements	during	the	middle	of	317	by	both	ancient	and	modern	writers,	even	less	exists	for	Polyperchon.	It	is	not	the	case	that	evidence	is	totally	lacking;	epigraphic	evidence	provides	some	indication	of	events.	In	order	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	Cassander’s	first	venture	 into	 Macedon,	 it	 is	 also	 vital	 to	 know	 what	 Polyperchon,	 a	 man	conspicuously	absent	from	Diodorus’	account,	was	doing,	and	more	importantly,	where	 he	 was	 doing	 it.	 	 As	 previously	 stated,	 no	 record	 of	 Polyperchon’s	whereabouts	exists	within	the	entire	ancient	literary	corpus	following	his	failure	at	the	seige	of	Megalopolis	in	the	summer	of	318,	until	the	return	of	Olympias	to	
																																																								815	passim	Adams,	1975.	
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Macedon	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 317.816	This	means	 that	 no	 reaction	 to	 Cassander’s	advance	 is	 recorded	 and	 a	 gap	 in	 Polyperchon’s	 biography	 exists	 of	 around	twelve	 months	 that	 requires	 discussion.	 Following	 his	 involvement	 with	 the	siege	 of	 Megalopolis,	 Polyperchon	 departed	 the	 city	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 his	forces	 for,	 as	Diodorus	 states	 “other,	more	necessary	business.”817	The	historian	does	not	specify	exactly	what	this	“other	business”	is,	and	frustratingly	does	not	clarify	the	matter	later	in	his	work.		Unfortunately,	 little	 can	 be	 stated	with	 any	 certainty	 regarding	 Polyperchon’s	movements	 during	 the	 temporal	 gap	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 evidence	 from	 our	literary	 sources.818		 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 following	 the	 Peloponnesian	campaign	of	318,	Polyperchon	journeyed	north,	where	he	attempted	to	reaffirm	his	hold	on	Macedon	and	the	royals	until	Olympias’	return	in	317,	this	at	a	time	when	Cassander’s	 influence	was	spreading	throughout	Greece	and	Macedon.819	Paschidis	 however	 has	 highlighted	 the	 unlikelihood	 of	 this	 interpretation.820	It	makes	 little	 sense	 that	 Polyperchon	 would	 have	 remained	 inactive,	 while	 his	standing	 in	 Greece	 diminished,	while	 Cassander	 invaded	 (Paschidis’	 phrasing)	Macedon	in	the	summer	of	317	and	while	he	began	to	lose	his	influence	over	the	royals	 with	 an	 increasingly	 problematic	 Eurydice.821	Polyperchon’s	 apparent	inactivity	in	Diodorus’	account	may	be	the	result	of	the	compression	a	the	end	of	Book	Eighteen	Whatever	the	reason	for	the	absence	of	detail	here,	Polyperchon’s	lack	 of	 response	 between	 the	 autumns	 of	 318	 and	 317	 is	 suspect.	 Ever	 since	Cassander’s	 flight	 from	 Macedon	 in	 319	 and	 the	 initiation	 of	 hostilities,	Polyperchon	 had	 acted	 and	 reacted	 to	 Cassander’s	 movements	 and	 strategies	
																																																								816	Diod.	 19.11.2	 cf.	 Just.	 14.5.1,	 which	 states	 Polyperchon	 was	 absent	 from	Macedon	and	in	Greece	until	his	simultaneous	return	to	Macedon	with	Olympias.	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	 9.	 (2008).	 p.	 241;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 pp.	196-197.		817	Diod.	18.72.1-2:	αὐτὸς	δ᾽ἐφ᾽ἑτέρας	ἀναγκαιοτέρας	πράξεις	ἐτρέπετο.	818	To	limit	our	available	sources	further,	Paschidis	also	identifies	that	the	years	of	318/17	are	absent	from	the	Marmor	Parium	 (Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	241.	cf.	FGrH	239.)	819	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	197-198.	820	Paschidis,	Tekmeria	9.	(2008).	p.	241.	821	For	Eurydice’s	rise	to	prominence,	see	Ch.	7.1.	
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with	 speed	 and	 diligence.	 Though	 this	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 events	 in	 the	 ancient	sources,	their	overt	comments	give	him	little	credit.822		There	 is	 an	 alternative	 explanation	 that	 exists	 in	 opposition	 to	 Polyperchon’s	lethargy	 and	 incompetence,	 and	 that	 may	 shed	 more	 light	 on	 the	 regent’s	movements	in	318/17.	This	theory	too	sets	a	plausible	geographical	location	for	him,	 which	 in	 turn	 aids	 in	 contextualizing	 Cassander’s	 first	 venture	 into	Macedon	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 317.	 The	 alternative	 comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	fragmented	 decree	 from	 Nesos,	 championed	 by	 Paschidis,	 promulgated	 in	honour	of	 their	distinguished	 citizen,	Thersippos.823	The	 inscription	 contains	 a	reference	to	activities	Polyperchon	conducted	in	Asia:	καὶ	Πολυπέρχοντος	εἰς	τὰν	Ἀσί[αν]	 ...	 [..5..]ντος	 διώκησε	 φίλον	 αὖτον	 τᾶι	 πό[λι	 ὑπά]ρχην.824	The	 core	 of	Paschidis’	 argument	 relies	upon	 restoration	of	 the	 fragmented	verb	 in	 line	24.	He	 proposes,	 instead	 of	 the	 traditionally	 accepted	 reconstruction	 proposed	 by	Paton	 of	 [στάλε]ντος,825	that	 a	 reading	 of	 [διάβα]ντος	 is	 preferable.826	If	 his	theory	is	correct,	then	it	is	possible	to	assert	that	Polyperchon	had	embarked	on	some	form	of	military	action	into	Asia	at	some	point	in	his	career.		Fortunately,	 the	 timing	 of	 such	 a	 venture	 is	 relatively	 straightforward.	 As	 this	study	has	evaluated,	Polyperchon’s	movements	prior	 to	318	are	known	with	a	level	 of	 certainty,	 meaning	 that	 there	 was	 no	 chance	 for	 him	 to	 depart	 the	European	sphere	of	the	Macedonia	Empire	before	the	autumn	of	318.	A	terminus	
ante	 quem	 too	 is	 readily	 accessable	 from	 the	 inscription	 with	 a	 reference	 to		kings	in	the	plural	(βασιλήων).827	This	would	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	Philip	III	and	Alexander	IV	were	both	alive	during	Polyperchon’s	time	in	Asia.828	News																																																									822 	Indeed,	 Theophrastus	 uses	 Polyperchon’s	 ability	 to	 succeed	 in	 military	endeavors	as	an	unfortunate	punch	line	to	a	joke	(Thphr.	Char.	8.6-7.).	823	IG.	XII2	625.	For	more	on	Thersippos,	see	Paschidis,	2008.	pp.	408-413.		824	IG.	XII2	625.	II.	A.	23-25.	825	IG.	XII2	625.	II.	A.	24.	826	Paschidis,	 Tekmeria.	 9.	 (2008).	 p.	 234.	 For	 the	 specificities	 of	 Paschidis’	reasoning,	see	pp.	232-235,	particularly	n.	5	and	n.	6	on	p.	234.	827	IG.	XII2	625.	II.	A.	27.	cf.	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	236.	n.	9.	828	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	236.	n.	9.	Paschidis	does	concede	that	while	unlikely,	 it	 is	 feasible	Polyperchon’s	mission	 to	Asia	 could	have	 taken	place	 at	the	time	of,	or	shortly	after,	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	in	the	autumn	
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of	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	 travelled	 fast,829	so	 it	 could	 be	 argued	that,	should	the	decree	of	Nesos	have	been	made	after	the	Autumn	of	317,	there	would	only	be	a	requirement	 to	make	reference	to	a	single	 living	king	and	not	the	plural	that	exists	in	the	inscription.	What	is	significant	is	that	this	inscription	coincides	with	 the	 period	 of	 time	 that	 Polyperchon	 vanishes	 from	 the	 literary	sources	and	provides	a	geographical	location,	outside	of	Macedon	in	Asia,	some	time	between	the	autumns	of	318,	and	317	B.C.	Paschidis	has	offered	a	possible	time	of	departure	 for	Polyperchon	on	his	Asian	 campaign,	 in	early	317	after	 a	brief	 period	 of	 preparation	 to	 amass	 the	 required	 forces.830	While	 admittedly	reliant	 upon	 hypothetical	 reconstructions, 831 	the	 proposed	 scenario	 would	account	for	the	presence	of	Polyperchon’s	name	in	the	decree	of	Nesos.	The	next	issue	 is	how	to	connect	these	nodal	points	of	understanding	 into	a	satisfactory	narrative.		It	must	 be	 stressed	 that	 this	 section	 of	 discussion	 delves	 into	 Paschidis’	 aptly	termed	 “unstable	 realm	 of	 hypothetical	 reconstructions,” 832 	but	 if	 this	understanding	 and	 limitation	 is	 maintained,	 a	 contextualisation	 of	 concurrent	events	may	provide	greater	insight	into	the	events	of	318/17.	No	explicit	reason	for	Polperchon’s	time	in	Asia	Minor	is	found	within	the	inscription,	however	the	purpose	may	lie	in	a	promise	to	his	chief	ally	in	the	region,	Eumenes	of	Cardia,	made	 in	318,	 to	 come	 to	his	 aid	with	 the	 royal	Macedonian	 army	 should	 it	 be	required. 833 	Since	 the	 resumption	 of	 hostilities	 with	 Antigonus	 following																																																																																																																																																															of	 317	 (cf.	 Diod.	 19.11.3-8;	 Just.	 14.5.9-10;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 18;	Carney,	 2006.	 pp.	 75-76;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 4,	 52-53,	 183;	 Yardley,	 Wheatley,	Heckel,	2011.	p.	204;	Anson,	2014.	p.	106;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	12.).	However,	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	 Polyperchon	 would	 have	 been	 in	 or	 near	Macedon	 at	 the	 time	of	Olympias’	 arrival	 to	work	 closely	with	 the	 ally	 he	had	been	 attempting	 to	 secure	 for	 the	 past	 two	 years.	 For	 further	 discussion	 of	Olympias’	 return	 and	 circumstances	 revolving	 around	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	and	Eurydice	and	the	effect	they	had	on	Cassander	and	Polyperchon,	see	Ch.	7.2.	829	cf.	Diod.	19.35.1;	 Just.	14.5.8;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	202,	206-209.	830	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	245.	831	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	242.	832	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	242.	833	Diod.	18.57.4;	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	63.	n.	40;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008)	p.	245;	cf.	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	168-169.	
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Polyperchon’s	original	letter	of	support	in	319,	Eumenes	had	been	hard	pressed	by	Monophthalmus	and	had	fled	from	Cappadocia	to	Cilicia.834	During	the	course	of	his	journey,	Eumenes	had	embarked	upon	a	massive	effort	to	procure	further	reinforcements	to	his	army	from	various	regions	throughout	the	Empire.835	The	army	he	was	able	to	raise	while	on	the	road	was	substantial.	While	the	specific	numbers	need	to	be	treated	with	caution,	they	are	able	to	provide	an	indication	of	the	overall	scale	of	military	strength	now	at	Eumenes’	disposal.	Following	the	conclusion	of	 the	siege	at	Nora,	Diodorus	 reports	 that	Eumenes’	 forces	 totaled	two	 thousand	 infantry	with	 a	 compliment	 of	 five	hundred	 cavalry.836	He	 could	also	 expect	 a	 further	 reinforcement	 of	 three	 thousand	men	 comprising	 of	 the	famed	Silver	Shields	who	had	been	ordered	by	Polyperchon	to	assist	Eumenes	in	his	 efforts. 837 	Finally	 the	 expansive	 recruitment	 campaign	 that	 Eumenes	undertook	 during	 his	 journey	 eastwards	 amassed	 him	 some	 ten	 thousand	infantry	 with	 a	 further	 two	 thousand	 cavalry,838	totaling	 a	 combined	 fifteen	thousand	footmen	with	two	thousand	five	hundred	mounted	troops.			Though	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 mention	 of	 Polyperchon	 within	 Eumenes’	recruitment	 efforts,	 there	 is	 reference	 made	 to	 mercenaries	 from	 the	 Greek	mainland	 travelling	 to	 join	 his	 forces. 839 	While	 this	 may	 be	 an	 attractive	invitation	to	 locate	Polyperchon	into	the	recruitment	drive	of	Eumenes	 in	318,	this	 interpretation	should	however	be	avoided.	Diodorus	specifically	highlights	that	these	men	came	from	the	Greek	cities	of	their	own	volition,840	rather	than	as	part	 of	 a	 greater	 body	 of	 Macedonian	 troops	 from	 Polyperchon’s	 royal	 army.	This	 movement	 does	 however	 demonstrate	 that	 Greek	 military	 forces	 were	venturing	into	the	East	318,841	which	in	turn	shows	that	the	physical	movement	of	troops	into	Asia	Minor	was	possible.	If	Polyperchon	were	able	to	supplement																																																									834	Diod.	18.59.1-3;	cf.	Nepos.	Eum.	5.7;	Anson,	2014.	p.	150.	835	Diod.	18.61.4-5;	Nepos.	Eum.	7.1;	Plut.	Eum.	16.3-4.		836	Diod.	18.59.1	837	Diod.	18.58.1,	18.59.3	838	Diod.	18.61.5.	839	Diod.	18.61.5	840	Diod.	18.61.5:	“πολλοὶ	καὶ	ἐκ	τῶν	τῆς	Ἑλλάδος	πόλεων	ἐθελοντὶ	κατήντων	καὶ	
πρὸς	τὴν	στρατείαν	ἀπεγπάφοντο.”	841	cf.	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	pp.	62-64,	especially	n.	35	on	p.	62.	
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Eumenes’	 army	with	 contingents	 of	 his	 own,	 a	 significant	 threat	 to	Antigonus’	position	would	be	created.		Polyperchon	could	not	risk	the	political	backlash	that	he	would	incur	if	he	chose	to	forgo	his	earlier	offer	of	aid	to	Eumenes,	despite	the	ever-increasing	influence	of	 Cassander	 in	 Greece	 and	 Macedon.	 While	 the	 office	 of	 regent	 afforded	Polyperchon	 the	 support	 of	 the	 kings,	 a	 point	 that	 he	 emphasised	 whenever	possible,	 Olympias	 and	 Eumenes	 were	 two	 key	 allies	 whose	 allegiance	 he	needed	 to	 maintain.	 Though	 there	 had	 been	 much	 correspondence	 and	 even	instances	of	co-operation	between	the	regent	and	Olympias,	Alexander’s	mother	was	 yet	 to	 depart	 from	 Epirus	 to	 Macedon	 and	 would	 not	 do	 so	 until	 after	Cassander’s	 first	venture	into	Macedon.	As	previously	discussed,	Olympias	was	wary	of	Polyperchon’s	endeavors	 to	secure	her	support	and	unsure	of	his	 true	intentions.	 Her	 confidant	 and	 advisor	 during	 this	 period	 of	 uncertainty	 was	Eumenes.	 Should	 Polyperchon	 renege	 on	 his	 offer	 of	 military	 support	 to	Eumenes,	not	only	would	it	risk	Eumenes’	allegiance,	it	would	also	threaten	the	political,	 economic	 and	 military	 support	 of	 Olympias	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	Cassander.	While	 the	only	explicit	evidence	 for	Polyperchon’s	presence	 in	Asia	Minor	comes	from	the	decree	of	Nesos	in	honour	of	Thersippos,	circumstantial	evidence	 from	 Polyperchon’s	 promise	 to	 Eumenes,	 and	 the	 intrinsic	 need	 to	maintain	 good	 relations	 with	 Olympias	 do	 add	 further	 plausibility	 to	 the	unattested	Asian	campaign	of	Polyperchon	taking	place	sometime	in	early	317.	Importantly	 for	 Cassander,	 Polyperchon’s	 absence	 from	 Macedon	 took	 place	during	the	time	that	his	first	venture	into	the	Macedonian	homeland	took	place	in	the	summer	of	317.		So	what	 factors	 exist	 for	Cassander	 immediately	prior	 to	his	 first	 venture	 into	Macedon?	 With	 Polyperchon	 absent	 from	 Macedon,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 wish	 to	continue	 the	momentum	 following	 Cleitus’	 defeat	 at	 the	 Bosporus,	 the	 son	 of	Antipater	could	have	decided	to	seize	the	opportunity	to	launch	an	opportunistic	attack	 on	 a	 militarily	 weakened	 Macedon.842	Certainly	 this	 must	 have	 been	 a	consideration	 for	 Cassander,	 however	 it	 must	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that	 following																																																									842	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	245.	
	 198	
Polyperchon’s	efforts	the	previous	year,	the	majority	of	cities	in	the	Peloponnese	were	still	hostile	to	his	cause.	For	Cassander	to	hold	his	position	in	Attica	while	operating	in	the	north,	he	would	be	required	to	maintain	a	significant	garrison	against	any	potential	 threat	 from	the	south	of	Greece.	Resistance	 to	Cassander	would	continue	and	eventuate	 in	direct	military	action	 later	 in	317,	 as	he	was	required	to	journey	into	the	Peloponnese	where	he	would	lay	siege	to	the	city	of	Tegea. 843 	What	 can	 be	 said	 with	 confidence	 is	 that	 there	 was	 significant	opposition	 to	 Cassander	 within	 the	 Peloponnese	 with	 forces	 that	 maintained	their	loyalty	to	Polyperchon	following	the	conflicts	of	the	summer	of	318.		In	 addition	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 absence	 from	 the	 European	 theatre	 and	 the	hostility	 Cassander	 faced	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	 the	 reason	 for	 Polyperchon’s	mission	to	Asia	must	be	considered.	If	Polyperchon	had	travelled	to	Asia	Minor	and	 on	 to	 aid	 Eumenes,	 it	 must	 be	 assumed	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 to	combine	their	 forces	 in	a	 joint	effort	against	Antigonus	Monophthalmus	and	to	remove	 him	 as	 a	 threat.	 Should	 the	 combined	 forces	 of	 Eumenes	 and	Polyperchon	be	successful	and	Antigonus	defeated,	then	a	major	blow	would	be	dealt	 to	 Cassander’s	 support	 base	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 man	 who	 had	 been	 a	significant	backer	since	319.		For	 the	 past	 three	 years,	 Antigonus’	 support	 had	 been	 instrumental	 in	Cassander’s	 struggle	 against	 Polyperchon	 for	 domination	 in	 Greece	 and	Macedon.	From	the	initial	asylum	granted	in	319	after	the	death	of	Antipater	and	Cassander’s	self	imposed	exile	following	his	rejection	of	the	office	of	chiliarch	left	to	him	by	his	father	under	Polyperchon’s	rule,	to	his	arrival	at	the	Bosporos	after	Cleitus’	success	during	the	initial	phases	of	the	battles	there,	Antigonus	was	the	driving	force	behind	Cassander’s	growing	success	in	the	European	sphere	of	the	Macedonian	 Empire.	 Without	 support	 from	 Antigonus,	 Cassander	 had	 neither	the	military	strength	to	return	to	Greece	in	the	spring	of	318,	nor	the	means	to	enable	 his	 return	 to	 Europe.	 Antigonus	 had	 provided	 economic,	 military	 and	political	 backing	 to	 Cassander’s	 cause.	 If	 the	 combined	might	 of	 Eumenes	 and	Polyperchon	were	able	to	defeat	Antigonus	in	Asia	Minor,	Cassander	would	lose																																																									843	Diod.	19.35.1.	
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those	vital	avenues	of	 support	as	well	as	his	 staunchest	 supporter	 for	his	own	efforts	to	take	control	in	Europe.844		One	 of	 the	 reasons	 Diodorus	 provides	 for	 Antigonus’	 alliance	 with	 Cassander	was	the	desire	to	keep	Polyperchon	in	Macedon	and	out	of	Asia	Minor.845	It	can	be	 deduced	 from	 Diodorus’	 account	 that	 Antigonus	 did	 in	 fact	 appreciate	 the	potential	 threat	 posed	 by	 Polyperchon	 once	 contact	 between	 the	 then	 new	regent	 and	 Eumenes	 was	 made.	 Once	 he	 had	 learned	 of	 this,	 Antigonus	 was	eager	to	engage	with	the	two	on	an	individual	basis,	rather	than	as	a	combined	force,	 as	 well	 as	 keeping	 Polyperchon	 occupied	 in	 Europe	 and	 out	 of	 Asia	Minor.846	This	may	also	account	for	Antigonus’	 involvement	in	the	Bosporus.847	While	 maintaining	 the	 alliance	 with	 Cassander	 was	 desirable,	 the	 pragmatic	need	 to	keep	 the	regent	and	 the	army	he	would	 lead	out	of	Asia	and	Eumenes	isolated	 was	 crucial.	 There	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 preoccupation	 of	Polyperchon	was	 one	 of	 the	 agreements	 reached	 by	Antigonus	 and	 Cassander	when	negotiating	their	alliance	in	319.848	To	win	Antigonus’	support,	Cassander	needed	 to	 keep	 Polyperchon	 in	 Europe.	 If	 he	 failed	 in	 this	 endeavour	 and	Polyperchon	was	able	to	successfully	cross	into	Asia,	the	onus	may	have	been	on	Cassander	 to	 draw	 Polyperchon	 back	 to	 the	 European	 theatre	 and	 out	 of	 the	east.	
	Because	 of	 the	 many	 factors	 facing	 Cassander	 drawing	 his	 focus	 in	 several	directions,	 the	 prospect	 of	 his	 being	 able	 to	 amass	 a	 strong	 military	 force	capable	 of	 launching	 a	 full-scale	 invasion	 of	 the	Macedonian	 homeland	 in	 the	summer	 of	 317,	 while	 simultaneously	 maintaining	 his	 base	 of	 operations,	 is	unlikely.	There	 is	no	question	that	Cassander’s	 first	venture	 into	Macedon	was	
																																																								844 	Antigonus	 would	 ultimately	 shift	 his	 support	 from	 Cassander	 over	 to	Polyperchon	 in	 315,	 when	 he	 dispatched	 his	 officer	 Aristodemus	 to	 the	Peloponnese	(cf.	Ch.	8.2).	845	Diod.	 18.54.4:	 “…βουλόμενος	τοὺς	περὶ	Πολυπέρχοντα	πολλοὺς	και	μεγάλους	
περισπασμοὺς	ἔχειν…”	846	Diod.	18.54.4.	847	Diod.	18.72.7-8.	cf.	Ch.	6.3.	pp.	184-185.	848	Diod.	18.49.1-3;	cf.	Ch.	6.1.	pp.	156-157.	
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not	a	mistake	on	the	behalf	of	Diodorus	and	that	it	did	in	fact	take	place,849	and	it	has	 been	 suggested	 that	 this	 first	 action	 into	 Macedon	 was	 the	 reason	 for	Polyperchon’s	return	from	Asia,850	however	there	is	room	to	discuss	the	scale	of	the	military	force	that	Cassander	led	into	the	north	during	this	time.		It	 is	 possible	 that,	 instead	 of	 a	 large-scale	 invasion	 that	would	 necessitate	 the	deployment	 of	 a	 significant	 segment	 of	 his	 military	 strength,	 Cassander	 may	have	opted	to	march	north	with	a	smaller	raiding	force.	By	doing	so,	Cassander	would	be	able	to	venture	far	 into	Macedonian	territory,	threatening	the	absent	Polyperchon’s	 base	 of	 operations	 without	 risking	 an	 uprising	 from	 the	Peloponnese.	 This	 would	 have	 the	 same	 effect	 of	 drawing	 Polyperchon	 back	from	 Asia	 Minor	 to	 Macedon,	 ending	 his	 aid	 mission	 to	 Eumenes	 of	 Cardia	against	 Antigonus	 without	 jeopardizing	 Cassander’s	 primary	 goal,	 that	 of	containing	Polyperchon	within	Europe.		There	 is	 precedence	 for	 the	 exact	 scenario	described	 above,	 as	 such	 an	 action	took	place	prior	to	317,	during	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi	 in	321	at	a	time	when	 Polyperchon	 had	 acted	 as	 overseer	 of	 European	 events	 on	 behalf	 of	Antipater	and	Craterus,	 the	 incumbant	strategoi.	Cassander	may	have	modeled	his	 first	 venture	 into	 Macedon	 on	 the	 Aetolian	 led	 uprising	 of	 321	 that	 was	orchestrated	by	 the	 then	regent	of	Macedon,	Perdiccas.851	Diodorus	 states	 that	Perdiccas’	reasoning	for	supporting	and	encouraging	the	Greek	coalition	against	Antipater	 was	 to	 “draw	 off	 Antipater.”852	The	 action	 was	 designed	 to	 ease	 the	threat	 Perdiccas	 faced	 in	 the	 greater	 allied	 forces	 of	 Antipater,	 Craterus,	Antigonus	and	Ptolemy.	The	Aetolians	were	unsuccessful	in	diverting	Antipater	back	 to	 Europe	 and	 he	 remained	 in	 Asia	 to	 continue	 his	 campaign	 against	Antiognus.	 The	 revolt	 was	 swiftly	 put	 down	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 significant	military	reserves853	left	 in	Macedon	to	safeguard	against	the	possibility	of	such																																																									849	Anson,	2014.	p.	99.	850	As	suggested	by	Paschidis	(Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	245).	851	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	pp.	138-139.	852	Diod.	18.38.1:	“…ἀντιπερισπάσαι	βουλόμενοι	τὸν	Ἀντίπατρον.”	853	Antipater	had	left	enough	forces	to	comprise	at	least	two	armies,	the	first	led	by	Polycles	that	was	defeated	(Diod.	18.38.2-3)	and	the	second	commanded	by	
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unrest.	Given	his	previous	experience	tackling	such	an	event,	Polyperchon	must	have	been	conscious	of	Cassander’s	potential	to	enter	into	Macedonian	territory	during	 his	 absence,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 threat	 such	 an	 action	 would	 pose	 to	 his	position	in	Macedon.	However,	Polyperchon	did	not,	after	a	year	of	conflict	and	military	 setbacks,	 have	 the	 same	 extensive	 military	 resources	 that	 were	 at	Antipater’s	disposal	in	321.		
	Maintaining	 the	 alliance	 to	 Eumenes,	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 alliance	 with	Olympias,	was	vital	to	Polyperchon’s	effort	against	Cassander	and	could	not	be	placed	at	risk.	Supporting	Eumenes	was	fundamental	to	gaining	Olympias’	trust	and	 support.	 Polyperchon	may	 have	 gambled	 on	 Cassander’s	 attentions	 being	focused	on	a	hostile	Peloponnese,	where	he	would	expend	his	military	efforts	in	an	 attempt	 to	 secure	 the	 region	 during	 the	 time	 that	 Polyperchon	was	 absent	from	Europe.854	If	 so	 the	gamble	 failed,	 and	as	previously	discussed,	news	had	the	 ability	 to	 travel	 quickly	 throughout	 the	 empire,855	when	 news	 reached	Polyperchon	 of	 Cassander’s	move	 north,	 he	 could	 break	 off	 any	 action	 in	Asia	and	return	to	Macedon.	A	swift	return	could	feasibly	mitigate	the	damage	caused	by	 his	 adversary’s	 move	 north.	 The	 Aetolian	 campaign	 does	 not	 prove	 the	motivation	 and	 intentions	of	Cassander’s	 first	 expedition	 into	Macedon	during	the	summer	of	317,	but	it	does	show	that	Macedon	and	Greece	were	active	areas	of	 conflict	 in	 the	 eastern	 region	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 and	 that	 such	diversionary	tactics,	 interconnecting	the	theatres	of	war,	were	present	prior	to	317.		No	 conflict	 between	 Polyperchon	 and	 Cassander	 is	 recorded	 by	 the	 sources	between	the	conflict	off	Byzantium	in	the	summer	of	318	and	Cassander	second	venture	 in	Macedon	 in	 the	 spring	 of	 316,	 but	 there	 are	 two	 explanations	 that	could	 account	 for	what	 took	 place.	 Either	 Diodorus,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 shift	 his																																																																																																																																																															Polyperchon,	which	was	successful	in	subduing	the	rebelling	Greek	forces	(Diod.	18.38.6).	854	Indeed	 this	 could	 account	 for	 Cassander’s	 reappearance	 in	 the	 narrative	 of	Diodorus	in	the	Peloponnese	at	Tegea.	855	In	this	instance,	from	Pella	across	the	Aegean.	Compare	with	chapter	5.2	and		the	news	of	Alexander’s	death	travelling	from	Babylon	to	Europe.		
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historiographical	 focus	to	Syracuse	omitted	the	events,	or	more	likely,	as	word	reached	Cassander	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 transit	 back	 to	Macedon,	 he	 broke	 off	 his	operations	 in	 the	north	and	returned	 to	Attica	with	 the	prize	of	Polyperchon’s	war	elephants	now	in	his	possession.856		Cassander’s	position	in	southern	Greece	and	the	hostilities	from	the	Peloponnese	meant	that	he	could	not	safely	dedicate	his	 entire	 military	 strength	 to	 an	 expansive	 northern	 invasion.	 When	 this	 is	considered	along	with	 the	 risks	posed	 to	Antigonus	by	 the	combined	 forces	of	Polyperchon	 and	 Eumenes,	 it	 may	 be	 more	 appropriate	 to	 view	 Cassander’s	actions	in	the	summer	of	317	as	a	raid	designed	to	draw	Polyperchon	off	 from	Asia,	rather	than	as	an	invasion	of	Macedonian	homeland.		The	 difference	 between	 the	 interpretation	 of	 invasion	 and	 raid	 may	 be	 a	semantic	debate.	The	view	of	Polyperchon’s	actions	as	an	invasion	and	my	own	understanding	of	 it	 as	 a	 raid	both	depend	of	 some	 speculation.	Once	more	we	can	only	 give	 a	probable	 account	of	 the	 events	 in	Macedon	and	Greece	during	318/17.	 If	 Cassander’s	 actions	 are	 contextualized	within	 concurrent	 events	 in	Greece	and	Asia	Minor,	 the	 interpretation	of	 raid	appears	more	plausible	 than	viewing	 them	 with	 a	 veni,	 vidi,	 non	 vici	 perspective.	 Not	 only	 does	 the	interpretation	 of	 raid	 show	 that,	 while	 seizing	 control	 of	 Macedon	 was	 an	obvious	aim	 for	Cassander,	he	was	willing	 to	 forgo	 the	opportunity	 to	 commit	himself	entirely	to	the	effort	in	favour	of	maintaining	a	hold	on	southern	Greece.	It	 may	 also	 go	 some	 way	 to	 dispelling	 the	 image	 of	 Polyperchon	 as	 an	 inept	military	 and	 political	 figure	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	 and	 further	 supports	Plutarch’s	 evaluation	 of	 his	 military	 acumen.857	If	 this	 version	 of	 events	 is	accepted,	 then	 Polyperchon	 was	 able	 to	 identify	 the	 source	 of	 much	 of	Cassander’s	 support	 in	 the	 form	of	Antigonus	and	attempt	 to	remove	him	as	a	threat,	 while	 simultaneously	 strengthening	 and	 building	 his	 alliances	 with	Eumenes	 and	 Olympias.	 When	 news	 arrived	 of	 Cassander’s	 invasion,	 at	 least	what	 from	 his	 perspective	 appeared	 to	 be	 an	 invasion,	 Polyperchon	 could	feasibly	 end	 his	 time	 in	 Asia	 and	 returning	 to	 Macedon	 to	 stop	 Cassander’s	advance	north.	Cassander’s	venture	into	Macedon	in	the	summer	of	317	did	not																																																									856	Diod.	19.35.7.	857	Plut.	Pyr.	8.3	
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win	 him	 the	 country,	 however	 by	 the	 winter	 of	 317/16	 he	 would	 return,	resulting	in	a	massive	shift	in	the	dynamic	of	the	conflict	with	Polyperchon.		The	 scenario	 proposed	 by	 Paschidis	 and	 built	 upon	 in	 the	 discussion	 above	offers	 some	 insight	 into	 the	 movements	 of	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	between	 the	 autumns	 of	 318	 and	 317.	 However	 a	 question	 that	 does	 present	itself	is	in	regard	to	the	availability	of	time	for	these	events	to	occur.	The	speed	of	 communications	within	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	was	 swift,	 especially	when	the	news	was	pressing.	This	is	evident	from	the	initiation	of	the	Lamian	War	in	323	occurring	not	with	the	rumours	of	Alexander’s	death	in	June	323,	but	with	later	 confirmation	arriving	 in	Athens.858	Conflict	was	underway	by	 the	autumn	on	323,859	with	the	actual	conflict	beginning	some	time	in	the	summer.860	While	this	does	not	definitively	state	that	Polyperchon’s	campaign	in	Asia	Minor	did	in	fact	take	place,	what	it	does	show	is	that,	even	if	the	same	timing	of,	at	most,	two	months	employed	for	correspondences	to	travel	between	Babylon	and	Athens	is	applied	to	travel	times	between	Pella	and	Polyperchon’s	last	attested	location	in	Nesos	in	western	Anatolia,861	a	much	shorter	distance	across	the	Aegean	Sea,	it	may	 be	 possible	 that	 Polyperchon	 received	 word	 of	 Cassander’s	 movements	within	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time,	 allowing	 him	 to	 return	 to	 Macedon	 from	 Asia.	Paschidis	has	suggested	that	Polyperchon	embarked	upon	his	mission	to	Asia	in	early	317,862	which	provides	the	regent	with	a	maximum	of	some	six	months	in	Asia	 before	 his	 return	 to	 Macedon	 and	 the	 onward	 journey	 to	 Epirus	 by	 the	autumn	of	the	same	year.	It	must	be	remembered	that	early	317	is	the	earliest	likely	opportunity	Polyperchon	had	to	travel	east,	and	it	is	entirely	possible	that	his	 journey	 could	 have	 occurred	 later	 in	 317.	 No	 detail	 exists	 for	 how	 long	Polyperchon	spent	in	Asia,	whether	he	was	able	to	spend	a	significant	period	of	time	 in	 Asia	 or	 was	 forced	 to	 return	 to	 Macedon	 almost	 immediately.	Cassander’s	 mission	 north	 could	 have	 occurred	 almost	 immediately	 after	 the																																																									858	Plut.	Phoc.	22.3-4;	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	p.	132.	859	Bosworth,	in	Palagia	&	Tracy,	2003.	p.	19.	cf.	Miller,	Hesperia	Supplements.	20.	(1982).	p.	102.	860	cf.	Ch.	4.	861	For	geographical	issues,	see	Stauber,	1996.	pp.	198-213.	862	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	245.	
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regent’s	 departure,	 affording	 Polyperchon	 only	 enough	 time	 to	 reach	 Anatolia	and	Nesos	before	he	was	forced	to	return	to	Macedon.	None	of	this	 is	concrete	evidence	 that	 definitively	 proves	 Polyperchon’s	 unattested	 campaign	 in	 Asia	Minor	between	 the	 autumns	of	 318	 and	317,	 but	 it	 does	 aid	 in	understanding	Polyperchon’s	 perceived	 inaction	 during	 Cassander’s	 first	 venture	 into	 the	Macedonian	 homeland	 and	 suggest	 the	 feasibility	 of	 such	 an	 campaign	 taking	place.		Following	 Polyperchon’s	 return	 to	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland	 as	 well	 as	Cassander’s	withdrawal	to	southern	Greece,	the	regent	would	soon	depart	from	Macedon	once	again,	but	not	as	part	of	a	military	campaign	against	Cassander	or	his	allies.	Polyperchon	still	needed	supplementation	to	his	forces,	even	more	so	now	 that	 the	 campaign	 to	 cut	 Cassander’s	 supply	 lines	 from	 Asia	 Minor	 and	Antigonus	was	underway.	However,	help	was	on	hand	and	soon	after	his	return	to	Macedon,	Polyperchon	would	depart	for	Epirus	and	the	awaiting	Olympias.		
7.2:	Τhe	Winter	of	317/16	and	Cassander’s	Consolidation	of	Power	
	The	 previous	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 engaged	 with	 the	 events	 surrounding	Polyperchon’s	 possible	 involvement	 in	 Asia	Minor	 as	well	 as	 Cassander’s	 first	venture	 into	Macedon	during	 the	summer	of	317.	This	 section	of	 investigation	continues	with	events	following	Cassander’s	return	to	southern	Greece	and	the	siege	of	Tegea	and	Polyperchon’s	 journey	 to	Epirus	 to	 secure	 the	 resources	of	Olympias	 until	 Cassander’s	 successful	 conquest	 of	 Macedon	 in	 the	 winter	 of	317/16	and	his	consolidation	of	power	within	 the	region.	Many	pivotal	events	took	place	during	the	hectic	period	of	time	between	the	autumn	of	317	and	early	316	 that	 would	 forever	 change	 the	 relationship	 of	 both	 Polyperchon	 and	Cassander	with	 the	 royal	 family	 and	with	 other	members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 as	well	 as	with	each	other.	While	 in	Epirus,	Polyperchon	would	have	his	 regency	stripped	 from	 him	 by	 the	 wife	 of	 Philip	 III,	 Eurydice,	 who	 had	 risen	 to	prominence	within	the	Macedonian	court	over	the	previous	year.	The	office	was	not	to	remain	vacant,	as	Eurydice	offered	the	regency	to	Cassander,	marking	the	first	point	in	time	since	the	initiation	of	hostilities	with	Polyperchon	in	319	that	
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Cassander	 actively	 engaged	 with,	 rather	 than	 against,	 the	 royal	 family.	 After	much	persuasion,	Polyperchon	convinced	Olympias	to	return	to	Macedon.	Soon	after	her	arrival,	the	mother	of	Alexander	embarked	upon	a	spate	of	executions.	These	 resulted	 in	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	 Eurydice	 as	 well	 as	numerous	 executions	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 aristocracy,	 directed	 against	Cassander’s	family	and	friends.	These	actions	by	Olympias	would	see	Cassander	respond	 by	 launching	 an	 invasion	 and	 successful	 conquest	 of	Macedon	 in	 the	winter	of	317/16	against	Polyperchon	and	the	mother	of	Alexander.	Following	their	defeat,	Cassander	began	to	consolidate	his	power	in	Macedon	in	a	series	of	actions	 viewed	 by	 both	 ancient	 and	 modern	 scholars	 as	 proto-monarchical.	While	there	is	little	doubt	that	Cassander	did	desire	control	over	Macedon,	it	is	important	 to	 understand	 the	 context	 of	 the	 accounts	 that	 refer	 to	 Cassander’s	actions	 at	 this	 time.	 Additionally,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Cassander	 wished	 to	represent	himself	following	his	return	to	Macedon	offers	further	insight	into	his	approach	 to	domination	with	 the	European	sphere	of	 the	Macedonian	Empire.	This	 section	 of	 investigation	 engages	 with	 the	 factors	 leading	 to	 Cassander’s	return	 to	Macedon	 in	 the	winter	of	317/16	as	well	as	 the	establishment	of	his	position	within	the	heartland	of	the	decaying	Macedonian	Empire.		After	much	persistence,	Polyperchon	had	finally	convinced	Olympias	to	end	her	self-imposed	exile	in	Epirus	where	she	had	remained	since	331,	exile	stemming	from	 the	 enmity	 that	 had	 existed	 between	 her	 and	 Antipater,	 and	 return	 to	Macedon.863	Following	his	return	from	Asia	Minor,	a	return	made	necessary	by	Cassander’s	diversionary	raid	into	Macedon,	Polyperchon	journeyed	to	Epirus	in	order	 to	 accompany	 the	 mother	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 and	 the	 army	 at	 her	disposal	back	to	Pella.864	The	reasons	for	Olympias’	change	of	mind	are	difficult	to	 state	 with	 any	 certainty.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 Polyperchon’s	 endeavour	 to	 aid	Eumenes	in	Asia	was	demonstrative	of	his	 intent	to	maintain	the	alliances	that	he	 had	 initiated	 in	 319,	 or	 that,	 given	 her	 age,	 she	 wished	 to	 see	 that	 her	
																																																								863	Diod.	19.11.1-2;	Just.	14.5.1;	cf.	Ch.	3.	p.	76.	864	Diod.	19.11.2;	cf.	Carney,	2006.	p.	71;	Paschidis,	Tekmeria.	9.	(2008).	p.	241.	
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grandson’s	 position	 as	 king	 of	Macedon	was	 secure.	865	Whatever	 her	 reasons,	Olympias	decided	 that	 the	 autumn	of	 317	was	 the	 time	 to	mark	her	 return	 to	Macedon.	Following	the	defeats	at	the	Siege	of	Megalopolis,	the	naval	battles	off	Byzantium	and	the	constriction	of	his	area	of	influence	after	Cassander’s	raid	in	the	summer,	this	new	region	from	which	Polyperchon	could	draw	upon	for	both	men	and	resources	would	have	been	welcome	support	 for	 the	 regent’s	efforts.	Not	only	would	he	be	 able	 to	 legitimise	his	position	as	 the	 regent	of	Macedon	with	further	Argead	support,	but	he	would	also	be	able	to	forge	an	alliance	with	the	King	of	Epirus,	Aecides.866		However,	while	Polyperchon	was	away	from	Pella,	building	his	partnership	with	a	 faction	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 in	 Olympias,	 he	 was	 simultaneously	 losing	 the	association	 with	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice.	 During	 the	 previous	 year,	 Eurydice	appears	to	have	taken	a	more	active	role	within	the	Macedonian	Court,867	going	so	 far	 as	 to	 take	 over	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 regency	 during	 Polyperchon’s	time	in	Asia.868	She	had	become	increasingly	hostile	toward	Polyperchon	as	the	regent	 of	 Macedon.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 hostility,	 Olympias’	 return	 to	 Macedon	was	 in	 the	 interests	of	neither	Eurydice	nor	Philip	 III,	as	 tensions	between	the	dual	kings	would	certainly	become	exacerbated.	The	authority	of	both	Olympias	and	Eurydice	 lay	with	 the	 king	with	whom	 they	were	most	 clearly	 connected,	Olympias	to	her	grandson	Alexander	IV,	and	Eurydice	to	her	husband	Philip	III,	
																																																								865	By	317,	Olympias	was	advancing	in	age,	being	into	her	fifties	by	the	time	of	her	acceptance	of	Polyperchon’s	offer	of	alliance	(Carney,	2006.	p.	71).	866 	Diod.	 19.11.2;	 Just.	 14.5.9;	 Aeacides’	 support	 could	 have	 been	 further	initiated	 by	 the	 offer	 of	 marriage	 between	 Alexander	 IV	 and	 Deidameia,	Aeacides’	daughter	(Plut.	Pyrrh.	4.2;	Carney,	2006.	pp.	169-70.	n.	34;	Carney,	Syll.	
Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	12.)	867	Diod.	 19.11.1.	 Eurydice	 certainty	 was	 no	 stranger	 to	 public	 involvement	within	 Macedonian	 politics;	 she	 had	 been	 an	 active	 participant	 during	 the	Partition	of	Triparadeisus	in	321	(Diod.	18.39.1-4;	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F	9.30-33).	 Carney,	 2000.	 p.	 133;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 4.	 s.v	 Adea.;	 Carney,	 Syll.	 Clas.	 25.	(2014).	p.	11,	12.	868 	Diod.	 19.11.1	 “…Κατὰ	 γὰρ	 τὴν	 Μακεδονίαν	 Εὐρυδίκη,	 τῆς	 βασιλείας	
προεστηκυῖα...”;	 Just.	 14.5.3;	 For	 discussion	 of	 Eurydice’s	 coup	 d’	 état,	 see:	Carney,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	367,	2000.	pp.	135-136;	Carney,	2006.	pp.	73-74;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	198.	
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with	 both	 women	 striving	 to	 elevate	 their	 respective	 king	 within	 the	Macedonian	court	at	the	expense	of	the	other.869		Since	 the	 initiation	 of	 his	 regency,	 Polyperchon	 had	made	 extensive	 efforts	 to	lure	 Olympias	 back	 to	 Macedon,	 meaning	 that	 Eurydice	 must	 have	 had	 some	advance	 warning	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 return	 to	 Macedon	 by	 Olympias	 and	would	have	been	aware	of	the	threat	that	this	posed	to	the	lives	of	both	herself	and	 Philip.	 In	 turn,	 Olympias	 would	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	Eurydice	to	the	welfare	of	Alexander	IV,870	as	he	matured	within	the	court	and	would	take	on	more	official	responsibilities	as	expected	of	the	young	king.	This	must	 have	 concerned	 Olympias	 in	 Molossia,	 giving	 her	 impetus	 to	 return	 to	Macedon	once	she	could	be	certain	of	Polyperchon’s	 intentions.871	Macedonian	succession	 was	 rarely	 a	 bloodless	 affair,	 and	 while	 the	 paranoia	 among	 the	members	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 royal	 family	 resulting	 from	 attacks	 and	assassinations	from	within	the	family	itself	may	have	led	to	Olympias’	return	as	well	as	Eurydice’s	 subsequent	actions,	 it	was	Polyperchon’s	desire	 to	maintain	Argead	 support	 for	 his	 regency	 from	 all	 sections	 of	 the	 family	 that	 drove	 a	further	wedge	between	Olympias	and	Eurydice.			On	 face	 value,	 losing	 the	 trust	 of	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 was	 a	 mistake	 by	Polyperchon,	 a	 mistake	 that	 would	 cost	 him	 the	 regency	 of	 Macedon	 and	ultimately,	drive	him	from	the	country.	While	this	can,	and	has,	been	seen	as	a	foolish	 blunder	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Polyperchon	which	would	 cost	 him	 swathes	 of	support	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 Homeland,872	in	 317,	 there	 may	 have	 been	 some	immediately	 pressing	 practical	 reasons	 that	 forced	 Polyperchon’s	 hand	 in	retrieving	the	mother	of	Alexander	III	and	the	forces	she	could	draw	upon	back	to	 Macedon.	 Since	 319	 and	 the	 outbreak	 of	 hostilities	 against	 Cassander,	Polyperchon’s	 main	 supply	 of	 men	 for	 the	 war	 effort	 came	 from	 the	 Royal																																																									869	Carney,	 2000.	 p.	 137,	 highlights	 that	 both	 Eurydice	 and	 Olympias	 were	engaged	 in	 the	 same	 jostling	 for	 supremacy	 that	 typified	 Argead	 royal	succession.	870	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	12.	871	Carney,	2000.	p.	120;	Carney,	2006.	p.	68;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	12.	872	Adams,	1975.	pp.	91-92;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	199;	Carney,	2000.	p.	135;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	229;	Anson,	2014.	p.	91;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25	(2014).	p.	12.	
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Macedonian	Army,	a	body	he	had	employed	extensively	throughout	the	conflict.	While	Cassander	could	draw	on	various	pools	of	resources	militarily,	both	from	his	alliances	with	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi	and	from	the	Greek	garrisons,	Polyperchon	was	more	limited	than	the	son	of	Antipater	with	fewer	avenues	for	practical,	 military	 support	 than	 his	 adversary.	 Eumenes	 was	 an	 important	alliance	for	Polyperchon	to	maintain,	however	the	possibility	of	Eumenes	being	able	 to	 depart	 Asia	 Minor	 and	 come	 to	 his	 aid	 while	 simultaneously	 facing	Antigonus	was	non-existent.873	While	the	support	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	was	pivotal	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 endeavours,	 this	 did	 not	 afford	 the	 regent	 more	resources	 in	 317	 than	 were	 already	 at	 his	 disposal	 in	 319.	 With	 Cassander’s	strength	 ever	 on	 the	 increase,	 Polyperchon	 needed	 to	 find	 new	 groups	 from	which	 he	 could	 draw	 fresh	 levies.	 Olympias	 and	 her	membership	 in	 the	 royal	family	 of	 Epirus	 provided	 such	 an	 avenue.	 Given	 the	 rough	 estimates	 of	Polyperchon’s	age,874	he	had	 lived	through	several	phases	of	Macedonian	royal	succession.875	The	 tumultuous	 and	 violent	 nature	 of	 the	 dynamic	 within	 the	Argead	 dynasty	 must	 have	 been	 familiar	 to	 the	 regent	 of	 Macedon.	Polyperchon’s	 alignment	with	Olympias	 in	 317	would	 result	 in	 the	 loss	 of	 the	support	of	Eurydice	and	Philip	III,	but	it	would	provide	him	the	practical	support	to	 continue	 the	 war	 against	 Cassander,	 a	 war	 that	 he	 was	 currently	 losing.	Regardless	of	Polyperchon’s	reasons	for	securing	Olympias’	return	to	Macedon,	it	did	cost	him	his	standing	with	Eurydice	and	Philip	III.	While	Polyperchon	was	away	 in	Epirus	 in	 the	autumn	of	317,	Eurydice	 stripped	him	of	 the	 regency	of	Macedon.876																																																									873	When	 Polyperchon	 had	 initially	 made	 contact	 with	 Eumenes	 offering	 him	either	support	or	asylum	following	the	siege	of	Nora,	Eumenes	made	it	clear	that	his	priorities	 lay	 in	maintaining	his	presence	 in	Asia	Minor	 and	not	 in	Europe	(Diod.	18.53.6;	Billows,	1990.	pp.	83-84;	Heckel,	 1992.	p.	 195;	Anson,	2004.	p.	137	Heckel,	2006.	p.	227;	cf.	Ch.	6.2.	pp.	168-169).	874	Between	born	at	some	point	between	390	and	380	(Heckel,	2006.	p.	226.)	875	From	the	reign	of	Amyntas	III,	which	ended	in	370/369	(March,	Historia.	44.	(1995).	p.	280).	876	Just.	14.5.3;	Adams,	1975.	p.	89;	Carney,	2000.	pp.	135-136;	Carney,	2006.	p.	73;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 pp.	 198-199.	Whether	 or	 not	 Eurydice	had	the	authority	to	make	such	a	decision	is	unclear,	Diodorus	asserts	that	she	assumed	the	regency	“…τῆς	βασιλείας	προεστηκυῖα...”	 (Diod.	19.11.1).	However	as	 Carney	 notes	 the	 abstract	manner	 in	which	Macedonians	 engaged	with	 the	concept	of	monarchy	(Carney,	CJ.	90.	(1995).	p.	378.)	may	have	allowed	Eurydice	
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	Orosius’	account	suggests	that	Cassander	and	Eurydice	had	become	romantically	involved.877	However	 it	 is	 far	 more	 likely	 that	 the	 alliance	 was	 born	 out	 of	practical	 necessity	 rather	 amorous	 endeavours.878	Polyperchon	 had,	 in	 effect,	cast	his	 lot	 in	with	Olympias	once	he	either	had	 lost,	or	dissolved,	 the	alliance	with	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip.	 This	 could	 mean	 that	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 regency	 of	Macedon	may	not	have	come	as	a	great	surprise	to	him.	If	Eurydice	had	indeed	seized	 the	 power	 in	 Macedon	 away	 from	 Polyperchon	 as	 both	 Diodorus	 and	Justin	 assert,	 it	 makes	 the	 damning	 statement	 that	 she	 had	 either	 lost	 all	confidence	in	Polyperchon’s	ability	to	administer	the	Macedonian	homeland,	or	that	 the	 connections	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 forging	 with	 Olympias	 posed	 too	great	a	 threat	 to	 the	position	which	she	and	Philip	 III	held	within	 the	court	 in	Macedon.	If	either	of	these	were	the	case,	then	the	next	step	would	have	been	for	Eurydice	to	strip	Polyperchon	of	the	office	of	regent	of	Macedon	and	this	is	just	what	she	did.	In	turn,	faced	by	the	prospect	of	losing	the	support	of	Eurydice	in	exchange	the	support	of	Olympias,	Polyperchon	must	have	expected	as	a	result,	to	maintain	the	position	he	had	had	since	319	and	be	reaffirmed	in	his	position	as	regent	by	the	mother	of	Alexander	III.		The	 issue	 facing	 Eurydice,	 now	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 remove	 Polyperchon	 as	regent	 had	 been	 taken,	 was	 who	 would	 replace	 him.	 If	 there	 was	 any	deliberation	 on	 the	 issue,	 it	was	 not	 for	 long,	 as	within	 the	 communication	 to	Polyperchon	 from	 the	 queen	 that	 informed	 him	 of	 his	 removal,	 Eurydice	 also	informed	him	to	deliver	up	his	forces	to	Cassander,	who	would	assume	the	now	vacant	role.879	As	Polyperchon’s	chief	adversary	in	Europe,	a	man	whose	family	had	a	long-standing	animosity	with	the	returning	Olympias,	Cassander	was	the	obvious	choice	for	Eurydice’s	new	regent.		The	offer	made	to	Cassander	marked	the	 first	 point,	 since	 the	 initiation	 of	 hostilities	 against	 Polyperchon	 in	 319																																																																																																																																																															to	 cement	 her	 edict	 on	more	 pragmatic	 ground.	Also	 note	 p.	 381,	 “In	practice,	
royal	women	 functioned	 as	 the	 reserve	 troops	 of	 the	 dynasty,	 ready	 to	 be	 called	
into	active	service	when	no	male	adult	Argeads	were	available.”	877	Oros.	3.23.29	878	Carney,	2000.	p.	136;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	198.	879	Just.	14.5.3.	
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where	 Cassander	 participated	 in	 an	 agreement	 with	 a	 member	 of	 the	 royal	Argead	family.	Cassander’s	reaction	to	the	offer	is	not	recorded,	but	it	requires	little	 to	 no	 leap	 of	 faith	 to	 accept	 that	 Cassander	 did	 indeed	 agree	 to	 take	 the	position	he	had	been	vying	 for	over	 the	 course	of	 two	years	 and	accepted	 the	appointment.	The	alliance	with	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	would	have	appealed	to	Cassander	on	a	number	of	levels.	Not	only	would	it	afford	him	the	support	of	one	of	the	Argead	factions	positioned	against	Polyperchon	and	Olympias	as	Eurydice	became	a	more	active	participant	within	Macedonian	politics,	but	it	would	also	lend	 Cassander	 a	 level	 of	 legitimation	 in	 his	 struggle	 against	 Polyperchon	 for	command	of	Macedon	and	Greece.		Cassander’s	 appointment	 was	 not	 a	 mere	 swap	 of	 one	 powerful	 general	 for	another.	In	addition	to	the	office	of	regent,	Eurydice	begged	Cassander	to	end	his	campaigning	efforts	in	southern	Greece	and	march	north	immediately	to	protect	her	against	the	retaliation	that	she	and	Philip	III	would	face	from	the	returning	Polyperchon	 and	 Olympias.880		 Unfortunately	 for	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III,	 and	despite	the	request	for	aid,	Cassander	remained	immovable	in	the	Peloponnese,	prioritising	 his	 efforts	 against	 Tegea	 over	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 royal	 couple.881	Cassander’s	 lack	 of	 response	 to	 Eurydice’s	 requests	 offers	 some	 intriguing	insight	into	how	he	may	have	viewed	the	new	alliance.	Until	the	autumn	of	317,	Cassander	had	shown	little	or	no	interest	in	entering	into	any	alliance	with	any	member	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 in	 his	 struggle	 against	 Polyperchon.	 It	 may	 be	possible	that	Cassander	and	Eurydice	came	into	contact	during	Cassander’s	time	in	Macedon	 in	 the	 summer	of	317,	however	 the	 scant	 information	existing	 for																																																									880	Diod.	19.11.1;	Just.	14.5.4.	881	The	delay	in	Cassander’s	action	is	determined	by	the	speed	at	which	he	could	have	returned	to	Macedon	if	he	had	indeed	chosen	to	do	so.	Following	Olympias’	return,	and	her	subsequent	actions,	Cassander	was	able	to	end	the	siege	of	Tegea	via	 diplomatic	 means	 and	 move	 north	 with	 great	 speed	 (Diod.	 19.35.1).	Bosworth	has	identified	that	Cassander’s	response	to	events	in	Macedon	during	the	winter	of	317/16	was	swift,	taking	place	over	the	space	of,	at	most,	a	matter	of	weeks	 (Bosworth,	Chiron.	 22.	 (1992).	 p.	 62.	 contra.	Errington,	Hermes.	 105.	(1977).	 p.	 495.	 cf.	 Dušaníc,	BCH.	89.	 (1965).	 p.	 134.).	 If,	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 317	when	Cassander	received	word	of	his	new	appointment,	he	had	wished	to	travel	to	the	aid	of	Eurydice	and	Philip	III,	 it	was	well	within	his	capacity	to	arrive	in	Pella	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 winter	 of	 317/16.	 For	 more	 discussion	 of	 Olympias’	return	and	events	thereafter,	see	below.	
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this	period	of	 time	does	not	provide	definitive	 information	 to	confirm	or	deny	the	possibility	of	this.	If	they	did	indeed	meet	during	Cassander’s	brief	foray	into	Macedon,	it	appears	that	either	no	binding	understanding	was	reached	between	the	two	or	that,	if	promises	were	made,	Cassander	had	little	interest	in	fulfilling	them.882		Carney	 has	 rightly	 identified	 that	 the	 safety	 of	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 was	 of	little	 concern	 to	 Cassander,	 despite	 the	 certain	 peril	 they	 faced	 from	 the	returning	Olympias.883	Similar	 to	Polyperchon	 throughout	his	 career	as	 regent,	Cassander	was,	in	317,	willing	to	engage	with	the	royals	as	long	as	it	served	his	purpose.	However,	where	Cassander	differed	 from	Polyperchon	was	that	 if	 the	plans	of	his	royal	allies	were	not	in	sympathy	with	his	own,	he	would	maintain	a	focus	upon	his	own	actions	rather	than	overextend	his	forces.		Rather	than	being	bound	by	royal	authority,	Cassander	would	instead	exploit	his	Argead	alliances.		Soon	after	Eurydice’s	decision	to	strip	Polyperchon	of	the	regency	of	Macedon,	and	 the	 subsequent	 offer	 to	 Cassander	 was	 made,	 Olympias	 departed	 from	Molossia	for	Macedon	accompanied	by	Aecides	and	Polyperchon.884	In	order	to	halt	Olympias’	advance	east,	and	 in	an	attempt	 to	protect	her	own	position,	as	well	as	that	of	her	husband,	Eurydice	led	an	army	to	the	border	of	Macedon	and	Epirus	at	Euia.885	Duris,	via	Athenaeus,	states	that	the	ensuing	combat	between	Olympias	 and	 Eurydice	 was	 the	 first	 battle	 led	 on	 both	 sides	 by	 women,886	however,	whether	a	battle	took	place	or	not	is	unclear.887	What	is	more	certain	is	that	 soon	 after	 the	 two	 armies	 met,	 Eurydice’s	 forces	 began	 to	 desert	 her	 in	favour	of	the	returning	Olympias.888	The	reason	for	the	shift	in	allegiance	by	the	Macedonian	 forces	 as	 recorded	 by	 both	 Diodorus	 and	 Justin	 was	 due	 to																																																									882	cf.	Carney,	2000.	pp.	135-136.	883	Carney,	2000.	p.	135;	Carney,	2006.	p.	73;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	12.	884	Diod.	19.11.2;	Just.	14.5.9;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	203.	885	Ath.	560.	F;	Carney,	2000.	p.	121;	Carney,	2006.	p.	74.	886	Ath.	 560.	 F:	 “…	 Δοῦρις	 δ᾽	 ὁ	 Σάμιος	 καὶ	 πρῶτον	 γενέσθαι	 πόλεμόν	 φησι	 δύο	
γυναικῶν	τὸν	Ὀλυμπιάδος	καὶ	Εὐρυδίκης.”	887	Carney,	2000.	p.	122;	cf.	Diod.	19.11.2;	Just.	14.5.9-10.	888	Diod.	 19.11.2-3;	 Just.	 14.5.10;	 Carney,	 2000.	 p.	 122;	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 74;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	4,	52,	183.		
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Olympias’	connections	 to	Alexander	 III.889	As	a	result	of	 the	mass	defections	 to	her	cause,	the	royal	mother	was	able	to	take	both	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	into	her	custody,890	paving	the	way	for	her	continued	journey	onto	Macedon.			The	 aura	 surrounding	 Olympias	 must	 have	 been	 a	 powerful	 factor	 within	Polyperchon’s	 considerable	 efforts	 to	 gain	 the	 support	 of	 Alexander’s	mother.	Her	 support	was	 especially	 important	 considering	 the	 circumstances	 that	 had	occurred	 over	 the	 previous	 year,	 where	 Polyperchon’s	 support	 base	 within	Macedon	 had	 begun	 to	 disintegrate	 while	 Cassander’s	 was	 increasing.	 The	traction	 that	 Olympias’	 return	 could	 gain	 in	 reaffirming	 the	 support	 of	 his	followers	within	the	Macedonian	homeland	was	key	to	his	efforts.	However,	this	desire	to	maintain	the	support	of	Olympias	would	come	at	a	cost	and	the	events	after	Olympias’	return	to	Pella	may	be	indicative	of	the	relationship	between	the	royal	mother	and	Polyperchon.		Once	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	were	under	Olympias’	control,	she	had	little	interest	keeping	 the	pair	alive.	Therefore,	 soon	after	 their	capture,	Olympias	put	Philip	III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	 Adea-Eurydice,	 a	 king	 and	 queen	 of	 Macedon,	 to	death.891Whether	 this	 was	 done	 because	 of	 the	 threat	 a	 living	 Eurydice	 and	Philip	 would	 present	 to	 both	 her	 own	 position892	and	 that	 of	 her	 grandson,	
																																																								889	Diod,	19.11.2-3:	“…οἱ	Μακεδόνες	ἐωτραπέωτες	τὸ	τῆς	Ὀλυμπιάδος	ἀξίωμα	καὶ	
τῶν	εὐεργεσιῶν	ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι	τῶν	Ἀλεξάνδρου	μετεβάλοντο.”;	Just.	14.5.10:	“…seu	memoria	mariti	seu	magnitudine	filii	et	indignitate	rei	moti	Macedones	ad	
Olympiada	transiere…”.	Adams	(Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	p.	21;	AncW.	10.	(1984),	p.	86.)	 suggests	 that	another	possible	 reason	 for	 the	mass	defection	 to	Olympias’	cause	lies	in	Philip	III’s	inability	to	command	an	army	in	the	field.	In	opposition	to	this	position	however,	Carney	(2006.	p.	171.	n.	54.)	highlights	that	if	this	were	so,	 their	 original	 commitment	 to	 following	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 and	 their	journey	to	Euia	explicitly	to	face	Olympias	is	perplexing.	890	Diod.	19.11.3;	Carney,	2006.	pp.	74-75.	891	Diod.	19.11.4-7;	Just.	14.5.10;	Adams,	Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	p.	21;	Bosworth	(Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	71)	states	the	acts	of	regicide	took	place	during	October	of	317	 (cf.	 Boiy,	 2007.	 p.	 58,	 149);	 Carney,	 2000.	 p.	 140;	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 75;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 4,	 52-3,	 183;	 Caroli,	 2007.	 p.	 49;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 and	Worthington,	2010,	p.	214.	892	Certainly	 the	manner	 in	which	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	were	 treated	 during	their	 final	days,	as	recorded	by	Diodorus,	did	result	 in	sympathy	 for	 them	and	
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Alexander	IV,	part	of	the	Argead’s	bloody	history	of	succession	and	domination	in	the	court	of	Macedon,	or	simply	the	act	of	a	conqueror	is	not	certain,	and	has	been	 the	 focus	 of	 significant	 evaluation	 by	 modern	 scholars.893	What	 is	 more	sure	is	that	the	royal	pair	were	not	the	only	ones	to	die	at	the	hands	of	Olympias	during	the	closing	stages	of	317.		Diodorus	 provides	 the	 most	 thorough	 account	 of	 what	 took	 place	 next.894	Immediately	following	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice,	Olympias	embarked	upon	 a	 series	 of	 executions	 in	 Macedon,	 executions	 clearly	 directed	 against	Cassander	and	perpetuating	 the	enmity	between	Olympias	and	 the	Antipatrids	that	had	been	 raging	 for	 at	 least	 the	 last	 fourteen	years.895	First	Olympias	had	Nicanor,	Cassander’s	brother	put	to	death.896	She	also	ordered	the	desecration	of	the	tomb	of	Iolaus,	another	of	Cassander’s	brothers.897	Next	came	the	deaths	of	a	significant	 number	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 aristocracy,	 those	 whom	 Olympias	deemed	 to	 be	 either	 friends	 of	 Cassander	 or	 sympathetic	 to	 his	 cause.898	Olympias	 explained	 these	 actions	 as	 being	 part	 of	 a	 response	 to	 Cassander’s	supposed	 involvement	 in	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 III	 back	 in	 323.899		 These	actions	 were	 perceived	 as	 illegal	 transgressions	 by	 ancient	 writers,900	and	 as	being	excessively	violent	by	some	sections	of	modern	scholarship.901	However,	as	 Carney	 astutely	 observes,	 Olympias’	 actions	 were	 not	 atypical	 for	 this																																																																																																																																																															dissatisfaction	 with	 Olympias	 from	 sections	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 aristocracy	(Diod.	19.11.5.).	893	See	below.	894	Diod.	19.11.8-9.	cf.	Just.	14.6.1.	895 	Contrast	 with	 Just.	 14.5.10,	 who	 suggests	 that	 the	 killings	 were	 more	wholesale	“nam	cum	principum	passim	caedes	muliebri	magis	quam	regionis	more	
fecisset…”	896	Diod.	19.11.8;	Adams,	Makedonia	3.	(1977),	p.	21;	Carney,	2006.	p.	75;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	80,	177,	cf.	p.	183;	Adams,	in	Roisman	and	Worthington,	2010,	p.	214.	897 	Diod.	 19.11.8;	 presumably	 this	 is	 the	 cupbearer	 referred	 to	 by	 Justin	(12.14.9);	Heckel,	2006.	p.	143.	898	Diod.	 19.11.8:	 states	 that	 the	 numbers	 of	 those	 killed	was	 one	 hundred.	 cf.	Just.	14.5.10;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	183.	899	Diod.	19.11.8.	900	Diod.	 19.11.8;	 Just.	 14.6.1.	 For	 Olympias’	 general	 reception	 by	 the	 ancient	sources,	see:	Carney,	2006.	pp.	125-137.	901	See	 for	 example,	 Adams,	Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	 p.	 21;	Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 199;	Errington,	 2008.	 p.	 27;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	 Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 214;	 cf.	Carney,	2006.	p.	79.	
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tumultuous	period	in	time,902	and	atrocious	acts	conducted	by	male	protagonists	are	recorded	with	little	criticism	from	ancient	scholars.903	As	conquering	forces	secure	a	 region,	political	murders	and	a	 change	 in	 the	administrative	dynamic	were	sure	 to	 follow.904	Whether	 the	actions	of	Olympias	 fell	within	 the	normal	course	of	 events	and	have	been	 judged	more	harshly	because	of	her	 sex	 is	 for	others	 to	 debate.	 Of	 key	 significance	 to	 this	 investigation	 is	 the	 part	 that	Polyperchon	may	have	played	in	these	events.		As	 almost	 to	 be	 expected,	 Polyperchon	 is	 not	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 recording	 of	these	events,	other	than	that	he	had	accompanied	the	mother	of	Alexander	the	Great	 back	 from	 Epirus. 905 	Are	 we	 to	 expect	 that	 Polyperchon	 remained	impotent	against	Olympias’	desire	 for	 revenge	against	her	enemies	 in	order	 to	satiate	her	bloodlust	as	this	is	represented	in	the	ancient	sources?	The	omission	of	Polyperchon	 in	 the	source	 tradition	 is	not	new.906	Hindsight	 suggests	 that	 it	would	 have	 been	wise	 for	 Polyperchon	 to	 attempt	 to	 restrict	 the	 numbers	 of	those	 killed	 as	 well	 as	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	 were	treated.907	This	 would	 in	 turn	 minimize	 the	 growing	 animosity	 against	 the	conquering	 forces	 of	 Olympias	 and	 himself	 within	 the	 influential	 sections	 of	Macedonian	 society.	 However,	 it	 must	 be	 highlighted	 that	 silence	 from	 the	sources	 does	 not	 equate	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 inaction	 nor	 in	 his	 possible	participation	 in	 the	political	killings	and	 these	 factors	should	not	be	dismissed	out	 of	 hand.	 It	 must	 be	 remembered	 that	 those	 killed	 were	 connected	 to	Cassander,	 either	 biologically	 or	 as	 being	 politically	 sympathetic	 to	 his	 cause,	and	were	a	faction	that	could	ferment	unrest	within	Macedon,	should	Cassander	attempt	 another	 venture	 into	 Macedonian	 territory.	 If	 Polyperchon	 was	 an	active	 participant	 in	 the	 executions,	 the	 analytical	 eye	 of	 hindsight	 could																																																									902	Carney,	2006.	p.	76.	903	See	for	example:	Arr.	Succ.	FGrH.	156.	F.	9.30);	Curt.	10.9.11-18;	Diod.	18.37.2,	19.44.1,	19.63.2,	22.12;	Plut.	Pyrrh.	26.6-7.	904	Carney,	2006.	p.	76.	905	Diod.	19.11.2	906 	For	 example,	 in	 this	 particular	 case	 Justin	 (14.5.3.)	 only	 refers	 to	Polyperchon’s	 notification	 from	 Eurydice	 to	 hand	 over	 the	 royal	 army	 to	Cassander	and	omits	him	from	the	entire	account	of	Olympias’	return.	907	Heckel,	1992.	p.	199;	cf.	Diod.	19.11.4-7.	
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interpret	 these	 deaths	 as	 justifiable	 acts,	 conducted	 by	 Olympais	 and	Polyperchon	 against	 their	most	 substantial	 opponent	 in	 Europe,	 Cassander.	 It	must	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that	 it	 was	 Polyperchon	 who	 orchestrated	 the	 alliance	with	Olympias	and	while	Olympias	was	in	no	doubt	returning	to	Macedon	with	the	primary	desire	to	oversee	the	welfare	of	Alexander	IV,	she	was	only	able	to	return	to	Macedon	because	Polyperchon	had	made	the	 initial	overtures	 to	her.	This	 suggests	 that	 the	 alliance	 between	 them	 was	 close	 and	 that	 he	 was	therefore	connected,	at	least	de	facto,	in	her	actions.	
	Alternatively,	Polyperchon	may	have,	in	order	to	maintain	Olympias’	support	in	a	 pseudo-Faustian	 manner,	 allowed	 her	 to	 act	 in	 the	 very	 manner	 so	 much	resented	in	the	narratives	of	both	Diodorus	and	Justin.	Polyperchon’s	journey	to	Epirus	indicates	that	his	support	base	from	within	Macedon	was	insufficient	to	continue	 the	 war	 against	 Cassander	 and	 his	 allies.	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 his	departure	 from	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 was	 political,	 rather	 than	 purely	geographical	and	that	he	had	now	aligned	himself	with	the	Olympias	led	Argead	faction.	Again,	shifting	allegiances	in	a	short	period	of	time	is	by	no	means	a	new	concept	to	historical	examination	of	the	Early	Hellenistic	World.908	An	issue	with	this	interpretation	however	is	that	if,	in	317,	Polyperchon	had	secured	Olympias’	support	 in	order	 to	expand	his	 support	base	within	Macedon	 itself,	 knowingly	allowing	 Olympias	 to	 act	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 would	 strengthen	 hostility	 to	 his	cause	 is	 perplexing.	 Unfortunately,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 state	with	 any	 certainty	what	role	Polyperchon	had	in	Olympias’	actions	once	she	returned	to	Macedon.	However	if	Olympias’	motivation	for	the	spate	of	killings	that	took	place	in	the	autumn	 of	 317	was	 politically	 based,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Polyperchon	would	 have	played	some	part	in	their	facilitation.	
	Carney	is	most	likely	correct	in	her	analysis	of	Olympias’	actions	as	being	in	step	with	other	atrocities	that	took	place	during	the	breakdown	of	Alexander’s	great	empire	as	well	as	 that	Olympias	has	 faced	a	hostile	reception	 from	the	ancient																																																									908	Indeed,	the	following	year	would	see	a	massive	restructure	in	Polyperchon’s	alliances	in	the	struggle	against	Cassander	and	the	alliance	with	Antigonus.	See	below.	
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literary	sources	that	has	transitioned	into	more	modern	academic	thought.	It	is	neither	 the	 focus	 nor	 intention	 of	 this	 study	 to	 defend	 or	 condemn	Olympias’	actions	in	the	autumn	of	317.	What	is	key	is	that	her	attacks	against	Cassander’s	friends	and	family	show	that	the	hostility	between	Olympias	and	the	Antipatrids	was	still	present.	Even	if	the	spate	of	executions	ordered	by	Olympias,	alongside	Polyperchon,	were	part	of	solidification	of	their	control	 in	Macedon,	conducted	against	 the	 sympathisers	 of	 their	 main	 rival	 within	 the	 country,	 these	 were	actions	that	Cassander	could	not,	and	would	not,	let	go	unanswered.	Due	to	the	long	 running	 hatred	 that	 existed	 between	 the	 mother	 of	 Alexander	 and	 the	Antipatrid	house,	 it	would	have	been	expected	 that	Cassander	 take	 the	attacks	personally.	As	soon	as	word	reached	him	of	the	deaths	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice,	and	more	importantly	the	death	of	Nicanor,	the	destruction	of	the	tomb	of	Iolaus	and	the	deaths	of	many	friends,	Cassander’s	priorities	immediately	shifted	from	the	Peloponnese	to	Pella.	
	Cassander	 was	 enraged	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 Olympias,909	and	 his	 rapid	 response	once	 word	 reached	 him	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 shows	 not	 only	 that	 he	 had	 the	ability	 to	 move	 north	 with	 speed	 when	 pressed,	 meaning	 that	 he	 could	 have	come	to	the	aid	of	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	if	he	so	desired,	it	also	lends	weight	to	his	 return	 to	Macedon	 in	 the	winter	 of	 317/16	 being	 based	 upon	 the	 attacks	conducted	against	his	 family	and	 friends,	rather	 than	out	of	a	desire	 to	avenge	the	deaths	of	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	as	may	have	been	expected	given	his	recent	appointment	to	the	regency	of	Macedon.		However,	his	newly	found	position	as	regent	of	Macedon	now	gave	Cassander	the	perfect	excuse	to	launch	an	invasion	into	Macedon	against	those	who	had	attacked	the	royal	family.	He	would	be	able	to	 legitimise	 his	 actions	 by	 asserting	 they	 were	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 deaths	 of	Eurydice	and	Philip	III,	this	despite	not	demonstrating	any	prior	interest	in	their	welfare.	 This	 would	 mean	 Cassander	 could	 act	 with	 theoretically	 greater	authority	 as	 regent	 of	 Macedon,	 but	 without	 having	 to	 contend	 with	 the	politically	active	members	of	the	royal	family	to	whom	he	was	already	hostile.910	While	Cassander	had	spent	a	significant	amount	of	time	and	effort	attempting	to																																																									909	Carney,	2006.	p.	79	910	e.g.	Alexander	IV,	who	by	317	was	less	than	six	years	of	age.	
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subdue	 the	 city	 of	 Tegea	 via	military	 endeavours,911	once	 he	 received	word	 of	the	 attacks	 against	 his	 family,	 he	 understood	 the	 need	 to	 retaliate	 as	 soon	 as	possible.	Because	of	 this,	 Cassander	 ended	 the	 siege	by	diplomatic	methods912	and	began	hasty	preparations	to	travel	north.		The	time	between	learning	of	the	return	of	Olympias	and	Cassander’s	departure	for	the	north	was	short.	Following	hastily	made	preparations	to	muster	an	army	and	 secure	 a	 fleet	 to	 transport	 it,913	after	 a	 period	 of	 no	 more	 than	 a	 month,	Cassander	 was	 on	 the	 move	 north. 914 	Following	 some	 brief	 engagements,	Diodorus	 states	 that	 most	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 forces	 were	 lost	 to	 Cassander’s	general	Callas	at	Perrhaebia	in	Thessaly.915	Despite	losing	much	of	his	strength,	Polyperchon	does	appear	to	have	still	had	a	number	of	 loyal	supporters	by	his	side,	and	withdrew	to	the	city	of	Azorius	in	order	to	hold	out	against	the	army	led	by	Callas.916	With	his	rival	occupied	for	the	moment,	Cassander	was	able	to	
																																																								911	If	as	Bosworth	suggests	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	were	killed	during	October	of	317	(Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	71),	news	of	Eurydice’s	decision	to	strip	Polyperchon	of	the	regency	and	offer	 it	 to	Cassander	must	predate	this,	at	the	very	latest	 in	September.	 Thus	 Cassander’s	 return	 to	 Macedon	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 winter	 of	317/16	 (Bosworth,	 Chiron.	 22.	 (1992).	 p.	 72;	 Boiy,	 2007.	 p.	 141,	 149).	 This	would	 give	 Cassander	 as	 much	 as	 a	 month	 where	 he	 continued	 the	 siege	 of	Tegea,	 before	 initiating	 his	 plans	 to	 march	 north.	 See:	 Bosworth,	 Chiron	 22.	1992.	p.	72.	n.	85.	for	discussion	of	Cassander’s	departure	point	for	his	invasion.	912	Diod.	 19.35.1:	 no	 record	 of	 the	 terms	 reached	 with	 Tegea	 is	 recorded,	however	it	appears	the	departure	was	abrupt	as	Cassander	left	his	allied	forces	in	the	region	to	face	Polyperchon’s	son	Alexander	“…καταλιπὼν	τοὺς	συμμάχους	
ἐν	πολλῇ	ταραχῇ.”	(Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992)	p.	62.	n.	30)	913	Diod.	 19.35.2.	 states	 that	 the	 Aetolians	 had	 sided	 with	 Polyperchon	 and	Olympias	and	had	blocked	the	pass	of	Thermopylae	and	instead	of	attempting	to	force	the	pass,	adding	further	delay	to	the	progression	of	his	movement	north,	Cassander	chose	instead	to	bypass	the	area	entirely.	914	Bosworth,	Chiron.	22.	(1992).	p.	62.	n.	30.	915	Diod.	 19.36.6;	 Carney,	 2006.	 p.	 80;	 cf.	 Diod.	 19.35.3;	 Diodorus	 claims	 that	Callas	was	 able	 to	win	 over	 Polyperchon’s	men	with	 bribery	 “…διέφθειρε	τῶν	
μετ᾽αὐτοῦ	στρατιωτῶν	τοὺς	πλείστους	χρήμασιν…”	(19.36.6).		916	cf.	Diod.	19.52.5-6.	Polyperchon	re-enters	Diodorus’	narrative	here	after	the	Cassander’s	 execution	 of	 Olympias	 (Diod.	 19.51.5-6;	 Just.	 14.6.6-12)	 which	 is	dated	 to	 the	 spring	 of	 316	 (Boiy,	 2007.	 p.	 142,	 149).	 Presumably	 his	 absence	from	Diordorus’	account	is	explained	by	little	change	occurring	during	the	siege,	as	well	 as	 the	more	 pressing	 events	 concerning	 Cassander’s	 engagement	with	Olympias	 that	 culminated	 with	 the	 siege	 of	 Pydna	 and	 Olympias’	 death.	 If	
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focus	upon	Olympias	and	 the	man	she	had	designated	 to	 lead	 the	 fight	against	him,	Aristonus.917	Olympias	herself	 thought	 it	prudent	 to	depart	 for	 the	 city	of	Pydna,	 there	to	await	 the	outcome	of	 the	confrontation.	With	her,	she	took	the	now	sole	king	of	Macedon,	Alexander	IV,	his	mother	Rhoxane	and	his	bride	to	be,	Deidameia.918	Significant	 for	 future	 events	 and	 Cassander’s	 consolidation	 of	power	in	Macedon,	Olympias	also	brought	Thessalonice,	the	daughter	of	Philip	II	to	Pydna	to	await	resolution	of	the	conflict.919		It	appears	that	Olympias	did	not	intend	for	Pydna	to	serve	a	significant	military	role	in	the	conflict	against	Cassander.920	We	are	once	again	reliant	on	Diodorus	who	offers	 the	most	extensive	account	regarding	 the	 inhabitants	of	Pydna	and	the	events	covering	the	winter	317/16	and	the	spring	of	316,	the	time	in	which	the	 siege	of	Pydna	occurred.921	The	historian	 asserts	 that	 the	occupants	of	 the	city	were	 not	 fit	 for	war,922	and	 a	 distinct	 lack	 of	 supplies	 required	 for	 a	 long	siege	existed.923	This	would	suggest	that	Olympias	and	her	allies	had	intended	to	engage	with	 Cassander	 in	 the	 field	 far	 from	 Pydna	 rather	 than	 via	 protracted	sieges.	 However	 Polyperchon	 had	 been	 isolated	 in	 Azorius	 and	 despite	 some	early	 success, 924 	Aristonius	 had	 been	 pushed	 back	 to	 Amphipolis. 925	Additionally,	the	army	led	by	Aeacides	was	driven	back	to	the	border	of	Epirus	and	Macedon	by	Cassander’s	general	Atarrhias	 following	an	attempt	 to	 relieve	Pydna.926	There	 was	 now	 little	 hope	 of	 another	 attempt	 to	 relieve	 Pydna	 and	despite	 a	 lack	 of	 adequate	 provisions,	 the	 city	 was	 forced	 to	 settle	 into	 a	protracted	siege	in	the	winter	of	317/16.																																																																																																																																																																Diodorus’	 sequence	 can	 be	 trusted,	 Polyperchon	 was	 then	 able	 to	 defend	 his	position	within	the	city	for	several	months.	917	Diod.	19.35.3-5.	For	Aristonus,	see:	Heckel,	2006.	p.	50.	918	Diod.	19.35.5.	Carney,	2006.	p.	80;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	183.	919	Diod	19.35.5;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	in	Wheatley	&	Hannah,	2009.	pp.	261-262.	920	cf.	Carney,	2006.	p.	80;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	49.	921	Diod.	19.35.6-7,	19.49-50.	cf.	Just.	14.6.2,	14.6.4-6;	Poly.	Strat.	4.11.3.	922	Diod.	19.35.5:	“…	ἀχρείων	δ᾽εἰς	πόλεμον	τῶν	πλείστων.”	923 	Diod.	 19.35.5-6:	 “…οὐδε	 γὰρ	 τροφῆς	 ἱκανον	 ἦν	 πλῆθος	 τοῖς	 μέλλουσι	
πολιορκίαν	ὑπομένειν	πολυχρόνιον.”	924	Diod.	19.50.7;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	50.	925	Diod.	19.50.3.	926	Diod.	19.35.4-5;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	5.	
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The	situation	within	the	city	soon	became	dire,	as	the	lack	of	supplies	resulted	in	starvation	and	death	becoming	rampant	among	the	inhabitants	of	the	city	as	the	winter	of	317/16	progressed.927	By	spring,	Olympias’	position	had	now	become	untenable,	 and	 following	a	vain	attempting	 to	escape	 the	city,928	as	well	 as	 the	dismissal	of	a	sizable	segment	of	the	small	garrison	that	had	survived	the	winter,	Olympias	was	forced	to	seek	terms	with	Cassander	that	would	end	the	siege.	929		Cassander	was	clearly	in	a	position	of	power.	The	isolation	of	Pydna	from	relief	forces	and	 the	desperate	position	Olympias	was	now	 in	meant	 that	he	did	not	need	 to	 compromise	with	her	 to	 any	 real	 extent.	The	only	 term	Olympias	was	able	 to	 negotiate	 was	 her	 personal	 safety.930 	With	 this	 granted,	 Cassander	secured	Pydna	and	the	royal	family.931	This	in	turn	led	to	the	acquisition	of	both	the	capital	Pella,	which	surrendered	once	news	of	Olympias’	defeat	reached	the	city,932	and	Amphipolis,	whose	commander	Aristonus	was	continuing	to	hold	out	against	Cassandrean	forces	in	the	hope	that	a	relief	force	may	come	to	his	aid.933		Cassander	now	had	possession	of	Macedon,	but	more	importantly,	the	victory	at	Pydna	put	the	king	Alexander	IV,	Rhoxane,	Thessalonice	and	Olympias	under	his	direct	control.	He	could	now	begin	to	use	the	royal	family	for	his	own	interests.	Soon	after	taking	her	prisoner	he	forced	Olympias	to	write	to	Aristonus	in	order	to	secure	Amphipolis,	thereby	removing	the	largest	pocket	of	resistance	within	Macedon	itself.934	Once	Aristonus	surrendered,	Cassander	had	him	murdered	to	avoid	any	possibility	of	insurrection.935		Additionally,	Eurydice’s	decision	to	appoint	him	to	 the	office	 in	 the	autumn	on	317,	 meant	 that	 Cassander,	 as	 both	 the	 regent	 of	 Macedon	 and	 the	 most	powerful	 man	 in	 the	 region,	 could	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 try	
																																																								927	Diod.	19.49;	Just.	14.6.5.	928	Diod.	19.50.4.	929	Diod.	19.50.1-6;	Just.	14.6.5;	Carney,	2006.	p.	82;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	183.	930	Diod.	19.50.5-6.	931	Diod.	19.50.5-6;	Just.	14.6.5;	Poly.	Strat.	4.11.3	932	Diod.	19.50.7.	933	Diod.	19.50.7-8.	934	Diod.	19.50.8.	935	Diod.	19.51.1.	
	 220	
Olympias	 with	 impunity.936	While	 Cassander’s	 regency	 had	 occupied	 tentative	legal	status,	there	was	no	one	within	Macedon	who	could	challenge	his	position,	nor	stop	him	from	acting	within	 this	capacity.	 Just	as	with	Olympias’	 return	 to	Macedon	 the	 previous	 year	 and	 the	 deaths	 of	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice,	 keeping	Olympias	 alive,	 now	 that	 he	 had	 secured	 Amphipolis,	 was	 not	 of	 interest	 to	Cassander.	In	turn,	it	is	likely	that	Olympias	was	well	aware	that	she	would	not	survive	 long	 in	 Cassander’s	 custody.937 	The	 removal	 of	 Nicanor	 and	 more	recently	Aristonus	clearly	demonstrates	that	Cassander	was	no	stranger	to	quiet	execution	 of	 his	 potential	 political	 rivals.	 Cassander	 could	 easily	 have	 simply	ordered	Olympias’	death	directly,	however	he	 chose	 instead	 to	 simultaneously	increase	 his	 standing	 among	 the	 Macedonian	 elites	 as	 well	 as	 to	 remove	Olympias	 as	 a	 threat.	 This	 was	 achieved	 by	 putting	 Olympias	 on	 trial	 for	 her	actions	 against	 the	 Macedonian	 aristocracy	 the	 previous	 year.938 	Olympias’	attacks	 against	 those	 she	 deemed	 sympathetic	 to	 Cassander’s	 position,	combined	 with	 her	 maltreatment	 of	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice,	 had	 fermented	dissatisfaction	at	best,939	and	hatred	at	worst940	within	Macedon.	By	handing	the	fate	 of	 Olympias	 over	 to	 the	 families	 of	 those	 affected	 by	 her	 actions	 in	 the	autumn	 of	 317,	 rather	 than	 summarily	 executing	 her	 once	 she	 was	 captured,	Cassander	 exploited	 anti-Olympian	 sentiments	 within	 Macedon.	 At	 the	 same	time	 he	 indicated	 to	 the	 elites	 that	 he	 would	 act	 in	 their	 interests,	 further	building	his	support	base	in	the	Macedonian	homeland.		The	 trial	 itself	 was	 little	more	 than	 a	 formality.	 Olympias	was	 not	 allowed	 to	attend,	 nor	 have	 representation	 during	 its	 course. 941 	She	 was	 soon	condemned.942	There	 is	a	discrepancy	 in	 the	ancient	 sources	as	 to	how	exactly	how	Olympias	met	her	fate.	Both	Diodorus	and	Justin	offer	embellished	accounts																																																									936	Anson,	CPh.	108.	(2008).	p.	136,	140.	937	Carney,	2006.	p.	82;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25	(2014).	pp.	12-13.	938	Diod.	19.51.1-2;	Just.	14.6.6.	939	Diod.	19.11.3-9,	19.35.1;	Just.	14.5.10.	940	Diod.	19.11.8-9;	Just.	14.6.7-8.	941	Diod.	19.51.1-2;	also	implied	by	Justin	(14.6.6);	Carney,	2006.	p.	83,	pp.	174-5	for	 some	discussion	 of	Olympias’	 legal	 right	 to	 representation	during	 her	 trial	(cf.	Adams,	Makedonia.	3.	(1977).	p.	22.	n.	23;	Hatzopoulos,	1996.	pp.	273-276;	Anson,	CPh.	103.	(2008).	pp.	139-140.).	942	Diod.	17.118.2,	19.51.1;	Just.	14.6.7;	Porphyry,	FGrH.	260.	F.	3.3.	
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that	 appear	 to	 employ	Homeric	 literary	 tropes.943		What	 is	 certain	 however	 is	that	Olympias	was,	with	 the	 support	of	 the	Macedonian	aristocracy,	murdered	under	Cassander’s	jurisdiction	soon	after	her	show	trial	in	the	spring	of	316,944	thus	bringing	an	end	to	 the	animosity	between	her	and	the	Antipatrid	 families	that	had	dogged	them	both	since	at	least	334.			The	murder	 of	 Olympias	 and	 the	 capture	 of	 Alexander	 IV	 also	 had	 a	massive	impact	upon	Polyperchon’s	position.	Gone	were	the	royals	upon	whom	he	relied	to	 support	 his	 cause	 and	 who	 had	 been	 key	 to	 his	 support	 base	 during	 the	struggle	 against	 Cassander.	 While	 still	 entrenched	 in	 Azorus	 at	 the	 time	 of	Olympias’	 death,	when	news	 arrived	 at	 the	 city,	 Polyperchon	broke	 out	 of	 the	city	 and	 fled	 south	 to	 Aetolia,	 which	 had	 pledged	 support	 to	 Olympias	 and	himself	 the	 previous	 year. 945 	After	 arriving	 in	 Aetolia,	 Polyperchon	 would	continue	 south	 to	 his	 stronghold	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	 held	 by	 his	 son	Alexander.946	From	here,	Polyperchon	would	set	about	rebuilding	his	position	in	southern	Greece.	
	
7.3:	Cassander’s	Assumption	of	Power	
	Following	 the	death	of	Olympias	Cassander	embarked	on	a	program	that,	over	the	 course	 of	 316	 and	315,	would	 aid	 in	 cementing	his	 control	 in	Macedon.	 It	must	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 following	 series	 are	 recorded	 by	 Diodorus947 	and	Justin948	in	highly	compressed	fashions,	meaning	that	defining	an	exact	sequence	of	 events,	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 that	 each	 event	 required,	 is	 highly	problematic.	While	the	death	of	Olympias	can	be	seen	as	the	first	phase	within																																																									943	Diod.	19.51.2-5;	Just.	14.6.7-12;	cf.	Carney,	2006.	pp.	80-81.	944	Carney,	2006.	p.	xii,	83-84;	Boiy.	2007.	p.	149;	cf.	Anson	(CPh.	103.	(2008).	p.	139)	who	favours	the	Low	Chronological	dating	of	315.	945	Diod.	19.52.5-6.	cf.	19.35.1-2,	where	the	Aetolians	held	out	against	Cassander	on	his	march	north,	blocking	the	pass	at	Thermopylae.	946	Diod.	19.53.	1;	cf.	Diod.	19.57.5,	which	marks	Polyperchon’s	next	appearance	in	 the	 source	 accounts.	 Note	 Justin’s	 error	 in	 15.1.1,	 where	 he	 once	 again	confuses	Polypercon	 [sic]	with	Craterus	 (Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	 2011.	p.	218).		947	Diod.	19.52.	948	Just.	14.6.13.	
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this	endeavor,	Cassander	 continued	 to	expand	his	hold	on,	 and	 influence	over,	the	royal	family.	In	order	to	stop	Alexander	and	his	mother	from	participating	in	any	 part	 of	 public	 life,	 he	 removed	 the	 pair	 from	 the	 administrative	 capital	 of	Pella	to	Amphipolis	where	they	were	kept	confined	by	Cassander’s	men.949	The	imprisonment	of	Alexander	and	Rhoxane	would	eliminate	the	possibility	of	the	boy	king	and	his	mother	being	used	as	a	rallying	point	for	Cassander’s	political	rivals.	For	Thessalonice,	the	daughter	of	Philip	II,	Cassander	had	other	plans;	he	made	 her	 his	 wife. 950 	Thessalonice’s	 feelings	 regarding	 the	 marriage	 with	Cassander	are	unrecorded,	and	it	is	likely	little	concern	was	paid	to	them.	What	she	represented	to	Cassander	was	a	strong	connection	to	Alexander	the	Great’s	father,	 a	 connection	 that	 he	 could	 exploit	 for	 further	 political	 traction	 within	Macedon.	 Carney	 has	 noted	 that,	 just	 as	 with	 Alexander	 IV	 and	 Rhoxane,	Thessalonice’s	life	following	Pydna	was	one	of	isolation	from	public	life.951	
	In	 addition	 to	 the	 imprisonment	 of	 Alexander	 IV	 and	 the	 marriage	 to	Thessalonice,	Cassander	continued	his	engagement	with	the	royal	 family	 in	his	new	 office	 of	 regent.	 He	 arranged	 and	 oversaw	 the	 burials	 of	 the	 murdered	Philip	 III	and	Eurydice	at	 the	traditional	Argead	burial	ground	 in	Aigai.	952	This	was	 done	 with	 great	 fanfare,	 with	 fitting	 royal	 dignity	 and	 funeral	 games,	honouring	 the	 pair	 killed	 by	 Olympias	 the	 previous	 year.	 Finally,	 Cassander	embarked	 upon	 an	 ambitious	 building	 campaign	 in	 Macedon	 and	 Greece.	Diodorus	 states	 that	 he	 ordered	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 at	 least	 three	 cities.	 He	rebuilt	 the	 city	 of	 Thebes	 that	 had	 been	 destroyed	 by	Alexander	 III	 in	 335.953	Additionally,	Cassander	also	ordered	 that	 two	new	cities	be	built,	 named	after	himself	and	his	wife,	Cassandreia	and	Thessalonica.954																																																									949	Diod.	19.52.4;	Just.	14.6.13,	15.1.3;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19.	950	Diod.	19.52.1,	19.61.2;	Just.	14.6.13;	Paus.	9.7.3,	8.7.7;	Porphyry,	FGrH.	260.	F.	3.4;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 40;	 Carney,	 2000.	 p.	 145;	Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 80,	 265;	Boiy.	2007.	p.	142.	951	Carney,	2000.	p.	157.	952 	Diod.	 19.52.5:	 “…ἒθαψεν	 ἐν	 Αἰγαιαῖς,	 καθάπερ	 ἒθος	 ἦν	 τοῖς	 βασιλεῦσι.”;	Palagia,	in	Howe	&	Reames,	2008.	p.	206;	Adams,	in	Roisman,	J	&	Worthington,	I,	2010.	p.	214.	953	Diod.	19.53.2;	19.61.1;	cf.	Diod.	17.12.	954	Diod.	19.52.2;	Heid.	Epit.	FGrH	156.	F.	2;	Livy.	44.11.2;	Marmor	Parium	FGrH	239.	B.	14;	Strab.	7	.21,	24;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	215.		
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	All	 of	 these	 acts	 are	 without	 question	 linked	 to	 notions	 of	 Cassander’s	 royal	aspirations,	with	Diodorus	 stating	 outright	 that	 Cassander	was	 in	 fact	 already	acting	as	a	king	following	his	the	victory	at	Pydna.955		This	sentiment	has	rightly	permeated	 into	 modern	 scholarship.956	Certainly	 all	 these	 actions	 are	 indeed	linked	to	the	Argead	family	and	the	Macedonian	throne.	But,	while	Cassander’s	future	 as	 the	 next	 king	 in	 Macedon	 following	 the	 murder	 of	 Alexander	 IV	 in	310/09	seems	certain,957	it	does	encourage	an	early	reading	into	the	security	of	his	position	in	Macedon.	Once	again,	neither	Cassander’s	actions	in	regard	to	his	royal	aspirations,	or	the	acts	themselves	are	open	to	question.	However,	an	area	that	does	require	 further	 investigation	 is	 the	space	of	 time	within	which	 these	monarchical	acts	took	place.		Cassander’s	 control	 following	 his	 hastily	 prepared	 invasion	 of	Macedon	 in	 the	winter	of	317/16	has	been	understood	as	being	total	conquest	of	the	region	and	the	 confirmation	 of	 his	 dominance	 within	 Macedon	 and	 Greece.958	It	 must	 be	noted	though	that	the	implementation	of	Cassander’s	control	within	the	region	should	not	so	quickly	be	separated	from	his	ongoing	struggle	with	Polyperchon.	Instead	 of	 viewing	 the	 two	 efforts	 as	 separate	 entities,	 a	 more	 thorough	understanding	 of	 events	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire	 is	 made	 possible	 by	engaging	with	both	Cassander’s	efforts	to	implement	his	control	of	Macedon	and	the	 ongoing	 effort	 against	 Polyperchon	 as	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 each	 other.	When	 this	 is	 done,	 Cassander’s	 position	 as	 the	 dominant	 actor	 par	 excellence	may	be	called	into	question.	Rather	than	a	conqueror	installing	his	new	junta	in	the	 Macedonian	 heartland,	 Cassander	 occupied	 a	 more	 tentative	 position.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	 concise	 methodical	 effort	 supplied	 by	 the	 literary	 sources,	Cassander	 embarked	upon	 a	 far	more	drawn	out,	 subtle	 approach	 to	 securing																																																									955 	Diod.	 19.52.1:	 “…Κάσανδρος	 δέ,	 κατὰ	 νοῦν	 αὐτῷ	 τῶν	 πραγμάτων	
προχωρούντων,	περιελάμβανε	ταῖς	ἐλπίσι	τὴν	Μακεδόνων	βασιλείαν.”	956	see	for	example:	Carney,	2006.	p.	83;	Errington,	2008.	p.	28;	Palagia,	in	Howe	&	 Reames,	 2008.	 p.	 206;	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 215.	 Kosmin,	2014.	p.	218	957	See	Ch.	8.3.	958	Fortina,	1965.	p.	43;	Adams,	1975.	p.	97;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 in	Wheatley	&	Hannah,	2009.	p.	261;	cf.	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25	(2014).	p.	12.	
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Macedon	over	the	space	of	at	 least	eighteen	months.	Anxious	of	 losing	his	new	foothold	in	Macedon,	that	he	was	able	to	create	for	himself	following	Olympias’	abrupt	return	to	Macedon	in	the	winter	of	317/16,	Cassander	began	a	series	of	actions	in	response	to	immediate	concerns	in	securing	his	position	in	Macedon.		The	marriage	between	Cassander	and	Thessalonice	had	a	number	of	benefits	for	the	regent.	Not	only	did	it	align	himself	to	the	royal	family,	but	it	also	integrated	himself	within	 it.959	This	would	afford	him	a	greater	degree	of	 flexibility	 to	act	within	 his	 capacity	 as	 regent	 of	Macedon.	 This	 strategy	 allowed	 Cassander	 to	create	symbolic	links	to	the	two	great	kings	of	Macedon,	Philip	II	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	 Alexander	 III	 as	 well	 as	 to	 use	 the	 imagery	 and	 royal	 prestige	 of	 the	Argead	house	to	further	his	aim	of	controlling	the	Macedonian	homeland.960	The	links	 were	 not	 just	 ceremonial,	 but	 also	 very	 practical.	 As	 both	 Carney	 and	Landucci	Gattinoni	highlight,	Cassander	would	now	be	able	to	tap	into	the	pro-Argead	sentiment	among	the	disaffected	Macedonian	elites	following	Olympias’	return	the	previous	autumn.961		The	burial	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	in	the	traditional	Argead	burial	grounds	at	Aigai	has	also	drawn	the	attention	of	both	ancient	and	modern	writers.	962	Along	with	 the	royal	 couple,	Cassander	also	buried	Cynna,	 the	mother	of	Eurydice	at	much	 the	 same	 time.	 The	 burial	 of	 Macedonian	 royalty	 was	 a	 highly	 political	issue.963	The	 burial	 of	 Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	 at	 Aigai	 with	 fitting	 ceremonial	practices	 conveyed	 great	 political	 prestige	 upon	 the	 person	 conducting	 the	
																																																								959	Landucci	Gattinoni,	 in	Wheatley	&	Hannah,	2009.	p.	262.	Landucci	Gattinoni	also	highlights	the	practical	benefits	that	marriage	would	have	for	Thessalonice,	which	may	problematise	the	hostility	that	Carney	(Historia.	37.	(1988).	p.	388.	n.	7)	suggests	the	daughter	of	Philip	II	had	for	her	new	husband.	960	Stewart,	 1993.	 p.	 278;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 in	Wheatley,	&	Hannah,	 2009.	 p.	262.	961	Carney,	2006.	p.	84;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	in	Wheatley	&	Hannah,	2009.	p.	263.	962	Diod.	 19.52.5;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	 Worthington,	 2010,	 p.	 214.	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	in	Howe,	Edward	Garvin	&	Wrightson,	2015.	p.	137.	963	As	can	be	seen	in	the	treatment	of	Alexander	the	Great’s	body	following	his	death	 in	323	by	the	Diadochoi	as	evident	 in	Diodorus’s	narrative	(Diod.	18.28-29).	
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ceremonies.964	It	was	also	a	practice	usually	denoting	the	next	successor	to	the	Macedonian	 throne. 965 	This	 placed	 Cassander	 as	 the	 dominant	 figure	 in	Macedon,	 stamping	 his	 authority	 following	 the	 defeat	 of	 Olympias.	 Whether	Cassander	 had	 any	 actual	 authority	 to	 conduct	 these	 ceremonies	 in	 his	 given	capacity	 as	 the	 newly	 appointed	 regent	 of	Macedon	 or	 not	may	 have	 been	 of	little	concern	to	him.	It	would	appear	likely	that	Cassander	did	not	conduct	the	burial	of	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	in	his	guise	as	regent	or	on	behalf	of	Alexander	IV	as	the	boy-king	and	his	mother	Rhoxane	appear	to	have	been	hurried	north	to	Amphipolis	soon	after	Cassander’s	victory	at	Pydna	in	the	custody	of	one	of	his	supporters,	 Glaucias.966	This	 would	 then	 mean	 that	 apart	 from	 Thessalonice,	there	 was	 no	 living	 Argead	 representation	 at	 Aigai	 other	 than	 the	 recently	inducted	Cassander.		Cassander	also	began	a	construction	campaign	centered	on,	but	not	 limited	 to,	northern	Macedon	and	Chalcidice.	If	Diodorus’	sequence	is	employed	as	a	rough	guide,	 shortly	 after	 his	 marriage	 to	 Thessalonice	 Cassander	 ordered	 the	construction	of	a	new	city	within	southern	Chalcidice,	which	was	to	bear	his	own	name,	the	city	of	Cassandreia.967	The	city,	located	on	the	plain	of	Pallene	was	to	syncretise	with	the	city	of	Potidaea	as	well	as	surrounding	villages,	providing	a	home	 for,	 amongst	 others,	 the	 Olythians,	 whose	 city	 had	 been	 destroyed	 by	Philip	 II. 968 	Following	 this,	 Cassander	 also	 ordered	 the	 foundation	 of	Thessalonica	 in	 honour	 of	 his	 new	 wife.969	In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 cities,	 he	ordered	the	city	of	Thebes	in	central	Greece	to	be	rebuilt,	having	been	destroyed	by	Alexander	III	in	336.970	These	three	cities	would	form	the	core	of	Cassander’s	construction	campaign	covering	the	years	of	316	and	315	respectively.																																																									964	cf.	Diod.	18.28.4.	965	Anson.	2014.	p.	127	966	Diod.	 19.52.4;	 Just.	 14.6.13;	 for	 Glaucias,	 see:	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 126.	 s.v.	
Glaucias	[2].	967	Diod.	 19.52.3;	 Marmor	 Parium.	 FGrH	 239.	 B.	 14;	 Livy.	 44.11.1;	 Landucci	Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 96;	 Caroli,	 2007.	 p.	 49;	Adams,	 in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	214;	Anson,	2014.	p.	127	968	Diod.	19.52.3.	cf.	Diod.	16.53;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	96.	969	Heidl.	 Epit.	FGrH.	 155.	 F.	 2.4;	 Strab,	 	 7.2.1;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 98,	104;	Anson,	2014.	p.	127;	970	Diod.	19.53.2;	Anson,	2014.	p.	127;	cf.	Diod.	17.12-13;	Paus.	9.7.1-2.	
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An	 issue	 then	 presents	 itself	 as	 to	 the	 sequence	 and	 dating	 of	 Cassandreia,	Thessalonica	and	Thebes.	Frustratingly,	the	precise	timing	of	each	of	these	city’s	foundations	 is	 not	 known	 and	 difficult	 to	 state	with	 any	 certainty	 beyond	 the	period	 of	 time	 when	 Cassander	 concentrated	 upon	 cementing	 his	 position	 in	Macedon.	In	regard	to	the	construction	of	Cassandreia,	the	most	likely	possibility	is	 that	 orders	 were	 given	 at	 some	 point	 during	 the	 year	 of	 315.971	Landucci	Gattinoni	has	identified	that	the	cause	of	this	uncertainty,	especially	in	regard	to	Thessalonica’s	construction,	is	the	result	of	the	lack	of	historical	context	within	the	ancient	sources	that	further	complicates	the	matter	of	defining	an	accurate	sequence	 of	 construction.972	If	 it	were	 possible	 to	 define	 an	 exact	 sequence	 of	events	within	Cassander’s	construction	campaign,	 it	may	have	been	possible	to	gain	 greater	 insight	 into	his	 approach	and	desire	 to	build	up	his	 support	base	within	northern	Greece	and	central	Greece.	The	 reconstruction	of	Thebes	may	have	begun	following	Cassander’s	return	to	the	Peloponnese	in	the	latter	half	of	316	 as	 he	 journeyed	 through	 Boeotia	 at	 the	 time.973	However,	 beyond	 the	geographical	locations	and	the	confines	of	the	roughly	eighteen	months	between	mid	 316,	 following	 the	 death	 of	 Olympias	 and	 315,	 it	 appears	 that	 further	precision	 may	 not	 be	 possible	 due	 to	 a	 distinct	 lack	 of	 information	 with	 the	surviving	source	accounts.		Within	a	Macedonian	context,	the	construction	of	new	cities	bearing	the	name	of	those	who	ordered	their	 foundation	held	distinctly	royal	attributes,974	with	the	precedent	set	by	both	Philip	II	and	Alexander	III	creating	a	pure	Argead	pedigree	to	the	naming	of	cities	after	those	who	commissioned	them.	When	Cassander’s	implementation	 of	 power	 within	Macedon	 over	 the	 course	 of	 316	 and	 315	 is	seen	solely	from	the	perspective	provided	by	the	ancient	literary	sources,	a	one-																																																								971	This	is	reinforced	by	the	record	found	in	the	Marmor	Parium	(FGrH.	239.		B.	14);	 cf.	Adams,	 in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 214	 implies,	 but	does	not	specifically	state	that	Cassandreia,	along	with	Thessalonica	were	constructed	by	the	end	of	315	and	before	314;	cf.	Anson,	2014.	p.	127.	972	Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 96;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 214	simply	place	the	contruction	of	Thessalonica	“[a]t	some	point	in	his	[Cassander’s]	
reign.”	For	more	discussion,	see	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	pp.	95-104.	973	Diod.	19.54.1-2.	974 	Caroli,	 2007.	 p.	 49;	 Errington,	 2008.	 p.	 128;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington,	2010.	p.	214;	Anson,	2014.	p.	127;	Kosmin,	2014.	p.	218.	
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sided	view	of	focused	intent	on	the	throne	of	Macedon	begins	to	emerge.	Others,	particularly	Diodorus,	represent	him	as	a	man	already	acting	as	a	king	in	all	but	name.	 However,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Cassander	 chose	 to	 represent	 himself	 may	complicate	 matters	 to	 a	 greater	 degree.	 This	 is	 particularly	 so	 in	 regard	 to	Cassander’s	 issue	 of	 coinage	 from	 the	 mints	 under	 his	 control,	 as	 the	 coins	appear	to	offer	a	different	representation,	one	that	contrasts	dramatically	with	that	of	the	literary	sources.		Following	Cassander’s	conquest	of	Macedon,	in	addition	to	taking	control	of	the	royal	 family,	 he	 also	 gained	authority	over	 the	mints	within	Macedon	at	Pella,	and	Amphipolis,975	and	by	 extension,	 control	 over	 the	 iconography	upon	 coins	issued	 from	 those	 mints.	 If	 Cassander	 was	 already	 aiming	 for	 the	 throne	 as	indicated	by	the	explicit	actions	of	marrying	into	the	Argead	family,	the	burial	of	Philip	 III	 and	 Eurydice	 as	well	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 not	 one,	 but	 two	 cities	 in	Cassandreia	 and	 Thessalonice,	 the	 control	 of	 the	 mints	 would	 provide	 him	 a	vehicle	 by	 which	 he	 could	 relay	 his	 image	 throughout	 Macedon.	 However,	Cassander	made	no	alteration	to	the	coinage	under	his	control	until	305,	when	he,	 along	 with	 other	 members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi,	 began	 to	 assume	 the	 royal	title. 976 	Indeed,	 Cassander	 would	 continue	 to	 mint	 unaltered	 posthumous	coinage	of	Philip	II	and	Alexander	the	Great,	 the	 former	of	which	he	continued	for	the	rest	of	his	 life.977	The	 lack	of	alteration	to	Cassander	controlled	coinage	during	a	 time	of	explicitly	 royal	acts	appears	 to	contradict	 the	representations	found	 within	 the	 accounts	 of	 Justin,	 and	 especially	 of	 Diodorus,	 and	 raises	questions	 as	 to	 the	 exact	 intentions	 of	 the	 son	 of	 Antipater	 following	 his	successful	 return	 to	 Macedon	 in	 the	 winter	 of	 317/16.	 It	 would	 appear	 that	Cassander	 did	 not	 represent	 himself	 as	 royalty	 during	 this	 time.	 Indeed																																																									975	Mørkholm,	 1991.	 p.	 42,	 59,	 79;	 Valassiades,	 XIII	 Congress	 International	 de	
Numismatica,	2003.	p.	405.	Mørkholm	also	raises	the	possibility	of	a	third	mint	at	Aigai	(Mørkholm,	1991.	p.	42.)	that	would	have	also	come	under	Cassander’s	control	at	the	same	time	as	those	at	Pella	and	Amphipolis.	976	Billows,	1990.	159;	Mørkholm	and	Valassiades	both	note	that	Cassander	did	add	 his	 name	 to	 bronze	 coins	 under	 his	 control	 (Mørkholm,	 1991.	 pp.	 59-60;	Valassiades,	XIII	Congress	 International	de	Numismatica,	 2003.	 p.	 405.	 But	 this	did	 not	 take	 place	 until	 310,	 after	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 in	 311	 when	Cassander’s	authority	in	Europe	as	strategos	was	confirmed.	cf.	Ch.	8.2.	977	Mørkholm,	1991.	p.	60	
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references	from	within	Plutarch’s	Life	of	Demetrius	tell	us	that	Cassander	would	shy	 away	 from	 the	 title	 of	 basileus	 even	 during	 later	 phases	 of	 his	 rule.978	If	Plutarch’s	 excerpt	 provides	 any	 insight	 into	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Cassander	approached	 the	 Macedonian	 monarchy,	 it	 may	 provide	 grounds	 for	 viewing	Cassander’s	consolidation	of	power	over	 the	course	of	316	and	315	on	a	more	nuanced	level,	exploiting	the	links	he	had	created	for	himself	to	the	royal	Argead	family.		
	So	 how	 can	 these	 seemingly	 diametrically	 opposed	 representations	 be	remedied?	Were	alterations	of	the	coinage	under	his	control	one	step	too	far	for	his	 monarchial	 aspirations,	 while	 the	 foundation	 of	 cities,	 reconstruction	 of	those	previously	destroyed	and	marriage	into	the	Argead	family	was	deemed	to	be	more	acceptable?	Was	Cassander’s	sole	focus	in	316	and	315	on	the	throne	of	Macedon	or	were	his	actions	part	of	a	more	multifaceted	approach	to	not	only	secure	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland,	 but	 also	 to	 combat	 the	 still	 dangerous	Polyperchon	in	the	Peloponnese?	There	can	be	little	doubt	that	Cassander’s	goal	was	total	control	of	Macedon	as	 its	sole	ruler,979	but	this	does	not	 immediately	equate	 to	 a	 desire	 to	 be	 king.	 Additionally,	 it	 must	 be	 noted, 980 that	 the	application	 of	 secure	 dating	 for	 Cassander’s	 actions	 during	 this	 time	 is	problematic.		An	answer	to	the	single	natured,	monarchical	approach	may	be	found,	so	much	as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	define,	 in	 the	 growing	 tensions	between	Cassander	 and	his	key	ally,	Antigonus	Monophthalmus	and	the	animosity	developing	as	a	result	of	the	 growing	 power	 of	 Antiognus	 in	 Asia	 Minor	 and	 the	 actions	 of	 Cassander,	Ptolemy	and	Lysimachus	 in	 cementing	 their	 respective	positions.	 	Many	of	 the	accusations	of	Cassander’s	monarchical	aspirations	came	as	Antigonus	initiated	the	possibility	 of	 constructing	 an	 alliance	with	Polyperchon	 against	 the	 son	of	Antipater	 and	 the	 support	 base	which	 this	was	hoped	 to	provide	Polyperchon	
																																																								978	Plut.	Dem.	18.2.	979 	cf.	 Yardley,	 Wheatley	 &	 Heckel,	 2011.	 p.	 246,	 with	 accompanying	bibliography.		980	As	done	by	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	246.	
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from	 among	 the	 Greek	 cities.981	This	 in	 turn	 led	 to	 the	 Third	 War	 of	 the	Diadochoi	 in	314.982		These	 growing	 tensions	 also	had	 resulting	 impact	 on	 the	accounts	within	 the	 literary	 sources.	This	particularly	 concerns	 the	 account	 of	Hieronymus	 of	 Cardia,	 who	 following	 the	 defeat	 of	 Eumenes	 by	 Antigonus’	forces	in	316,	had	taken	up	residence	within	the	Antigonid	court.	It	was	during	his	 time	here	 that	Hieronymus	embarked	upon	 the	composition	of	his	magnus	
opus	 that	 went	 on	 to	 become	 one	 of	 the	 central	 authorities	 for	 subsequent	ancient	 writers,983	and	 may	 provide	 a	 retroactive	 distortion	 of	 Cassander’s	consolidation	 of	 power	 after	 the	 defeat	 of	 Olympias.	 What	 this	 bias	 source	perspective	does	to	the	transmission	of	information	through	the	millennia	is	to	highlight	 the	monarchical	 aspect	 of	 Cassander’s	 endeavours	 between	 316	 and	315,	 while	 simultaneously	 suppressing	 any	 other	 feature	 that	 had	 an	 impact	upon	his	thinking.	It	must	however	be	highlighted	that	it	is	not	the	intention	of	this	 investigation	 to	 dismiss	 the	 monarchical	 aspects	 of	 Cassander’s	consolidation	 of	 power,	 but	 rather	 to	 incorporate	 these	 acts	 within	 more	immediately	pressing	events	in	Europe.		There	may	 be	 other	 driving	 factors	 behind	where	 Cassander	 ordered	 his	 new	cities	be	built.	The	main	routes	of	entry	into	his	area	of	influence	were	likely	to	come	 from	 the	Peloponnese	 and	Polyperchon’s	 position	 there,	 or	 alternatively	via	the	Hellespont	and	Thrace	through	Lysimachean	held	territory.	By	building	both	 Thessalonica	 and	 Cassandreia	 between	 Pella	 and	 Thrace,	 Cassander	may	have	 sought	 to	 create	 a	 strong	 basis	 of	 support	 to	 his	 cause	 against	 potential	hostile	 forces	venturing	west	on	 land	from	Asia	Minor.984	While	Cassander	had	control	of	Athens,	 the	addition	of	Thebes	 to	his	cause,	along	with	 the	personal	loyalty	of	the	inhabitants,985	would	act	as	another	strategic	city	that	could	aid	in																																																									981	For	 a	more	 thorough	discussion	 of	 Antigonus’	 alliance	 and	 the	 propaganda	campaign	he	embarked	upon	against	Cassander,	see	below.	982	cf.	Adams,	1975.	pp.	115-117;	Billows,	1990.	pp.		114-115;	Boiy,	2007.	60-63;	Errington,	2008.	p.	31;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	pp.	215-216.	983	cf.	Hornblower,	1981.	pp.	11-14.	984	Diodorus	suggests	 that	Cassander	was	keen,	and	subsequently	successful	 in	building	 Cassandreia	 into	 one	 of	 the	 largest,	 cities,	 both	 geographically	 and	presumably	in	terms	of	population	in	Macedon	(Diod.	19.52.2-3).	985	See	Diod.	19.53.2-3.	
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the	war	 effort	 against	 Polyperchon.986	It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 precedent	 for	 naming	cities	after	those	who	ordered	their	construction	was	up	until	this	point	in	time,	a	 purely	 Argead	 affair.	 As	 Anson	 has	 previously	 noted,987	the	 Diadochoi	 were	prolific	 builders,	 employing	 the	 foundation	of	 new	 cities	 as	 another	 avenue	 to	extend	 their	 various	 spheres	 of	 influence	 throughout	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	and	to	suppress	troublesome	areas	in	their	control	resulting	in	the	example	set	by	Philip	II	and	Alexander	III,	an	example	followed	initially	by	Cassander	during	his	 period	 of	 consolidation	 and	 shortly	 thereafter	 by	 other	 members	 of	 the	Diadochoi.988	This	may	provide	grounds	to	argue	that,	 in	addition	to	Cassander	cementing	 his	 position	 within	 Macedon	 and	 Greece	 as	 the	 new	 ruler	 of	 the	Macedonian	 homeland,	 the	 immediate	 threats	 to	 his	 position	 may	 have	 also	influenced	his	building	program.	
	Over	 the	 course	 of	 316	 and	 315,	 while	 Cassander	 was	 embarking	 upon	consolidation	 of	 power	 within	 Macedon,	 Antigonus	 initiated	 a	 propaganda	campaign	 directed	 against	 Cassander	 based	 upon	 the	 numerous	 actions	conducted	by	 the	son	of	Antipater	 that	Antigonus	perceived	as	being	explicitly	royal.989	The	 exact	 sequence	 of	 events	 regarding	who	was	 the	 cause	 for	 these	tensions	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	 with	 any	 strong	 conviction	 due	 to	 the	compressed	 and	 problematically	 non-contextualised	 nature	 of	 the	 source	tradition	 covering	 this	 period	 of	 time,	 particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Diodorus’	narrative.	Whether	 the	 tensions	originated	 in	 the	actions	of	a	single	 individual	that	 set	 in	place	an	unstoppable	escalation	of	hostilities	appears	 too	simplistic	an	 understanding	 of	 the	 complex	 events	 during	 the	 opening	 stages	 of	 the	 still	emerging	Hellenistic	World.		
	Eighteen	 months	 is	 a	 not	 inconsiderable	 period	 of	 time	 for	 the	 dynamic	 of	alliances	 among	 the	 Diadochoi	 to	 shift	 and	 adapt	 as	 the	 situation	 dictates.	However,	the	exact	sequence	of	events	that	led	to	the	development	of	hostilities																																																									986 	Diod.	 19.53.1	 for	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 both	 Polyperchon	 and	 his	 son	Alexander;	Anson,	2014.	p.	127.	987	Anson,	2014.	p.	127.	cf.	Billows,	1990.	pp.	292-305.	988	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	104.	989	Diod.	19.61.1-3;	Billows,	1990.	p.	114.	
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between	 Antigonus	 and	 Cassander	 is	 not	 of	 central	 concern	 to	 this	investigation.990	Of	greater	importance	is	the	result	of	these	tensions,	that	being	the	 shift	 in	 allegiance	 of	 Antigonus	 from	 being	 Cassander’s	 ally	 to	 his	 enemy.	From	 314,	 Antigonus	 and	 Polyperchon	 would	 enter	 into	 an	 alliance	 against	Cassander,	 Ptolemy	 and	 Lysimachus. 991 	For	 Antigonus,	 the	 alliance	 with	Polyperchon	 served	 much	 the	 same	 purpose	 as	 his	 original	 alliance	 with	Cassander	 in	 319	 against	 Polyperchon.992	It	 would	 keep	 Cassander	 and	 his	military	 resources	out	 of	 direct	 confrontation	 against	Antigonus	 in	Asia	Minor	and	 occupied	 within	 the	 European	 sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	 For	Polyperchon,	this	newly	forged	link	to	Monophthalmus	provided	him	with	a	vital	lifeline	 to	 continue	 the	 war	 against	 Cassander	 from	 his	 stronghold	 in	 the	Peloponnese.993	However,	Polyperchon	would	need	to	survive	one	more	conflict	with	Cassander	in	the	Peloponnese	in	the	later	stages	of	316	before	he	cemented	Antigonid	support.		While	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 dismiss	 Polyperchon	 as	 a	 dominant	 political	 and	 military	figure	 within	 Macedonian	 politics	 following	 his	 removal	 from	 the	 regency	 of	Macedon	in	the	space	of	roughly	two	years	after	the	death	of	Antipater,	it	is	clear	that	 Cassander	 did	 not	 do	 so.	 Almost	 immediately	 after	 taking	 Macedon,	 and	during	his	consolidation	of	power,	Cassander	once	again	turned	his	attention	to	the	Peloponnese	and	began	to	reorganise	an	invasion	of	the	region.994	Though	it	is	 easy	 with	 the	 advantage	 of	 hindsight	 to	 see	 that	 Polyperchon	would	 never	again	 have	 the	 influence	 and	 power	 that	 was	 at	 his	 disposal	 in	 319	 after	 the	death	of	Antipater,	he	was	however	still	Cassander’s	greatest	rival	in	Greece	and	remained	 a	 real	 threat	 to	 his	 position.	 Cassander	 had	 been	 unable,	 despite	considerable	 effort,	 to	destroy	Polyperchon’s	 support	base	 in	 the	Peloponnese	during	his	 first	 venture	 into	 the	 region	 in	317.	He	was	 forced	 to	break	off	 the	
																																																								990	For	debate	on	this	issue,	see	Adams,	1975.	p.	104-106;	Billows,	1990.	pp.	107-108;	 Errington,	 2008.	 pp.	 28-30;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	215	991	Diod.	19.57.2;	Just.	15.1.1-4.	992	cf.	Ch.	6.1.	pp.	152-153.	993	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	215.	994	Diod.	19.52.5-6.	
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engagement	at	Tagea	and	head	north	against	the	coalition	between	Polyperchon	and	Olympias	returning	from	Epirus.		As	previously	stated,	little	information	can	be	gleaned	from	the	ancient	sources	in	 regards	 to	 Cassander’s	 first	 invasion	 of	 the	Peloponnese	 other	 than	 that	 he	was	 unable	 to	 raise	 Tagea	 during	 the	 city’s	 besiegement.	 Cassander	 was	 also	unable	 to	 crush	 Polyperchon’s	 support	 base	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.	 His	 sudden	departure	 to	 Macedon	 once	 word	 reached	 him	 of	 Olympias’s	 actions	 against	Philip	III	and	Eurydice,	the	spate	of	executions	among	the	Macedonian	elites	and	the	attacks	against	his	 family	afforded	 the	cities	 loyal	 to	Polyperchon	a	period	several	months	where	 they	could	rebuild	 their	defences	 in	preparation	 for	 the	likely	 return	 of	 Cassandrean	 forces	 should	 he	 emerge	 victorious	 from	 the	conflict	during	the	winter	of	317/16.				Cassander	would	 soon	 return.	By	 the	 second	half	of	316,	his	 forces	were	once	again	 on	 the	 march	 south.995	It	 was	 clear	 that	 Polyperchon	 had	 expected	 his	rival’s	second	attempt	on	the	Peloponnese	and	in	response	to	this,	had	stationed	his	 son	 Alexander	 on	 the	 isthmus	 that	 connects	 the	 Peloponnese	 to	mainland	Greece,	 guarding	 the	 pass. 996 	However,	 Cassander	 was	 able	 to	 employ	transportation	 across	 the	 water	 and	 bypassed	 Alexander’s	 position	 without	conflict.	From	here,	he	resumed	his	war	on	Polyperchon	and	his	allies.		Unfortunately,	no	specific	reference	to	Polyperchon’s	whereabouts	or	his	actions	during	 Cassander’s	 second	 invasion	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 in	 316	 exists.	 Once	again,	 historical	 evaluation	 of	 Cassander’s	 campaign	 is	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 the	compressed	 account	 found	 in	 Diodorus’s	 narrative. 997 	Polyperchon’s	 last	attested	location	is	fixed	to	Aetolia	in	the	spring	of	316	after	his	flight	from	the	siege	at	Azorius	in	the	northern	Thessaly	once	news	of	Olympias’	execution	had	reached	 the	 city.998	Diodorus	 writes	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 to	 stay	 in	 Aetolia																																																									995	Diod.	19.54.3-4;	Beloch,	places	the	second	invasion	to	the	summer	of	316	(IV2	1924.	p.	441);	Heckel,	1992.	pp.	200-201;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20,	228.	996	Diod.	19.54.3	997	Diod.	19.54.3-4.	998	cf.	Diod.	19.52.5-6.	
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among	 local	supporters	 in	 the	region999	and	await	 further	developments	of	 the	conflict	against	Cassander	before	deciding	on	the	next	course	of	action	he	was	to	take.	 Following	 this	 reference,	 the	 next	 marker	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 location	 is	within	 the	 Peloponnese	 in	 315	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 Antigonus’	 emissary	Aristodemus	and	the	initiation	of	alliance	and	friendship	between	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon.1000	Diodorus	 does	 appear	 to	 suggest	 that	 at	 the	 time	 Cassander	departed	 south,	Polyperchon	had	not	entered	 into	 the	Peloponnese.	This	 is	on	the	basis	that	Cassander’s	stated	goal	for	the	campaign,	as	Diodorus	asserts,	was	to	throw	Alexander	out	of	his	position	in	the	region,1001	without	making	mention	of	Polyperchon	himself.	 It	 could	be	argued	 that	at	 the	point	 in	 time	Cassander	had	 marched	 south	 through	 Boeotia,	 Polyperchon	 withdrew	 from	 Aetolia,	possibly	leading	his	army	into	the	Peloponnese	without	conflict.	Once	there,	he	could	turn	his	attention	back	to	directing	the	war	effort	and	supporting	his	son	Alexander	 against	 Cassander	 as	 it	would	be	unlikely	 that,	 as	 Cassander’s	 chief	rival	along	with	his	Epirote	dominated	army,	Polyperchon	would	be	allowed	to	remain	active	and	unmolested	 in	mainland	Greece.	However,	 it	must	be	stated	that	 it	 is	entirely	plausible	 that	Polyperchon	maintained	his	position	 in	Aetolia	throughout	the	period	of	Cassander’s	second	campaign	into	the	Peloponnese.1002	From	what	can	be	gleaned	from	Diodorus’	narrative,	it	appears	that	Alexander,	not	 Polyperchon,	 was	 the	 military	 and	 political	 head	 of	 the	 effort	 against	Cassander	in	the	region	during	316,	and	that	Alexander	was	the	only	person	in	the	 Peloponnese	 who	 had	 an	 army	 at	 his	 disposal	 to	 combat	 Cassander’s	invading	 forces.1003	This	 does	 not	 explicitly	 discount	 Polyperchon’s	 position	 in	either	Aetolia	or	within	 the	Peloponnese;	 it	 is	possible	 that	Polyperchon	could	have	been	located	in	either	location	in	southern	Greece.																																																										999	These	Aetolian	supporters	actively	aided	Polyperchon	and	Alexander	against	Cassander,	notably	holding	the	pass	at	Thermopylae	against	Cassander’s	march	south,	delaying	him	for	a	period	of	time	(Diod.	19.53.1-2.)	1000	Polyperchon’s	presence	 is	 implied	 in	Diod.	19.57.5,	 and	explicitly	 stated	 in	19.60.1.	1001	Diod.	 19.53.1:	 “…σπεύδων	 Ἀλέξανδρον	 τὸν	 Πολυπέρχοντος	 ἐκβαλεῖν	 ἐκ	 τῆς	
Πελοποννήσου.”	1002	As	suggested	by	Billows	(1990.	p.	108).	1003	Diod.	19.53.1.	
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Cassander’s	 time	 in	 the	Peloponnese	was	brief,	but	within	 this	 short	period	of	time	he	was	able	 to	deliver	a	series	of	blows	 to	Polyperchon’s	 influence	 in	 the	region.	 In	quick	 succession,	Argos,	 the	 cities	 of	Messenia1004	and	Hermionis	 all	fell	 to	 Cassander.	 Cassander’s	 success	 in	 his	 second	 campaign	 in	 the	Peloponnese	 was	 significant,	 but	 once	 again	 he	 was	 unsuccessful	 in	 driving	Polyperchon	 and	 Alexander	 and	 their	 supporters	 from	 the	 Peloponnese.	 His	gains	 were	 hardly	 surprising	 considering	 the	 successive	 defeats	 sustained	 by	Polyperchon’s	cause	during	 the	previous	year.	Cassander,	with	 the	momentum	he	 was	 able	 to	 build	 during	 his	 successful	 return	 to	 Macedon	 and	 the	 new	avenues	 that	 control	of	 the	Macedonian	homeland	could	provide	 following	 the	unpopularity	 of	 Olympias’	 brief	 reign,	 opened	 new	 avenues	 of	 support	 from	which	 he	 could	 draw,	 affording	 him	 significantly	 greater	military	 resources	 at	his	disposal	than	those	available	to	his	rival.	The	limited	resources	may	help	to	explain	the	lack	of	military	engagement	by	Alexander	against	Cassander	during	his	 army’s	 gains	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 316.	 For	 the	 entire	 duration	 of	 the	campaign,	 instead	 of	 engaging	 Cassander	 and	 his	 army	 on	 the	 field	 of	 battle,	Alexander	 and	 his	 forces	 maintained	 their	 original	 position	 on	 the	 strategic	isthmus	 between	 mainland	 Greece	 and	 the	 Peloponnese.1005 	Cassander	 too	seems	to	have	chosen	to	avoid	a	direct	military	encounter	with	the	only	sizable	military	force	within	the	region	in	favour	of	attacking	the	more	vulnerable	cities	in	the	Peloponnese.		As	with	much	of	Diodorus’	narrative	concerning	events	in	Europe	spanning	the	years	 of	 317-315,	 little	 information	 is	 available	 in	 regard	 to	 specifics	 in	 the	return	 to	 the	 Peloponnese	 by	 Cassander	 in	 316.	 Especially	 in	 regards	 to	Cassander’s	 return	 to	mainland	 Greece,	 nothing	 is	 said	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 his	departure,	other	than	that	he	left	a	garrison	of	two	thousand	men	near	Megara	to	 guard	 against	 Alexander’s	 force	 on	 the	 isthmus.1006	However,	 Polyperchon	was	still	an	active	figure	in	southern	Greece,	meaning	that	Cassander	had	once	again	failed	to	bring	the	Peloponnese	under	his	control.																																																										1004	Apart	 from	 the	 city	 of	 Ithome,	 which	 appears	 to	 have	 held	 out	 against	Cassander’s	forces.	1005	cf.	Diod.	19.53.1,	19.54.3.	1006	Diod.	19.54.3-4;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201	
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	It	was	in	the	following	year	after	Cassander’s	departure	north	in	315,	that	news	from	 Asia	 Minor	 reached	 Polyperchon	 via	 Aristodemos,	 Antigonus’	 general,	concerning	the	possibility	of	forging	a	new	alliance	against	Cassander,	Ptolemy,	Lysimachus	and	Seleucus.1007	With	him,	Aristodemus	brought	 a	 vital	 lifeline	 to	Polyperchon’s	 struggle	against	Cassander,	both	politically	 in	 the	establishment	of	cooperation	against	the	son	of	Antipater	but	more	immediately	important	in	a	military	capacity,	with	the	employment	of	8,000	mercenary	troops	Aristodemus	was	 able	 to	 acquire	 from	 Sparta,1008	thus	 bolstering	 the	 diminished	 forces	 of	Polyperchon	and	Alexander.		In	 order	 to	 put	 the	 alliance	 between	 Antigonus	 and	 Polyperchon	 into	 effect,	Alexander	departed	from	his	father	in	the	Peloponnese,	travelling	to	Antigonus	in	 Asia	Minor,	where	 he	 had	 established	 himself	 near	 the	 city	 of	 Tyre	 in	 315,	following	his	defeat	of	Eumenes	of	Cardia	the	previous	year.1009	As	part	of	their	pact,	 the	 former	 adversaries	 would	 now	 officially	 recognise	 each	 other’s	authority	 and	 position.	 Polyperchon	 was	 confirmed	 as	 strategos	 of	 the	Peloponnese.1010	In	 return,	 Polyperchon	 would	 not	 only	 recognise	 Antigonus’	authority	in	Asia,	but	also	implied	within	the	treaty	was	the	general	authority	of	Antigonus	into	Europe	and	Macedon	as	the	new	regent	of	Macedon.1011	Indeed,	as	Billows	highlights,	Polyperchon,	as	Antipater’s	named	successor	in	319,	may	have	 actually	 appointed	 Antigonus	 as	 his	 own	 successor	 to	 the	 regency	 of	Macedon,	providing	Antigonus	with	a	level	of	valid	authority	in	European	affairs,	albeit	 a	 tenuous	 and	 inconsistent	 one	 considering	 their	 previous	 hostility.1012	The	 alliance	 between	 Antigonus	 and	 Polyperchon	 has	 been	 noted	 by	 modern	
																																																								1007	Diod.	19.57.5,	19.60.1.	1008	Diod.	19.57.5,	19.60.1;	Billows,	1990.	p.	111;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201	1009	Diod.	19.54.7,	19.60.1,	19.61.1;	Adams,	1975.	p.	109;	Billows,	1990.	p.	109,	113;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20,	230;	Anson,	2014.	p.	100,	133;	cf.	Billows,	1990.	p.	114.	1010	Diod.	19.60.1;	Billows,	1990.	p.	115;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201	1011	Diod.	19.61.3;	Billows,	1990.	p.	115,	in	particular	n.	41;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201.	n.	155;	Heckel	2006.	p.	230;	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	115.	1012	Billows,	1990.	pp.	114-115.	
	 236	
scholars,1013	however	an	aspect	 that	does	 require	 further	emphasis	 is	 the	very	initial	phases	of	the	alliance	and	the	possible	permutations	that	may	have	been	in	play	during	Aristodemus’	arrival,	as	well	as	subsequently	during	Alexander’s	time	at	Tyre	when	the	formal	alliance	took	place.	While	it	is	correct	that	within	a	short	period	of	time,	the	tide	would	turn	against	Polyperchon	with	the	defection	of	 Alexander	 to	 Cassander’s	 forces	 as	 well	 as	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 Antigonid	presence	 with	 Greece,1014 	these	 were	 events	 conducted	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	developing	 situation	 in	 the	 region	 that	 could	not	have	been	known	during	 the	establishment	of	 the	alliance	between	 the	Polyperchon	and	Antigonus	prior	 to	the	initiation	of	the	Third	War	of	the	Diadochoi	in	314.		Little	can	be	stated	definitely	due	the	focus	of	Diodorus’	narrative	on	Antigonus’	plans	 for	 Europe,	 resulting	 in	 Polyperchon’s	 presence	 becoming	 suppressed	within	 the	 account.	 But	 considering	 the	 state	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 position	 in	 the	Peloponnese	and	the	successive	blows	dealt	to	his	cause	over	the	previous	years,	it	is	likely	that	Polyperchon	may	have	relinquished	his	direct	authority	and	claim	over	 the	Macedonian	homeland	as	 its	 regent	 in	order	 to	 secure	Antigonus’	 far	more	 substantial	 support	 and	 resources	 from	 across	 the	 Aegean.1015 	What	authority	 and	 position	 Polyperchon	 was	 to	 hold	 beyond	 his	 command	 of	 the	Peloponnese	 is	unclear	 and	 certainly	 the	 command	of	 the	Peloponnese	 should	not	be	confused	with	the	command	of	the	entirety	of	Europe.	No	mention	of	the	governance	of	Macedon	itself	survives,	if	this	was	even	contemplated	before	the	result	 of	 the	 oncoming	 conflict	was	 known.	 If	 the	 information	 from	Diodorus’	narrative	 is	 all	 that	 can	be	 employed	 to	 gain	 insight	 into	 this	matter,	 it	would	suggest	that	Polyperchon’s	role	as	strategos	of	the	Peloponnese	may	have	been	either	a	temporary	or	strictly	military	appointment.	Part	of	Antigonus’	strategy	against	Cassander	and	the	coalition	was	to	destabilise	Cassander’s	support	base	among	 the	 Greek	 cities.	 This	 was	 to	 be	 achieved	 by	 Monophthalmus’	 offer	 of	
																																																								1013	See	 for	example:	Adams,	1975.	p.	117;	Billows,	1990.	pp.	113-115;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	13.	1014	See	Ch.	8.1.	1015	cf.	Billows,	1990.	p.	115.	n.	41;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201.	n.	155;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	230.	contra.	Simpson,	Historia.	6.	(1957).	pp.	372-3.	
	 237	
freedom	and	autonomy	from	foreign	occupation	to	the	Greek	cities,1016	echoing	Polyperchon’s	Exiles	Decree	and	it’s	own	use	in	early	318.1017	If	Antigonus	was	indeed	sincere	in	providing	all	the	Greeks	with	their	freedom	from	Macedonian	rule,	this	must	have	also	included	the	Peloponnese	and	Polyperchon’s	authority	in	the	region	along	with	it.	Once	the	hostilities	were	concluded,	this	would	then	in	 turn	 deny	 Polyperchon	 any	 future	 office	 of	 influence	 in	 Greece	 if	 what	Diodorus	records	within	his	narrative	is	all	that	existed	in	the	treaty.	However,	it	is	possible	that	Antigonus’	overtures	to	the	Greeks	may	have	been	purely	on	the	basis	of	political	agitation	of	old	anti-Antipatrid	sentiments	among	the	cities	and	designed	to	gain	further	influence	for	himself	within	the	region.1018	As	he	had	no	practical	authority	within	Greece,	his	promises	of	freedom	to	the	cities	were	still	only	 appealing	 propositions	 designed	 to	 gain	 traction	 in	 Europe.1019	However,	there	was	little	risk	to	Antigonus	if	his	proclamation	failed.	If	he	were	successful,	both	 he	 and	 his	 allies	 would	 have	 a	 new,	 not	 insignificant,	 body	 of	 support	among	the	Greek	cities	that	had	not	been	open	to	him	before.1020	If	this	was	the	case,	then	Polyperchon	would	be	able	to	continue	in	his	capacity	as	Antigonus’	general	 in	the	Peloponnese,	or	even	reassume	his	position	in	Macedon	itself	as	Antigonus’	representative.	It	must	be	remembered	that	Greece’s	governance	and	its	future	may	not	have	been	of	central	concern	to	Antigonus.			Of	more	immediate	concern	was	the	growing	combined	threat	from	the	coalition	of	Cassander,	Lysimachus,	Ptolemy	and	Seleucus	and	the	military	strength	they	could	 bring	 against	 him	 if	 they	 were	 able	 to	 unite	 their	 forces.1021	Antigonus	needed	 to	 build	 an	 alliance	 within	 Greece	 in	 order	 to	 divert	 Cassander’s	attention	 from	Asia	 to	 nearer	 events	 in	 Europe.1022	This	 approach	would	 then	aid	 in	 breaking	 up	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 allied	 coalition	 in	 bringing	 their																																																									1016	Diod.	19.61.3:	“εἶναι	δὲ	καὶ	τοὺς	Ἕλληνας	ἅπαντας	ἐλευθέρους,	ἀφρουρήτους,	
αὐτονόμους.”;	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	50,	115;	Strootman,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	p.	317.	1017	See:	Ch.	6.2.	1018	Diod.	19.61.4.	1019	Simpson,	Historia.	8.	(1959).	p.	391.	1020	cf.	Billows,	1990.	p.	116.	1021	Diod.	19.57.1;	Just.	15.1.2;	Adams,	1975.	pp.	105-106;	Billows,	1990.	pp.	109-110;	Errington.	2008.	p.	29;	Anson,	2014.	p.	135.	1022	Billows,	1990.	p.	114,	116.	
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combined	might	solely	against	Antigonid	holdings	 in	Asia.	Antigonus’	desire	 to	break	up	the	coalition,	thereby	allowing	him	to	tackle	each	member	on	a	more	individual	 and	 manageable	 basis,	 has	 already	 received	 significant	 academic	attention,	 explanation	 and	 investigation. 1023 	However,	 Antigonus	 would	 be	unable	 to	 engage	 with	 each	 member	 of	 the	 coalition	 simultaneously,	 so	 an	alliance	 with	 Polyperchon	 would	 provide	 a	 perfect	 opportunity	 to	 recreate	 a	similar	 scenario	 to	 the	 one	he	had	 constructed	 in	319,	when	 the	 alliance	with	Cassander	had	almost	entirely	succeeded	in	keeping	Polyperchon	fixed	in	Greece	and	Macedon	and	away	from	providing	significant	support	to	Eumenes	of	Cardia	in	Asia	Minor.1024		While	 Antigonus’	 alliance	 with	 Polyperchon	 bears	 striking	 similarities	 to	 his	initial	pact	with	Cassander	in	319	in	that	for	Monophthalmus	they	both	provided	convenient	 distractions	 for	 his	 enemies	 in	 Europe,1025	there	 were	 key	 aspects	that	differed	in	the	alliance	of	315.	One	key	area	of	distinction	was	in	the	amount	of	 support	 Antigonus	 provided	 Polyperchon	 as	 opposed	 to	 Cassander.	 In	 319,	Cassander	had	received	significant	support	with	Antigonus	providing	the	son	of	Antipater	 with	 both	 an	 army	 and	 a	 navy	 to	 transport	 it	 back	 to	 Europe	 the	following	 year.1026	By	 contrast,	 Antigonus	 provided	 a	 far	 smaller	 amount	 of	support	 to	Polyperchon	 in	315.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 funds	 that	Aristodemus	had	brought	 to	 the	 Peloponnese	 the	 previous	 year	when	 initial	 contact	was	made	with	Polyperchon	and	Alexander	along	with	the	Spartan	mercenaries	they	were	able	 to	 procure,	 Antigonus	 had	 allotted	 to	 Alexander	 the	 sum	 of	 five	 hundred	talents	in	order	to	continue	the	war	effort	against	Cassander	in	Europe.1027	Vital	for	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	alliance	between	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon	marked	the	 first	 point	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	 Cassander	 where	 Polyperchon	 was	operating	without	any	level	of	Argead	support,	though	it	must	be	noted	that	he	
																																																								1023	See	 for	 example:	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 113-129;	 Billows,	 1990.	 pp.	 109-134;	Errington,	2008.	pp.	28-35;	Anson,	2014.	pp.	125-163.	1024	cf.	Ch.	6.1.	pp.	157-158.	1025	Simpson,	Historia.	6.	(1957).	p.	373.	1026	cf.	Ch.	6.3.	1027	Diod.	 19.61.5;	 Billows,	 1990.	 pp.	 115-116;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 201;	 Heckel,	2006.	p.	230.	
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would	continue	to	use	Cassander’s	imprisonment	and	treatment	of	Alexander	IV	and	Rhoxane	for	political	leverage	against	his	rival.		In	 addition	 to	 the	 financial	 aid	 and	 the	 offer	 of	 freedom	 to	 the	 Greek	 cities,	Antigonus	 began	 to	 agitate	 groups	within	Macedon	 and	Greece	 that	may	 have	been	 dissatisfied	 with	 Cassander’s	 actions	 of	 the	 previous	 two	 years	 in	consolidation	of	his	control	over	the	Macedonian	homeland	following	Olympias’	defeat	 and	 Polyperchon’s	 expulsion.	 Before	 an	 audience	 of	 supporters	 and	sympathisers,	 Antigonus	made	 a	 declaration	 that	 Cassander’s	 actions	 over	 the	years	 of	 316	 and	 315,	 the	 execution	 of	 Olympias,	 his	 marriage	 to	Thessalonice, 1028 	the	 imprisonment	 of	 both	 Alexander	 IV	 and	 his	 mother	Rhoxane	 in	 Amphipolis,	 the	 burial	 of	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	 Eurydice	 with	royal	 ceremony	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 Cassandreia	 and	 reconstruction	 of	Thebes	were	explicitly	those	of	one	aspiring	to	seize	the	throne	of	Macedon	for	himself. 1029 	Antigonus’	 terms	 for	 Cassander	 to	 avoid	 conflict	 were	 clear:	Cassandreia	and	Thebes	were	to	be	destroyed,1030	Alexander	IV	and	his	mother	were	 to	 be	 freed	 and	 given	 over	 the	Macedonians	 and	 Cassander	was	 also	 to	submit	to	Antigonus	as	the	legitimate	regent	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.1031		Antigonus	must	 have	 known	 that	 these	 terms	were	 entirely	 unacceptable.	 For	Cassander	 to	 submit	 to	 this	 total	 loss	 of	 prestige	 and	 position,	 despite	 all	 the																																																									1028 	Which	 Antigonus	 asserts,	 most	 likely	 correctly,	 was	 forced	 upon	Thessalonice.	 (Carney,	 Historia.	 37.	 (1988).	 p.	 388.	 n.	 7,	 though	 also	 note	Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 in	 Wheatley	 &	 Hannah,	 2009.	 p.	 262,	 who	 highlights	Thessalonice’s	role	in	the	court	following	the	marriage.)	1029	Diod.	19.61.1-2;	cf.	Ch.	7.3.	pp.	223-224.	1030 	Notably	 absent	 from	 both	 the	 accusations	 of	 Cassander’s	 monarchical	aspirations	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cities	 that	 were	 to	 be	 destroyed	 was	 that	 of	Thessalonica.	 However,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 Thessalonica	 has	 simply	 been	omitted	 from	 Diodorus’	 list.	 Conveniently	 for	 Antigonus	 and	 given	 it’s	geographical	 location,	 near	 the	 isthmus	 to	 the	 Peloponnese,	 the	 demolition	 of	Thebes	 would	 also	 provide	 Polyperchon,	 the	 largest	 hostile	 group	 in	 Greece,	with	an	easier	entry	into	mainland	Greece,	should	he,	or	Antigonus,	decide	upon	such	an	action.	1031	Diod.	 19.61.3:	 “...	 τὸν	 βασιλέα	 καὶ	 τὴν	 μητέπα	 τὴν	Ῥωξάνην	προαγαγὼν	 ἐκ	
τῆς	 φυλακῆς	 ἀποδῷ	 τοῖς	 Μακεδόσι	 καὶ	 τὸ	 σύνολον	 ἐὰν	 μὴ	 πειθαρχῇ	 τῷ	
καθεσταμένῳ	 στρατηγῷ	 καὶ	 τῆς	 βασιλείας	 παρειληφότι	 τὴν	 ἐπιμέλειαν	
Ἀντιγόνῳ.”	
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efforts	he	had	gone	to	in	order	to	secure	dominance	over	Greece	and	Macedon	for	 the	 past	 four	 years	 against	 Polyperchon,	 was	 unthinkable.	 Indeed,	Cassander’s	 capitulation	 was	 likely	 neither	 the	 intent	 nor	 even	 a	 realistic	expectation	of	Antigonus.	 In	 the	highly	unlikely	 scenario	 that	Cassander	did	 in	fact	 choose	 to	 forsake	 his	 long	 held	 alliances	 with	 Lysimachus,	 Ptolemy	 and	Seleucus	in	response	to	Antigonid	accusations,	then	Antigonus	would	have	been	successful,	at	least	in	part,	in	breaking	up	the	coalition	without	effort,	lessening	the	 size	 of	 the	 monumental	 combined	 force	 he	 was	 facing	 from	 the	 allies.		However,	 Cassander	 was	 not	 expected	 to	 bow	 to	 these	 demands.	 Nor	 would	Antigonus	have	genuine	concern	for	Cassander’s	motives	in	Europe	beyond	the	threat	he	may	pose	to	his	own	sphere	of	influence.	What	Antigonus’	propaganda	campaign	against	Cassander	may	have	hoped	to	achieve	was	a	destabilisation	of	Cassander’s	 base	 of	 operation	 by	 exploiting	 the	 anti-Antipatrid	 sentiment	 that	had	 existed	 within	 the	 region	 ever	 since	 Antipater’s	 tenure	 as	 regent	 of	Macedon.	 It	was	 also	designed	 to	 undermine	Cassander’s	 ability	 to	 implement	his	 control	 over	 his	 area	 of	 influence.	 As	 Anson	 has	 correctly	 identified,	 the	construction	of	new	cities	by	the	members	of	the	Diadochoi	and	by	Philip	II	and	Alexander	 III	 acted	 as	 a	 means	 to	 secure	 problematic	 areas	 of	 influence	 and	suppress	 unrest	 in	 newly	 conquered	 territories.1032	While	 Antigonus	 asserted	that	the	reconstruction	of	Thebes	was	a	particularly	grievous	act	as	it	defied	the	orders	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great,	 the	 practical	 benefits	 its	 destruction	 would	provide	 to	 groups	 hostile	 towards	 Cassander	 must	 not	 have	 gone	 unnoticed.		The	 destruction	 of	 these	 cities	 would	 have	 undermined	 Cassander’s	 strength	and	 would	 once	 again	 act	 as	 a	 means	 of	 isolating	 Cassander	 away	 from	 the	coalition	and	activities	in	Asia	Minor.			As	the	situation	stood	after	the	declaration	at	Tyre	in	315,	a	strong	alliance	had	been	built	between	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon,	providing	Polyperchon	with	a	lifeline	 to	 continue	 the	 war	 against	 Cassander.	 However,	 whatever	 security	Polyperchon	had	gained	following	the	arrival	of	Aristodemus	was	not	to	last,	and	it	 was	 not	 long	 before	 he	 would	 once	 against	 find	 himself	 in	 a	 vulnerable	position	against	the	son	of	Antipater.																																																									1032	Anson,	2014.	p.	127.	
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	This	final	section	of	this	chapter	has	engaged	with	the	way	in	which	Cassander	cemented	 his	 authority	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland	 following	 his	 successful	conquest	of	the	region	and	the	execution	of	Olympias	in	the	winter	of	317/16.	In	order	 to	 achieve	 this,	 Cassander	 employed	 a	 nuanced,	 multifaceted	 approach,	burying	the	murdered	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	in	the	traditional	burial	grounds	at	Aigai,	 wedding	 the	 daughter	 of	 Philip	 II	 Thessalonice	 as	 well	 as	 ordering	 the	construction	of	Cassandreia,	Thessalonica	and	the	reconstruction	of	Thebes	that	would	serve	as	greater	bastions	of	support	within	his	new	domain.	Reaction	to	Cassander’s	 actions	 was	 swift,	 as	 the	 growing	 tensions	 between	 the	 allies	eventuated	 with	 Cassander,	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 demanding	 concessions	from	 the	 growing	 power	 of	 Antigonus,	 while	 in	 response,	 Antigonus	 levelled	accusations	 against	 Cassander	 and	 his	 perceived	 desire	 to	 seize	 the	 throne	 of	Macedon	for	himself.		For	 Polyperchon,	 a	 drastic	 shift	 in	 the	 way	 he	 approached	 the	 war	 against	Cassander	 was	 required.	With	 Olympias	 gone,	 and	 the	 support	 base	 he	 could	draw	 upon	 from	within	 the	Macedonian	 homeland	 along	with	 it,	 Polyperchon	and	his	son	Alexander	headed	south	to	the	other	greater	body	of	support	created	during	 the	opening	 stages	of	 the	 conflict	 against	Cassander,	 the	Aetolians,	 and	the	Peloponnese.	The	situation	was	dire	for	Polyperchon	as	for	the	first	time	he	was	unable	 to	 rely	upon	explicit	Argead	support.	 	Despite	 this	he	was	 still	 the	most	 significant	 threat	 to	 Cassandrean	 supremacy	 within	 Europe,	 a	 fact	 that	appealed	 to	 Antigonus,	 who	 began	 to	 make	 overtures	 of	 friendship	 with	Polyperchon	 and	 Alaexander,	 via	 his	 intermediary,	 Aristodemus.	 While	 it	 is	inviting	to	perceive	Polyperchon	as	an	already	defeated	man,	who	would	never	again	 rise	 to	 the	 prominence	 he	 had	 achieved	 in	 319	 and	 318,	 he	 was	 still	 a	dangerous	threat	to	Cassander’s	cause,	and	would	remain	a	significant	opponent	for	the	coming	years.		This	 chapter	 has	 covered	 the	 events	 following	 the	 Cassandrean	 victory	 over	Polyperchon’s	 navy	 off	 Byzantium	 in	 317,	 until	 the	 expulsion	 of	 Polyperchon	from	Macedon	down	into	the	Peloponnese	in	316	and	the	events	precluding	the	
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initiation	of	the	Third	War	of	the	Diadochoi	in	314.	This	period	of	time	saw	the	greatest	 amount	 of	 military	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	highlighting	 the	 interconnectivity	of	 the	numerous	conflicts	 in	 the	 fragmenting	Macedonian	 Empire.	 While	 the	 combined	 forces	 of	 Cassander,	 Lysimachus,	Ptolemy	and	Antigonus	defeated	Polyperchon’s	navy,	the	regent	of	317	and	his	war	against	Cassander	and	his	allies	was	by	no	means	halted.		As	 Paschidis	 had	 previously	 postulated,	 following	 his	 withdrawal	 from	 the	Peloponnese,	Polyperchon	was	able	 to	 launch	a	short	 lived	campaign	 into	Asia	Minor	 in	 order	 to	 aid	 his	 chief	 ally,	 and	most	 significant	 threat	 to	 Antigonus,	Eumenes.	 In	 reaction	 to	 Polyperchon’s	movements	 east,	 and	 to	 draw	 his	 rival	back	to	the	European	theatre,	Cassander	temporarily	ceased	his	Peloponnesian	efforts,	 striking	 north	 to	 threaten	 Polyperchon’s	 base	 of	 operations	 in	 the	Macedonian	homeland	in	the	summer	of	317.	While	later	scholars	have	viewed	this	action	as	a	failed	invasion	of	the	region,	and	a	concerted	effort	by	Cassander	to	 win	 Macedon	 for	 himself,	 it	 appears	 more	 likely	 that	 this	 was	 never	 the	intention	of	Cassander.	In	a	manoeuvre	echoing	the	attempts	of	the	Aetolians	in	321,	 the	 son	of	Antipater	 struck	north	 in	order	 to	 relieve	 the	pressure	against	Antigonus	 in	the	east.	Once	word	reached	him	across	the	Aegean,	Polyperchon	chose	 to	 depart	 from	Asia	 to	mitigate	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 Cassander	 and	 had	returned	 to	Macedon	by	 the	 autumn	of	 317.	 Following	his	 return	 to	Macedon,	Polyperchon	continued	on	to	Epirus	to	escort	Olympias	back	to	Pella,	ending	her	self	imposed	exile	in	Molossia.		In	 addition	 to	 the	military	 actions	 by	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon,	 there	were	also	drastic	shifts	in	the	political	alliances	that	had	been	set	in	place	during	the	initial	phases	of	the	conflict.	While	Polyperchon	was	absent	in	Epirus,	and	in	order	to	secure	the	safety	of	her	husband,	as	well	as	herself,	Eurydice	stripped	Polyperchon	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 regency	 and	 offered	 the	 office	 to	 Cassander,	ordering	that	Cassander	cease	his	operations	at	Tagea	and	march	to	protect	the	royal	 pair.	 The	 offer	 made	 by	 Eurydice	 marked	 the	 first	 time	 that	 Cassander	engaged	with	the	concept	of	royal	support	during	the	war	against	Polyperchon.	While	 it	 appears	 that	 Cassander	 did	 accept	 the	 office	 offered	 by	 Eurydice,	
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instead	 of	 heading	 north,	 he	 chose	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 to	 continue	exerting	 pressure	 against	 Polyperchon’s	 support	 base	 in	 the	 south	 at	 Tagea,	demonstrating	 that	 while	 he	 was	 willing	 to	 accept	 the	 political	 status	 the	regency	afforded	him,	he	would	only	act	in	the	royal	interests	if	they	suited	his	own.			Cassander	 would	 only	 venture	 north	 following	 the	 return	 of	 Olympias,	Polyperchon	 and	 the	 Epirote	 army	 they	 led	 back	 to	 Macedon	 and	 the	 acts	 of	reprisal	that	Olympias	conducted	in	the	autumn	of	317.	The	murders	of	Eurydice	and	Philip	 III,	 the	 spate	of	 executions	among	 the	Macedonian	elites	 and	 the	 ill	treatment	of	the	bodies	of	the	royal	pair,	as	well	as	of	Cassander’s	family	would	cost	Polyperchon’s	cause	dearly.	Whether	he	was	complicit	in	Olympias’	conduct	or	 not,	 her	 actions	 still	 resulted	 in	 a	 massive	 loss	 of	 support	 for	 the	 former	regent	within	 the	Macedonian	homeland.	Once	news	reached	Cassander	of	 the	events	 in	 Macedon,	 he	 broke	 off	 his	 action	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 and	 marched	north,	 reaching	 the	 north	 by	 the	winter	 of	 317/16,	 capturing	Olympias	 at	 the	siege	 of	 Pydna	 and	 relegating	 Polyperchon	 to	 his	 Aetolain,	 Boeotian	 and	Peloponnesian	allies	in	southern	Greece.		The	multiple	efforts	Polyperchon	made	to	secure	the	support	of	Olympias	were,	from	the	cold,	analytical	eye	of	hindsight,	mistakes	that	resulted	in	his	expulsion	from	Macedon.	However,	as	the	actions	were	unfolding,	Polyperchon’s	reasoning	may	 have	more	 based	 on	 practical	 necessities	 than	 on	 political	 incompetency.	While	the	tacit	support	of	Olympias’	execution	of	her	Argead	adversaries	should	not,	 and	 cannot	 be	 excused,	 the	 resources	 that	 Adea-Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	Arrhidaeus	could	offer	Polyperchon	were	exhausted	and	clearly	not	enough	 to	drive	out	the	threat	Cassander,	along	with	his	allies,	posed	to	the	regent,	and	he	was	 forced	 to	 seek	 other	 avenues	 of	 support	 and	 supply.	 Indeed	 he	 had	 been	doing	 so	 since	 319.	 	 This	 he	 was	 successful	 in	 securing,	 as	 evidenced	 by	Olympias’	final	acceptance	of	Polyperchon’s	invitation	to	move	back	to	Macedon.		The	 deaths	 of	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 after	 Cassander	 accepted	 the	 office	 of	regent,	as	well	as	the	swift	execution	of	Olympias	were	all	positives	for	the	new	
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regent.	Now	he	was	able	to	represent,	even	if	merely	on	a	superficial	 level,	 the	interests	of	 the	royal	 family	without	having	a	powerful,	 influential,	 living	royal	problematising	his	efforts	to	secure	Europe	for	himself.		By	 the	 spring	 of	 316,	 Olympias	 was	 dead.	 Instead	 of	 simply	 murdering	 the	mother	of	Alexander,	which	may	have	been	an	appealing	option	given	the	long	standing	antipathy	with	Olympias	and	 the	Antipatrids,	Cassander	 instead	used	her	actions	the	previous	year	to	gain	leverage	with	the	Macedonian	elites	whom	she	had	attacked,	parading	her	in	front	of	a	public	trial	and	allowing	those	who	held	 grievances	 against	 the	 matriarch	 to	 decide	 on	 her	 date,	 simultaneously	removing	 her	 as	 a	 future	 issue	 while	 conveniently	 building	 upon	 his	 support	base	 in	 Macedon.	 With	 Olympias	 gone,	 Cassander	 turned	 his	 attentions	 to	cementing	his	hold	on	the	Macedonian	homeland	with	a	programme	that	would	occupy	the	next	two	years.		Employing	a	multifaceted	approach,	Cassander	built	upon	the	influence	his	new	appointment	 as	 regent	 afforded	 him	 by	 burying	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 at	 the	traditional	Argead	burial	grounds	at	Vergina,	 integrating	himself	 into	the	royal	family	 itself	 by	 marrying	 the	 daughter	 of	 Philip	 II,	 Thessalonice	 and	 the	embarkation	of	his	building	programme	with	the	foundation	of	Cassandreia	and	Thessalonica	 as	 well	 as	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 Thebes.	 	While	 this	 programme	was	 successful	 in	 building	 Cassander’s	 support	 base	within	Macedon,	 external	tensions	among	the	allies	began	to	come	to	the	surface.	These	tensions	between	Antigonus	 and	 Cassander,	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy	 resulted	 in	 monarchical	accusations	 levelled	 against	 both	 factions.	 The	 friendship	 between	 Cassander	and	Antigonus	would	end	and	a	dramatic	shift	in	the	European	political	sphere	would	take	place,	with	Polyperchon	becoming	the	Antigonid	backed	player,	first	with	the	arrival	of	Aristodemus	 in	the	Peloponnese	 in	315,	and	cemented	with	Antigonus’	declaration	of	war	against	Cassander	at	Tyre	in	315.		Polyperchon	 had	 lost	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland,	 however,	 this	 by	 no	 means	equates	to	the	end	of	his	cause,	nor	to	the	significance	of	the	threat	he	posed	to	Cassander.	Cassander,	 by	his	 concerted	efforts	 to	 crush	Polyperchon’s	 support	
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base	in	the	Peloponnese	during	317,	demonstrates	that	he	was	well	aware	of	the	significance	of	Polyperchon’s	hold	in	the	south,	and	the	coming	years	would	see	further	efforts	by	the	new	regent	of	Macedon	to	defeat	Polyperchon	in	southern	Greece.	However,	 Polyperchon,	with	his	new	Antigonid	 ally	would	 continue	 to	act	as	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	Cassander	and	serve	as	the	most	significant	threat	to	his	new	hold	on	Macedon.	
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Chapter	8:	The	Beginning	of	the	End.	
	This	 chapter	 of	 investigation	 covering	 the	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 period	 of	 time	 following	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	alliance	between	Polyperchon	and	Antigonus	in	315	with	Alexander’s	return	to	the	 Peloponnese	 from	 Tyre	 and	 concludes	 in	 309,	 with	 the	 pact	 the	 two	combatants	 entered	 into	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Herakles	 and	 Polyperchon’s	 final	recorded	 campaign	 against	 Cassander.	 In	 order	 to	 cover	 the	 events	 that	 took	place	during	 this	 timeframe,	 the	 chapter	 is	 separated	 into	 three	 sections,	 each	with	a	focus	on	a	distinct	topic.			The	 first	 section	 covers	 the	 period	 from	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 First	War	 of	 the	Diadochoi	in	315	until	the	call	for	peace	between	Antigonus	and	the	coalition	of	Cassander,	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy,	which	would	eventuate	in	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	in	311/10.	During	this	time,	Cassander	faced	the	combined	strength	of	Polyperchon	 and	 his	 new	 ally	 in	 Antigonus.	 That	 Cassander	 regarded	Polyperchon’s	stronghold	 in	the	Peloponnese	as	dangerous	 is	suggested	by	the	way	 in	which	 he	would	 continue	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 region.	 Following	 a	 series	 of	unsuccessful	attempts	 in	317	and	316	to	secure	 the	region	via	military	means,	once	again	during	 the	 initial	phases	of	 the	 conflict,1033	it	 seems	 that	Cassander	instead	chose	a	more	politically	canny	method	of	gaining	influence	in	the	region.	He	did	so	by	 facilitating	 the	defection	of	Alexander,	Polyperchon’s	son	and	 the	most	prominent	of	his	 supporters	 in	Greece	and	 forming	an	alliance	with	him.	While	 the	military	 consequences	 of	 Alexander’s	 defection	 from	his	 father	may	not	 have	 been	 as	 significant	 as	 they	 initially	 appear,	 it	 did	 deal	 a	 significant	political	 blow	 to	 Polyperchon,	 and	 by	 extension	 to	 the	 efforts	 of	 Antiognus	 in	Greece	and	Macedon.	As	a	result,	and	in	order	to	maintain	Cassander’s	focus	on	Europe	and	out	of	Asia,	an	increase	in	the	Antigonid	presence	in	the	region	was	required.	 Most	 markedly,	 this	 is	 seen	 the	 arrival	 into	 Greece	 of	 Antigonus’	general,	 Telesphorus	 and	 later	 by	 the	 arrival	 of	 Polemaeus	 in	 313.	 The	 first	section	 of	 this	 chapter	 concludes	with	 the	 closing	 stages	 of	 the	Third	Diadoch																																																									1033	Diod.	19.62.9.	
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War	 in	Europe	 that	 led	 to	 the	 initiation	of	negotiations	 for	peace	between	 the	coalition	and	the	Antigonid	forces.	
	The	 second	 area	 of	 investigation	 evaluates	 the	 events	 during	 the	 peace	negotiations.	These	would	result	in	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	and	the	declaration	of	peaceful	status	quo	among	the	delegates.	It	was	at	this	time	that	the	position	of	 both	 Cassander	 and	 Antigonus	within	 the	 fragmenting	Macedonian	 Empire	would	 be	 officially	 recognised	 by	 their	 adversaries.	 Of	 particular	 importance	were	 those	 combatants	 during	 the	 Third	 Diadoch	War	who	were	 not	 present	during	 the	 dialogue.	 Notable	 by	 their	 absence	 were	 both	 Polyperchon	 and	Seleucus.	 In	addition	to	the	peace	negotiations,	 the	deaths	of	Alexander	IV	and	his	mother	Rhoxane	and	the	impact	of	these	on	the	empire	are	discussed.	
	The	third	and	final	section	of	the	chapter	moves	on	to	cover	Polyperchon’s	final	effort	against	Cassander	for	control	of	the	Macedonian	homeland	and	Greece	in	309.	During	this	time,	Polyperchon	reverted	to	his	traditional	support	base,	the	royal	family,	to	add	weight	to	his	claim	within	Macedon.	As	has	been	previously	discussed,	by	 this	 time,	 the	majority	of	 the	Argead	 family	were	either	dead,	or	married	 to	members	of	 the	Diadochoi.	However,	 there	was	one	man	who	held	links	to	the	royal	family	whom	Polyperchon	could	employ	to	support	his	claim	-	Herakles,	the	illegitimate	son	of	Alexander	the	Great	and	Barsine,	the	daughter	of	 the	 former	satrap	of	Phrygia,	Artabazus.	While	 the	potential	 for	Herakles	 to	play	 a	 role	within	 the	Macedonian	 court	had	been	 raised	 in	 the	days	 after	 the	death	of	his	father	in	323	and	immediately	dismissed,	now	that	he	was	the	sole	living	male	 relative	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great,	 his	 political	 appeal	 had	 increased.	Polyperchon’s	efforts	against	Cassander	in	309	were	short-lived	and	ultimately	unsuccessful,	but	it	cannot	be	overlooked	that,	even	as	late	as	309,	Polyperchon	was	 still	 able	 to	pose	 a	 significant	 threat	 to	Cassander,	 especially	 if	 his	 efforts	were	 able	 to	 gain	 traction	 and	popular	 support	 in	Greece	 and	Macedon.	Much	like	 the	 defection	 of	 Alexander	 in	 314,	 Cassander	 decided	 against	 a	 military	intervention	in	the	Peloponnese.	Instead,	as	he	did	in	314,	he	chose	to	put	an	end	to	 Herakles’	 claim	 before	 it	 gained	 too	 much	 political	 traction,	 ending	 the	uprising	via	the	political	manoeuvring	and	canniness	that	had	typified	his	efforts	
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over	the	previous	decade	in	a	manner	that	both	facilitated	the	death	of	Herakles	and	ended	the	now	decade	long	conflict	with	Polyperchon	in	one	fell	swoop.		With	 the	 Third	 War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 declared,	 the	 combatants	 once	 again	readied	 their	 forces	 for	 war.	 It	 must	 be	 highlighted,	 as	Wheatley	 has,1034	that	Polyperchon’s	 movements	 following	 315	 become	 difficult	 to	 define	 with	 any	certainty.	Because	of	this,	caution	is	required	when	attempting	to	do	so.	For	the	events	in	Greece	and	Macedon	during	the	early	phases	of	the	Third	Diadoch	War	prior	 to	 the	arrival	of	Demetrius	Poliorcetes	 into	Athens	 in	307	and	Plutarch’s	accompanying	biography,1035	historical	 evaluation	 is	once	again	predominantly	limited	to	the	compressed	narrative	of	Diodorus	Siculus.1036	Therefore,	much	of	what	 follows	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 informed	 academic	 speculation	 based	 upon	available	evidence,	rather	than	as	a	recount	of	historical	fact.		Cassander	made	yet	another	attempt	to	expel	Polyperchon	and	Alexander	from	their	 positions	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.	 This	 was	 done	 via	 the	 order	 sent	 from	Cassander	 to	 his	 appointed	 commander	 of	 Argos,	 Apollonides,	 to	 venture	 into	the	 heart	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 to	 conduct	 raiding	 missions	 within	 Arcadia.1037	Cassander’s	 efforts	 during	 this	 time	were	 not	 solely	 based	 on	military	means,	and	 he	 diversified	 his	 approach.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 raids	 by	 Apollonides	 in	Arcadia,	Cassander	also	began	to	employ	diplomacy	to	finally	gain	control	of	the	Peloponnese.	His	aim	appears	clear.	The	threat	posed	by	Polyperchon’s	hold	on	the	 south	was	geographically	his	most	 immediate	problem	but	despite	 several	attempts	 to	 wrestle	 control	 from	 him	 over	 the	 previous	 years,	 the	 possibility	that	Antigonus	could	use	his	new	ally’s	position	in	the	Peloponnese	as	a	launch	pad	 into	 the	European	 theatre	 seems	 to	have	been	Cassander’s	primary	 focus.	Should	 Antigonus	 be	 able	 to	 enter	 into	 Greece,	 the	 combined	 strength	 of	
																																																								1034	Wheatley,	 Antichthon.	32.	 (1998),	 p.	 12;	Wheatley,	 Phoenix.	 52.	 (1998).	 p.	257;	Wheatley,	2000.	p.	222;	See	also:	Anson,	Phoneix.	60.	(2006).	p.	226;	Meeus,	
Phoenix.	66.	(2012).	p.	74.	1035	Plut.	Demtr.	20.46.1;	For	more	discussion	on	Demetrius’	time	in	Athens,	see:	Wheatley,	1997.	pp.	165-198.	1036	Diod.	19.63-69.	1037	Diod.	19.63.1	
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Polyperchon,	the	Greek	cities	and	the	forces	he	brought	with	him	would	surely	result	in	a	devastating	blow	to	Cassander’s	own	position.		
8.1:	The	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi	–	315		Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon’s	 rivalry	 had	 to	 this	 point	 been	 a	 bitter	 and	 hotly	contested	 one,	 but	 in	 315,	 a	 new	dynamic	 between	 the	 pair	 began	 to	 emerge.	While	 even	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 alliance	 between	 them	was	unthinkable,	Polyperchon’s	new	pact	with	Antigonus	had	given	Cassander	pause	for	 thought.	During	Apollonides’	actions	 in	 the	central	Peloponnese,	Cassander	made	 contact	 with	 Polyperchon,	 and	made	 endeavouring	 to	 turn	 him	 and	 his	faction	 from	 their	 friendship	 with	 Antigonus.1038 	Diodorus	 does	 not	 record	exactly	what	it	was	that	Cassander	offered	to	Polyperchon	in	order	to	lure	him	away	 from	 his	 new	 alliance	 with	 Antigonus,	 but	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	possibilities	which	can	be	considered.	It	is	possible	that	what	Cassander	offered	Polyperchon	was	the	same	as	he	was	to	shortly	offer	Alexander,	that	being	the	command	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 under	 his	 greater	 authority.1039	If	 this	 was	 so,	there	was	little	incentive	for	Polyperchon	to	accept	the	offer,	as	he	would	merely	be	exchanging	a	previous	overseer	and	former	foe	in	Antigonus,	for	a	new,	more	recent	enemy	in	Cassander,	a	man	who	was	simultaneously	conducting	military	action	 at	 the	 time	 he	 was	 making	 efforts	 to	 make	 peace.	 Though,	 given	 the	rejection	made	by	Polyperchon	 to	 the	offer,	 it	may	be	possible	 that	Cassander	attempted	to	offer	Polyperchon	a	lower	position	in	his	regime	in	an	attempt	to	concede	 less	 authority	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.	 Conversely,	 Cassander	may	 rather	than	providing	an	alliance	with	Polyperchon,	merely	have	sought	to	dissolve	the	conflict	 and	 attempt	 to	 reach	 some	 other	 mutually	 acceptable	 arrangement.	Unfortunately,	Diodorus	either	omits	this	information	or	it	was	not	in	his	source.	In	 either	 case,	 precisely	 what	 Cassander	 was	 willing	 to	 concede	 to	 end	Polyperchon’s	alliance	with	Antigonus	in	315	can	only	be	a	matter	of	conjecture.																																																										1038 	Diod.	 19.63.3:	 “…	 ἐπεχείρησεν	 ἀφιστάναι	 τοὺς	 περὶ	 Πολυπέρχοντα	 τῆς	
Ἀντιγόνου	φιλίας.”;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	13.	1039	cf.	Diod.	19.64.3;	See	below.	
	 250	
Whatever	 the	 case,	 Cassander’s	 offer	 was	 not	 enough	 to	 gain	 Polyperchon’s	defection	 from	Monophthalmus,	 and	 his	 approaches	 were	 swiftly	 rejected.1040	Whether	Polyperchon	ever	entertained	the	notion	of	a	new	alliance	is	unknown	and	highly	unlikely,	given	the	conflict	of	the	past	half-decade.	However,	a	factor	of	which	he	must	have	been	aware	was	 that,	 should	he	chose	 to	renege	on	his	pact	 with	 Antigonus,	 Polyperchon	 would	 almost	 certainly	 face	 an	 immediate	response	 from	 Aristodemus	 and	 the	 forces	 at	 his	 disposal.	 Even	 within	 the	environment	of	ever-changing	and	fluid	concepts	of	alliances	that	existed	among	the	Diadochoi,	a	shift	in	allegiance	such	as	great	and	swift	as	the	one	Cassander	proposed	to	Polyperchon	in	315	appears	too	great	a	change	for	Polyperchon	to	accept.		Shortly	 after	 Polyperchon’s	 rejection	 of	 his	 offer,	 Cassander	 launched	 yet	another	 invasion	of	 the	 south,	 travelling	 through	Thessaly	and	Boeotia,	 briefly	stopping	at	the	newly	reconstructed	Thebes	to	shore	up	the	defences	of	the	city,	and	then	on	to	the	Peloponnese.1041	Echoing	the	campaign	of	the	previous	year,	Cassander’s	time	in	the	Peloponnese	was	short.1042	Following	the	crossing	of	the	Isthmus,	Cassander	and	his	army	achieved	a	measure	of	success,	razing	the	port	and	agricultural	areas	of	Corinth	and	then	into	Arcadia.	During	his	time	there	he	was	 able	 to	 secure	 the	 city	 of	 Orchomenus, 1043 	and	 venture	 towards	Polyperchon’s	position	at	Messenia.1044		It	 is	 here,	 at	 Messenia,	 that	 one	 of	 the	 rare	 occasions	 when	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 came	 into	 direct	 contact	 with	 each	 other	 took	 place.	 Diodorus	confirms	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 situated	 within	 the	 city	 when	 Cassander	arrived.1045	While	 this	 was	 an	 opportunity	 finally	 to	 defeat	 Polyperchon,	 no	conflict	 between	 the	 adversaries	 took	place.	 Instead	of	 direct	military	 conflict,	Cassander	 instead	 chose	 to	 leave	 the	 city	 and	 head	 further	 into	 Polyperchon-																																																								1040	Diod.	19.63.4	1041	Diod.	19.63.3-4.	1042	cf.	Ch.	7.1.	1043	Diod.	19.63.4-5.	1044	Diod.	19.64.1.		1045	Diod.	19.64.1.	
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held	 territory	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.1046	While	 Diodorus’	 narrative	 does	 suggest	that	Cassander	was	planning	on	returning	to	lay	siege	to	the	city	at	some	point	in	the	future,1047		this	event	never	took	place.	Instead,	Cassander	moved	to	Argolis,	and	 presided	 over	 the	 Nemean	 Games,	 before	 departing	 from	 the	 south	 and	venturing	back	to	Macedon,	no	doubt	in	order	to	shift	his	focus	west	and	on	to	the	expeditionary	force	that	was	soon	to	depart	for	Caria	under	the	command	of	Asander.1048	Once	again,	Cassander	was	unable	to	dislodge	Polyperchon	from	his	position	in	the	Peloponnese	before,	now	for	the	third	time,	he	departed	north.		Certainly	 the	 prospect	 of	 removing	 Polyperchon	 as	 a	 threat	 soon	 after	 his	reaffirmation	of	hostile	 intentions	 following	 the	 rejection	of	Cassander’s	 initial	approaches	must	have	been	appealing	to	the	son	of	Antipater.	There	is,	however,	a	possibility	that	Cassander’s	time	was	limited	and	the	idea	of	a	potentially	long	drawn	 out	 siege	 at	 Messenia	 may	 have	 affected	 his	 decision-making.	Additionally,	 the	 example	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 failed	 siege	 of	Megalopolis	 and	 the	losses	 he	 sustained	 during	 the	 endeavour	 in	 318	 may	 have	 represented	 a	scenario	that	Cassander	did	not	wish	to	re-enact.	However,	Diodorus’	narrative	does	not	transmit	enough	information	to	reveal	the	truth	on	the	matter.	 	What	can	 be	 said	 with	more	 confidence	 is	 that	 Cassander	 continued	 a	multifaceted	approach	 to	 gaining	 greater	 control	 in	 the	 Peloponnese.	 Despite	 the	 failed	attempt	 to	 persuade	 Polyperchon	 to	 abandon	 his	 alliance	 with	 Antigonus,	Cassander	 continued	 to	make	efforts	 to	draw	off	Polyperchon’s	 supporters	via	political	means	designed	 to	not	only	 lessen	 the	 influence	of	his	 adversary,	 but	also	to	 increase	his	own	presence.	Certainly	 there	were	 factions	present	 in	 the	Peloponnese	who	were	hostile	to	both	Polyperchon	and	his	son	Alexander,	who	were	open	to	subverting	their	position	in	southern	Greece.	1049	But	it	seems	clear	that	Cassander	was	not	content	with	gaining	support	 from	these	groups	alone.	Following	 his	 departure	 from	 the	 Peloponnese,	 Cassander	 made	 contact	 with	Alexander,	 arguably	 one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 figures	 hostile	 to	 him	 in	 the	region.																																																									1046	Diod.	19.64.1.	1047	Diod.	19.64.1:	“…τὸ	μὲν	πολιορκεῖν	αὐτὴν	ἐπὶ	τοῦ	παρόντος	ἀπέγνω.”	1048	Diod.	19.64.1-2;	cf.	Diod.	19.67-68.	1049	cf.	Diod.	19.63.5.	
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	The	 timing	 of	 this	 initial	 contact	 between	 the	 combatants	 has	 previously	received	 identification	and	a	measure	of	evaluation.	The	narrative	of	Diodorus	would	suggest	that	Cassander	made	initial	contact	with	Polyperchon	prior	to	his	invasion	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 and	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Aristodemus’	 venture	 into	 the	region	in	order	to	propose	the	Antigonid	alliance	to	him.1050		Unlike	the	previous	offer	 made	 to	 Polyperchon	 before	 Cassander’s	 third	 invasion	 of	 the	 region,	information	is	available	regarding	his	approach	to	Alexander	that	allows	a	more	critical	 evaluation	 of	 events.	 As	 Cassander	 departed	 from	 the	 Peloponnese,	Alexander,	 accompanied	 by	 Aristodemus,	 ventured	 into	 the	 areas	 in	 which	Cassander	had	been	able	to	install	bastions	of	support	against	Polyperchon	and	attempted	to	regain	favourable	support	for	both	Polyperchon	and	Antigonus.1051	This	 sequence	 of	 events	 has	 been	 followed	 by	 Adams	 and	 Anson,	 who	 both	accept	a	 literal	reading	of	Diodorus’	account.1052	While	there	 is	 little	 issue	with	this	reading,	alternatives	are	available.	Heckel	has	suggested,	albeit	tentatively,	that	 Cassander,	 rather	 than	 making	 contact	 prior	 to	 his	 invasion	 of	 the	Peloponnese	 in	 reaction	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 rejection,	 as	 Diodorus	 transmits,	attempted	to	dissuade	Polyperchon	from	the	alliance	with	Antigonus	as	he	was	departing	 the	 region	 and	 after	 he	 had	 conducted	 his	 third	 invasion	 of	 the	Peloponnese.1053If	 Heckel	 is	 correct	 in	 his	 suggestion	 that	 Cassander’s	 initial	request	 to	 Polyperchon	 occurred	 after	 his	 departure	 from	 the	 Peloponnese,	 a	possible	change	 in	the	way	Cassander	conducted	his	diplomatic	efforts	may	be	revealed.	 The	 timing	 would	 bring	 the	 efforts	 to	 turn	 both	 Polyperchon	 and																																																									1050	Diod.	19.63.2-3;	cf.	Diod.	19.60.1;	Ch.	7.3.	1051	Diod.	 19.64.2-3.	 Diodorus	 suggests	 that	 Alexander	 and	 Aristodemus	 were	both	motivated	 to	 reestablish	 the	 freedom	 among	 the	 cities	 where	 Cassander	had	 placed	 garrisons	 (“τούτου	 δὲ	 χωρισθέντος	 Ἀλέξανδρος	 ἐπιὼν	 τὰς	 ἐν	
Πελοποννήσῳ	 πόλεις	 μετ᾽	 Ἀριστοδήμου	 τὰς	 μὲν	 ὑπὸ	 Κασάνδρου	 καθεσταμένας	
φρουρὰς	 ἐκβαλεῖν	 έπειρᾶτο,	 ταῖς	 δὲ	 πόλεσιν	 ἀποκαθιστᾶν	 τὴν	 ἐλευθερίαν.”)	However,	 the	 likelihood	 that	 this	 was	 a	 true	 sense	 of	 freedom	 from	 foreign	influence	is	minimal.	The	freedom	on	offer	refers	back	to	the	initial	decree	made	by	 Antigonus	 at	 Tyre	 the	 previous	 year,	 which	 was	 embroiled	 in	 political	machinations	to	destabilise	Cassander’s	position	in	Europe.	It	is	more	plausible	to	suggest	that	instead	of	true	autonomy,	the	pair	wished	to	reinstall	favourable	conditions	within	the	cities.	1052	Adams,	1975.	pp.	116-117;	Anson,	2014.	p.	136.	1053	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	230.	
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Alexander	 away	 from	 Antigonus	 closer	 together.	 Should	 Heckel’s	 timing	 be	correct,	 then	 Cassander’s	 effort	 to	 nullify	 the	 threat	 from	 Polyperchon	 via	explicitly	 non-military	 avenues	may	 suggest	 that	 the	military	 resources	 at	 his	disposal	 were	 not	 sufficient	 to	 subdue	 either	 Polyperchon,	 Alexander	 or	Aristodemus,	 resulting	 in	 a	 necessary	 change	 to	 Cassander’s	 approach	 to	 the	increasingly	 troublesome	Peloponnese	 issue.	 If	Cassander’s	 initial	 contact	with	Polyperchon	occurred	at	much	the	same	time	as	the	celebration	of	the	Nemean	Games,	 and	 his	 subsequent	 contact	 with	 Alexander,	 which	 occurred	 after	Cassander	 had	 departed	 north	 to	 Macedon,1054	this	 may	 a	 more	 sporadic	 and	seemingly	 less	 considered	 political	 strategy	 in	 Cassander’s	 efforts	 to	 bifurcate	Polyperchon’s	support	base	in	the	south.	It	could	be	regarded	as	an	offer	of	good	intentions	 to	 Polyperchon	 by	 Cassander	 and	 his	 sudden,	 and	 seemingly	unexplained,	 departure	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 he	 was	 willing	 to	 conduct	negotiations	without	having	the	entirety	of	his	military	strength	so	close	to	the	centre	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 base	 of	 support.	While	Heckel’s	 suggestion	 is	 entirely	plausible,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 to	 support	 either	 interpretation	 due	 to	 the	single	 compressed	 account	 of	 Diodorus.	 Consequently	 one	 must	 be	 cautious	when	attempting	any	definitive	assertions.		The	position	which	Cassander	offered	to	Alexander,	the	son	of	Polyperchon,	was	the	 command	 of	 the	 Peloponnese,	 albeit	 under	 Cassander’s	 authority.1055	It	 is	this	point	within	Diodorus’	narrative	that	offers	possible	insight	into	Alexander’s	political	 aspirations	 within	 the	 European	 sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire.	While	no	mention	is	made	of	this	aspect	of	Alexander’s	life	prior	to	the	meeting	with	Cassander	 in	314,	Diodorus	asserts	that	 the	position	of	strategos	was	one	that	Alexander	had	desired	and	 it	was	 this	which	gave	him	cause	 to	 enter	 the	war	against	Cassander.1056	The	brief	assertion	does	not	allow	certainty,	however	it	may	refer	to	a	possible	agreement	made	between	either	Polyperchon	and	his	
																																																								1054	Diod.	19.64.2-3;	Adams,	1975.	pp.	116-117;	Billows,	1990.	p.	117;	Wheatley,	
Phoenix.	52.	(1998).	p.	265;	Dixon,	 in	Heckel,	Tritle	&	Wheatley,	2007.	pp.	171-172;	Meeus,	Phoenix.	66.	(2012).	p.	84;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	13.	1055	Diod.	19.64.2-3.	1056	Diod.	19.64.3-4.	
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son	 for	distribution	of	authority	within	Europe	once	hostilities	with	Cassander	had	concluded,	or	alternatively	between	Alexander	and	Antigonus	himself.		For	 the	majority	 of	 the	 conflict	 against	 Cassander,	 Alexander	 had	 operated	 as	one	of	Polyperchon’s	key	military	supporters	in	Southern	Greece	and	was	a	key	political	 figure	 in	 the	 region	because	of	 this.1057	As	Heckel	 states	 following	 the	year	of	318	and	despite	his	temporary	departure	from	the	ancient	sources,	“…it	
appears	that	Alexander	was	near	or	in	the	Peloponnese	when	Cassander	directed	
his	 attentions	 to	 Macedonia	 in	 317”, 1058 	following	 Olympias’	 return	 to	 the	Macedonian	 homeland. 1059 	By	 314,	 Alexander	 had	 been	 located	 in	 the	Peloponnese	for	a	sufficient	period	of	time	to	have	become	an	eminent	political	figure	 in	 the	 region,	 forming	 alliances,1060	as	 well	 as	 enmities	 with	 various	factions	 operating	 therein 1061 	and	 with	 Cassander,	 who	 via	 Diodorus’	interpretation,	viewed	Alexander	as	the	most	significant	threat	in	the	south	from	316	 onwards.1062	Despite	 Alexander’s	 prominence	 in	 his	 father’s	 cause	 and	 in	Southern	Greece	and	regardless	of	the	timing	of	Cassander’s	initial	approach	to	Polyperchon,	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	Alexander	was	not	Cassander’s	 first	 choice	 in	his	efforts	to	mitigate	the	threat	in	the	south	via	diplomatic	means.	He	had	first	approached	 Polyperchon	 and	 had	 been	 rejected.	 After	 his	 father,	 however,	Alexander	 was	 the	 most	 influential	 hostile	 figure	 in	 Europe,	 making	 him	 the	obvious	 next	 candidate	 for	 Cassander’s	 political	 approaches	 following	Polyperchon’s	rejection	of	his	overtures.		Whether	 or	 not	 Alexander	 took	 time	 to	 consider	 Cassander’s	 proposition	 is	unknown,	however	he	did	ultimately	accept	and	was	appointed	to	the	command	of	 the	 Peloponnese	 on	 Cassander’s	 behalf,	 defecting	 from	 his	 father’s	 cause.	Alexander’s	 switch	 from	 Polyperchon	 to	 Cassander	 has	 received	 a	 number	 of																																																									1057	cf.	Diod.	18.65.3-5,	18.66.1,	18.68.3;	Wheatley,	Antichthon	38	(2004).	p.	3.	n.	10;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20.	1058	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20.	1059	cf.	Ch.	7.2.	1060	Made	during	Polyperchon’s	 initial	 venture	 into	 the	Peloponnese	 in	318,	 cf.	Diod.	18.66.1,	18.69.3-4;	cf.	Ch.	6.2.	1061	cf.	Diod.	19.66.6-19.67.1.	1062	cf.	Ch.	7.3.	
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interpretations	from	modern	scholars,	ranging	from	simple	identification	of	the	event	with	little	discussion	beyond	it,	to	more	in-depth	analyses.1063	The	account	found	 in	Diodorus	 suggest	 that	Alexander’s	 change	 in	 allegiances	was	because	Cassander	was	 offering	 him	 the	 exact	 position	 he	 desired.	 A	 number	 of	 other	possibilities	have	been	presented	in	efforts	to	explain	his	shift	in	loyalty.		Fortina	 has	 implied	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 Alexander’s	 ambition	 to	 hold	 the	command	 of	 the	 Peloponnese,	 the	 son	 of	 Polyperchon	 may	 have	 become	disenfranchised	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 alliance	 forged	 between	 his	 father	 and	Antigonus	 following	 Aristodemus’	 arrival	 the	 previous	 year.	 From	 the	 initial	phases	of	the	Antigonid	alliance,	it	appears	that	Alexander	became	increasingly	dissatisfied	 with	 the	 situation	 and	 his	 father’s	 contracting	 political	 influence	following	 the	 series	 of	 defeats	 at	 the	 hand	 of	 Cassander	 during	 317-316.1064	Fortina	 continues	by	 suggesting	 that	Alexander	decided	 casting	his	 lot	 in	with	Cassander	 and	 becoming	 his	 southern	 commander,	 would	 serve	 his	 own	endeavours	 better	 than	 maintaining	 the	 alliance	 with	 his	 father	 and	 the	Antigonids,	who	were	 increasing	 their	 foothold	 in	 Europe.1065	While	 Fortina	 is	correct	 in	 his	 identification	 that	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 oncoming	 years	Antigonus	would	increase	his	presence	and	therefore	his	influence	in	Greece,1066	this	appears	to	have	been	done	in	reaction	to	Alexander’s	defection,	rather	than	in	 expectation	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 his	 support. 1067 	Certainly	 the	 presence	 of	Aristodemus	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 Antigonus	 desired	 to	increase	 his	 influence	 in	 the	 region.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 appears	more	 likely	 that,	considering	 the	 level	 of	 cooperative	 engagement	 of	 both	 Polyperchon	 and	Alexander	with	 their	Antigonid	 counterparts,	 the	 alliance	may	have	been	on	 a	
																																																								1063	See	 for	example:	Beloch,	Vol.	 IV2	1924.	p.	443;	Fortina,	1965.	p.	67;	Adams,	1975.	p.	118;	Billows,	1990.	p.	117;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	201;	Errington,	2008.	p.	32;	Wheatley,	Antichthon	38.	 (1998).	p.	12;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	230;	Dixon,	 in	Heckel,	Tritle	 &	 Wheatley,	 2007.	 p.	 172;	 Anson,	 2014.	 p.	 136;	 Carney,	 Syll.	 Class.	 25.	(2014).	p.	13.	1064	Fortina,	1965.	p.	67.	1065	Fortina,	1965.	p.	67.	1066	Particularly	around	Aetolia	and	the	city	of	Aegium	(Diod.	19.66.3-4)	1067	Diod.	19.66.2-5.	
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more	 cooperative	 basis	 than	 such	 as	would	 result	 in	 the	 loss	 of	 Alexander	 to	their	cause.		Beloch	 offers	 another	 perspective	 on	 Alexander’s	 defection,	 suggesting	 that	 it	may	 in	 fact	 be	 a	 misnomer.	 Instead	 Beloch	 suggests	 that	 Alexander’s	 new	alliance	 with	 Cassander	 was	 symptomatic	 of	 a	 desire	 by	 the	 aging	Polyperchon1068	to	put	an	end	to	the	conflict	that	had	been	raging	since	319	and	to	 retire	 from	 military	 and	 political	 life.1069	Beloch	 argues	 that	 Polyperchon	could	not	and	would	not	submit	himself	to	serve	under	the	direct	command	of	his	younger	adversary.	 It	was	presumably	because	of	 this	 that	he	relinquished	his	position	of	command	in	the	Peloponnese	as	well	as	his	position	of	authority	within	 Southern	 Greece	 to	 Alexander.1070	The	 possibility	 that	 Polyperchon,	 on	account	of	his	age,	may	have	desired	to	end	his	hostilities	against	Cassander	 is	one	that	deserves	some	consideration.	The	argument	may	carry	more	weight	if	we	place	 his	 desire	 for	 peace,	 not	 in	 314	with	 the	 defection	 of	Alexander,	 but	instead	later	in	308/9	after	the	promulgation	of	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	and	the	murder	 of	 Herakles.	 However,	 there	 is	 not	 enough	 available	 from	 the	 brief	account	 found	 in	 the	 ancient	 sources	 to	 support	 Beloch’s	 position	 beyond	consideration	as	a	possibility.	Alexander’s	imminent	death	means	that	there	was	little	 time	 for	 Polyperchon	 to	 enter	 into	 retirement	 before	 taking	 back	 the	position	he	had	left	to	his	son	and	continuing	the	war	against	Cassander.1071		The	reasons	for	Alexander’s	acceptance	of	Cassander’s	offer	beyond	those	found	in	Diodorus’	account	are	unknown.	It	is	likely	that	the	new	alliance	was	based	on	a	number	of	factors.	While	interesting	to	consider,	the	various	permutations	and	possibilities	accounting	for	Alexander’s	defection	to	Cassander’s	cause	are	based	on	 little	 to	 no	 evidence.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 heed	Wheatley’s	 warning	regarding	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 Polyperchon’s	 movements	 following	
																																																								1068	Heckel	identifies	his	age	as	around	seventy	by	314	(Heckel,	2006.	p.	230.)	1069	Beloch,	 Vol.	 IV2	 p.	 443:	 “Er	 [Polyperchon]	 zog	 sich	 also	 vom	 Kommando	
zurück,	und	überließ	die	Strategie	seinem	Sohne.”	1070	Beloch,	Vol.	IV2	p.	443.	1071	A	position	that	Beloch	asserts	(Beloch,	Vol.	IV2	p.	443).	
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315.1072	What	can	be	said	with	confidence	is	that	the	event	was	a	sizable	political	victory	 for	 Cassander	 in	 mitigating	 the	 threat	 offered	 by	 one	 of	 his	 most	prominent	 adversaries	 in	 Southern	Greece	 and	 dealt	 a	major	 political	 blow	 to	both	Polyperchon	and	the	Antigonid	alliance	in	314.		A	 consideration	 that	 further	 problematises	 any	 discussion	 of	 Alexander,	particularly	his	relationship	with	Polyperchon,	was	that	his	death	occurred	not	long	 after	 he	 had	 sided	 with	 Cassander’s	 cause.	 No	 direct	 military	 conflict	appears	 to	 have	 taken	 place	 between	 father	 and	 son,	 but	 following	 his	appointment	 as	 Cassander’s	 strategos,	 Alexander	 departed	 for	 the	 northern	Peloponnese	 into	 Archaia,	 where	 he	 led	 a	 victorious	 assault	 on	 the	 city	 of	Dyme,1073	and	 then	moved	 on	 to	 the	 city	 of	 Sicyon.	When	 he	 chose	 to	 depart	from	 the	 city,	 Alexander	 met	 his	 end	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 citizen	 of	 the	 city,	Alexion.1074	Alexander’s	 death	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 a	 prelude	 to	 a	 greater	uprising	 by	 Sicyon,1075 	however	 against	 whom	 this	 revolt	 was	 intended	 is	unclear.	Diodorus	simply	relates	that	the	people	of	Sicyon	desired	their	freedom.	Whatever	 the	 case,	 Sicyon	 was	 soon	 subdued	 by	 Alexander’s	 widow,	Cratesipolis,	who	had	 taken	 control	 over	 her	 husband’s	 army	 and,	 following	 a	bloody	conflict,	re-established	authority	over	the	city.1076	Now	that	the	city	was	under	 her	 control,	 the	 issue	 of	 where	 were	 Cratesipolis	 and	 her	 army’s	allegiances	 to	 be	 directed?	Was	 she	 to	maintain	 her	 husband’s	 recent	 alliance	with	Cassander,	or	was	she	to	return	to	Polyperchon’s	side?	That	she	could	hold	the	 city	 as	 an	 independent	 faction	 within	 the	 Peloponnese	 does	 not	 seem	 a	reasonable	possibility.	We	do	know,	however,	that	by	the	following	year	of	313,	Sicyon	had	 returned	 to	Polyperchon’s	 control,	 forming	a	 central	 bastion	of	his	base	 of	 support.1077 	Careful	 consideration	 is	 required	 when	 evaluating	 the																																																									1072	Wheatley,	1997.	p.	222;	Wheatley,	Anticthon	38.	(1998).	p.	12.		1073	Diod.	19.66.5-6.	1074	Diod.	19.67.1	1075	cf.	Diod.	19.67.2;	Macurdy,	AJPh	50.	(1929).	p.	274;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	202.	n.	159;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	20.	1076	Diod.	 19.67.12;	 Macurdy,	 AJPh	 50.	 (1929).	 p.	 274;	 Carney,	 Syll.	 Class.	 25.	(2014).	pp.	13-14.	1077	Diod.	19.74.2-3:	“ἐν	ταύταις	γὰρ	Πολυπέρχων	διέτριβεν	δυνάμεις	ἁδρὰς	ἔχων	
καὶ	πιστεύων	ταύταις	τε	καὶ	ταῖς	τῶν	τόπων	ὀχυρὀτησιν.”	There	are	a	number	of	
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return	of	Sicyon	 to	Polyperchon’s	control,	 as	available	evidence	 is	 limited.	The	alliance	between	Polyperchon	and	Cratesipolis	can	be	deduced	from	their	 joint	occupation	 around	 Sicyon	 during	 this	 time.	 No	 record	 of	 conflict	 between	 the	pair	 is	recorded	Cratesipolis	maintained	amicable	relations	with	Sicyon	during	this	period	of	time,1078	and	continued	to	do	so	until	at	least	309	and	308	BCE	and	Ptolemy	Soter’s	brief	foray	into	the	region.1079	While	not	definitive,	the	absence	of	 overt	 hostility	 between	 the	 pair	 during	 a	 period	 when	 Polyperchon	 was	vulnerable	would	suggest	that	Polyperchon	and	Cratesipolis	had	renewed	their	former	ties	following	Alexander’s	death.		While	 it	 is	tempting	to	suggest	yet	another	defection	or	revolt	within	the	ever-evolving	realm	of	political	alliances	among	the	Diadochoi	to	explain	Alexander’s	death,	 there	 is	 not	 enough	 surviving	 information	 to	 know.	 It	may	 be	 possible	that	Alexion’s	 actions	were	 in	 response	 to	Alexander’s	 defection	 to	Cassander,	whose	 successive	 military	 campaigns	 had	 plagued	 the	 region	 for	 years.	Conversely,	Sicyon	may	have	desired	to	remove	itself	from	the	conflict	entirely,	as	 Diodorus	 suggests	 the	 city	 was	 willing	 to	 fight	 for	 its	 freedom	 against	Cratesipolis	and	her	army.1080	One	possibility	 is	 that	Cratesipolis	and	her	army	still	held	a	greater	measure	of	loyalty	to	Polyperchon	than	to	other	groups.	Now	that	Alexander	was	dead,	they	simply	returned	to,	and	were	welcomed	back	into,																																																																																																																																																															possible	reasons	that	may	have	 lead	to	 the	return	of	Alexander’s	 former	army,	now	under	the	control	of	Cratesipolis,	to	Polyperchon’s	cause;	Cratesipolis	may	have	 disagreed	 with	 Alexander’s	 defection	 to	 Cassander,	 she	 may	 have	 been	influence	 by	 the	 general	 sentiment	 of	 her	 troops,	 she	 may	 have	 had	 a	 prior	amicable	relationship	with	Polyperchon	or	a	general	aversion	to	Cassander.	We	simply	do	not	know	and	this	can	only	be	left	to	the	shaky	realm	of	hypothetical	reconstruction	and	speculation	(cf.	Ch.	2.3).	It	is	not	a	great	leap	of	judgment	to	suggest	 that	Cassander’s	 recent	 treatment	of	prominent	women	may	have	had	some	bearing	on	her	decision,	with	the	execution	of	Olympias	 in	early	315,	his	forced	 marriage	 to	 Thessaloniki	 soon	 afterwards	 and	 the	 imprisonment	 of	Rhoxane,	the	mother	of	Alexander	IV.	However,	given	the	lack	of	guidance	by	the	available	evidence,	Cratesipolis’	motivations	can	only	be	speculated	upon.	1078	Poly.	8.58.	1079	Diod.	20.37.1-2;	cf.	Plut.	Demtr.	15.1;	Diog.	Laert.	2.115;	Bosworth,	in	Bosworth	&	Baynham,	2000.	p.	216;	Wheatley,	Antichthon	38	(2004).	p.	4.	n.	13;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	59.	1080	Diod.	19.67.2:	 “τῶν	γὰρ	Σικυωνιων...συνδραμόντων	μετὰ	τῶν	ὅπλων	ἐπι	τὴν	
ἐλευθερίαν.”	
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Polyperchon’s	 forces	 once	 again,	 re-implementing	 the	 military	 power	 he	 had	held	prior	to	his	son’s	murder.1081	When	this	took	place,	or	whether	Polyperchon	held	 any	 hostility	 towards	 his	 son	 or	 the	 army	 now	 under	 the	 control	 of	 his	daughter-in-law	is	not	known,	though	by	314/3,	Polyperchon	clearly	could	not	enjoy	the	luxury	of	turning	away	any	supporters	who	presented	themselves.		This	first	section	of	investigation	of	this	chapter	has	discussed	the	initial	phases	of	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi	in	Europe	with	a	primary	focus	on	Cassander’s	reaction	to	the	new	alliance	between	Polyperchon	and	Antigonus	as	well	as	his	entry	into	the	Peloponnese	for	the	fourth	time	in	another	unsuccessful	attempt	to	 implement	his	 control	over	 the	 region.	 In	addition	 to	Cassander’s	European	movements	 in	315	and	314,	 this	 section	of	 investigation	discussed	 the	 shift	 in	Cassander’s	approach	to	the	struggle	against	Polyperchon	now	that	he	had	lost	the	support	of	Antigonus.	This	shift	is	seen	in	the	evolution	of	Cassander’s	purely	military	 approach	 to	 combating	 Polyperchon	 to	 incorporation	 of	 political	elements	to	mitigate	the	growing	threat	that	Polyperchon	now	posed.	However,	when	 Polyperchon	 rejected	 the	 proposal	 by	 Cassander,	 Cassander	 shifted	 his	focus	to	the	other	eminent	members	of	his	adversary’s	support	base,	notably	to	Polyperchon’s	son,	Alexander.	Here	Cassander	was	successful	 in	facilitating	the	defection	 of	 Alexander	 shortly	 before	 his	 death	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Sicyon	 in	 the	northern	 Peloponnese	 in	 314.	 The	 loss	 of	 Alexander	 had	 significant	 political	impact	 upon	 Polyperchon’s	 prestige,	 however,	 from	 a	 military	 perspective,	 it	appears	that	following	Cratesipolis’	victory	over	Sicyon,	Polyperchon	was	able	to	reabsorb	 both	 the	 city	 and	 this	 army	 into	 his	 support	 base.	 However,	 the	defection	 and	 subsequent	 death	 of	 Alexander	 meant	 that	 Polyperchon	 and	Antigonus	both	 lost	 a	 significant	 figure	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	Cassander.	This	would	force	Antigonus	to	change	the	way	in	which	he	would	approach	events	in	Europe,	not	only	in	regards	to	Polyperchon,	but	also	to	Cassander.		
	
	
																																																									1081	cf.	Wheatley,	Antichthon	38	(2004).	p.	3.	n.	10.	
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8.2:	War	and	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	
	This	 section	 of	 investigation	 discusses	 the	 events	 leading	 up	 the	 negotiations	that	 eventuated	 in	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 in	 311/0,	 when	 a	 secession	 of	hostilities	 was	 called	 for	 between	 the	 coalition	 of	 Cassander,	 Lysimachus	 and	Ptolemy	with	Antigonus.	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 an	understanding	of	what	 led	 to	 the	negotiations,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	discuss	 the	events,	albeit	briefly,	 in	Europe	and	Anatolia	and	the	respective	actions	of	the	combatants.	Of	central	concern	to	this	investigation	 is	 the	 way	 the	 dynamic	 in	 the	 alliance	 between	 Antigonus	 and	Polyperchon	changed	following	Alexander’s	death	at	Sicyon.	Now	that	one	of	the	key	power	figures	opposing	Cassander	was	gone,	Antigonus	was	forced	to	shift	a	greater	 amount	 of	 resources	 to	 Europe	 in	 order	 to	 concentrate	 Cassander’s	immediate	 attentions	 in	 Greece,	 rather	 than	 allowing	 him	 the	 ability	 to	move	with	 strength	 against	 Antigonus	 in	 Asia	Minor.	 This	 addition	 to	 the	 Antigonid	presence	in	Europe	can	be	seen	first	with	the	arrival	of	Telesphorus	in	314,	and	the	following	year	with	the	arrival	of	another	of	Antigonus’	officers,	Polemaeus.		The	 negotiations	 that	 would	 result	 in	 peace	 for	 the	 western	 reaches	 of	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	 did	 not	 include	 all	 of	 the	 principal	 participants.	 A	 key	absence	 from	 the	 discussions	was	 Polyperchon,	who	 stubbornly	maintained	 a	foothold	in	the	Peloponnese.	While	it	has	been	argued	that,	by	311,	Polyperchon	had	lost	all	credibility	as	a	military	and	political	leader	in	Europe,	resulting	in	his	absence	from	the	negotiations	near	the	Hellespont,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	he	 still	 presented	a	 significant	 threat	 to	Cassander	 and	 the	 reason	 for	his	absence	 from	 negotiations	 may	 lie	 in	 the	 political	 machinations	 of	 Antigonus	who	was	keen	to	reach	a	swift	peace	before	turning	his	own	attentions	west	to	the	 growing	 threat	 posed	 by	 Seleucus.	 In	 order	 to	 ascertain	 Polyperchon’s	standing	in	310,	close	evaluation	of	Antigonus’	famous	letter	to	Scepsis	following	the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 is	 necessary.	 Though	 the	 letter	 is	 well	 known	 to	scholars,	 Polyperchon’s	 place	 within	 the	 text	 has	 been	 neglected,	 thereby	missing	 a	 vital	 insight	 into	 the	 relationship	 between	 Monophthalmus	 and	 his	Peloponnesian	 ally.	 By	 re-evaluating	 the	 letter,	 greater	 understanding	 of	
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Polyperchon’s	standing	during	the	latter	stages	of	the	conflict	against	Cassander	is	possible.		Following	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander,	 the	 representatives	 in	 Greece	 of	 both	Cassander	 and	 Antigonus	 continued	 the	 struggle	 for	 dominance	 in	 Europe.	Ascertaining	Polyperchon’s	movements	during	the	remaining	years	of	the	First	War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 is	 difficult,	 however	 it	 would	 appear,	 from	 what	 scant	references	to	him	exist	within	the	literary	tradition,	he	maintained	his	position	in	 the	Peloponnese	and	did	not	undertake	a	prominent	 role	 in	 the	 conflict.1082	Cassander’s	actions	are	more	certain.	After	returning	from	the	campaign	in	the	Peloponnese	the	previous	year,	he	forged	an	alliance	with	the	Acarnians,	and	in	the	summer	of	314,	embarked	upon	an	aggressive	military	campaign,	launching	an	 invasion	 into	 Aetolia	 once	 he	 became	 aware	 of	 their	 alliance	 to	Aristodemus.1083	From	here,	Cassander	continued	into	Illyria,	where	he	defeated	the	 Illyrian	 king,	 Glaucis,	 and	 established	 a	 garrison	 within	 the	 region	 before	returning	back	to	Macedon.1084	It	is	once	Cassander	returned	to	the	Macedonian	Homeland	 that	 he	 embarked	 upon	 his	 only	 trans-Aegean	 military	 endeavour	since	his	return	to	Attica	in	318.			Despite	Antigonus’	concerted	efforts	to	keep	Cassandrean	forces	out	of	Asia,	 in	the	winter	of	314/3	Cassander	was	able	to	send	a	body	of	reinforcements	from	Macedon	as	well	as	from	the	Munychia	garrison	to	Caria	under	the	command	of	Asander	 and	 Prepelaus.	 The	 forces	 sent	 were	 in	 aid	 of	 the	 Seleucid	 and	Ptolemaic	 forces	 in	 the	 region	 which	 was	 best	 by	 Antigonid	 troops.1085	With	Alexander	dead,	and	the	military	and	political	weight	of	Polyperchon	restricted																																																									1082	Diod.	 19.74.2	 places	 Polyperchon’s	 location	 between	 Sicyon	 and	 Corinth	during	the	year	of	313,	most	likely	alongside	Cratesipolis	who	had	remained	in	the	 area	 since	 the	 reprisal	 against	 Sicyon	 the	 previous	 year	 following	 her	husband’s	death	until	308	and	Ptolemy’s	invasion	of	the	Peloponnese	(cf.	Diod.	20.37.1;	 Plut.	 Demtr.	 8.1;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 90;	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 150-152;	Wheatley,	1997.	pp.	168-169;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	59;	Errington,	2008.	p.	46;	Hauben,	in	Hauben	&	Meeus,	2014.	pp.	251-257).	No	mention	of	Polyperchon’s	location	is	made	until	his	elevation	of	Herakles	as	a	political	tool	in	309	(See:	Ch.	8.3.).	1083	Diod.	19.67.1-5.	1084	Diod.	19.67.6-7.	1085	Diod.	19.68.2-3,	19.68.5;	Adams,	1975.	p.	121,	123;	Billows,	1990.	p.	119.	
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by	this,	Cassander’s	forces	were	now	available	to	do	exactly	what	Antigonus	had	hoped	his	alliance	with	Polyperchon	would	stop,	that	is	to	present	a	direct	threat	to	Antigonid	holdings	within	Asia	Minor	itself.1086	It	is	interesting	to	note,	when	placed	 in	contrast	 to	Antigonus’	motivations	 for	 the	alliance	with	Polyperchon,	that	Cassander’s	reasons	for	the	Carian	expedition	were,	in	addition	to	aiding	his	allies	 in	 the	 region,	 to	 keep	 Antigonus	 located	 in	 Asia	 and	 prevent	 him	 from	entering	Europe.	This	would	allow	Cassander,	as	Adams	has	identified,	to	keep	the	 worst	 of	 the	 fighting	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 from	 his	 base	 of	 operations	 in	Macedon.1087 	Should	 Cassander	 be	 able	 to	 establish	 a	 foothold	 within	 Asia	centred	 on	 Caria	 he	 would	 be	 able	 to	 expand	 directly	 into	 Antigonid	 held	territory	 in	 Anatolia.	 The	 expedition	 was	 ultimately	 unsuccessful,	 and	Cassander’s	troops	were	crushed	by	the	Antigonid	general	Polemaeus,	who	led	a	night	attack	on	Cassander’s	troops,	either	destroying	or	capturing	the	force.1088	The	loss	of	the	expeditionary	force	into	Caria	must	certainly	have	been	a	blow	to	Cassander’s	 military	 resources	 and	 checked	 his	 trans-Aegean	 aspirations,	however	it	was	by	no	means	a	significant	enough	defeat	to	force	Cassander	out	of	 the	 conflict.	 However,	 it	 may	 be	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time	 that	 the	 tide	 of	Cassander’s	fortunes	began	to	turn	against	him.		In	response	to	Cassander’s	engagement	in	Caria,	and	in	order	to	re-establish	the	scale	of	the	threat	against	him	in	Greece	and	Macedon,	Antigonus	dispatched	his	officer	 Telesphorus	 to	 the	 Peloponnese.1089	From	 here,	 Telesphorus	 set	 about	securing	 the	 factions	 within	 the	 region	 that	 were	 previously	 loyal	 to	Alexander,1090	thereby	helping	to	bolster	the	pro-Antigonid	presence	within	the	Peloponnese	to	the	levels	they	were	following	the	return	of	Alexander	from	Tyre	in	315	and	the	implementation	of	the	Polyperchon-Antigonid	alliance.	It	seems	clear	that	Telesphorus	was	keen	to	generate	good	will	with	Antigonus	during	his	movements	 as	 he	 ventured	 throughout	 the	 Peloponnese;	 once	 again	 he																																																									1086	Diod.	 19.68.2-3;	 19.69.1;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 70;	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 120-121;	Billows,	1990.	pp.	119-120;	Anson,	2014.	p.	159;	cf.	Ch.	8.1.	1087	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington.	2010.	p.	216	1088	Diod.	19.68.5-7;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	224.	1089	Diod.	19.74.1;	Billows,	1990.	p.	121.	1090	Diod.	19.74.1-2.	
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conveyed	to	the	Peloponnesian	factions	previously	loyal	to	Alexander	Antigonus’	desire	 to	 implement	 freedom	 among	 the	 cities	 as	 Antigonus	 had	 promised	 at	Tyre.	 By	 313,	 Telesphorus’	 efforts	 resulted	 in	 Cassander	 losing	 his	 position	 in	the	 Peloponnese, 1091 	and	 from	 here	 a	 general	 contraction	 of	 Cassander’s	holdings	within	 Greece	 as	 Antigonus	 continued	 to	 exert	more	 pressure	 in	 the	west.	 	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that,	 while	 Telesphorus’	 orders	 were	 to	 establish	freedom	for	the	Greek	cities,	this	seemingly	did	not	apply	to	the	territory	held	by	Polyperchon	 as	 both	 Corinth	 and	 Sicyon	 would	 remain	 under	 Polyperchon’s	control.1092		Telesphorus	was	not	the	only	officer	Antigonus	sent	to	Greece	during	the	Third	War	of	the	Diadochoi.	In	the	summer	of	313,	he	sent	his	nephew	Polemaus,	along	with	a	 fleet	of	some	150	warships	 to	Boeotia,	where	he	received	both	political	and	military	support	from	the	Boeotian	League.1093	However,	Antigonus’	efforts	did	not	run	entirely	smoothly.	Telesphorus	viewed	the	appointment	as	insulting	to	 his	 own	 position	 and,	 in	 reaction	 to	 Polemaeus’	 arrival	 into	 Greece	 as	Antigonus’	overall	commander,	chose	to	rebel	against	Antigonus	and	struck	out	for	 himself.1094	Telesphorus’	 rebellion	 against	 Antigonus	 was	 short	 lived,	 as	Polemaeus,	upon	learning	of	his	subordinate’s	actions,	moved	his	forces	into	the	Peloponnese	and	after	a	short	period	of	time,	was	able	to	resecure	Telesphorus’	allegiance	 for	 the	 Antigonid	 cause.1095	While	 it	 appears	 that	 Telesphorus	 was	forgiven	 for	 his	 insurrection,1096	it	 is	 demonstrative	 of	 the	 fragile	 and	 even	 at	times	 petty	 nature	 of	 political	 alliances	 in	 the	 extremities	 of	 the	 Macedonian	Empire,	even	during	times	of	success	and	advancement.																																																									1091	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	216.	1092	This	 interpretation	 is	 further	 supported	 by	 Polemaeus’	 subsequent	 entry	into	 the	 Peloponnese	 to	 wrestle	 control	 away	 from	 the	 now	 rebellious	Telesphorus	(Diod.	19.87.)	Despite	the	ability	 to	take	the	cities	away	from	him	should	 this	 have	 been	 the	 desire	 of	 either	 Antigonus	 or	 Polemaeus,	Polyperchon’s	 holdings	 in	 the	 region	 were	 once	 again	 left	 unmolested	 (Diod.	19.74.2;	cf.	Billows,	1990.	p.	131.)	1093	Diod.	19.77.2-4.	For	discussion	 regarding	 the	 spelling	of	Polemaeus’	name,	see:	Hauben,	EA.	9.	(1987).	p.	32;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	224.	1094	Diod.	19.87.1-3;	Billows,	1990.	p.	131.	1095	Diod.	19.87.3;	Billows,	1990.	p.	131.	1096	As	 has	 been	 identified	 by	 Billows	 (1990.	 p.	 131)	 with	 Telesphorus’s	 later	presence	within	the	Demetrius’	court	at	Athens	in	307/6	(cf.	D.L.	5.79.).	
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In	addition	to	the	Carian	expedition,	Cassander	continued	his	aggressive	military	policy,	 first	 against	 the	 city	of	Oreus	 in	Euboea	where	he	 learnt	of	Polemaeus’	arrival	into	Greece.	In	response	Cassander	moved	his	forces	to	Chalcis	in	order	to	 check	 the	new	 threat	 from	Polemaeus.1097	However,	 the	move	 further	 south	made	Macedon	and	Cassander’s	base	of	support	there	vulnerable	to	attack,	and	this	 was	 accentuated	 by	 Antigonus,	 who	 moved	 his	 forces	 towards	 the	Hellespont,	 presenting	 Cassander	 with	 the	 choice	 of	 maintaining	 a	 stronger	position	 in	Euboea,	 or	 returning	 to	Macedon.1098	Not	wishing	 to	 jeopardise	his	position	 in	 Macedon,	 Cassander	 withdrew	 from	 Euboea,	 leaving	 his	 brother	Pleistarchus	 in	command	of	 the	garrison1099	and	moved	back	 to	his	position	 in	Macedon	before	 the	winter	 of	 313/12,1100	leaving	Polemaeus	 relatively	 free	 to	move	against	Cassandrean	held	territory	and	gain	control	of	Greece.1101		
	Cassander	made	one	final	campaign	during	the	Third	War	of	the	Diadochoi.	Now	that	 Southern	 Greece	 was	 almost	 completely	 lost	 to	 him,1102	maintaining	 the	garrisons	 that	 remained	 loyal	him	was	vital.	 In	 the	 summer	of	312,	Cassander	marched	into	Epirus	in	aid	of	his	general,	Lyciscus,	to	re-establish	control	in	the	region	following	the	coronation	of	the	new	Epirote	king,	Alcetas.1103	Once	Epirus	was	 stabilised,	 albeit	 temporarily,1104 	Cassander	 moved	 against	 the	 city	 of	Apollonia	in	Illyria.1105	However	the	Illyrian	campaign	was	a	disaster.		Cassander	suffered	 substantial	 loses	 while	 laying	 siege	 to	 Apollonia	 and	 was	 forced	 to	retreat	 to	 Macedon	 before	 the	 winter	 of	 312.1106	Cassander’s	 military	 efforts	over	313	and	312	had	little	to	no	success,	and	saw	an	overall	contraction	of	his	military	and	political	 influence	within	 the	European	Sphere	of	 the	Macedonian																																																									1097	Diod.	19.77.4-5.	1098	Diod.	19.77.5.	1099	Diod.	19.77.6.	cf.	Plut.	Demtr.	30.1;	Pau.	1.15.1	1100	Diod.	19.77.6.	1101	For	Polemaeus’	campaigns,	see:	Diod.	19.78.	1102	Save	for	Athens,	which	remained	under	his	control.	cf.	Billows,	1990.	p.	131.	1103	Diod.	19.88.1	1104	Following	a	brief	rule,	Alcetas	was	deposed	by	an	Epirote	uprising.	Though	brief,	 stability	 in	 Eprius	 still	 afforded	 Cassander	 precious	 time	 to	 turn	 his	attentions	south.		cf.	Diod.	19.89.3;	Paus.	1.11.5;	Adams,	1975.	p.	133.		1105	Diod.	19.89.1-2.	1106	Diod.	19.89.2-3.	
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Empire.	 With	 Polemaeus	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 with	 a	 firm	 grasp	 on	 areas	 of	Mainland	 Greece	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Peloponnese	 divided	 between	 the	 control	 of	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon,	Cassander	began	efforts	to	negotiate	terms	of	peace	with	Antigonus	the	following	year.1107		Cassander’s	decision	to	approach	Antigonus	for	peace	came	at	a	convenient	time	for	 Antigonus,	 as	 although	 he	 was	 making	 significant	 advances	 into	 Europe,	events	 in	 his	 eastern	 territories	 were	 not	 as	 successful.	 	 Antigonus’	 son	Demetrius	had	suffered	a	serious	defeat	at	Gaza	at	 the	hands	of	Ptolemaic	and	Seleucid	forces.	This	defeat	and	the	growing	threat	that	Seleucus	was	beginning	to	pose	 to	Antigonus’	position	 in	Babylonia	appears	 to	have	been	a	motivating	factor	 for	 him	 to	 end	 the	 hostilities	 in	 the	west	with	 Cassander	 and	 the	 allied	coalition	in	order	to	refocus	his	attentions	east.1108			Accompanied	by	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy,	Cassander	met	with	Antigonus	who	still	 maintained	 the	 position	 he	 had	 occupied	 near	 the	 Hellespont	 from	 the	previous	 year	 in	 order	 to	 discuss	 the	 cessation	 of	 hostilities.	 A	 glimpse	 into	Antigonus’	 mindset	 during	 the	 deliberation	 and	 negotiations	 is	 fortuitously	available	in	addition	to	the	ever-present	narrative	of	Diodorus.	This	comes	in	the	form	of	a	letter	Antigonus	sent	to	the	city	of	Scepsis	in	North	West	Anatolia	that	was	later	recorded	into	an	inscription	that	transmits	Antigonus’	reasoning	when	facilitating	 the	 peace	 process	 with	 Cassander,	 Lysimachus	 and	 Ptolemy.1109	In	addition	to	Diodorus’s	narrative,	Antigonus’	letter	to	Scepsis	has	become	one	of	the	 pivotal	 authorities	 for	 historical	 analysis	 of	 the	 peace	 treaty.	 While	 the	insight	offered	 is	 intrinsic	 to	understanding	the	peace	of	311,	Antigonus’	 letter	needs	to	be	read	with	caution.	If	the	inscription	does	indeed	record	the	words	of	
																																																								1107	Diod.	 19.105;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 77;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 133;	 Billows,	 1990.	 p.	131;		Errington,	2008.	p.	35;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	216.	1108	cf.	Diod.	19.90.1;	Plut.	Demtr.	7.2;	Billows,	1990.	p.	136;	Lund.	1992.	p.	61;	Boiy,	2007.	pp.	145-147;	Errington	has	also	suggested	that	there	may	have	been	a	general	war	weariness	among	 the	Diadochoi	who	wanted	 to	end	 the	conflict	and	focus	on	internal	affairs	(Errington,	2008.	pp.	33-34.)	1109	OGIS.	5.	=	RC.	1;	Munro,	JHS	19.	(1899)	pp.	330-340;	Errington,	2008.	p.	35.	
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Monophthalmus,1110	then	 a	 level	 of	 political	 distortion	 by	 Antigonus	 can	 be	expected.1111	This	can	result	in	some	areas	becoming	advantageously	prominent	for	 Antigonus’	 political	 aspirations	 while	 other,	 less	 advantageous	 issues	become	 vague	 or	 are	 even	 omitted.	 While	 it	 is	 not	 the	 intention	 of	 this	investigation	 to	 critique	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 letter,	 the	 sections	 concerning	Cassander	 and	 in	 particular,	 Polyperchon	 are	 of	 key	 importance	 and	 deserve	attention.		The	 final	 results	of	 the	Peace	of	 the	Dynasts	were	put	 into	place	by	 the	end	of	311,1112	and	 echoed	 much	 of	 what	 had	 been	 decreed	 during	 the	 Partition	 of	Triparadisus	in	320.1113	Lysimachus	was	placed	in	command	of	Thrace,	Ptolemy	received	Egypt	and	areas	of	Libya	and	Arabia,	while	Antigonus’	position	in	Asia	gave	 him	 supreme	 command	 of	 the	 region.1114	Cassander	 would	 be	 formally	recognised	as	 the	strategos	of	Europe	until	 the	maturing	Alexander	 IV	came	of	age,	 the	 same	 position	 that	 Antipater	 had	 received	 in	 320.1115	The	 issue	 of	defining	who	was	 and	was	not	 in	 attendance	has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 significant	academic	 discussion	 and	 debate,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 Seleucus. 1116	Seleucus’	presence	at	the	meeting	would	seem	unlikely,	given	that	he	was	cause	for	 Antigonus’	 desire	 to	 conclude	 hostilities	 so	 that	 he	 could	 refocus	 his	attentions	west,	 Seleucus’	 participation	 in	 the	 proceedings	 or	whether	 he	 had	representation	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 investigation.	Of	 greater	 concern	 is	
																																																								1110	As	 asserted	 by	 Munro	 (JHS.	 19.	 (1899)	 p.	 339),	 and	 is	 an	 area	 with	 little	cause	for	doubt.	Harding,	1985.	n.	132;	Hauben,	EA.	9	(1987).	p.	29;	Austin,	2006.	p.	85.	1111		cf.	Errington’s	identification	of	the	ambiguity	that	Antigonus	employs	within	the	inscription	(2008.	p.	35).	1112	Diod.	 19.105.1-3;	 Billows,	 1990.	 pp.	 131-133;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 201;	 Boiy,	2007.	p.	150;	Errington,	2008.	p.	35.	1113	Errington,	2008.	p.	34.	cf.	Ch.	5.3.	p.	149.	1114	Diod.	19.105.1:	“Ἀντίγονον	δὲ	ἀφηγεῖσθαι	τῆς	Ἀσιας	πάσης.”	1115	Diod.	 19.105.1:	 “…ἐν	 δε	 ταύταις	 ἦν	 Κάσανδρον	 μὲν	 εἶναι	 στρατηγὸν	 τῆς	
Εὐρωπης	μέχρι	ἂν	Ἀλέξανδρος	ὁ	ἐκ	Ῥωξάνης	εἰς	ἡλικίαν	ἔλθῃ.”	 It	must	be	noted	that	 this	 temporal	 limitation	 did	 not	 only	 apply	 to	 Cassander,	 but	 also	 to	 the	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi.	1116		 See	 for	 example:	Welles,	 1934.	 p.	 7;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 136;	 Hauben,	EA.	9	(1987).	p.	33;	Billows,	1990.	p.	132;	cf.	Errington,	2008.	p.	34;	Anson,	2014.	pp.	148-150.	
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Polyperchon’s	 impact	 on,	 and	 influence	 over,	 the	 peace	 talks	 and	 how	 the	convening	dynasts	engaged	with	him	during	this	time.		The	 conventional	 academic	 interpretation	 holds	 that	 Polyperchon	was	 neither	present,	 nor	 had	 representatives	 engaged	 with	 the	 peace	 talks	 of	 311.1117	Certainly	this	position	is	 implied	by	Antigonus’	 letter	to	Scepsis,	relating	to	the	city	 that	measures	were	 taken	 to	deprive	Polyperchon	of	 allies,	because	of	his	political	isolation.	This	would	further	reinforce	the	notion	that	Polyperchon	was	not	present	at	the	negotiations	at	the	Hellespont.1118	While	it	can	be	seen	that,	as	Antigonus	 increased	 his	 influence	 in	 Greece	 as	 the	 conflict	 progressed,	Polyperchon	became	a	less	vital	ally,	this	does	not	equate	to	his	dismissal	from	Antigonus’	 side.1119	Antigonus	 must	 have	 known,	 perhaps	 more	 than	 anyone	else,	 that	 a	 shift	 in	 allegiances	 could	 have	 monumental	 unintended	consequences	 upon	 the	 political	 environment.	 Without	 question,	 in	 311/0,	Polyperchon’s	influence	and	political	strength	was	waning,	but	if	Antigonus	had	rejected	the	alliance	with	Polyperchon	outright,	 it	risked	prolonging	the	war	in	Europe	at	a	time	when	his	attentions	were	being	drawn	back	to	the	west	and	the	oncoming	war	with	Seleucus	in	Babylon.	Instead	of	abandoning	Polyperchon	and	potentially	 prolonging	 war	 in	 Europe,	 Antigonus	 may	 have	 taken	 the	 same	approach	he	had	with	Telesphorus	in	313,	and	chose	to	end	the	hostilities	via	a	more	 political	 process,	 assuring	 Polyperchon’s	 compliance.	 Polyperchon	 had	proven	himself	a	stubborn	adversary	and	a	significant	thorn	in	Cassander’s	side	from	 his	 position	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 for	 over	 half	 a	 decade	 and	 from	 what	information	 is	 available	 he	 still	 held	 a	 strong	 position	 around	 Corinth	 and																																																									1117	Beloch,	 IV2	 1924.	 p.	 443;	 Will,	 1984.	 p.	 50;	 Bengston,	 1987.	 pp.	 43-44;	Billows,	1990.	p.	132;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	202;	Heckel,	2002.	p.	230;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	55;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	14;	also	Wheatley	(Antichton.	32.	(1998).	p.	13.),	 who	 exercises	 necessary	 caution,	 and	 while	 not	 explicitly	 referring	 to	Polyperchon’s	participation	 in	 the	peace	 talks,	 tentatively	 implies	Polyperchon	may	have	remained	in	the	Peloponnese	until	310.	1118	OGIS.	 5.	 =	 RC.	 1.36-41:	 “οὐ	 μὴν	 ἀλλὰ	 διὰ	 τὸ	 ὑπολαμβάνειν	 καὶ	 τῶν	 πρὸς	
τοῦτον	 συντελεσθέντων	 :	 τὰ	 πρὸς	 Πολυπέρχοντα.	 θᾶσσον	 ἂν	 διοικηθῆναι,	
μηθενὸς	αὐτῶι	συνορκοῦντος.”	See	Appendix	1.	pp.	297-300.	1119	The	relationship	between	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon	may	have	continued	in	an	unofficial	capacity	following	the	promulgation	of	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	as	Polyperchon’s	campaign	in	309	with	Herakles	appears	to	bear	the	hallmarks	of	Antigonid	approval	(cf.	Ch.	8.3.	p.	280).	
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Sicyon.	In	addition,	there	was	the	possibility	that	Polyperchon	could,	if	spurned	by	Antigonus,	change	sides	to	join	Cassander,	who	had	already	approached	him	to	do	so	in	315,	a	turn	of	events	that	would	divert	more	time	and	resources	to	Europe	than	Antigonus	wished	to	expend.	Keeping	Polyperchon	onside,	but	out	of	 any	 key	 participation	 in	 the	 peace	 talks	 as	 Antigonus’	 letter	 to	 Scepsis1120	suggests,	implies	that	he	was	still	important	enough	to,	at	the	very	least,	warrant	discussion	during	the	negotiations	for	peace.		The	decision	to	leave	Polyperchon	alone	and	isolated	in	his	diminished,	yet	still	defendable,	 position	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	 abandoned	 by	 Antigonus	 and	 the	alliance	 they	 made	 in	 315,	 would	 ease	 the	 negotiation	 process.	 This	 was	particularly	 so	 with	 Cassander,	 and	 further	 increased	 by	 the	 withdrawal	 of	Antigonid	 forces	 from	Greece	 as	 a	 demonstration	 of	 Antigonus’	 sincerity.	 It	 is	clear	 from	 his	 presence	 within	 Antigonus’	 letter	 that	 Polyperchon	 was	 still	 a	significant	enough	figure	within	the	Greek	political	sphere	to	warrant	discussion	during	the	peace	negotiations	and	mention	to	the	Troad	city	in	Monophthalmus’	letter,	 despite	 the	 zenith	 of	 his	 power	 and	 influence	 having	 passed	 after	 his	expulsion	 from	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland,	 in	 317.	 There	 may,	 however,	 be	further	 implications	 that	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 Polyperchon’s	 inclusion	 in	Antigonus’	 letter	 to	 Scepsis.	 The	 topic	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 political	 isolation	 in	Antigonus’	letter	may	not	be	the	only	area	within	which	he	was	a	factor.	He	may	indeed	 have	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 greater	 amount	 of	 attention	 than	 previously	allotted	to	him	and	the	following	portions	of	Antigonus’	letter	to	Scepsis	may	be	the	 key	 to	 revealing	 the	 level	 to	 which	 Polyperchon	 was	 a	 factor	 during	 the	peace	negotiations.	The	following	lines	of	Antigonus’	correspondence	read:		“καὶ	 διὰ	 τὴν	 οἰκειότητα	 τὴν	 ὑπάρχουσαν	 ἡμῖν	
πρὸς	αὐτόν,	ἅμα	δὲ	καὶ	ὑμᾶς	ὁρῶντες	κα[ὶ]	τοὺς	
ἄλλους	 συμμάχους	 ἐνοχλουμένους	 ὑπό	 τε	 τῆς	
στρατείας	 καὶ	 τῶν	 δαπανημάτων,	 	 ὤιμεθα	
καλῶς	 ἔχειν	 συνχωρῆσαι	 καὶ	 τὰ[ς	 δ]ιαλ[ύς]εις	
ποήσασθαι	καὶ	πρὸς	τοῦτον.”	–	.	5.	RC.	1.	41-46.																																																									1120	OGIS.	5.	=	RC.	1.	
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“…since	 no-one	 would	 be	 allied	 to	 him	[Polyperchon]	and	at	this	same	time	seeing	that	you	 and	 the	 allies	 were	 suffering	 from	 the	campaign	 and	 from	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 war,	 we	thought	 we	 might	 make	 an	 agreement	 and	 to	bring	 about	 an	 end	 also	 with	 this	 man	[Polyperchon]…”1121		The	 issue	within	 these	 rather	 ambiguous	 lines1122	centres	 on	 just	who	 is	 being	referred	 to	 in	 lines	 42	 (“πρὸς	αὐτόν”)	 and	46	 (“πρὸς	τοῦτον”),	 a	matter	 that	 is	further	complicated	by	the	somewhat	inelegant	language	employed	by	Antigonus	as	 noted	 by	Munro	 upon	 the	 letter’s	 discovery.1123	Nonetheless,	 if	 treated	with	due	caution	and	awareness	of	these	ambiguities,	the	letter	does	provide	valuable	evidence	 for	 the	 political	 dynamics	 of	 the	 time.	Antigonus	 has	 previously	 been	taken	 to	 reger	 to	 Ptolemy	 as	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 peace	 negotiations,	 or	 to	Polemaeus,	 the	Antigonid	 general.1124	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 Ptolemy	 is	 explicitly	referred	to	twice	within	the	letter,1125	proximity	and	context	would	suggest	that	another,	more	plausible	identity	and	one	that	has	been	largely	overlooked	for	the	person	of	whom	Antigonus	speaks.	I	suggest	that	he	is,	in	fact,	Polyperchon.1126	If	this	 alternative	 reading	 is	 taken,	 then	 Polyperchon’s	 participation	 within	 the	talks	as	well	the	way	in	which	the	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi	perceived	him	requires	a	 radical	 shift	 in	perspective	 regarding	his	prominence.	Polyperchon’s																																																									1121	See	Appendix	for	the	complete	translation	that	this	study	employs.	1122 	An	 issue	 identified	 and	 possibly	 further	 complicated	 by	 Dittenberger’s	somewhat	 unclear	 comment	 “Ptolemeum,	 non	 Polyperchonta	 intellegi	 vix	 est	
quod	 moneam.”	 (OGIS.	 p.	 18.	 n.	 16).	 The	 Latin	 is	 awkward	 but	 seems	 to	 be	intended	to	mean:	“It	is	tentatively	that	I	advise	that	Ptolemy,	not	Polyperchon,	is	
to	be	understood”.	1123 	Munro,	 JHS.	 19.	 (1899).	 p.	 337:	 “Antigonus	 writes	 a	 rough	 Macedonian	
soldier’s	Greek.”	It	must	also	be	stressed	that	αὐτῶι	in	Line	40	can	only	refer	to	Polyperchon,	 further	 emphasising	 that	 Polyperchon,	 and	 not	 Ptolemy	 is	 the	subject	 of	 this	 section	 of	 the	 passage.	 See	 Appendix	 for	 a	more	 literal	 English	translation	of	Antiognus’	writing.	1124	Hauben,	EA.	9.	(1987).	pp.	31-32.	1125	OGIS.	5.	RC.	1.	30,	50;	Hauben	EA.	9	(1987).	p.	29,	32-33;	Caroli,	2007.	pp.	55-56.	1126	cf.	OGIS.	5.	RC.	1.	40.	cf.	Welles,	1934.	p.	6,	who	pioneered	this	interpretation	of	Polyperchon;	Heckel,	1992.	p.	202.	
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involvement	moves	from	that	of	a	passive	player	within	the	peace	deliberations	to	 one	 who	 actively	 participated	 in	 the	 negotiations,	 forging	 an	 agreement	 to	maintain	the	peace	with	Europe	and	with	Cassander.		The	position	that	Lines	41-46	of	Antigonus’	letter	explicitly	refer	to	Ptolemy	was	first	argued	by	Welles,	suggesting	an	ambiguous	prior	relationship	between	the	pair	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	 person	 to	 whom	 the	 reference	 is	 made	 is	 Soter	himself. 1127 	This	 prior	 relationship	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 some	 academic	evaluation.	 It	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 the	 prior	 relationship	 referred	 to	 by	Antigonus	 is	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 Antigonid	 and	 Ptolemaic	 families	 via	the	Antipatrid	family.1128	Following	the	First	War	of	the	Diadochoi,	Antipater	had	embarked	 upon	 a	 series	 of	 politically	 motivated	 marriage	 alliances	 between	eminent	 families	within	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	 and	 his	 own.1129	One	 of	 these	marriages	 was	 between	 Ptolemy	 Soter	 and	 Antipater’s	 daughter	 Eurydice,	thereby	supplying	the	Ptolemaic	connection	proposed	by	Harding	and	by	Bagnall	and	Derow.	The	Antigonid	connection	appears	 later	with	the	marriage	between	Antigonus’	son	Demetrius	and	another	of	Antipater’s	daughters,	Phila,	the	former	wife	of	Craterus.1130	This	marriage	is	loosely	dated	to	the	period	of	time	after	the	partition	of	Triparadisus	in	320.1131		The	 historicity	 of	 the	 marriages	 is	 not	 in	 doubt,	 however	 their	 political	prominence	 in	 late	 311	may	 be	 exaggerated.	 Certainly	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that	there	did	exist	 a	measure	of	 affection	between	 the	 two	daughters	of	Antipater,																																																									1127	Welles,	 1934.	 p.	 10.	 Which	 was	 subsequently	 accepted	 and	 built	 upon.	Harding	(1985).	p.	132.	n.	14)	and	Bagnall	&	Derow	(2004)	p.	10.),	both	suggest	this	is	possibly	an	allusion	to	the	marriages	between	Soter	and	Poliorcetes	and	Antipater’s	 daughters;	 cf.	 Hauben,	 EA.	9.	 (1987).	 pp.	 32-33.	 Certainly	 there	 is	nothing	 to	 preclude	 such	 an	 arrangement,	 as	 Cassander	 may	 have	 used	 the	marriages	of	his	sisters	to	form	his	own	alliances	with	Lysimachus	and	Ptolemy	in	319	(cf.	Ch.		6.1).	1128	Harding,	1985.	132.	n.	14;	Bagnall	&	Derow,	2004.	p.	10.	Both	Billows	(1990.	p.	132)	and	Heckel	(1992.	p.	203)	use	the	reference	in	the	letter	as	support	for	Polyperchon’s	absence	from	the	peace	negotiations.	1129	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	pp.	135-136.	1130	cf.	Ch.	5.2.	p.	136.	1131	cf.	 Diod.	 19.59.	 which	 places	 Phila	 in	 the	 east;	 Plut.	Demtr.	 14;	 Wheatley,	1997.	p.	37;	Carney,	2000.	p.	165.	
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which	 may	 have	 eased	 communication	 between	 the	 Antigonid	 and	 Ptolemaic	families.	 Unfortunately	 the	 roughness	 of	 Antigonus’	 Greek	 does	 little	 to	 clarify	the	matter.1132	It	is	feasible,	although	curious,	that	Antigonus	was	alluding	to	the	marriage	between	his	son	to	Phila	and	Ptolemy’s	Antipatrid	wife,	Eurydice	as	the	relationship	 in	 the	 surviving	 letter	 to	 Scepsis.	 Reminding	 the	 empire	 of	 the	connection	 between	 the	 families	 could	 fulfil	 a	 political	 desire	 in	 the	 highly	propagandistic	 letter	 to	 affect	 an	 easier	 transition	 to	 peace	 within	 both	 the	Antigonid	and	Ptolemaic	spheres	of	influence.	However,	when	placed	within	the	context	of	the	letter,	the	proximity	to	Polyperchon’s	location	in	the	letter	and	the	greater	historical	context	would	suggest,	as	Lenschau	has	identified,1133	that	this	prior	 relationship	 to	 which	 Antigonus	 refers,	 may	 instead	 be	 the	 alliance	between	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon.	This	 reading	 in	no	way	 impacts	upon	 the	connection	 between	 the	 Antigonid	 and	 Ptolemaic	 Houses	 and	 still	 provides	 a	more	 fitting	 account	of	Polyperchon’s	 fate	 in	311.	 It	must	be	 remembered	 that	Antigonus	 was	 supporting	 Polyperchon’s	 cause	 against	 Cassander	 both	financially	and	militarily	up	until	the	days	immediately	prior	to	the	initiations	of	peace	negotiations	and	the	reference	to	peace	also	being	made	with	Polyperchon	would	provide	an	explanation	 to	Antigonus’	 support	base	of	what	had	come	of	their	expenditure	 in	Greece	against	Cassander’s	hold	on	Macedon	now	that	 the	war	had	been	brought	to	an	end.1134		Both	 interpretations,	 for	 either	 Ptolemy	 or	 Polyperchon,	 require	 greater	historical	 context	 to	 attempt	 an	 identification	 as	 to	 whom	 Antigonus	 refers.	However,	 there	 is	 little	evidence	specifically	 in	Lines	41-46	that	would	 lead	the	reader	 to	 reject	 the	 understanding	 that	 the	 person	 under	 discussion	 is	Polyperchon,	 rather	 than	Ptolemy.	The	 reading	of	Polyperchon	would	appear	a	more	 likely	 option	 given	 the	 prominent	 support	 he	 received	 from	 Antigonus	throughout	 the	Third	War	of	 the	Diadochoi	over	an	extended	marriage	alliance	between	opposing	 factions	and	does	not	put	 into	 jeopardy	 the	existence	of	 the																																																									1132	Nor	 does	 Hauben’s	 insightful	 investigation	 (EA.	9	 (1987).	 pp.	 29-36),	who	only	notes	Polyperchon’s	presence	within	 the	names	 recorded	 in	 the	 latter	 (p.	29).	1133	Lenschau,	RE.	1805.	1134	See	below.	
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relationship	between	Ptolemy	and	Antigonus,	as	this	is	evident	in	other	parts	of	the	 letter.1135		So	with	 this	alternative	reading	of	Antigonus’	Scepsis	 letter,	how	does	 the	 perception	 of	 Polyperchon	 change	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	311?	 Lines	 44-45	 state	 that	 Antigonus	 had	 been	 funneling	 support	 to	Polyperchon’s	 position	within	 the	 Peloponnese	 from	 Scepsis	 and	 “other	allies,”	presumably	other	cities	within	Anatoila,	in	order	for	Polyperchon	to	continue	the	war	effort	against	Cassander.	In	order	to	end	the	hostilities	in	Greece	and	relieve	the	pressure	that	had	been	exerted	upon	Scepsis,	both	Antigonus	and	the	other	members	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 deemed	 it	 necessary	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement	 with	Polyperchon. 1136 	The	 exact	 nature	 of	 the	 agreement	 is	 unknown	 and	interpretation	of	the	possible	clauses	relies	heavily	upon	speculation,	however	it	may	be	possible	to	suggest	at	least	two	criteria	to	which	Polyperchon	may	have	agreed.		As	it	was	a	key	tenant	of	the	peace	itself,	Polyperchon	must	have	been	expected	to	agree	 that	peace	was	 to	be	declared	within	Greece	and	 that	 a	general	 status	
quo	be	enacted.1137	The	second	aspect	 is	 less	clear,	but	given	 the	context	of	 the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon,	it	may	have	informed	one	outcome	of	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts,	that	being	the	limitation	put	upon	Cassander’s	tenure	as	commander	 in	Europe.	Cassander’s	position	as	strategos	in	Europe	was	only	valid	until	the	time	at	which	Alexander	IV	came	of	an	age	at	which	he	could	take	an	active	role	in	the	governance	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.1138	Given	Alexander’s	age,	 Cassander’s	 official	 time	 in	 office	 could	 feasibly	 be	 limited	 to	 a	 few	 short	years,1139	offering	the	opportunity	once	against	for	an	Argead	to	hold	sway	over	Macedon.	Whether	the	meeting	Dynasts	truly	intended	that	Alexander	IV	should	ever	 hold	 the	 throne	 in	 his	 own	 right	 is	 highly	 doubtful,	 as	 this	 would																																																									1135	As	implied	by	OGIS	5.	RC.	1.	29-31.	1136	OGIS	5.	=	RC.	1.	46.	1137	This	is	indicated	by	the	agreement	of	the	dynasts	to	declare	freedom	and	autonomy	among	the	Greek	cities	(Diod.	19.105.1;	OGIS	5.	=	RC.	1.	53-56;	Dmetriev,	2011.	p.	120),	once	again,	echoing	the	offer	of	freedom	for	compliance	that	Polyperchon	has	initiated	back	in	318.	1138	Diod.	19.105.1;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	56.	1139	By	311,	Alexander	IV	would	have	been	around	the	age	of	twelve	or	thirteen.	If	his	 father	 is	used	as	an	 indication	Alexander	may	have	been	able	 to	actively	undertake	official	duties	within	as	little	as	three	years	time.	
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automatically	 invalidate	 their	 own	 holdings	 in	 the	 empire.	 What	 it	 may	 have	achieved	 was	 the	 placation	 of	 Polyperchon	 in	 the	 Peloponnese,	 who	 in	 his	support	 of	 Olympias	 had	 cast	 his	 lot	 entirely	 behind	 the	 rule	 of	 Alexander	 IV	since	abandoning	Philip	III	and	Eurydice	in	317.		A	possible	explanation	for	the	term	set	upon	Cassander’s	tenure	may	have	been	to	 secure	 Polyperchon’s	 acceptance	 of	 the	 peace	 to	 be	 installed	 in	 Greece.	 In	order	 to	 counter	 the	 loss	 of	 allies,	 as	well	 as	 the	 supplies	 provided	 to	 him	 by	Antigonus,	 limiting	 Cassander’s	 time	 as	 strategos	 with	 a	 clear	 indication	 that	Alexander	 IV	was	 to	 assume	 the	 throne	once	he	 came	of	 age	may	have	been	 a	measure	 enacted	 to	 secure	 Polyperchon’s	 willingness	 to	 maintain	 peace	 and	bring	an	end	to	the	conflict	with	Cassander.	However,	this	also	placed	a	fixed	end	to	the	short	life	of	Alexander	IV.		The	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 of	 311/10	 played	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 post-323	Macedonian	Empire.	 It	served	as	an	opportunity	 for	 the	signatories	 to	 focus	on	strengthening	their	hold	on	their	own	dominions	rather	than	the	infighting	that	had	 plagued	 the	 increasingly	 fragmenting	 integrity	 of	 the	Macedonian	 empire.	For	Cassander,	it	provided	him	with	official	recognition	of	his	position	in	Europe	as	regent	until	 the	coming	of	age	of	Alexander	 IV.	 In	doing	so	he	was	given	the	office	to	which	he	believed	he	was	entitled,	one	for	which	Antipater	had	passed	over	him	in	favour	of	Polyperchon.	Cassander	was	finally	coming	to	the	position	for	which	he	believed	he	was	most	suited	and	for	which	he	had	embarked	upon	a	war	that	lasted	nearly	a	decade.		Polyperchon’s	 position	 in	 311/10	 during	 the	 meeting	 of	 the	 dynasts	 on	 the	Hellespont	 is	 much	 less	 clear.	 Conventional	 thought	 has	 held	 that	 he	 had	remained	 languishing	 in	 the	 Peloponnese	 since	 316,	 a	 defeated	 man	 whose	ability	 and	 cause	 was	 all	 but	 destroyed.	 However,	 with	 the	 revaluation	 of	Antigonus’	 Letter	 to	 Scepsis,	 and	 its	 placement	within	 the	 historical	 context	 of	European	 events,	 this	 position	 requires	 reconsideration.	 Far	 from	 being	 the	defeated	 former	regent,	Polyperchon	and	his	cause	were	still	 receiving	military	and	financial	support	from	Antigonus	and	his	dominions	in	Anatolia	in	order	to	
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continue	 the	 war	 against	 Cassander.	 Given	 his	 steadfast	 position	 in	 the	Peloponnese,	 Polyperchon	 could	 not,	 and	 did	 not,	 go	 overlooked	 during	 the	parlay	 among	 the	 dynasts.	 Polyperchon	 was	 still	 not	 defeated,	 and	 his	capitulation	was	required	with	haste.	If	he	was	overlooked	or	ignored,	his	hostile	actions	could	easily	unsettle	the	tenuous	peace	installed	in	the	western	segments	of	 the	Macedonian	empire,	 threatening	not	only	his	 enemy	Cassander,	 but	 also	diverting	 the	 attentions	of	 his	 ally	Antigonus,	whose	 focus	was	 required	 in	 the	east	 against	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 Seleucus.	 Therefore,	 given	 the	 contents	 of	Antigonus’	 letter,	 Polyperchon	 was	 indeed	 an	 influential,	 even	 if	 absent,	participant	 in	 the	 peace	 negotiations.	While	 impossible	 to	 know,	 this	 influence	may	even	have	impacted	on	the	temporal	 limit	that	the	Diadochoi	agreed	upon,	that	 the	 time	 they	were	 to	 spend	 in	 their	 respective	 offices	would	 only	 last	 as	long	as	the	young	Alexander	IV	was	unable	to	take	an	active	role	in	the	rule	of	the	Macedonian	empire.		
8.3:	The	Aftermath	of	311	and	the	Claim	of	Herakles	
	The	 final	 section	 of	 investigation	 for	 this	 thesis	 on	 the	 conflict	 between	Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 and	 their	 struggle	 for	 supremacy	 in	 Europe	 is	devoted	 to	 the	 period	 following	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 in	 311	 until	 the	conclusion	 of	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 pair	 in	 309/8	 following	 the	murder	 of	Herakles	 by	 Polyperchon.	 During	 this	 period	 of	 time,	 a	 number	 of	 significant	events	occurred	that	highlight	the	distinctive	ways	in	which	the	two	combatants	approached	the	war	and	their	relationships	with	the	royal	family.	The	Peace	of	311	provided	a	measure	of	security	 for	both	Cassander	 in	his	seat	at	Pella	and	Polyperchon	in	his	entrenched	position	in	the	Peloponnese.	If	the	implemented	terms	 from	 the	 peace	 talks	 as	 recorded	 by	 Diodorus	 were	 upheld	 and	 saw	Alexander	IV’s	transition	onto	the	throne	in	the	coming	years,	 it	can	be	argued	that	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	would	have	ended	in	311	with	 an	 uneasy	 cessation	 of	 active	 hostilities	 between	 the	 pair.	 However	Alexander	IV’s	assumption	of	power	did	not	take	place,	and	soon	after	the	peace	was	enacted	 in	311,	Cassander	 set	 about	ensuring	 that	his	present,	 temporary	hold	 on	 the	 governance	 of	 Europe	 for	 a	 time	 until	 the	 young	 king	 reached	
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maturity,	 would	 become	 a	 more	 permanent	 office.	 While	 the	 exact	 timing	 is	uncertain,	 shortly	 after	 the	 promulgation	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 in	 311,	Cassander	ordered	 that	both	Alexander	 IV	and	his	mother	Rhoxane,	who	were	still	 imprisoned	 in	Amphipolis,	be	murdered,	 thereby	removing	any	possibility	of	 Alexander	 the	 Great’s	 son	 taking	 the	 throne	 in	 his	 own	 right	 and	 freeing	Cassander	from	the	limitations	placed	on	the	Diadochoi	by	the	peace	agreement.	The	 death	 of	 Alexander	 IV,	 the	 last	 male	 Argead	 who	 held	 direct	 links	 to	Alexander	 III,	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 of	 little	 concern	 to	 the	 members	 of	 the	Diadochoi.			While	Polyperchon’s	immediate	reaction	to	the	news	of	the	young	king’s	death	is	unrecorded,	his	next	move	was	to	resume	the	conflict	with	Cassander.	In	what	is	possibly	one	of	Polyperchon’s	most	notable	ventures,	he	facilitated	the	arrival	of	Alexander	the	Great’s	illegitimate	son	Herakles	in	Europe	from	Asia.	From	there,	he	launched	the	final	campaign	in	his	conflict	against	Cassander	in	order	to	place	a	 son	 of	 Alexander	 on	 the	 throne	 of	Macedon.	 Herakles’	 campaign	was	 short-lived	 and	 ultimately	 unsuccessful.	 Instead	 of	 risking	 another	 potentially	 risky	and	 expensive	 invasion	 in	 southern	 Greece,	 Cassander	 chose,	 as	 he	 had	 done	with	Alexander	in	314,	to	end	the	conflict	via	diplomatic	means.	This	resulted	in	both	the	death	of	Herakles	and	an	alliance	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	and	offers	an	intriguing	insight	into	the	political	environment	in	Europe	and	the	amount	of	support	available	to	the	Polyperchon-backed	campaign	of	Herakles.		The	 Peace	 of	 311	 had	 a	 number	 of	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 effects	 upon	 the	Macedonian	Empire	in	the	emerging	Hellenistic	World.	One	person	they	centred	upon	was	Alexander	IV,	who	was	elevated	back	into	prominence	in	the	political	sphere.1140	As	long	as	the	young	king	lived,	the	temporal	limitations	set	upon	the	tenure	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 would	 still	 be	 in	 effect.	 While	 this	 self-imposed	limitation	would	 initially	 seem	 counter-intuitive,	with	 the	 benefit	 of	 historical	hindsight,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 measures	 would	 assist	 in	 maintaining	 the																																																									1140	Fortina,	 1965.	 p.	 86;	 Adams,	 1975.	 pp.	 136-137;	 Billows,	 1990.	 p.	 135;	Carney,	in	Worthington,	1994.	pp.	377-379;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	56;	Errington,	2008.	p.	34;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	216.	
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integrity	 of	 the	 empire	 as	 a	 single	 entity	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 young	 king.	 It	 is	possible	that	this	temporal	limitation	may	never	have	been	intended	to	come	to	fruition	and	was	a	political	farce	that	was	merely	a	means	to	an	end.	It	may	have	been	 expected	 that	 Alexander	would	 be	 removed	 as	 a	 potential	 future	 threat,	instead	of	 taking	 the	 throne	when	he	 came	of	 age.1141	It	 is	highly	unlikely	 that	any	of	the	participants	in	the	peace	talks	of	311	held	a	genuine	interest	in	seeing	this	decree	fulfilled	and	allowing	Alexander	IV	to	take	control	of	the	empire	as	it	would	mean	that	 the	conflicts	since	323	to	establish	 their	own	bases	of	power	had	 been	 for	 naught.	 As	 Adams	 highlights,	 Alexander	 IV	 was	 a	 particular	problem	 for	Cassander	on	 the	grounds	 that	he	held	control	of	 the	Macedonian	homeland	 and	 had	 the	 young	 king	 in	 his	 custody. 1142 	Additionally,	 the	notoriously	stubborn	Polyperchon	must	have	been	a	factor	for	Cassander	when	assessing	what	was	to	be	done	with	Alexander	IV	as	Polyperchon	in	his	effort	to	maintain	his	regency	in	Macedon	had	allied	himself	to	the	royal	family	and	more	specifically	to	Alexander’s	grandmother,	Olympias	in	317.	Though	not	explicitly	recorded	as	part	of	the	peace	negotiations	as	recorded	by	Diodorus	or	contained	within	Antigonus’	letter	to	Scepsis,	it	is	possible	that	Alexander’s	death	may	have	been	informally	agreed	upon	during	the	meeting	of	the	dynasts	 in	 late	311.1143	Alternatively,	as	Diodorus	relates,	 the	murder	of	Alexander	IV	was	 in	response	to	the	young	king’s	developing	maturity,1144	while	Pausanias	ties	the	murders	to	Cassander’s	loathing	of	the	royal	Argead	family.1145	Whatever	the	case,	planned	or	not,	Alexander	IV’s	days	were	numbered	following	the	declaration	of	peace	in	the	western	empire.		Following	the	declaration	of	peace,	Cassander	sent	word	to	Glaucias,	the	man	he	had	placed	 in	Amphipolis	 to	oversee	the	young	king	and	his	mother,	 to	quietly	
																																																								1141	Adams,	1975.	p.	136;	Billows,	1990.	p.	135;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	22.	(1991).	p.	30;	Carney,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	378;	Adams,	2010.	p.	216;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19;	Anson,	2014.	p.	149.	1142	Billow,	1990.	p.	135;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	126;	Adams,	2010,	p.	216.	1143	cf.	Adams,	1975.	pp.	137-138.	1144	Diod.	19.105.2;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	22.	(1991).	p.	29.		1145	Paus.	9.7.2.	
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murder	the	pair	and	preserve	their	bodies	for	future	burial.1146	The	exact	dating	of	this	is	somewhat	unclear,	and	has	been	much	discussed.1147	All	parties	agree	that	 the	murder	of	 the	pair	 took	place	 following	 the	Peace	of	311,1148	however	what	expanse	of	time	occurred	between	these	events	has	received	a	number	of	interpretations.1149		 	 The	 year	 in	 which	 Alexander	 IV’s	 death	 took	 place	 is	divided	 into	 a	 number	 of	 schools	 of	 thought,	 each	 reliant	 upon	 one	 of	 the	 ill-defined	 references	 made	 by	 the	 ancient	 accounts.	 The	 majority	 of	 ancient	sources	 that	 record	 Alexander	 IV’s	 death	 only	 mention	 its	 occurrence	 in	passing,1150	which	 has	 in	 turn	 led,	 understandably,	 to	 less	 specific	 dating	 by	modern	 scholarship.1151	The	 only	 two	 surviving	 sources	 that	 provide	 a	 clearer	delineation	of	 time	regarding	Alexander’s	murder	are	Diodorus’	narrative,	 and	the	 Parian	Marble.1152	Diodorus’	 reference	 to	 the	murder	 locates	 it	 within	 the	period	 of	 time	 immediately	 following	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	Dynasts,	 leading	 to	 the	possibility	 that	 Cassander’s	 orders	 to	 Glaucias	 in	 Amphipolis	 took	 place	 some	time	prior	to	the	end	of	the	winter	in	311/0.1153																																																										1146	Diod.	 19.105.2;	Heidl.	 Epit.	FGrH.	 155.	 F.	 2.3;	 Just.	 15.2.5;	Marmor	Parium,	
FGrH.	239.	B.	18;	Pau.	9.7.2;	Adams,	1975.	p.	137;	Adams,	Anc.	World.	22	(1991).	pp.	 29-31;	 Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 130;	 Caroli,	 2007.	 p.	 56;	 Adams,	 in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 216;	 Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	 2011.	 pp.	235-236.	1147 	See	 for	 example:	 Adams,	 Anc.	 World.	 22.	 (1991).	 p.	 30;	 Carney,	 in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	378;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	216.	1148	Save	 for	 Hammond	 &	 Walbank	 (1988.	 p.	 165.)	 who	 follow	 a	 more	 strict	adherence	to	Justin’s	narrative	(cf.	Heckel,	1992.	p.	203.	n.	160)	1149	Adams,	 Makedonia.	 3.	 (1983).	 p.	 28;	 If	 a	 general	 agreement	 to	 murder	Alexander	was	made	by	the	Dynasts,	it	would	further	compound	the	problem	in	understanding	 the	murder	 of	 the	 royal	 pair	 and	 the	 period	 of	 time	 Cassander	was	 able	 to	 keep	 the	murders	 secret	 and	 out	 of	 the	 public	 forum.	 For	 further	discussion	regarding	this	issue,	see	below.	1150	Just.	15.2.1-3;	Paus.	9.7.2;	Heidl.	Epit.	FGrH.	155.	F.1;	App.	Syr.	54.	1151 	See	 for	 example:	 Adams,	 Anc.	 World.	 22	 (1991).	 p.	 30;	 Carney,	 in	Worthington,	 1994.	 pp.	 377-378;	 Wheatley,	 Limina.	 3.	 (1997).	 p.	 70.	 n.	 45;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19;	Adams,	in	Roisman	&	Worthington,	2010.	p.	216;	1152	Diod.	19.105.2;	Marmor	Parium,	FGrH.	239.	F.	1.	1153	Diod.	19.105.2;	Wheatley,	Antichthon	32.	 (1998).	p.	16;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	129;	A	dating	that	has	also	been	accepted	by	Adams	(1975.	p.	144.	n.1;	
Anc.	World.	22	 (1991).	 p.	 30;	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington,	 2010.	 p.	 216),	 who	accepts	 the	 murder	 of	 Alexander	 and	 Rhoxane	 took	 place	 as	 a	 direct	consequence	of	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	the	previous	year;	Heckel,	2006.	p.	19;	Errington,	2008.	p.	45.	
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The	 Parian	 Marble	 however,	 records	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 in	 the	 year	 of	310,1154	and	has	received	the	bulk	of	academic	support	over	the	last	century.1155	The	 issue	 of	 the	 notoriously	 problematic	 chronology	 of	 the	 Marble	 has	 been	noted,1156	meaning	that	supplying	a	date	for	Alexander’s	death	beyond	310	with	information	 solely	 from	 the	 Marble	 is	 difficult.	 Wheatley,	 however,	 has	thoroughly	 and	 convincingly	 argued,	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 Diodorus’	 compressed	narrative	as	well	as	the	historical	context	of	Polyperchon’s	subsequent	actions,	that	 the	 murder	 of	 Alexander	 IV	 and	 his	 mother	 Rhoxane	 may	 be	 more	appropriately	 set	 at	 a	 period	 of	 time	 between	 mid	 to	 late	 310.1157	For	 the	purposes	of	this	study,	the	exact	dating	of	Alexander	IV’s	murder	is	superseded	by	 the	 need	 to	 maintain	 a	 coherent	 sequence	 of	 events,	 specifically	 that	Cassander’s	 orders	 to	 Glaucias,	 and	 the	 murder	 of	 the	 royal	 pair	 predates	Polyperchon’s	final	campaign	with	Herakles	against	Cassander.		From	 Diodorus’	 account,	 it	 can	 be	 inferred	 that	 Cassander	 had	 maintained	correspondences	 with	 Lysimachus,	 Ptolemy	 and	 Antigonus	 regarding	 the	removal	 of	 Alexander	 IV.1158	However,	 if	 this	 was	 not	 the	 case	 and	 Cassander	had	 acted	 independently,	 without	 the	 consent	 or	 knowledge	 of	 the	 other	members	of	the	Diadochoi,	the	result	was	much	the	same.	Instead	of	receiving	a	negative	 reaction	 from	 the	 other	 dynasts	 or	 raising	 the	 ire	 of	 the	 greater	population	within	 Europe,	 the	 death	 of	 Alexander	 IV,	 the	 last	 legitimate	male	member	 of	 the	 Argead	 family	 and	 a	 sitting	 king	 of	 Macedon,	 along	 with	 his	mother,	seems	to	have	been	met	more	with	relief	than	tension.1159	With	the	last	Argead	 king	 of	Macedon	 gone,	 the	 various	 offices	 held	 by	 the	Diadochoi	were	liberated	 from	 the	 temporal	 limitations	 set	 upon	 them	 by	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	Dynasts.	 Now	 it	 was	 possible	 for	 them	 to	 build	 further	 upon	 their	 individual																																																									1154	Marmor	Parium,	FGrH.	239.	B.	18.	1155	See	for	example:	Beloch,	IV1	1924.	p.	138;	Wheatley,	1997.	p.	137;	Wheatley,	
Anticthon.	32	(1998).	p.	14.	n.	13;	Caroli,	2007.	p.	56.	1156	cf.	Wheatley,	Anticthon.	32	(1998).	p.	15.	n.	15.	1157	For	 a	 full	 discussion,	 see:	Wheatley,	Anticthon.	32	 (1998).	 pp.	 14-19.	 Note	that	Wheatley	does	suggest	the	murders	could	feasibly	have	taken	place	as	late	as	309.	1158	Diod.	19.105.3.	1159	Billows,	1990.	p.	135.	
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powerbases,	as	well	as	to	place	their	monarchical	aspirations	into	effect	without	contending	with	the	Macedonian	Royal	House.		Word	 of	 Alexander	 IV’s	 death	 spread	 slowly	 and	 certainly	 not	 on	 the	 scale	 or	with	 the	 rapidity	 that	 news	 of	 his	 father’s	 death	 had	 spread	 in	 323.	 One	 key	reason	 for	 this	was	 the	 secretive	 nature	 of	 the	 royals’	 deaths	 and	Cassander’s	ability	to	restrict	the	release	of	information.	His	control	of	information	may	also	explain	 the	 relatively	 vague	 indications	 in	our	 sources	 regarding	 the	 timing	of	the	murders.	This	seems	to	have	been	especially	so	in	the	eastern	extremities	of	the	Macedonian	Empire,	where	Alexander	IV	would	continue	to	hold	regal	status	in	 the	 years	 after	 his	 death.1160		 In	 Diodorus’	 case,	 it	 may	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	greater	 compression	 of	 his	 narrative	 following	 the	 promulgation	 of	 the	 peace	treaty	 in	 311.	 Considering	 the	 supposed	 involvement	 of	 his	 family	 in	 the	assassination	 plot	 to	 murder	 Alexander	 the	 Great	 in	 323, 1161 	as	 well	 as	Antigonus’	successful	propaganda	campaign	against	him	following	the	execution	of	 Olympias	 in	 316,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 Cassander	would	 attempt	 to	 keep	 the	death	of	the	king	of	Macedon	secret	and	control	the	way	in	which	the	empire	as	a	 whole	 would	 learn	 that	 the	 king	 was	 dead	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 inciting	unnecessary	political	backlash.		In	apposition	to	his	father’s	death,	news	of	which	raced	through	the	empire,	and	whether	or	not	it	was	designed	to	do,	 it	appears	that	Alexander	IV’s	death	was	known	within	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	Macedonian	 Empire	 in	 the	months	following.	While	his	reaction	is	not	known,	nor	when	exactly	he	received	word	that	Alexander	was	indeed	dead,	the	preparations	made	by	Polyperchon	for	his	next	 and	 final	 manoeuvre	 against	 Cassander	 would	 suggest	 that	 it	 was	 in	reaction	to	the	vacancy	of	the	Macedonian	Throne	rather	than	as	a	precursor	to	it.		Following	Alexander’s	death,	Polyperchon	sent	word	to	the	city	of	Pergamon,	
																																																								1160	Adams,	Anc.	World.	22	(1991).	p.	30;	Wheatley,	Anticthon.	32.	(1998).	p.	17.	n.	 23;	 Boiy,	 ZPE.	 138.	 (2002).	 pp.	 250-251,	 254;	 Boiy,	 in	 Alonso	 Troncoso	 &	Anson,	2013.	pp.	7-8;	For	an	in-depth	evaluation	of	the	respective	records	in	the	east,	see	Boiy,	2007.	pp.	84-89.	1161	cf.	Ch.	4.	
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where	 the	 illegitimate	 son	 of	 Alexander	 the	 Great,	 Herakles,	 resided. 1162	Polyperchon’s	 aim	 was	 to	 facilitate	 Herakles’	 passage	 from	 western	 Anatolia	over	the	Aegean	to	the	Peloponnese,	from	where	he	could	lead	a	campaign	north	to	 reinstall	 an	 Argead	 on	 the	 Throne	 of	 Macedon.	 The	 question	 of	 Herakles’	parentage	and	the	legitimacy	of	his	connection	to	Alexander	the	Great	is	not	the	focus	of	 this	 investigation.1163	Clearly	Herakles	did	not	have	enough	support	 to	claim	the	 throne	 in	323	during	 the	deliberations	of	 the	Partition	of	Babylon	 in	the	wake	of	his	father’s	death.	However	by	310	and	with	a	radically	diminished	royal	 family,	as	the	 last	surviving	male	member	of	the	Argead	family,	his	claim	could	possibly	gain	greater	traction	within	Europe	with	royal	sympathisers	than	would	have	been	possible	while	Alexander	IV	was	alive.	Polyperchon	may	have	been	able	to	expedite	Herakles	on	his	own,	yet	as	has	been	previously	suggested,	it	 is	 likely	 that	 Antigonus	was	 aware	 of	 the	 young	 pretender’s	movements	 as	well	 as	 Polyperchon’s	 motives	 for	 bringing	 him	 west.1164	However,	 it	 would	appear	 that	 Monophthalmus’	 support	 was	 not	 explicit,	 remaining	 tacit	throughout	 the	 campaign,	 as	 any	open	 support	 of	Polyperchon’s	 efforts	would	place	the	peace	terms	at	jeopardy	risking	a	resumption	of	hostilities	in	the	west.	It	 seems	 more	 likely,	 that	 his	 support	 was	 designed	 to	 occupy	 Cassander’s	attentions	 away	 from	 any	 possible	 action	 against	 the	 Antigonid	 sphere	 of	influence.		Herakles	was	not	the	only	focus	of	Polyperchon’s	preparations.	Diodorus	relates	that,	 while	 central	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 efforts	 to	 install	 another	 member	 of	 the	royal	 house,	 Polyperchon’s	 support	 for	 Herakles	was	 part	 of	 a	more	 dynamic	plan	to	remove	Cassander	from	his	position	in	Macedon.	In	addition	to	securing																																																									1162	Diod.	 20.20.1-2;	 Fortina,	 1965.	 pp.	 87-88;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 145;	 Billows,	1990.	 p.	 140;	 Heckel,	 1992.	 p.	 203;	 Wheatley,	 Antichthon.	 32.	 (1998).	 p.	 12;	Landucci	 Gattinoni,	 2003.	 p.	 128;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 138;	 Adams,	 in	 Roisman	 &	Worthington.	2010.	p.	216;	Anson,	2014.	p.	150;	cf.	Howe,	in	Alonso	Troncoso	&	Anson,	2013.	p.	58.	1163	For	discussion	on	this	topic,	see:	Tarn,	JHS.	41.	(1921).	pp.	22-25;	Berve,	Vol.	II,	 1926.	 p.	 168;	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 145;	 Brunt,	 RFIC.	 103.	 (1975).	 pp.	 22-34;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	128.	n.	204.	1164	Adams,	1975.	p.	145;	Billows,	1990.	p.140;	Wheatley,	Antichthon	32.	(1998).	pp.	14-15;	Anson	(2014.	p.	150.)	suggests	that	Herakles	may	have	arrived	in	the	Peloponnese	by	the	Autumn	of	310;	Carney,	Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	pp.18-19.	
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Herakles,	Polyperchon	also	made	contact	with	disaffected	groups	within	Greece,	most	 notably	 the	Aetolian	 League,	 and	was	 able	 to	 secure	 significant	 financial	and	 military	 aid. 1165 	The	 amount	 of	 time	 Polyperchon	 spent	 planning	 the	invasion	 is	 unknown.	 Given	 what	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 Diodorus’	 narrative	regarding	Polyperchon’s	efforts,	it	can	be	inferred	that	the	campaign	in	support	of	 Herakles	 was	 long	 in	 the	 making,	 rather	 than	 a	 hastily	 implemented	venture. 1166 	Once	 completed,	 Polyperchon	 had	 been	 able	 to	 accumulate	substantial	forces	for	the	journey	north,	numbering	in	excess	of	20,000	infantry	and	over	1,000	cavalry	troops.1167	In	309,	far	from	being	the	defeated,	 isolated,	aging	 statesman	 languishing	 in	 the	Peloponnese,	 Polyperchon	was	 still	 able	 to	present	a	real	threat	that	Cassander	would	not	be	able	to	ignore.1168		Once	 ready,	 Polyperchon,	 Herakles	 and	 their	 army	 departed	 north	 from	 the	Peloponnese.	 The	 dating	 of	 this	 embarkation,	 as	 with	 most	 of	 Polyperchon’s	movements	 during	 this	 time,	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain.	 Though	 the	 majority	 of	scholars	place	the	campaign	in	the	year	of	309,1169	Wheatley	has	argued	that	the	campaign	could	just	as	feasibly	be	inserted	into	the	following	year	of	308.1170	As	previously	 stated	 for	 the	 goals	 of	 this	 study,	 the	 sequence	 of	 events	 are	more	important	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 struggle	 between	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon	 than	 providing	 a	 definitive	 chronology	 for	 this	 period	 of	 time.	Instead	 of	 marching	 directly	 into	 Macedon	 itself,	 Polyperchon	 marched	 his	troops	 to	 Epirus. 1171 	As	 well	 as	 being	 a	 difficult	 region	 within	 which	 for	Cassander	 to	 implement	 his	 authority,	 the	 detour	 into	 the	 homeland	 of	 his	former	ally	Olympias	may	have	allowed	Polyperchon	to	add	more	support	to	his	already	 substantial	 forces	 before	 entering	 into	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland.																																																									1165	Diod.	20.20.1-4.	1166	Diod.	20.20.1:	“	Ἅμα	δὲ	τούτοις	πραττομένοις	Πολυπέρχων	διατρίβων.”	1167	Diod.	20.20.4.	1168	Carney,	 in	 Worthington,	 1994.	 p.	 378;	 Heckel,	 2006.	 p.	 230;	 Carney,	 Syll.	
Class.	25	(2014).	p.	19.	1169	Carney,	in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	378;	Wheatley,	Anticthon	32.	(1998).	p.	12,	especially	 n.	 5	 for	 further	 bibliography;	 Dixon,	 in	 Heckel,	 Tritle	 &	 Wheatley,	2007.	p.	173;	Paschidis,	Tekmaria.	9.	(2008).	p.	246;	Adams,	2010.	p.	216.	1170	Wheatley,	Anticthon	32.	 (1998).	 p.	 23:	 “Chronographically,	 there	 is	 nothing	
whatever	to	preclude	either	309	or	308	as	the	year	for	this	event.”	1171	Diod.	20.28.1.	
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Cassander	 was	 clearly	 worried	 that	 his	 own	 troops	 may	 desert	 to	 Herakles’	cause,	 reminiscent	of	Olympias’	 return	 to	Macedon	and	her	confrontation	with	the	 forces	 led	 by	 Eurydice	 and	 Philip	 III	 in	 317.1172	This	 concern	 could	 easily	extend	to	the	garrisons	Cassander	had	placed	within	the	region	as	well	as	to	the	Epirote	 population,	 whose	 support	 would	 not	 be	 difficult	 for	 Polyperchon	 to	gain.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 20,000	 men	 who	 left	 the	 Peloponnese	 with	Polyperchon	may	have	been	comprised	of	an	Epirote	contingent	originally	from	the	troops	Polyperchon	absorbed	on	his	escape	south	after	Olympias’	execution	in	early	316.		The	prospect	of	 leaving	Polyperchon	and	Herakles	unmolested,	 free	to	venture	into	the	heart	of	his	support	base	at	will,	would	not	have	been	an	appealing	one	for	 Cassander.	 Therefore,	 in	 response	 to	 his	 rival’s	 movements	 into	neighbouring	Epirus,	Cassander	too	moved	his	own	army	into	the	region.	With	both	armies	camped	near	Stymphaea,1173	the	stage	was	set	for	a	hostile	military	confrontation	 between	 the	 old	 rivals.	 However,	 as	 with	 Cassander’s	 previous	invasion	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 in	 315	 at	 the	 siege	 of	 Messenia,1174	no	 action	 is	recorded	 to	 have	 taken	 place	 between	 the	 pair.	 Instead,	 Cassander	 is	 said	 to	have	 sent	 emissaries	 to	 Polyperchon’s	 camp	 in	 hope	 of	 reaching	 a	 diplomatic	resolution,	 not	 just	 for	 the	 immediate	 action	 at	 hand,	 but	 for	 a	 permanent	cessation	of	hostilities.	Previously	Polyperchon	had	demonstrated	little	interest	in	 opening	 a	 dialogue	 with	 Cassander,	 as	 exemplified	 by	 the	 rejection	 of	Cassander’s	overtures	 to	abandon	 the	newly	 forged	alliance	with	Antigonus	 in	314,	but	by	the	time	of	the	Herakles	Campaign,	Polyperchon	was	more	amenable	to	a	dialogue	taking	place.		The	amount	of	 the	 time	 that	 the	negotiations	 took	 is	unknown,	however	given	Diodorus’	 account,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 there	 were	 multiple	 phases	 to	 the	dialogue.	Curiously,	a	point	raised	by	Diodorus	during	Cassander’s	negotiations	with	 Polyperchon	 was	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 dissuade	 his	 rival	 from	 continuing	 to																																																									1172	cf.	Ch.	7.2.	1173	Diod.	20.28.1;	Talbert,	1985.	p.	62.	B2	1174	cf.	Ch.	8.1.	p.	250.	
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support	Herakles,	 Polyperchon	would	not	 be	 able	 to	 rule	 in	 his	 own	 right	 but	that	he	would	be	ordered	by	others.1175	It	is	doubtful	that	these	‘others’	to	whom	Cassander	referred	applied	to	Herakles	himself,	as	Polyperchon	must	have	been	aware	that,	if	he	were	to	place	the	young	claimant	on	the	throne	of	Macedon,	he	would	surely	be	under	the	direction	of	the	young	king’s	authority.1176	It	is	more	likely	that	Cassander	was	referring	to	outside	political	influences	that	could	have	been	brought	 to	bear	against	Polyperchon	and	the	new	king	of	Macedon,	most	likely	in	reference	to	the	seemingly	ever-present	influence	of	Antigonus	in	Greek	politics	during	the	time.1177	It	appears	though	that	this	offer	was	not	enough	to	dissuade	Polyperchon	 from	his	mission	 to	 install	Herakles,	 as	 the	negotiations	between	 the	 pair	 would	 continue.	 While	 Antigonus	 was	 seemingly	 willing	 to	outwardly	 abandon	 the	 alliance	 with	 Polyperchon	 during	 the	 Peace	 of	 311,	Polyperchon,	as	in	314,	seems	to	have	continued	to	maintain	any	formally	held	agreement	 he	 had	 made	 with	 Monophthalmus.	 With	 this	 point	 apparently	stalled,	 Cassander	went	 on	 to	make	more	 generous	 offers	 and	 concessions	 to	Polyperchon.	 As	 Diodorus	 relays,	 Polyperchon	 would	 receive	 what	 had	 been	previously	 his	 within	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland.1178	In	 addition	 to	 this,	 and	possibly	 as	 an	 admission	 of	 his	 inability	 to	 extricate	 Polyperchon	 from	 his	entrenched	 position	 within	 the	 Peloponnese	 via	 military	 means,	 Cassander																																																									1175	Diod.	20.28.2.	1176	Herakles	 was	 around	 the	 age	 of	 seventeen	 or	 eighteen	 by	 309/8	 (Just.	15.2.3:	who	cites	Herakles’	age	as	fourteen,	possibly	in	confusion	with	Alexander	IV	 (cf.	 Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 147.	 n.	 4;	Wheatley,	Antichthon.	 32.	 (1998).	 pp.	 18-19;	Anson,	 2014.	 p.	 150);	 Diod.	 20.20.1-2).	 As	 Develin	 notes:	 “…the	 fourteenth	
birthday	is	symbolic	of	reaching	manhood,	Herakles	at	the	time	of	his	death	in	309	
seventeen	or	eighteen	years	old.”	Yardley	&	Develin,	1994.	p.	139.	n.4.	This	would	mean	that	Herakles	would	have	begun	to	transition	from	a	passive	regal	position	into	a	more	active	participant	in	the	governance	of	Macedon.	cf.	Errington,	2008.	p.	34.	1177	Tarn,	 JHS.	 41	 (1921).	 p.	 22;	Adams,	 1975.	 p.	 145;	 Billows,	 1990.	 p.	 140;	Anson,	2014.	pp.	150-151;	Though	Carney	(Syll.	Class.	25.	(2014).	p.	19.)	rejects	this	notion	on	 the	grounds	 that	both	Antigonus	and	Polyperchon	had	expelled	too	much	an	effort	 to	 facilitate	Herakles’	 claim	 to	 simply	abandon	 the	venture	before	 it	 began.	 As	 Carney	 plausibly	 identifies,	 it	 would	 appear	 likely	 that	Polyperchon	and	Herakles	may	have	already	begun	their	campaign	north	at	the	time	that	Cassander’s	offer	to	end	the	hostilities	reached	Polyperchon’s	camp.	1178	Diod.	20.28.2;	Adams	(1975.	p.	147)	correctly	identifies	that	this	must	refer	to	 Polyperchon’s	 estate,	 which	 was	 likely	 confiscated	 following	 Polyperchon’s	flight	from	Macedon	during	Cassander’s	successful	invasion	in	316	(cf.	Ch.	7.2).	
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chose	 instead	 to	 nullify	 this	 threat	 and	 simultaneously	 incorporate	 the	 region	into	 his	 sphere	 of	 influence	 via	 diplomatic	 efforts.	 Should	Polyperchon	 accept,	Cassander	would	promote	him	to	the	position	of	strategos	of	the	Peloponnese	on	Cassander’s	behalf,	and	he	would	be	provided	with	additional	military	resources	to	compliment	his	own	strength.1179	Polyperchon’s	concessions	were	simple.	He	was	 to	 murder	 Herakles	 and	 along	 with	 him	 the	 threat	 posed	 to	 Cassander’s	hold	 on	Macedon,	 abandon	 the	 campaign	 that	 he	 led	 and	 join	with	Cassander,	thereby	 bringing	 the	 conflict	 to	 an	 end, 1180 	terms	 that	 Polyperchon	 duly	accepted.1181		Polyperchon’s	motivations	 for	openly	 joining	with	Cassander	by	 the	murder	of	Herakles	 are	 difficult	 to	 ascertain.	 Certainly	 as	 a	 long	 time	 supporter	 of	 the	Argead	House	with	which	he	closely	allied	himself	throughout	the	conflict	with	Cassander,	the	murder	of	the	last	male	member	of	the	family	does	appear	to	run	in	stark	contrast	 to	 the	standard	model	of	Polyperchon’s	modus	operandi	 since	319.	Diodorus	simply	suggests	 that	he	was	won	over	by	 the	many	promises	of	Cassander	 and	 that	 this	 was	 what	 brought	 an	 end	 to	 the	 conflict.1182	This	assessment	 however	 appears	 overly	 simplistic.	 It	 is	 far	 more	 likely	 that	Polyperchon’s	acceptance	of	Cassander’s	overtures	was	the	result	of	a	number	of	factors.	Being	aged	in	his	seventies	by	309/8,	Polyperchon	may	have	wished	to	retire	 from	active	military	 life.1183	The	possibility	 too	that	Antigonus	wished	to	supplant	Polyperchon’s	 authority	 in	Europe	may	have	 struck	a	 chord	with	 the	aging	statesman,	or	that	a	successful	installation	of	Herakles	as	ruler	of	Macedon	would	merely	result	in	a	perpetuation	of	hostilities	that	would	see	more	years	of																																																									1179	Diod.	 20.28.2-4:	 These	military	 resources	 comprised	 of	 4,000	Macedonian	foot	troops	and	five	hundred	Thessalian	cavalry.	1180	Diod.	20.28.2-3;	Just.	15.2.3;	cf.	Harding,	1985.	p.	167.	n.	13;	Billows,	1990.	p.	142;	Wheatley,	Antichthon.	32.	 (1998).	p.	12;	Landucci	Gattinoni,	2003.	p.	129;	Yardley,	Wheatley	&	Heckel,	2011.	p.	237.	1181 	As	 Paschidis	 has	 identified,	 with	 the	 acceptance	 of	 Cassander’s	 offer,	Polyperchon	disappears	from	the	ancient	sources	(Tekmeria.	9	(2008).	p.	246).	1182	Diod.	20.28.2-3;	A	position	that	is	supported	by	Carney,	who	makes	pains	to	emphasize	 Polyperchon’s	 gullibility	 and	 ineptitude	 as	 a	 political	 leader	 (in	Worthington,	1994.	p.	378.).	1183	As	 has	 been	 previously	 suggested	 by	 Beloch	 for	 Alexander’s	 defection	 to	Cassander’s	cause	in	314	(Beloch,	IV2	1924.	p.	443;	cf.	Ch.	8.1).	
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conflict	 in	 an	 already	 war-weary	 Europe, 1184 	may	 have	 weighed	 on	Polyperchon’s	 mind.	 Given	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts,	Polyperchon	 would	 have	 little	 expectation	 of	 being	 able	 to	 draw	 on	 open	support	from	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi	and,	save	for	the	Aetolian	League,	many	 sympathetic	 groups	 in	 Europe	 may	 not	 have	 wished	 to	 jeopardize	 the	tentative	 peaceful	 status-quo	 which	 appears	 to	 have	 resulted	 from	 the	 peace	talks.	 Polyperchon	 may	 have	 accepted	 Herakles’	 death	 on	 these,	 purely	pragmatic	grounds,	which,	if	carried	out,	would	secure	his	life	and	recognise	his	position	in	both	Macedon	and	the	Peloponnese.	While	it	is	impossible	to	be	sure	of	 Polyperchon’s	 motivations,	 it	 appears	 that	 he	 was	 not	 operating	 from	 a	subordinate,	 inept	 position,1185	but	 from	 one	 of	 strength	 and	 influence	 with	which	Cassander	had	to	contend	when	proposing	an	end	to	the	rivalry.	What	is	known	 is	 that,	 with	 Herakles’	 death,	 Cassander	 was	 now	 without	 a	 direct	challenge	to	his	position	in	Macedon	and	that	he	possessed	a	new,	powerful	ally	in	the	Peloponnese	in	Polyperchon.		This	final	section	of	 investigation	was	devoted	to	the	final	phase	of	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon,	 following	the	deaths	of	Alexander	IV	and	Rhoxane	 until	 the	 appointment	 of	 Polyperchon	 as	 Cassander’s	 general	 in	 the	Peloponnese	 by	 308,	 following	 Polyperchon’s	 murder	 of	 Herakles.	 While	 the	death	of	Alexander	IV	and	his	mother	shortly	after	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	may	have	aided	in	further	securing	Cassander’s	hold	over	the	Macedonian	homeland,	it	 jeopardised	 the	 peaceful	 status	 quo	 that	 the	meeting	 at	 the	 Hellespont	 had	been	 able	 to	 secure.	 Despite	 efforts	 to	 maintain	 these	 deaths	 as	 secret,	Polyperchon	 had	 used	 his	 connection	 to	 Antigonus	 to	 secure	 the	 arrival	 of	Alexander	 III’s	 illegitimate	 son	Herakles,	 following	which	 in	309	 the	 long	 time	royal	 supporter	 used	 the	 last	 living	 son	 of	 Alexander	 III	 along	with	 his	 Greek	allies	to	once	again	threaten	Cassander’s	position	in	the	north.	A	long,	protracted	conflict	 was	 not	 in	 Cassander’s	 interest,	 so	 measures	 to	 facilitate	 diplomatic	negotiations	 were	 initiated	 and	 accepted.	 While	 the	 length	 of	 time	 that	 the	negotiations	 took	 is	 not	 certain,	 the	 results	 are.	 Polyperchon	 was	 to	 become																																																									1184	cf.	Adams,	1975.	p.	146.	1185	cf.	Appendix	1.	pp.	297-300.	
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Cassander’s	commander	in	the	Peloponnese	if	he	murdered	the	young	Herakles,	the	 last	 royal	 who	 could	 threaten	 Cassander’s	 legitimacy	 to	 rule	 in	 Macedon.	While	 Diodorus’s	 simplistic	 evaluation	 of	 Polyperchon’s	motivation	 to	murder	Herakles	 as	 being	 little	 more	 than	 response	 to	 the	 bribery	 offered	 by	 the	scheming	Cassander,	a	more	multifaceted	explanation	is	available.	Given	his	lack	of	previous	success	in	extracting	Polyperchon	from	his	hold	in	the	Peloponnese	despite	 numerous	 unsuccessful	 military	 actions,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 expedite	 the	cessation	 of	 hostilities,	 Cassander	 was	 required	 to	 provide	 Polyperchon	 with	various	successions,	not	to	deceive	Polyperchon,	but	out	of	sheer	necessity.	For	Polyperchon,	 the	position	offered	 to	him	afforded	allowed	a	convenient	end	to	the	decade	long	war	against	Cassander,	along	with	a	position	of	influence	in	the	south	and	the	retainment	of	his	property	within	Europe.		This	chapter	of	the	investigation	has	covered	the	final	stages	of	both	military	and	political	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon.	 Following	 Cassander’s	successful	 conquest	of	Macedon	and	 the	 initiation	of	his	 strategy	 to	 secure	his	control	of	the	region,	tensions	were	emerging	among	Antigonus	Monophthalmus	and	 the	other	 allies,	 including	Cassander.	By	315,	Antigonus	had	broken	away	from	 the	 allies	 and	 importantly	 for	 this	 study,	 levelled	 accusations	 against	Cassander	 of	 monarchical	 intend	 based	 upon	 his	 methods	 to	 secure	 the	homeland,	 precluding	 the	outbreak	of	 the	Third	War	of	 the	Diadochoi.	 This	 in	turn	 resulted	 in	Antigonus	 forsaking	his	 alliance	 to	Cassander	 and	 shifting	his	focus	to	support	Cassander’s	greatest	opponent	in	Europe,	Polyperchon.	Despite	his	flight	from	Macedon	in	316,	Polyperchon	was	still	a	real	threat	to	Cassadrean	interests	in	Greece,	especially	following	the	alliance	that	Polyperchon	had	been	able	 to	 forge	 with	 Antigonus.	 After	 numerous	 failed	 attempts	 to	 expel	Polyperchon	 and	 his	 supporters	 from	 the	 Peloponnese,	 Cassander	 knew	 he	could	 not	 defeat	 Polyperchon	 simply	 through	military	 strength,	 and	 therefore,	tried	 to	 break	 the	 threat	 posed	 to	 him	 via	 alternative	 means.	 Shortly	 after	Alexander’s	 return	 from	 Tyre	 in	 314,	 Cassander	 attempted	 to	 lure	 first	Polyperchon,	 and	 then	 his	 son	 Alexander	 over	 to	 his	 cause.	 Though	 he	 was	unsuccessful	with	 the	 father,	 he	was	not	with	 the	 son,	 and	Cassander	 secured	
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Alexander’s	defection	early	 in	the	conflict	of	 the	Third	War	of	the	Diadochoi	 in	Europe.		Alexander’s	time	with	Cassander	following	his	defection	was	short,	as	he	died	at	the	hands	of	the	Sicyean,	Alexion	in	314.	While	the	loss	of	his	son,	and	the	forces	he	 commanded	 was	 a	 blow	 to	 Polyperchon,	 Alexander’s	 widow,	 Cratesipolis,	soon	 returned	 the	 troop	 formerly	 under	 her	 husband’s	 command	 to	Polyperchon.	 From	here,	 little	 is	 known	about	Polyperchon’s	movements	until	the	promulgation	of	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	at	the	Hellespont	in	the	winter	of	311/10.		During	the	negotiations,	Cassander	was	able	to	secure	the	office	he	had	desired	since	 the	 death	 of	 his	 father	 Antipater	 in	 319,	 the	 recognised	 position	 of	
strategos	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	 stead	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 king,	 Alexander	 IV.	Polyperchon’s	participation	 is	 less	well	defined,	but	 it	 is	 clear	 from	Antigonus’	letter	 to	 the	 Troad	 city	 of	 Scepsis	 that	 he	 was	 discussed	 during	 the	 meeting.	While	it	appears	likely	that	neither	Polyperchon,	nor	his	representatives	were	in	attendance	at	the	Hellespont,	he	was	not	a	passive,	impotent	factor	that	required	no	attention.	While	the	western	members	of	 the	Diadochoi	were	able	to	 install	an	 uneasy	 peace,	 Polyperchon	 was	 a	 man	 who,	 in	 his	 position	 in	 southern	Greece,	could	easily	jeopardise	the	cessation	of	hostilities	if	he	did	not	receive	a	favourable	outcome.	The	peace	declared	in	Europe	would	allow	Polyperchon	to	maintain	his	holdings	in	the	Peloponnese,	but	it	is	possible	that	his	long	support	of	the	Olympian	faction	of	the	Argead	family	may	even	have	been	a	factor	in	the	temporal	 limitation	 placed	 on	 the	 meeting	 Dynasts’	 offices	 to	 the	 time	 that	Alexander	IV	came	into	adulthood.	Whether	or	not	Polyperchon	was	the	cause	of	the	 restriction	 on	 Cassander’s	 time	 in	 office	 or	 not,	 Alexander	 IV’s	 days	were	numbered,	 and	 soon	 after	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts,	 the	 young	 king	 and	 his	mother	were	dead,	murdered	by	Cassander’s	man	Glaucias.		Peace	 in	 Europe	 was	 not	 to	 last,	 as	 Polyperchon	 launched	 one	 final	 effort	 to	remove	 Cassander	 from	Macedon,	 and	 reinstall	 a	male	 Argead,	Herakles,	 onto	the	Macedonian	throne.	Once	again,	Cassander	employed	diplomacy,	rather	than	
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military	might	to	end	the	threat	posed	by	Herakles	and	Polyperchon’s	forces.	A	prolonged	 campaign	 was	 not	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 Cassander,	 nor	 of	 Antigonus,	whose	attentions	were	drawn	to	the	east	and	the	war	with	Seleucus.	Therefore,	Cassander,	 knowing	 that	 removing	 Polyperchon	 from	 the	 Peloponnese	 would	once	 again	be	unlikely	 or	would	 require	more	 resources	 than	he	 could	 afford,	instead	offered	Polyperchon	command	of	 the	Peloponnese	 in	exchange	 for	 the	death	of	Herakles.	Polyperchon’s	allegiance	would	afford	Cassander	a	strong	and	entrenched	 governor	 in	 the	 south,	 and	would	 also	 remove	Herakles	 as	 a	 rival	before	 his	 cause	 gained	 traction	 with	 royal	 sympathisers	 in	 Greece	 and	Macedon.			While	Polyperchon	had	rejected	Cassander’s	approaches	in	314,	although	these	had	subsequently	won	over	his	son	Alexander,	this	time	he	was	more	amenable	to	 negotiations	 and	 by	 308,	 Herakles	 was	 dead.	 Polyperchon’s	 motives	 are	uncertain,	and	following	the	murder	of	Herakles,	he	disappears	from	the	ancient	record.	Though	Diodorus	asserts	he	was	lured	by	the	many	offers	of	Cassander,	the	combination	of	his	advancing	age,	the	little	hope	he	had	left	of	continuing	the	war	against	Cassander	now	that	Antigonus	had	been	instrumental	 in	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	and	the	opportunity	to	end	the	conflict	alive	and	in	a	position	of	authority	cannot	be	ignored.		The	war	 between	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	was	 not	 a	 war	 that	 was	 ended	with	either	a	great	victory	on	the	battlefield,	or	with	a	grand	concession	by	the	defeated	 man	 to	 his	 conqueror.	 It	 was	 a	 decade	 long	 conflict	 that	 ended	 via	diplomatic	 compromise.	 Cassander	 was	 unable	 to	 extricate	 his	 foe	 from	 his	stronghold	in	the	Peloponnese,	and	Polyperchon	was	no	longer	able	to	continue	the	war	with	the	same	veracity	that	he	was	able	to	achieve	in	early	phases	of	the	conflict.	Herakles’	death	secured	a	level	of	compromise	and	satisfaction	for	both	men,	 ending	 the	 conflict	 that	 had	 begun	 in	 319	 shortly	 after	 the	 death	 of	Antipater.				
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Chapter	9:	Conclusion	
	The	death	of	Antipater	 in	319	sparked	a	 long	and	bitterly	 fought	war	between	two	 very	 different	men,	 Polyperchon,	whom	 the	 dying	Antipater	 appointed	 as	the	next	regent	of	the	Macedonian	Empire,	and	Cassander,	Antipater’s	son,	who	had	been	overlooked	despite	his	management	of	the	regency	during	Antipater’s	period	 of	 declining	 health.	 The	 ensuing	 conflict	 and	 its	 consequences	 would	fundamentally	 change	 the	 political	 landscape	 of	 the	 empire	 in	 terms	 of	 its	governance,	 but	 also	 set	 precedents	 for	 engagements	with	 the	 Greek	 cities	 by	the	Diadochoi.	Previous	investigations	and	interpretations	viewed	the	conflict	as	a	 lop-sided,	 and	 concluded	 that	 Cassander	 dominated	 the	 inept	 Polyperchon.	However,	 a	 careful	 and	 systematic	 re-evaluation	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 both	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	acted,	and	re-acted	to	each	other	demonstrates	that	the	decade	of	fighting	was	less	clearly	defined.	While	the	power	balance	did	shift	between	them,	neither	man	was	able	 to	assert	complete	dominance	 in	Europe.	The	conflict	was	brought	to	an	end	not	by	a	great	political	or	military	victory,	but	by	a	mutually	beneficial	agreement	following	the	stalemate	created	by	the	Peace	of	the	Dynasts	in	310.		As	a	stalwart	supporter	of	the	Argead	house	since	the	rise	of	Philip	II,	Antipater	had	 played	 an	 integral	 role	 in	 Alexander	 III’s	 succession	 to	 the	 Macedonian	throne	in	336	as	well	as	in	assisting	the	young	royal	during	his	reign.	The	trust	placed	in	Antipater	by	Alexander	was	never	more	prominent	than	at	the	time	of	his	 appointment	 to	 the	 management	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland	 during	Alexander’s	 great	 expansion	 of	 the	 empire	 into	 the	 East	 in	 334.	 Despite	 the	tensions	 that	 emerged	 between	 the	 king	 and	 his	 regent	 during	 these	endeavours,	 tensions	 which	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	 Antipater’s	 replacement	 by	the	popular	Craterus	in	324,	there	is	little	to	suggest	that	Antipater	swayed	from	his	position	as	a	strong	Argead	supporter.			Following	 Alexander’s	 death	 in	 323,	 Antipater	 and	 Craterus	 worked	 co-operatively,	 forming	 close	 ties	between	 their	 families	until	 the	 eruption	of	 the	First	 War	 of	 the	 Diadochoi	 in	 321,	 when	 Craterus	 died	 fighting	 Eumenes	 of	
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Cardia	near	the	Hellespont.	With	the	 loss	of	his	son-in-law,	Craterus,	Antipater	also	 lost	 a	 clearly	 identifiable	 and	 uncontroversial	 successor	 who	 could	 take	over	the	regency	in	the	event	that	he	could	not	longer	operate	in	such	a	capacity.	Cassander,	despite	his	service	to	his	father	during	his	journey	to	Babylon	in	324,	his	military	experience	as	Antigonus’	chiliarch	and	his	management	of	Europe	on	his	 father’s	 behalf	 during	 his	 final	 days	 was	 always	 an	 unlikely	 choice,	 not	because	 of	 his	 lack	 of	 ambition	 or	 ability,	 but	 because	 of	 his	 relationship	 to	Antipater	and	his	perceived	 inexperienced	stemming	 from	 the	Demades	affair.	Though	 Antipater	 did	 not	 alienate	 his	 son	 from	 political	 power	 and	responsibility,	 Cassander	was	 not	 given	 the	 role	 that	 he	 felt	 he	 deserved,	 and	Polyperchon,	Alexander’s	appointed	replacement	 for	Craterus	 in	324,	who	had	demonstrated	his	ability	 to	manage	 the	Greek	cities	 in	 times	of	crisis,	 took	 the	position	as	regent	instead.	Polyperchon	was	also	able	to	draw	upon	the	approval	of	the	great	Macedonian	king,	and	that	of	the	popular	Craterus	under	whom	he	had	spent	a	significant	period	of	his	career.		Soon	 after	 Antipater’s	 death	 and	 despite	 his	 appointment	 as	 Polyperchon’s	second	in	command,	Cassander	was	determined	to	take	control	of	Macedon	for	himself,	soon	departing	from	Macedon	for	Anatolia	and	the	court	of	Antigonus.	From	 there,	 Cassander	 built	 on	 his	 prior	 connections	 to	 members	 of	 the	Diadochoi,	 namely	Antigonus,	 Lysimachus	 and	Ptolemy	 as	well	 as	 connections	with	the	oligarchies	in	Greek	installed	and	supported	by	his	father	in	the	wake	of	the	 manpower	 shortage	 created	 by	 the	 demands	 of	 Alexander	 III’s	 military	expansion.	These	were	the	forces	he	brought	in	opposition	to	Polyperchon’s	new	regency.		In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 Cassander’s	 modus	 operandi,	 Polyperchon	 built	 his	 own	support	 base	 from	within	Macedon,	 primarily	 on	 the	 foundation	 of	 legitimacy	afforded	to	him	by	the	members	of	the	Argead	family	in	Macedon,	namely	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus,	his	wife	Eurydice	as	well	as	the	young	Alexander	IV	and	groups	sympathetic	 to	 the	 royal	 family.	 Not	 only	 did	 this	 place	 Polyperchon	 in	 a	sufficiently	strong	position	to	force	Cassander’s	departure	from	Macedon,	but	it	also	meant	 that	 Cassander	 was	 unable	 to	 seek	 support	 from	 the	 royal	 family	
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during	 the	 initial	 phases	 of	 the	war.	 To	 complement	 internal	 Argead	 support,	Polyperchon	made	concerted	efforts	to	gain	the	support	of	the	most	prominent	member	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 outside	 of	Macedon,	 Olympias,	 who	 had	 confined	herself	 to	 Molossia	 following	 her	 departure	 from	 Pella	 after	 her	 hostile	interactions	 with	 Antipater.	 Wary	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 intentions,	 Olympias	 was	hesitant	to	return	immediately	to	Macedon	to	aid	the	new	regent.		Polyperchon’s	 desire	 to	 foster	 amicable	 ties	with	Olympias	was	 evident	 in	 the	alliance	 he	 forged	 with	 Eumenes	 of	 Cardia,	 the	 close	 confidant	 of	 the	 royal	mother	 and	 also	 Antigonus’	 most	 significant	 threat	 in	 Anatolia.	 With	 the	successful	 acquisition	 of	 Eumenes’	 support	 and	 that	 of	 the	 Argead	matriarch,	Polyperchon	would	be	able	to	bring	the	substantial	force	of	Epirus	into	the	war	against	 Cassander	 as	 well	 as	 keep	 Antigonus	 from	 entering	 Europe.	Polyperchon’s	pioneering	efforts	to	combat	Cassander’s	support	base	in	Greece	were	not	solely	political	with	his	use	of	freedom	as	a	political	tool,	but	also	saw	military	 expansion	 into	 the	 south.	 While	 he	 was	 unsuccessful	 in	 gaining	Athenian	 support,	 which	 had	 fallen	 into	 Cassander’s	 hands	 via	 the	 efforts	 of	Nicanor,	Polyperchon	was	highly	successful	in	creating	a	powerful	support	base	in	southern	Greece,	centred	on	the	Peloponnese,	an	example	that	was	taken	up	by	other	members	of	the	Diadochoi.	Though	the	most	prominent	military	action	during	Polyperchon’s	campaign	 in	 the	Peloponnese	was	 the	unsuccessful	 siege	at	Megalopolis,	 the	 significance	 of	 Polyperchon’s	 decision	 to	 raise	 the	 siege	 is	overstated.	 	 	Despite	Cassander	 invading	 the	 region	on	 at	 least	 three	 separate	occasions	 Polyperchon	 maintained	 his	 control	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 for	 the	remainder	of	the	war.		317	 would	 see	 the	 greatest	 period	 of	 substantial	 military	 engagement	 in	 the	conflict	 between	 Polyperchon	 and	 Cassander.	 The	 Cassandrean	 naval	 victory	over	Polyperchon’s	fleet,	two	years	after	the	initiation	of	the	conflict,	marked	the	first	 point	when	 the	 forces	 of	 Polyperchon	 and	Cassander	met	 in	 combat.	 The	same	year	also	saw	Polyperchon’s	only	departure	from	Europe	into	Asia	Minor	in	aid	of	his	ally,	Eumenes.	However,	given	the	swift	reaction	of	Cassander’s	raid	into	northern	Greece,	Polyperchon’s	time	in	Asia	Minor	was	short	and	the	regent	
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was	 forced	 to	return	west	 in	order	 to	protect	his	support	base.	The	same	year	also	 saw	 Cassander’s	 first	 engagement	with	 the	 royal	 family	 as,	 following	 the	threat	 posed	 by	 Polyperchon’s	 desire	 to	 secure	 the	 support	 of	 Olympias,	Eurydice	stripped	Polyperchon	of	the	regency,	giving	the	position	to	the	son	of	Antipater.	 317	 also	 marked	 Olympias’	 decision	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 conflict,	throwing	her	support	behind	Polyperchon	 in	exchange	 for	 the	guardianship	of	her	 grandson,	 Alexander	 IV.	 The	 period	 of	 time	 following	 Olympias’	 return	 to	Macedon	would	see	 the	greatest	period	of	bloodshed	within	 the	Argead	house	during	the	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon.	Eurydice	and	Philip	III	Arrhidaeus	 would	 perish	 during	 Olympias’	 reprisals	 in	 the	 winter	 of	 317/16,	with	 Olympias	 herself	 meeting	 her	 death	 following	 Cassander’s	 successful	invasion	of	Macedon	and	his	reaction	to	her	attacks	against	friends	and	family.		Following	 the	 conquest	 of	 Macedon,	 Cassander	 shifted	 focus	 to	 securing	 his	position	 in	 the	 Macedonian	 homeland.	 He	 buried	 Philip	 III	 Arrhidaeus	 and	Eurydice	 at	 the	 traditional	 Argead	 burial	 grounds	 at	 Aegae,	 married	Thessalonice	 and	 began	 his	 building	 program	 which	 would	 eventuate	 in	 the	reconstruction	 of	 Thebes	 and	 the	 foundation	 of	 Cassandrea	 and	 Thessalonica.	While	 both	 ancient	 and	 modern	 writers	 have	 interpreted	 these	 actions	 as	Cassander’s	first	attempts	on	the	Macedonian	throne,	when	the	ancient	evidence	is	 placed	within	 its	 temporal	 context	 and	with	 an	 understanding	 of	 Diodorus’	hostile	 authority,	 Cassander’s	 actions	 are	 more	 suitably	 ascribed	 to	 his	multifaceted	 and	 careful	 approach	 to	 securing	 a	 position	 which	 was	 not	 yet	secure	against	a	still	strong	adversary	in	Polyperchon.		The	successful	conquest	of	Macedon	by	Cassander	by	the	spring	on	316	forced	Polyperchon	 south	 to	 the	 bastion	 of	 support	 he	 had	 built	 in	 southern	 Greece.	From	the	south,	Polyperchon	still	presented	a	significant	 threat	 to	Cassander’s	hold	 on	 Macedon,	 a	 threat	 magnified	 by	 Polyperchon’s	 new	 alliance	 with	Antigonus	 in	315.	Cassander,	knowing	all	 to	well	 the	advantage	 that	Antigonid	coffers	would	allow	his	opponent,	sought	to	turn	Polyperchon	from	his	new	ally	via	political	incentives.	While	unsuccessful	in	securing	Polyperchon’s	defection,	Cassander	 was	 able	 to	 persuade	 Alexander	 to	 desert	 his	 father.	 Despite	 the	
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setbacks	Polyperchon	 suffered	 in	316	and	315,	 he	 remained	Cassander’s	most	significant	 threat	 in	 Europe	 and	was	 still	 receiving	 ample	 supply	 and	 support	from	Antigonus	 in	Anatolia.	This	 is	made	 clear	by	Antigonus’	 letter	 to	 Scepsis,	which	 not	 only	 highlights	 the	 Antigonid	 supplies	 diverted	 to	 Polyperchon’s	cause,	 but	 also	details	 the	discussion	among	 those	meeting	parties	 concerning	Polyperchon	and	 the	 events	 that	 took	place	 in	311/0,	 the	promulgation	of	 the	Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts	 and	 the	 uneasy	 peaceful	 status	 quo	 established	 in	 the	western	portion	of	the	Macedonian	Empire.		With	peace	installed,	Cassander	finally	received	external	recognition	of	the	office	he	had	fought	nearly	a	decade	to	secure,	the	regency	of	Macedon.	Polyperchon’s	position	 following	 the	 peace	 is	 less	 well	 defined,	 beyond	 the	 assertion	 by	Antigonus	that	he	was	without	any	explicit	alliances	among	the	signatories	via	Polyperchon’s	 place	 within	 the	 Letter	 to	 Scepsis.	 What	 is	 known	 is	 that	 the	signatories	 to	 the	 peace	 treaty	 desired	 peaceful	 stability	 in	 their	 respective	spheres	 of	 influence,	 which	 an	 isolated	 and	 abandoned	 Polyperchon	 could	disrupt.	 Another	 consequence	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 the	 Dynasts,	 however,	 was	 the	death	of	Alexander	IV,	whose	maturity	would	officially	end	the	positions	held	by	the	Diadochoi	if	he	had	lived	to	reach	this	age.		There	 would	 be	 one	 final	 phase	 in	 the	 conflict	 between	 Cassander	 and	Polyperchon,	the	swift	rise	and	fall	of	Alexander	III’s	 illegitimate	son,	Herakles.	Following	the	treatment	of	Alexander	IV	and	his	mother	Rhoxane,	Polyperchon	once	again	used	Argead	support	 to	springboard	an	effort	 to	remove	Cassander	from	 Macedon	 and	 prepared	 to	 launch	 an	 invasion	 north	 in	 309/8	 from	 his	entrenched	position	in	the	Peloponnese.	Cassander	knew	that	ending	the	threat	of	Herakles	 by	military	means	would	 be	 long,	 costly	 and	 given	 his	 experience	with	military	 actions	 in	 southern	 Greece,	 another	 potential	 failure.	 As	 in	 315,	Cassander	 attempted	 to	 end	 the	 conflict	 via	 the	 diplomatic	 manoeuvring	 that	typified	the	Antipatrid	family.	In	exchange	for	the	death	of	Herakles,	Cassander	would	 give	 Polyperchon	 the	 command	 of	 the	 Peloponnese	 on	 his	 behalf,	simultaneously	 ending	 the	 potential	 of	 another	 Argead	 threat	 in	 Macedon,	 as	well	 as	 dissolving	 the	 threat	 Polyperchon	 posed	 in	 the	 south.	 With	
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Polyperchon’s	acceptance,	 the	decade	 long	conflict	 for	 control	of	Macedon	and	Greece	was	brought	to	an	end.		The	conflict	between	Cassander	and	Polyperchon	ended	without	great	victory	or	defeat	 for	 either	 man,	 but	 via	 a	 diplomatic	 middle	 ground	 between	 the	belligerents,	 typifying	the	complex	nature	of	the	warring	pair’s	 interactions	for	the	previous	decade.	Following	Antipater’s	death	in	319,	the	two	men	embarked	on	vastly	different	approaches	 for	control	of	 the	region,	 the	older	Polyperchon	employing	mostly	royally	backed	legitimisation	against	the	younger	Cassander,	who	 chose	 to	 break	 away	 from	 the	 royal	 family	 and	 seek	 support	 from	 the	Diadochoi	 and	 Antipatrid	 sympathisers	 in	 Greece.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 combatants	made	 a	move,	 the	 other	would	 swiftly	 adapt	 and	 refocus	 their	 own	 efforts	 in	order	 to	 achieve	 some	 advantage	 over	 their	 opponent.	 The	 vastly	 different	manner	 in	 which	 Polyperchon	 and	 Cassander	 engaged	 with	 the	 royal	 family	typifies	 this	 action-reaction	 dynamic	 between	 the	 two	with	 the	 Argead	 family	used	 as	 political	 pawns	 by	 each	man,	 a	 strategy	which	 ultimately	 sealed	 their	fate	as	casualties	in	the	conflict.		Traditional	 academic	 representation	 of	 the	 conflict	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 wily	Cassander	finally	outclassing	the	bumbling,	maligned,	and	inept	Polyperchon,	by	engineering	 the	 assassination	 of	 Herakles	 in	 309/8.	 However,	 this	 thesis	 has	demonstrated	 that,	 far	 from	 being	 an	 outmatched	 and	 outclassed	 opponent,	Polyperchon	was	in	fact	an	enduring	and	dangerous	threat	to	Cassander’s	cause	throughout	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 conflict.	 Despite	 his	 defeat	 at	 the	 naval	 battles	near	 Byzantium,	 Polyperchon	 doggedly	 harassed	 Cassander,	 repelling	 several	invasions	from	his	base	of	operations	in	the	Peloponnese,	continuing	to	garner	significant	external	support	through	the	aid	of	Antigonus,	until	Cassander	chose	to	 reposition	 him	 as	 a	 friend,	 rather	 than	 a	 foe.	 This	 new	 interpretation	 also	advances	understanding	of	Cassander’s	road	to	dominance	in	Macedon,	in	that,	far	 from	being	 the	driving	dominant	man	 in	Greece	and	Macedon,	his	position	was	often	more	 tenuous	 and	 fragile	 than	has	previously	been	 thought,	 forcing	him	to	adapt	 to	and	exploit	opportunities	as	 they	developed.	While	 the	goal	of	each	 man	 was	 control	 of	 the	 European	 Sphere	 of	 the	 Macedonian	 Empire,	
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Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 conducted	 themselves	 in	 radically	 different	ways.	Polyperchon	would	 continue	 to	 employ	 the	Argead	 family	 as	 political	 support	throughout	 the	 conflict,	 drawing	 in	 addition	 on	 Eumenes	 and	 Olympias,	 and	later	Antigonus,	as	external	supporters.	He	revolutionised,	moreover,	the	way	in	which	the	Diadochoi	engaged	with	the	Greek	cities	through	the	employment	of	freedom	 as	 a	 political	 mechanism.	 Conversely,	 Cassander	 opted	 for	 allied	support	 from	 other	members	 of	 Alexander’s	 Diadochoi	 against	 the	 incumbent	Polyperchon,	 choosing	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 pro-Antipatrid	 garrisons	positioned	in	Greece	by	his	father	and	only	engaging	with	Argead	support	when	he	 was	 able	 to	 dictate	 the	 alliance	 from	 a	 position	 of	 overt	 control	 over	 the	family.	 By	 engaging	 with	 Cassander	 and	 Polyperchon	 together,	 rather	 than	separately,	 this	 thesis	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	was	 not	 a	one-sided	affair,	but	an	ever	shifting,	complex	war	that	raged	over	Europe	and	across	 the	 Aegean,	 and	 offers	 increased	 understanding	 of	 events	 in	 Europe,	following	the	death	of	Antipater	in	the	middle	of	319.																	
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Appendix	1:	Antigonus’	Letter	to	Scepsis.1186	
A.1187	πολλὴν	δὲ	σπουδὴν]	ἐποιού[μ]εθα	[περὶ	τῆς	τῶν	Ἑλλήνων	ἐλ]ευθερίας,	ἄλλα	τε	οὐ	μικ[ρ]ὰ	δι[ὰ	τοῦτο	συνχ]ωροῦντες	καὶ	χρήματα	πρὸς	δια-	-πομπάς	·	κα]ὶ	ὑπὲρ	τούτων	συναπεστείλαμε[ν	5-																				μετὰ	Δημά]ρχου	Αἰσχύλον.	ἕως	δὲ	συνωμολογ-	-εῖτο,	ἐν	τ]ούτοις	τὴν	ἔντευξιν	ἐπὶ	τοῦ	Ἑλλη[σ-	-πὀντου]	ἐπ[ο]ιούμεθα·	καὶ	εἰ	μὴ	κωλυταί	τι-	-νες	ἐγέ]νοντο,	τότε	ἂν	συνετελέσθη	ταῦτα.	νῦν	δὲ]	γενομένων	λόγων	Κασσάνδρωι	καὶ	Πτο-	10-																	-λεμαί]ωι	ὑπὲρ	[δ]ιαλύσεων,	καὶ	πρὸς	ἡμᾶς	πα-	-ραγε]νομένων	Πρεπελάου	καὶ	Ἀριστοδήμου	ὑπὲ]ρ	τούτων,	καίπερ	ὁρῶντές	τινα	ὧν	ἠξί-	-ου]	Κάσσανδρος	ἐργωδέστερα	ὄντα,	ἐπεὶ	τὰ	π]ερὶ	τοὺς	Ἕλληνας	συνωμολογεῖτο,	ἀναγ-	15-																	-κ]αῖον	ὤιμεθα	εἶναι	παριδεῖν,	ἵνα	τοῦ	τὰ	ὅ-	-λα	συντελεσθῆναι	τὴν	ταχίστην·	ἐπεὶ	πρὸ	πολλοῦ	γ᾽ἂν	ἐποιησάμεθα	πάντα	διοικῆσα[ι	τοῖς	Ἕλλησιν	καθὰ	προειλόμεθα	[:]	διὰ	τὸ	δὲ	μακρότερον	τοῦτο	γίνεσθαι,	ἐν	δὲ	τῶι	χρο-	20-																	-νίζειν	ἐνίοτε	πολλὰ	καὶ	παράλογα	συμβαί-	-νειν,	φιλοτιμεῖσθαι	δὲ	ἐφ᾽ἡμῶν	τὰ	πρὸς	το[ὺς																																																									1186	I	am	deeply	indebted	to	my	supervisor,	Dr	Graeme	Miles,	for	his	constructive	feedback	and	critique	regarding	 translations,	and	 to	Ass	Prof	Pat	Wheatley	 for	his	 help	 regarding	 the	 prior	 academic	 treatment	 of	 the	 letter.	 Any	 errors	 that	remain	are	entirely	my	own.	The	translation	has	aimed	for	a	literal	translation	of	Antigonus’	“rough	Macedonian	solider’s	Greek”	as	acknowledged	by	Munro	(JHS.	19	 (1899).	 p.	 337),	 over	 an	 eloquent	 one.	 Making	 eloquent	 English	 out	 of	awkward	Greek	is	a	dishonest	way	of	translating	and	can	lead	to	the	suppression	of	 ambiguities	 that	 reveal	 important	 information	 about	 the	 text	 and	 our	understanding	of	it.	For	further	discussion	of	this	text,	see:	Ch.	8.2.	1187	For	the	entirety	of	Antigonus’	letter	to	the	city	of	Scepsis,	see:	Munro,	JHS.	19	(1899).	pp.	333-336.	For	other	 recordings	of	 the	correspondence,	 see:	OGIS.	5;	Welles,	 1966.	 RC.	1.	 For	 alternative	 translations,	 see:	 Harding,	 1985.	 132.	 pp.	165-167;	Bagnall	&	Derow,	2004.	6.	pp.	8-10;	Austin,	2006.	38.	pp.	86-88.	
	 297	
Ἕλληνας	συντελεσθῆναι,	ὤιμεθα	δεῖν	μηδὲ	μικρὰ	κινδυνεῦσαι	τὰ	ὅλα	μὴ	διοικηθῆναι·	ὅσην	δὲ	σπουδὴν	πεποήμεθα	περὶ	ταῦτα	φανε-	25-																	-ρὸν	οἶμαι		ἔσεσθαι	καὶ	ὑμῖν	καὶ	τοῖς	ἄλλοις	ἅπασιν	ἐξ	αὐτῶν	τῶν	διοικημένων.	ὄντων	δ᾽	[ἡ-	-μῖν	τῶν	πρὸς	Κάσσανδρον	καὶ	Λυσίμαχον	συν-	-τετελεσμένων,	πρὸς	Πρεπέλαον	ἔπεμψαν	αὐ-	-τοκράτορα·	ἀπέστειλεν	Πτολεμαῖος	πρὸς	ἡ-	30-																	-μᾶς	πρέσβεις	ἀξιῶν	καὶ	τὸ	πρὸς	αὐτὸν	διαλυ-	-θῆναι,	καὶ	εἰς	τὴν	αὐτὴν	ὁμολογίαν	γραφῆναι.	ἡ]με[ῖ]ς	δὲ	οὐ	μικρὸν	μὲν	ἑ[ω]ρῶμεν	τὸ	μεταδιδό-	-ναι	φιλ]οτιμίας	ὑ[π]ὲρ	ἦς	πράγματα	οὐκ	ὀλίγα	ἐσχ[ήχαμεν	κ]α[ὶ]	χρήματα	πολλὰ	ἀνηλώκαμε[ν,	35-																		καὶ	τα[ῦτ]α	τῶν	πρὸς	Κά[σ]σανδρον	κ[αὶ	Λ]υσί[μα-	-χον	ἡμῖν	διωικημένων,	καὶ	εὐχερεσ[τέρας	οὔσης	τῆς	λοιπῆ[ς	π]ραγματείας·	οὐ	μὴν	ἀλλὰ	διὰ	τὸ	ὑπολαμ[β]άνειν	καὶ	τῶν	πρὸς	τοῦτον	συντελεσθέ[ν]των	τὰ	πρὸς	Πολυπέρχοντα	40-																		θ]ᾶσσαν	ἂν	διοικηθῆναι,	μηθένος	αὐτῶι	συν-	-ορκοῦντος,	καὶ	διὰ	τὴν	οἰκείτητα	τὴν	ὑπάρ-	-χουσαν	ἡμῖν	πρὸς	αὐτὸν,	ἅμα	δὲ	καὶ	ὑμᾶς	ὁ-	-ρῶντες	κα[ὶ]	τοὺς	ἄλλους	συμμάχους	ἐνοχλου-	-μένους	ὑπό	τε	τῆς	στρατείας	καὶ	τῶν	δαπανη-	45-																		-μάτων,	ὤιμεθα	καλῶς	ἔχειν	συνχωρῆσαι	καὶ	τὰ[ς	δ]ιαλ[ύσ]εις	ποήσασθαι	καὶ	πρὸς	τοῦτον·	σ[υνο]μολογησόμενον	δὲ	ἀπεστείλαμεν	Ἀρισ-	-τό[δ]ημον	καὶ	Αἰσχύλον	καὶ	Ἡγησίαν.	οὗτοί	τε	δὴ	παρεγένοντο	λαβόντες	τὰ	πιστὰ,	καὶ	οἱ	50-																		παρὰ	Πτολεμαίου,	οἱ	περὶ	Ἀριστόβουλον,	ἦλ-	-θον	ληψόμενοι	παρ᾽	ἡμῶν.	ἴστε	οὖν	συντετε-	-λεσμένας	τὰς	διαλύσεις	καὶ	τὴν	εἰρήνην	γε-	-γενημένην.	γεγράφαμεν	δὲ	ἐν	τῆι	ὁμολογίαι	ὀμόσαι	τοὺς	Ἕλληνας	πάντας	συνδιαφυλάσ-	
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55-																	-σειν	ἀλλήλοις	τὴν	ἐλευθερίαν	καὶ	τὴν	αὐτ[ο-	-ν]ομίαν,	ὑπολαμβάνοντες	ἐφ᾽	ἡμῶν	μὲν	ὅσα	ἀν-	-θ]ρωπίνωι	λογισμῶι	διαφυλάσσεσθαι	ἂν	τα[ῦ-	-τ]α,	εἰς	δὲ	τὸν	λοιπὸν	χρόνον,	ἐνόρκων	γενο-	-μένων	τῶν	τε	Ἑλλήνων	πάντων	καὶ	τῶν	ἐν	τοῖς	60-																	π]ράγμασιν	ὄντων,	μᾶλλον	ἂν	καὶ	ἀσφαλέστε-	-ρ]ον	διαμένειν	τοῖς	Ἕλλησιν	τὴν	ἐλευθερίαν.	κ]αὶ	τὸ	συνδιαφυλάξειν	δὲ	προσομνύναι,	ἅ	ἡ-	-μ]εῖς	ὡμολογήκαμεν	πρὸς	ἀλλήλους	οὐκ	ἄδο-	-ξον	οὐδὲ	ἀσύμφορον	τοῖς	Ἕλλησιν	ἑωρῶμεν	65-																		ὄν.	καλῶς	δή	μοι	δοκεῖ	ἔχειν	ὀμόσαι	ὑμᾶς	τὸν	ὄρκον	ὃν	ἀφεστάλκαμεν·	πειρασόμεθα	δὲ	καὶ	εἰς	τὸ	λοιπὸν	ὅτι	ἂν	ἔχωμεν	τῶν	συμφε-	-ρόντων	καὶ	ὑμῖν	καὶ	τοῖς	ἄλλοις	Ἕλλησιν	πα-	-ρασκευάζειν.	ὑπὲρ	δὴ	τούτων	καὶ	γράψαι	μοι	70-																		ἐδόκει	καὶ	ἀποστεῖλαι	Ἄκιον	διαλεξόμε-	-νον·	φέρει	δὲ	ὑμῖν	καὶ	τῆς	ὁμολογίας	ἧς	πε-	ποήμεθα	καὶ	τοῦ	ὅρκου	ἀντίγραφα.	ἔρρωσθε.		“And	 with	 great	 haste	 we	 enacted	 the	 matter	 of	 freedom	 for	 the	 Greeks,	 and	
because	of	 this	we	exported	no	small	consessions	and	money,	and	 for	 the	sake	of	
this	 matter	 we	 dispatched	 Demarchus	 along	 with	 Aischylus.	 As	 we	 collectively	
agreed	in	this	matter,	we	enacted	to	meet	at	the	Hellespont.	And	if	it	had	not	been	
for	 certain	 hinderers,	 the	 matter	 would	 have	 been	 settled	 then.	 And	 now	 with	
Cassander	and	Ptolemy	beginning	discussion	about	the	cessation	of	hostilties,	and	
with	 Prepelaus	 and	 Aristodemus	 being	 present	 with	 us	 about	 these	 things,	
although	we	 saw	 some	 of	 Cassander’s	 issues	 being	 troublesome,	 and	 since	 there	
was	agreement	on	the	Greek	issue,	we	saw	it	necessary	to	set	this	aside,	so	the	issue	
of	 cessation	of	hostilties	 could	be	 settled	as	quickly	as	possible.	As	we	believed	 it	
would	be	good	if	 the	prior	agreements	 for	all	 the	Greeks	were	as	we	desired.	But	
because	 the	 issues	 were	 becoming	 drawn	 out,	 and	 spending	 much	 time	 on	 this	
issue,	we	were	ambitious	to	speak	together	about	resolving	the	things	concerning	
the	Greeks,	we	thought	it	necessary	not	to	allow	the	small	things	to	endanger	the	
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whole	settlement.	And	what	great	zeal	we	showed	will	be	seen	by	you	and	by	all	
others	 from	 the	arrangements	 themselves.	With	 the	matter	 regarding	Cassander	
and	 Lysimachus	 having	 been	 completed	 by	 us,	 we	 sent	 a	 representative	 with	
authority	to	Prepalaus,	Ptolemy	sent		envoys	decreeing	that	he	wished	peace	with	
me,	as	well	as	that	he	wished	to	be	written	into	the	same	agreement.	And	we	saw	
that	 it	was	 not	 a	 small	 thing	 to	 give	 up	 ambition	 by	which	we	 had	 incurred	 no	
small	 trouble	 and	much	 expenditure,	 and	 that	 too	 since	 the	matters	 concerning	
Cassander	and	Lysimachus	had	been	agreed	upon	by	us	and	since	 the	remaining	
matter	would	be	easier.	Because	of	 the	understanding	and	since	 things	had	been	
concluded	with	this	man,	we	thought	the	things	concerning	Polyperchon	would	be	
concluded	more	rapidly,	since	no-one	would	be	allied	to	him	and	at	this	same	time	
seeing	too	that	you	and	the	allies	were	suffering	from	the	campaign	and	from	the	
cost	of	the	war,	we	thought	we	might	make	an	agreement	and	bring	about	an	end	
also	 with	 this	 man	 [Polyperchon],	 and	 we	 sent	 Aristodemus,	 Aischylus	 and	
Hegesias	to	create	the	agreement.	They	returned	to	us	bearing	tokens	of	trust,		and	
those	 from	Ptolemy,	 and	 those	 in	 the	 company	of	Aristoboulos,	 came	 in	order	 to	
take	them	from	us.	So	know	that	an	armistice	had	been	made	and	peace	has	arisen.	
We	have	written	 into	 the	pact	 that	all	 the	Greeks	 swear	 to	preserve	 freedom	 for	
one	another	and	autonomy,	swearing	to	undertake	to	protect	these	things	 in	our	
time	as	much	as	possible	with	human	reasoning	and	for	the	rest	of	our	time,	since	
all	 the	Greeks	had	sworn	to	this	agreement,	and	those	 involved	 in	their	affairs,	 it	
would	be	easier	for	freedom	to	remain	for	the	Greeks,	and	assist	in	protecting	the	
oath	for	each	other	would	appear	to	us	neither	unreasonable	nor	incongruous	for	
the	Greeks.	 It	 seems	 to	me	a	good	 idea	 for	 you	 to	make	 the	oath	which	we	have	
sent,	and	we	will	attempt	to	provide	what	we	have	that	is	beneficial	for	you	and	for	
the	other	Greeks.	Therefore,	on	account	of	these	things	it	seems	good	to	me	to	send	
Akius	to	you	to	discuss	these	matters.	He	brings	to	you	versions	of	the	agreement	
which	we	made	to	the	oath.	Farewell.”				
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